You'd really have the same analysis of the Cuban missile crisis as you have here? — boethius

No, because Russia had a clear intention of deploying actually existing missiles.

The whole point of exiting the INF treaty (which was never entered anyways, just pretend entering and exiting) is to develop exactly those kinds of missile with size and range to ABM missiles. — boethius

Oh, so now you are talking about missiles which have NOT YET BEEN DEVELOPED? But you have clearly writtten:

Russia really didn't like the forward positioning of US missile bases in Europe (that can be easily loaded with nuclear warheads). — boethius

So you are saying that Russia really did not like the positioning of non-existent missile bases with non-existent misssiles. And the FACT remains, that the US did not deploy such missiles in any new NATO countries since 1960s. Sure, they COULD do that, but the probability of this in the view of known facts remains low. Much lower than the probability of Russian re-invasion.

Is forward missile bases, either nominally ABM sties that could be fitted with nuclear weapons now or in the future (or then straight up abandoning "we're only concerned about Iran, tee hee hee" and simply overtly forward deploying nuclear missiles), in itself sufficient reason to start a giant war. — boethius

Again, you clearly have no idea what you are talking about. That is why I have asked you specifically for the types and ranges of missiles you meant: checking this up would save you from further embarassing yourself. So now is your chance again: read up on what kind of bases and missiles Russia has protested about.

It's unstable, so Ukraine entering NATO could lead to a series of escalations that lead to the US forward deploying nuclear weapons because they feel it is "needed" even if they didn't intend to do so from the outset.

Things change, and any analysis of these sorts of issues will go decades into the future. What can we expect the future to be like? — boethius

In terms of ridiculousness the argument 'Ukraine could become so unstable that the US would deploy nukes there' reaches new heights. Obviously you are reduced to such arguments, because you have no others, simply because in view of the facts the Ukraine's alignment has practically no bearing on the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe.

And, again, your argument is self-refuting. Finland has switched from neutral to being in NATO in a year. That is, if the US decides to adopt such aggressive stance as you describe, Ukraine's neutrality would make exactly zero difference, as its alignment can be changed much quicker than the US will be able to develop the infrastructure to use it. So against the nuclear threat you are describing any Ukrainian pledges would provide Russia with ZERO protection.

Ukraine was ranked 55th in 2023 in the Global Innovation Index. https://www.wipo.int/global_innovation_index/en/2023/index.html — javi2541997

Russia's rank: 51st, Spain: 29th.

Well, I mean, the US already forward deployed its biolabs to Kyiv to work on "Slav-killing super viruses" that would be dispersed into Russia via "bats and pigeons," so nuclear weapons makes perfect sense.

Somewhere in the narrative shuffle, the biolabs theme seems to have been lost though, although if you go back enough pages in this thread...

No, because Russia had a clear intention of deploying actually existing missiles. — Jabberwock

You are so ignorant of the key issues that you are basically not worth talking to.

I will continue to do so, however, as I think you are well representative of the general ignorance of Western society.

There's literally a New York article entitled:

On the Edge of a Polish Forest, Where Some of Putin’s Darkest Fears Lurk — Title of the article

What is the very next sentence in the subtitle of the article?

A U.S. missile facility in Poland is at the heart of an issue animating the Kremlin’s calculations over whether to go to war against Ukraine. — Sub-title of the article

What are the points (made by experts) in said article?

As he threatens Ukraine, Mr. Putin has demanded that NATO reduce its military footprint in Eastern and Central Europe — which Washington and European leaders have flatly refused to do. Mr. Putin has been fuming about American missiles near Russia’s border since the Romanian site went into operation in 2016, but the Polish facility, located near the village of Redzikowo, is only about 100 miles from Russian territory and barely 800 miles from Moscow itself. — On the Edge of a Polish Forest, Where Some of Putin’s Darkest Fears Lurk

And what is Putin quoted as saying?

“Are we deploying missiles near the U.S. border? No, we are not. It is the United States that has come to our home with its missiles and is already standing at our doorstep,” Mr. Putin said in December at his annual news conference. — On the Edge of a Polish Forest, Where Some of Putin’s Darkest Fears Lurk

And what is the key concern The New York Times brings up?

The Polish base, the heart of which is a system known as Aegis Ashore, contains sophisticated radars capable of tracking hostile missiles and guiding interceptor rockets to knock them out of the sky. It is also equipped with missile launchers known as MK 41s, which the Russians worry can be easily repurposed to fire offensive missiles like the Tomahawk. — On the Edge of a Polish Forest, Where Some of Putin’s Darkest Fears Lurk

Again, what is the fantasy here is that some bullshit that will work handily in some Western echo chamber matters in the real world.

You actually think people doing actual risk analysis are going to be like "hmm, well today there's is not a missile that is produced that is literally labeled as 'Aegis Ashore compatible' so therefore there is nothing to worry about".

You really think switching out warheads in even the ABM missiles are some insurmountable task?

Risk analysis is about what people can do, what they might be motivated to do in the present as well as future scenarios ... not what some troll on the internet claims is not 100% already done, signed in blood, deployed in the tubes today, US forces themselves photographed and geolocated the nukes in the tube and the president of the United States already did a press conference with the photos, standing beside the missile bases with the nukes, assured everyone that the nukes are definitely in those tubes and, to make sure he couldn't be misunderstood, had already ordered several of the nukes to be fired to remove all possibility for doubt.

Again, as I said, plausible deniability, no matter how thin or implausible, in echo chambers is a great way to masterbate with fellow sycophants about whatever your point du jour is. It is not a serious framework for analysis.

Had the Soviets only deployed "missile bases" and "we don't know which missiles are in the missile tubes, tee hee hee" and "we haven't literally developed a missile called 'Surprise Mother Fuckers' and published the specification" and had some plausible deniability bullshit ... you're position is "well of course the US wouldn't have been concerned in the least".

And guess what!! The Soviets initially denied the photo evidence represented actual nukes. Did the US have "actual proof" the nukes were in what appeared to be missiles? No.

Plausible deniability does not matter at all in this sort of analysis or decision making.

Again, I repeat, analysis based on the idea that NATO bases and infrastructure does not represent a threat to anyone, is just dumb.

Your comments and your like-minded interlocutors, are relevant only as an example of how people gaslight themselves as well as can feel so confident to speak about subjects they don't even have the most basic factual knowledge of. Truly remarkable.

Russia's rank: 51st, Spain: 29th. — Jabberwock

It is true that some metrics can differ from the main point, but the premise is they are more developed than us (my country) and Ukraine, although the abusive Western propaganda wants to urgently prove otherwise.

Have you ever been to Russia?

You are so ignorant of the key issues that you are basically not worth talking to. — boethius

That is rather funny, given your following remarks.

It is also equipped with missile launchers known as MK 41s, which the Russians worry can be easily repurposed to fire offensive missiles like the Tomahawk. — On the Edge of a Polish Forest, Where Some of Putin’s Darkest Fears Lurk

It is not a point made by 'experts', it is a point made by Russians and just repeated by the journalist. Actual experts would point out that locating an offensive base within such range from Kaliningrad and Byelarus would not be optimal, to put it mildly, given the interception times. Moreover, their offensive capabilities, given the range and flight time of the relevant missiles, would be rather limited - you could get the same effect with a frigate in Baltic, which for the offensive purposes would have the advantage of not being in the same heavily observed spot. So much for your 'factual knowledge'.

Had the Soviets only deployed "missile bases" and "we don't know which missiles are in the missile tubes, tee hee hee" and "we haven't literally developed a missile called 'Surprise Mother Fuckers' and published the specification" and had some plausible deniability bullshit ... you're position is "well of course the US wouldn't have been concerned in the least". — boethius

Most likely unknowingly, given your 'factual knowledge', you describe the exact situation of Kaliningrad, 500 km from Berlin. Did NATO invade Kaliningrad for that reason? I cannot recall such situation.

Have you ever been to Russia? — Jabberwock

Have you ever been to Spain? Have you ever been to Ukraine? Does this matter at all? :roll:

I haver never been to Japan but it is obvious that it is a developed and rich nation. What is your point?

I have been both to Spain and to Russia. I am asking, as I wonder what is the foundation of your views. Citing isolated indexes (in which you do not believe anyway, when the very link you quote clearly undermines your point) and comparing two different metrics does not seem to be a good one, so I was wondering whether you had something more solid.

The Nazi's are definitely there in Ukraine (I am happy to re-post all those Western journalist documenting it) and are definitely a problem (mainly for Ukraine). They are also a genuine security concern for Russia (as they have no hesitation to explicitly say their goal is a war with Russia and to destroy Russia — boethius

since the Nazis are definitely there and pre-2022 already fighting a war against Russian speakers in the Donbas (which many Russian speakers in Russia feel some responsibility for) and their explicit objective is to destroy Russia — boethius

Can you provide your evidence of Ukrainian Nazis who “have no hesitation to explicitly say their goal is a war with Russia and to destroy Russia”?

Exactly how important in purely military terms, I don't know. The one thing that is certain is that it's mainly the Nazis that kept the war in the Donbas going and were killing so many civilians and once it was clear other sectors of Ukrainian society couldn't control them, a bigger war was essentially inevitable for this reason alone. — boethius

Can you provide your evidence for “it's mainly the Nazis that kept the war in the Donbas going and were killing so many civilians”?

To make the argument that Putin "duped" Russia into prosecuting the war you either need to accept Zelensky and Bibi do an equal, if not more, amount of duping their own populations — boethius

Why "if not less" instead? As far as I’m concerned, there are two plausible reasons why Putin's propaganda machine is more free to manipulate the truth at home than Zelensky and Bibi’s propaganda machines in their respective home countries:
- Ukrainians and Israelis can have more easily access to views critical of the regime from the inside and the outside, than Russians. Even during wartime.
- Ukrainians and Israelis are exposed to direct feedback from relatives and friends engaged on the front line more easily than Russians.

If you think Zelensky and Bibi are justified then their lies you won't think of as duping but just another aspect to the war.


If you don't think Putins' war effort is justified then you'll conclude the exact same kind of lies are “duping”. — boethius

As far as I’m concerned BOTH Russia and Ukraine may resort to spinning propaganda at convenience because that is another aspect to the war. Still there are different constraining factors which I can’t discount: in addition to the ones I mentioned earlier, there is the question of the propaganda addressing masses abroad, especially in the West because Ukraine depends totally on Western support for this war, Russia no. Now, given the democratic crisis in the West due to populism and anti-Americanism (promoted also by Russia), pro-Ukrainian propaganda is way more severely scrutinised than the Russian one. You and your sidekicks are the best example of this attitude in this thread. So I guess Ukraine would need to spin propaganda addressing Western masses more badly than Russia to gain Western support, and yet if it does, it may pay hard for that twice (when Russian deceptive propaganda against Ukraine succeeds and when Ukrainian deceptive propaganda fails), while Russia can play deceptively almost for free.

For me, a pre-condition to justified warfare is the likelihood of being able to win. You need really extreme conditions to justify fighting to the death or sacrificing a large number of citizens and still losing; conditions I simply do not see in the Russia-Ukraine war. — boethius

I don't think Ukraine can win on purely military terms, I don't think anyone is coming to their aid, and therefore I think they should sue for peace and use their leverage of remaining force application to negotiate as good a deal as they can. If they can, with enough Western money and weapons consistently provided over a long period of time, eventually "tire the Russians out" and achieve some gains that way, I don't think that would be at an acceptable cost. — boethius

Now, I do not think Ukraine's war on the Donbas was justified, so based on this I'd conclude Russia's war against Ukraine is therefore justified. — boethius

That’s a handy summary of your pro-Russian views. Not sure about its logic though.
So you conclude that Russia had sufficient reason to wage war against Ukraine from only these two premises:
- Russia was likely able to win against Ukraine.
- Ukraine was waging war against pro-Russian separatists in Donbas.
Is that right?

As a Canadian we had Quebec separatists as a big issue when I was growing up, at no point did I (or that many Canadians for that matter) believe going and killing Quebeckers would be a justified course of action if they separated, even if we non-Quebeckers largely believed it to be "illegal".

So, to say Ukraine was justified in attacking the Donbas and killing Donbas civilians I would need to accept it would be justified for English-Canadians to go kill French-Canadians if they tried to separate (regardless of what I thought of their provincial run elections or provincial politicians or whatever). And I simply don't see why I'd be justified in going and killing French-Canadians in pretty much any situation of separation or how it was done or "if it was legal" or whatever arguments maybe lying around.

Furthermore, if Quebec was still right next to France and we English-Canadians decided it was a good idea to go kill Quebeckers and force them back into our confederacy, then I wouldn't be surprised nor see much grounds to complain if France, with their far bigger military, decided to spank us back across the Outaouais. And why wouldn't French speakers in France defend French speaking populations in Canada if being shelled by Canadians running around with a bunch of Nazi symbolism all over the place?

You play with fire, you get burned.

Of note, Quebec is still in Canada today and we didn't even have to kill anybody. We did have to recognize they're their own nation and can have all sorts of language laws; so, again, I don't see why Russian speakers wouldn't be as pissed about any language repression as French speakers in Canada would be (we accepted all sorts of pro-French language laws and many still wanted to separate, that votes were really close). — boethius

Your thought experiment discounts the fact that Canada and France are sovereign democratic and pluralistic countries. Yet I find it plausible that countries with strong democratic and pluralistic institutions may have constraints that would make an escalation to civil conflict or international conflict with similar countries way more unlikely than countries where such constraints are missing, like in strong authoritarian regimes as the Russian and weak democracies as the Ukrainian. BTW, as far as I'm concerned, that's also linked to the most compelling reason for Westerners to support Ukraine: to protect Western institutions from the political, economic and military threats coming from authoritarian regimes like Putin's.

You state they "covered their bases" and answering that is a side track? Or then you could just answer directly but are deciding to side track? Or is my question a side track? — boethius

Let me stop you right there, and apologize for (now leading you onto) this ↑ side-track:

What bases? — boethius

irredentism and such has come up among others, promoted by the Kremlin circle as justification — jorndoe

(↑ see that? focus – "neutrality" – "what might we then have expected from the Kremlin" – "for an intact Ukraine" – please stick to the train of comments at hand)

When you say Ukrainian sovereignty shouldn't be controversial, well neither should Iraq's, Afghanistan's, Syria's, Lybia's, and so on. — boethius

Sure. Well, why did Imperial Japan lose out? (Nazi Germany?) I suppose we might consider when sovereignty is lowered by other concerns, though it could end up polluting the thread. This is where Putin-apologetics re-enter (apropos "like they covered their bases", e.g. irredentism).


Right, , anything unfavorable about Russia is a Western conspiracy. :D


Meanwhile in Georgia

President Grills Ivanishvili and GD in Final Address to Parliament, Offers to Mediate United Opposition Platform
^{— Civil Georgia · Jan 6, 2024}

More fingerprints.

Is Russia preparing kids for war? Moscow rolls out Soviet-era 'training' to teach children how to use weapons
^{— Srishti Singh Sisodia · WION · Nov 11, 2022}
Fundamentals of Security and Defense of the Motherland (en)
^{— To help the teacher · Nov 15, 2023}

This should bring back some Cold War memories, for some at least. It's worth noting that the only nuclear rattling lately has come from the Kremlin circle and North Korea, who appears to be partners. So, what's going on here? A "2nd cold war" path seems clear enough, though the rattlers haven't been particularly successful in provoking any such counter-rattling. Are those two attempting to reinvent the good old nuclear holocaust paranoia, to the point of domestic school curriculum...? Just your regular (warranted) updates to teaching kids? I don't know, except it doesn't seem random. Anyone have insights?

Europe is militarizing in response to the conflict in Ukraine, and Russia is militarizing in response to the Europeans.

Recently western media, especially in Europe, is filled with high-ranking officers claiming that "there could be a war with Russia within the next five years".

Fearmongering at its worst.

It's hard to say whether these people are bought and paid for, or are really that short-sighted. I find both options equally likely.

It's completely nonsensical, since the Europeans themselves helped to facilitate war in Ukraine and forced Russia to expand their military operations by refusing negotiations and arming Ukraine to the teeth, even stripping their own militaries in the process!

If Europe wanted, it could stop dancing to Uncle Sam's tune tomorrow and have a negotiated settlement after which things could return roughly to normal. The fact they are not doing that, and choosing to warmonger instead, is picked up by the Russians and interpreted as a desire for conflict.

Europe truly has the most bone-headed leadership imaginable, but they play the role of Uncle Sam's stooges so, so well.

The "Logical problem of evil" can be enlightening in politics too:

P1. If an omnipotent, omnibenevolent and omniscient X exists, then evil does not.
P2. There is evil in the world.

C1. Therefore, an omnipotent, omnibenevolent and omniscient X does not exist.

Now if one replaces X with Europe, US, the West, the Rest, voting Western citizen, multipolar world, anti-capitalist system, political ideology, humanity, political lobby, proletarian class, political leader, geopolitical expert, anti-system journalist, military-industrial complex, etc. one can hopefully see how intellectually myopic and hypocritical the "THEY could if THEY wanted" argument used as a bludgeon by the populist propaganda can be.

, I'm still not seeing how Moscow has been threatened with nuclear bombing (or invasion for that matter).
It seems more like they managed to come up with that by themselves (2023Dec31, Starovoyt), now apparently to the point of domestic school curriculum.
But, yes, recently there have been some military types (German, Polish, Nordic, Baltic) having aired concerns of them being attacked, however unlikely that seems (fearmongering of sorts).

:point: A question: why do Moldovans get nervous and jittery when there's talk of Putin? — Feb 5, 2024

, the Canada-Quebec and Ukraine-Donbas situations differ. Adding to 's comments, a difference that matters has come up a few times in the thread.

The Kremlin sent operatives into Donbas to organize propagandize stage insurge arm shoot for years (eventually culminating with the invasion). Standard playbook. Oddly enough, they employ extremists of the sort they claim to be after in the first place (2023Oct8).

If we suppose for a moment they hadn't done all that crap (including invade), then Kyiv would have to constitutionally recognize minorities as per EU requirements/standards, as part of their EU membership negotiations. And why wouldn't they? It's not like they're anti-Tatar for example.

But that's a bit late now. The Kremlin's ongoing :fire: efforts, have created animosity (2024Jan18, 2023Aug22) that will take a while to heal.

Holy shit:
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-zelenskiy-says-time-has-come-changes-top-military-2024-02-08/

Holy shit:
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-zelenskiy-says-time-has-come-changes-top-military-2024-02-08/ — neomac

Late last year a poll put the public's trust in Zaluzhnyi at over 90%, significantly higher than Zelenskiy's 77%.

Only a totalitarian ass removes a person who perceives him as an enemy just because the people give more credibility to himself. This is why the state and Duma of Russia are so screwed, man.

What a minute! It is Zelenskiy who is acting like a totalitarian. What a bloody surprise. Folks, I thought he was running for the Nobel of Peace.

Surprisingly, this breakig news is not shared by @jorndoe. What do your journalists and media say about this non-democratic act?

It is Putin's fault. Zaluzhnyi is friends with him. :lol:

, , I'd say "Poor move Kyiv"; seems like we concur?

(I don't think Zaluzhnyi ran for office, though, .)

Zelenskiy who is acting like a totalitarian. — javi2541997

Zelensky's choice can be questioned and is controversial, given Zaluzhnyi's popularity, but that has nothing to do with totalitarianism or democracy:
"The Armed Forces of Ukraine (Ukrainian: Збройні сили України (ЗСУ), romanized: Zbroini syly Ukrainy; abbreviated as ZSU or AFU) are the military forces of Ukraine. All military and security forces, including the Armed Forces, are under the command of the President of Ukraine and subject to oversight by a permanent Verkhovna Rada parliamentary commission. They trace their lineage to 1917, while the modern armed forces were formed after Ukrainian independence in 1991."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armed_Forces_of_Ukraine

It's Zelensky who appointed Zaluzhnyi as commander-in-chief and if Zelensky estimates that Zaluzhnyi is no longer fit for the job, he has the presidential power to replace him. Besides Ukraine is under martial law which grants the Ukrainian President democratically elected to constrain democratic life in wartime (like postponing presidential elections), always under the supervision of a democratically elected parliamentary commission.

It is not a point made by 'experts' — Jabberwock

The point experts made was just noting the distance to Russia (which you shouldn't need experts to point of the obvious, but in our conversation it seems to be necessary), you then take the point that literally follows:

And what is the key concern The New York Times brings up? — boethius

... Which is pretty normal they would cite Russias concerns as according to Russia.

Again, you are so ignorant of the topic that you are not worth discussing except as an example of just how extreme people's ability to gaslight themselves and others really is.

Actual experts would point out that locating an offensive base within such range from Kaliningrad and Byelarus would not be optimal, to put it mildly, given the interception times. Moreover, their offensive capabilities, given the range and flight time of the relevant missiles, would be rather limited - you could get the same effect with a frigate in Baltic, which for the offensive purposes would have the advantage of not being in the same heavily observed spot. So much for your 'factual knowledge'. — Jabberwock

Oh, so you're saying it would be even better for NATO to move it's infrastructure even closer to Russia, like say in Ukraine?

You're literally making my points for me.

Now, yes, you can launch a missile from anywhere, but as I've explained that's not how risk analysis works.

You don't start risk analysis with "well, anything could happen really so therefore there is nothing in particular to pay attention to".

For example, take ships or submarines, trying to equate them with ground bases ... therefore there's no additional risk, is first simply a straight invalid argument form.

Even if we assumed the risk was the same ... then that's just more of the same risk. Russia and the US don't just have 1 submarine each that can end civilization, they have whole bunch each! So, if you wanted to consider missile bases on the ground the same kind of risk as a submarine, then the US is simply adding more submarines to their fleet inviting a response from Russia.

How an actual nuclear strike would occur is not some sneak attack, but a series of escalations in which one side concludes they have an "edge" and their best move is to strike first. Gaining an edge is about number of missiles (enough missiles to completely obliterate the opposing side as well as intercept a large number of the opposing missiles - some will certainly still get through but there's a difference between 10 nukes landing on your cities and 1000), which is why arsenals grew to such stupendous amounts at the height of the Cold War: enough nukes to target all their nukes (ideally multiple times), and then enough to survive both first strike and ABM interceptions and so on.

Of course, neither side in the Cold War could actually get to this comfortable position of having literally 10x more nukes than the other side, and a MAD balance of forces just requires missile parity (therefore it was rational to negotiate a reduction in the arsenal to avoid the chances of an accidental nuclear war).

However, in climbing down from the stupendous amount of warheads at the height of the Cold War, with the addition of advanced intelligence, targeting and ABM systems, you can start to come up with plans where you can (potentially) tactically outsmart your opponent in a first strike.

Of course, the US claims that it needs to develop these systems to protect itself from rogue actors, but all these systems have duel first strike use.

And that is simply in equating the risk of missile bases and submarines, doing so is anyways simply factually incorrect.

You can try to find ships and submarines on the high-seas, which if you do provides early warning.

A first strike is unlikely to be completely by surprise and out of the blue, as you'd still be likely killing tens of millions of your own citizens, but is much more likely in a series of escalations and the more missiles one side has closer to the other, the more likely they'll conclude they'll be better off after a nuclear exchange; likewise, because of this, the more likely the side at a disadvantage will first strike those bases leading to further unintended nuclear escalation.

In such a scenario the Americans would be like "Why'd you blow up the bases!" and the Russians would be like "We got scared so we blew them up!" and then the Americans would be like "They were totally there only for missile defence Iran, you just killed thousands of people for nothing, now we need to blow something up of yours!" to which the Russians would respond "You better not you Imperialist dogs!"

It's in these sorts of war games where you conclude that the more missiles closer to your border is very much a bad thing and therefore if you do not respond to NATO forward deploying missile bases then they'll just keep doing more of that.

The next thing you do is renew your ICBM capabilities and develop hypersonic intermediate missiles to be able to strike all the forward operating bases (either with conventional or nuclear weapons).

The argument that "well, the US is good and wouldn't hurt a fly so no one should worry about their weapons and where they are" is just stupid.

If I take out a gun and point it at you, you do not need to be convinced I intend to kill you to recognize the threat and react; if I then come closer to you with my gun drawn and slowly approaching your head ... the fact that I say I mean you no harm is not so reassuring. Would you let me do this if you had some chance of reacting and reducing the threat before I get my gun pressed up against your head? You have no evidence I intend you any harm: Maybe it's just a joke or Iran is hiding behind under your hat and I might have to take them out? Why does what I physically do with my weapon matter to you?

I'm honestly not sure you have the analytical ability to answer the question, so I will go ahead and do it for you. The reason you react to the threat is because the impact of me shooting you in the head (even by accident) is very high and therefore the risk that I do intend you harm or the gun goes off by accident warrants whatever action you can do to reduce the risk, such as drawing your gun and pointing it at me and telling me to back off, it's not funny and if Iran did actually live under your hat you'd blow your head off because you're a patriot.

According to your logic: A president under martial law does whatever he wants to keep him in power. He removes Zaluzhnyi from the cabinet because he disagreed with him briefly, and the latter is obtaining more respect from the Ukrainian people. It is a totalitarian act. According to information from Reuters, most of the Ukrainians are upset because of this. Do they have the right to discuss this issue in Parliament? Or is Zelensky unbeatable?

If Putin had done this... Wow, all the press of the world would have gone mad against them. As I said, I will let time speak for itself, and we will discover how Zelensky actually is. You state we have to respect how the government acts towards the Armed Forces of Ukraine, although it is flawed.

OK, I ask you why don't we respect the 65th article of the Russian constitution too? :smile:

na zdravie!

↪boethius, the Canada-Quebec and Ukraine-Donbas situations differ. Adding to ↪neomac's comments, a difference that matters has come up a few times in the thread.

The Kremlin sent operatives into Donbas to organize propagandize stage insurge arm shoot for years (eventually culminating with the invasion). Standard playbook. Oddly enough, they employ extremists of the sort they claim to be after in the first place (2023Oct8). — jorndoe

Guess what!

The Front de libération du Québec[a] (FLQ) was a militant Quebec separatist group which aimed to establish an independent and socialist Quebec through violent means.[3][4] It was considered a terrorist group by the Canadian government.[5][6] Founded sometime in the early 1960s, the FLQ conducted a number of attacks between 1963 and 1970,[7][8] which totaled over 160 violent incidents and killed eight people and injured many more.[8][9] These attacks culminated with the Montreal Stock Exchange bombing in 1969 and the October Crisis in 1970, the latter beginning with the kidnapping of British Trade Commissioner James Cross. In the subsequent negotiations, Quebec Labour Minister Pierre Laporte was kidnapped and murdered by a cell of the FLQ. — Front de libération du Québec

Extremists also were in the FLQ, later sheltered by Cuba (maybe supported by Cuba or then the Soviets all along!?!?! who knows).

I said there were not circumstances in which I viewed a war against Quebec as justified due to separation. They want to separate, their provincial government declared independence, I would not view it as justified to have waged war against Quebec to subjugate them, even if there were Cuban or Soviet agents involved, and violence and extremism.

I specifically gave the example of a scenario in which France was physically next to Quebec and did whatever Russia did in the Donbas.

Countries breaking up has has happened a lot throughout history, it isn't "the end of the world", so if Quebec didn't attack us English Canadians I would not have, and still don't, view it as justified to have waged war on Quebec to maintain some sort of "Canadian pride" or whatever. It would be time to negotiate with this new political entity (whether controlled by the blasted French or not) and learn to live together. What would shelling Hull across the Ottawa river accomplish?

Furthermore, France was (and still is) a far more powerful country than Canada, so how would provoking a war with France have served English Canadian interests?

Canada is big so maybe France couldn't completely defeat us, but they'd do far more damage to us than we'd do to them, we wouldn't get Quebec back ... so what would be the point of the war?

I went through NATO training (in Canada) and one of the rules of war explained to me is that military action must have a military reason. Officer went through a long history of warfare with the catch phrase "then history evolved!" to explain each new rule we were expected to follow compared to the days of literally launching diseased corpses on catapults over city walls.

Military action must reasonably serve attainable military objectives, independent of the political situation and the political goals. Political justification of the goal does to justify a military campaign if it has no reasonable chance of attaining the military objectives.

We were instructed to surrender when further military objectives could no longer reasonably achieve the military objectives and further fighting would simply cause further loss of life without the potential of changing outcomes. Of course, reasonable chance in this context can be a small chance, depending on the impact of the goal in question in the context (i.e. fighting a hopeless rearguard action is justified in allowing the escape of a larger part of the forces); so actual analysis can be very complicated, but the basic point is that it is against the rules of war to fight on principle alone. Some wars are won, some wars are lost, the principle of minimizing harm reduces the likelihood of spirals of escalating violence (which we now see in Israel-Palestine can escalate all the way to genocide; overwhelming force being just as unreasonable in attaining a military objective as too little force to matter, which is why the other foundation of the rules of war is proportionality).

And guess what's totally not allowed?

Shelling civilians in Donetsk.

So I don't have much sympathy, on simply a soldier to soldier basis, for the Ukrainian forces.

Even according to our own Western civilians, Russia has killed less civilians in nearly 2 years of war than Israel has in 2 months ... yet Putin is Hitler and what Israel is doing is ugly but just the "reality of war".

The West has no moral high ground at the moment.

I wish it weren't so.

The full interview between Tucker Carlson and Vladimir Putin with English translation.

Carlson did a pretty professional job. It's also worth noting how remarkable it is that Putin is willing to sit down for a two-hour, non-scripted interview with a foreign journalist. I don't think many western leaders would be prepared to do that under today's circumstances.

And again you just wasted time,yours and mine, writing a dozen of paragraphs of pseudo-philosophical musings which are completely irrelevant, simply because you know so little about the topic you write about.

The base in Redzikowo has three MK41 tubes with 8 cells each. That is 24 cells total.

A single Ticonderoga-class destroyer has 122 cells. The US has 22 of those. Arleigh Burke-class destroyer has 90 cells, there are 73 in the active service. If you take just those two classes of ships, you get almost 10000 cells. But that is comparison of capabilities of just a single type of a missile launcher... Of course, if you add all NATO frigates, etc. the disproportion would be much greater. And that is just tactical missiles - in a nuclear war SLBMs would have a much greater impact.

So sure, if you have 1000 guns pointed at you, if you add one, technically it is more. The question is, how much of a difference it makes, given that you also point 1000 guns at the other guy. By your logic, NATO should bomb Kaliningrad each time Russia puts a new frigate into service and sends it to the Baltic - as even a single frigate has more missile capacity than the Polish Aegis base.

↪boethius And again you just wasted time,yours and mine, writing a dozen of paragraphs of pseudo-philosophical musings which are completely irrelevant, simply because you know so little about the topic you write about. — Jabberwock

For the sake of people following who don't want to live in total delusion, I'll explain things again to you.

A single Ticonderoga-class destroyer has 122 cells. The US has 22 of those. Arleigh Burke-class destroyer has 90 cells, there are 73 in the active service. If you take just those two classes of ships, you get almost 10000 cells. But that is comparison of capabilities of just a single type of a missile launcher... Of course, if you add all NATO frigates, etc. the disproportion would be much greater. And that is just tactical missiles - in a nuclear war SLBMs would have a much greater impact. — Jabberwock

Your ability to not think, even for a moment, of you say is truly remarkable.

I explained it: moving ships to Russia's shores would be a provocation. How do you get 73 Arleigh Burke-class destroyer's next to St. Petersburg to quickly strike at targets in Russia.

Obviously you don't, there would a Naval blockade before then.

Likewise if you sent all your nuclear submarines to surround Russias shores for a first strike. Maybe it works ... but maybe it doesn't. There's a risk your ships are detected, and if not today, Russia can act on that threat by developing better detection capabilities.

To what extent US submarines can avoid detection close to Russia's shores I don't know, but they anyways would take time to get into position, and any realistic scenario of nuclear escalation it is not pre-planned. If Russian analysts sit down and consider the scenario where the US undertakes a first strike totally out of the blue, zero political tensions, maybe they conclude they can't really do much about that, other than strive to have a survivable counter strike capability. It's also an unlikely scenario as it's unclear that the US president could successfully order such an operation.

Again, risk analysis is about managing the spectrum of likely scenarios.

This involves:

1. Evaluating what this spectrum of likely scenarios are.
then:
2. Identifying what scenarios are "actionable intelligence"; there are things that can be done that reduces the risk.
finally:
3. A cost-effectiveness optimization of what series of actions lower overall risk over the spectrum as a whole, at an acceptable cost (which is just another way to say there's some larger risk analysis assessment where devoting more resources would create some greater risks elsewhere).

You can always imagine scenarios that are not actionable at an acceptable cost. I could be struck by a falling bullet at anytime, but I don't hide in a bunker because the cost isn't acceptable.

Likewise, for what is actionable, such as wearing a seatbelt in a car, you can always imagine a scenario where that is what kills you; you were a seatbelt because the spectrum of likely scenarios is weighted towards the seatbelt helping.

This is all really basic stuff. I definitely don't expect you to be able to follow, but I hope it helps others.

So sure, if you have 1000 guns pointed at you, if you add one, technically it is more. — Jabberwock

For the reasons stated above, this is not the case, as the US doesn't have all these ships and submarines in Russian waters, positioned to strike all the time.

And you just completely ignore that this single base is (if not action is taken to discourage further bases) perhaps a trend and one of many to follow.

Anyways, typical American logic: I have a 1000 guns pointed at you already! Why do you care about 1 more!? You're overly sensitive!!!

... Well why are you so insistent on 1 more, perhaps it is the one that makes the operational difference, and if I don't do anything abbot 1, maybe it becomes 10 and then 100 and then 1000.

That's just common sense reaction to increasing the threat. Why? Why increase the threat?

The US attitude is just that they do because they can ... but ok, still, why?

You might say, well US is irrational, just likes putting missiles bases here and there even if it's a needless provocation, but precisely because US acts irrationally is why you shouldn't worry.

But no!! If there's no rational reason for the base, that's even more alarming to any normal person.

If you're capable of irrationally forward deploying your missiles then you're capable of irrationally conducting a first strike and killing millions of your own citizens simply because you'll kill more of ours.

That's how this sort of analysis goes, so you react to mitigate the threat: more missiles, faster missiles, invade Ukraine so the missile bases can't get at least that close.

Now, as mentioned, this isn't sufficient reason to invade Ukraine but it is one more factor of consideration and a big consideration for the military establishment to support the war (wars usually happen when there is both political and military establishment consensus; maybe Putin's main reason is just to get Russia's land back, typical political ambition, but then the military looks at it and says and says "NATO is forward deploying so it is the time for action").

You're fundamental mistake is thinking that just because you don't think nuclear escalation is likely and so there's no action to take about it, that therefore military analysts and military decision makers reason the same way. I can guarantee you they don't, they are paid and trained to analyze the military situation independent of any political consideration. Military people don't care that they don't think there's a political situation today that would result in a war, they are paid to prepare for any likely war anyways (if the likeliest war isn't very likely, non-evil soldiers are happy about that ... but they prepare for it as a first priority anyways).

When the US forward deploys military assets the opposing militaries, in this case Russia, start planning and routines and conduct war games to destroy it. The very fact you're developing various plans and position forces to destroy something is convincing evidence that it's a threat to you.

The fact no civilian believes it is a "actual threat" is not how soldiers operate. It's there, it could shoot us, therefore we will plan to shoot it first if ordered to do so.

I explained it: moving ships to Russia's shores would be a provocation. How do you get 73 Arleigh Burke-class destroyer's next to St. Petersburg to quickly strike at targets in Russia. — boethius

To outdo the Redzikowo base, you do not have to move ALL US ships into the Baltic. In fact, you do not need any US ships at all: ANY single German frigate would outfire the Redzikowo base. I know it can be a shock to you, but German military ships are regularly sailing the Baltic Sea and they are not blockaded each time by Russia (and so do the American ones and other NATO ships - USS Gravely - i.e. the equvalent of four Redzikowo bases, was recently in a Polish port, with no Russian blockades). To have an equivalent of the Aegis OFFENSIVE capability, all NATO has to do is literally put into service another frigate. I will tell you a military not-so-much-a-secret: they do that quite often, with no or little Russian protests. Quite possibly, because Russians commission new missile platforms (and new missile types) quite often, too, EACH of which is much more powerful than the Aegis base in offensive capabilities. So in fact neither NATO nor Russia protest adding to the 1000 already pointed weapons, they do it routinely.

Likewise if you sent all your nuclear submarines to surround Russias shores for a first strike. Maybe it works ... but maybe it doesn't. There's a risk your ships are detected, and if not today, Russia can act on that threat by developing better detection capabilities. — boethius

'Surround Russia's shores'? You are so out of your element that it is comical. Trident II has the range of 7500 km. Tomahawk's range is 2500 km. That is, a SLBM submarine, to reach the same targets as the Redzikowo base, needs to be... in the middle of Atlantic. In fact, SLBMs can reach the exact same targets from the OTHER side - while sailing around Alaska. Not to mention the Mediterranean Sea... Your fundamental mistake is that you are repeatedly doing 'analyses' based on your very limited knowledge of the facts.

'Surround Russia's shores'? You are so out of your element that it is comical. Trident II has the range of 7500 km. Tomahawk's range is 2500 km. That is, a SLBM submarine, to reach the same targets as the Redzikowo base, needs to be... in the middle of Atlantic. In fact, SLBMs can reach the exact same targets from the OTHER side - while sailing around Alaska. Not to mention the Mediterranean Sea... Your fundamental mistake is that you are repeatedly doing 'analyses' based on your very limited knowledge of the facts.

This is sort of a red herring. The threat from Aegis Ashore is that it can shoot down Russia's ballistic missiles, not that the cells there could be used to launch an attack. Aegis interceptors have shot down SRBMs, IRBMS, and even ICBM targets in public tests. For intercepting Russian missiles, location is indeed incredibly important, and Aegis Ashore systems, be they in Poland or Korea, offer interception options that naval assets, being necessarily bound to the sea, can't offer. Plus, they don't have to go into port for maintenance.

You are right though that those sites do not worry Russia because of new US strike capabilities. The B-2 and B-21, which offer the possibility of a large, undetected, first strike, are far more dangerous in terms of decapitation/counter force attacks. The threat rather is that US ABM might become comprehensive enough that pounding the table and yelling about your mostly 40-year-old nuclear arsenal is no longer convincing. This is critical in that Russian behavior re Georgia or Ukraine would probably be dealt with the way the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was dealt with, but for their nuclear arsenal.

If anything, the Ukraine War has only made this threat more acute, as it has simultaneously shown the weakness of Russian conventional forces and destroyed Russia's vast supply of old Soviet assets. Not only this, but it certainly has to call into question the readiness of Russian nuclear assets, given the corruption and lack of preparation shown in the rest of the armed forces. After all, they are, on paper, maintaining an arsenal 33% larger than the US one on a budget less than 2% of the size. The US nuclear budget, which we know to have been quite inadequate for the upkeep for all the weapons allowed under current treaties, is about the size of the entire Russian defense budget prior to the war. Nuclear weapons are not cheap, and they also aren't the sort of thing you can stick on a shelf and expect to work at a moment's notice years later. Tritium-based weapons from the Cold War are highly unlikely to actually work (not that anyone should bank on that lol).

This is sort of a red herring. The threat from Aegis Ashore is that it can shoot down Russia's ballistic missiles, not that the cells there could be used to launch an attack. Aegis interceptors have shot down SRBMs, IRBMS, and even ICBM targets in public tests. For intercepting Russian missiles, location is indeed incredibly important, and Aegis Ashore systems, be they in Poland or Korea, offer interception options that naval assets, being necessarily bound to the sea, can't offer. Plus, they don't have to go into port for maintenance. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, I know that. It is boethius who insists that Aegis are 'forward nuclear bases' which pose a threat of the first strike.

, you're comparing that to Donbas...? Sure, there are some similarities, and then there are the differences. By the way, the Ukrainian separatists didn't get their way. Rather, by Kremlin decree, Donbas (and Crimea) swiftly swapped flags, UA → RU. (anyway, this stuff has come up a few times already, including whatever aspects/angles)

Israel — boethius

... is a mad mess and has been for a while.