@boethius, so, in short, you say Russia is not really a threat to anyone, but NATO is an existential threat to Russia. :D *hah*

Yep, NATO is a threat: to Kremlinian free military (and such) actions, and to Putin's ambitions.

Mearsheimer has argued that Crimea would be, or is, a great geo-political-power-military asset to Russia, which the Kremlin apparently couldn't pass up. Land grab. Then a variation of "neo-imperialism" or "neo-colonialism" or whatever.

The Kremlin has instead proven a direct present tangible ongoing threat to Ukraine and Ukrainians. (And others.)

It seems unlikely that the Kremlin would have accepted this peace agreement, for example.

Maybe Kyiv's democratic (and such) aspirations are a threat to Putinian authoritarianism, to their control and influence. :D Well, their efforts threw a wrench in Kyiv's attempts to free themselves from their large neighbor.

NATO nuclear weapons in Ukraine was always and remains unlikely. Russian nuclear weapons and rattling on the other hand...

NATO was kind of simmering down over the years, but, with Putin's crap, that seems to have ended.

If Putin's Russia were to assimilate a fifth of Ukraine, then their NATO-phobic (and "West-phobic") argument would continue to apply to the remaining intact Ukraine. If Putin's Russia was to assimilate all of Ukraine, then Putin's logic could equally be raised vice versa by Moldova Poland Romania Hungary Slovakia, and hence the EU. It's open-ended perpetual crap.

And to what end?

↑ nothing new here

For the obvious reason that they could deploy nuclear weapons there. — boethius

I was clearly referring to this statement and all my arguments referred to this. I am not sure why you were unable to follow it, I tried to be as clear as possible.

Notice how I explain that you could obviously substitute a missile, whether existing or to be developed, in an ABM as well as just putting a nuclear warhead in an ABM missile if you wanted to. — boethius

And I have asked you specifically which missiles you have referred to. It should be well noted that you did not do that, only backtracked to claim that they could be 'developed'. Because the simple fact is that at this time you cannot put a nuclear warhead on SM-3 missiles which are deployed there. Sure, maybe such warheads could be developed, but it is rather pointless to assess the risks of of launch platforms based on missiles which have not even been developed yet... Not to mention that their maximum range does not even reach Moscow, so their use would be rather questionable as the first strike weapon. And sure, you could put Tomahawks in the tubes, but it is far more complicated and rather difficult to do 'covertly'. The fact is that at this time it is not possible 'to switch nuclear missiles/warheads easily' (and this does not even touch the issue that an offensive base needs specific targeting infrastructure which is different from the defensive one), as you have claimed. Add to that the fact that no nuclear weapons have been deployed in any new NATO countries since the sixties, then we have no reason to assess the risk of deploying nuclear weapons in Ukraine as high, which was your exact claim.

As to your watered down position:

1. ABM bases can be converted to launch nuclear missiles.

Yes, they can, but not easily nor covertly. To switch the warhead you have to develop new warheads to fit on existing missiles, or, alternately, replace the missiles themselves, which cannot be done covertly. And their effectiveness compared to mobile platforms is quite limited, especially for a base located 900 km from the Russian border currently equipped with missiles with 1200 km range.

In your comparison, you'd have to get those ships close to Russia, likewise any planes to conduct a first strike, which are what are called "warning signs". — boethius

Oh, so you did not look at the map, how unsurprising. Hint: Redzikowo is not 'close to Russia'. With current missiles it would reach about 300 km behind the Russian border (another hint for non-users of maps: Russia is a bit bigger than that). To make it any sense, it would have to be equipped with Tomahawks. But tell me, which is easier: to covertly smuggle a Tomahawk with a nuclear missile through the whole Europe to install it in Redzikowo, which is most likely observed all the time, or just to load it in any NATO port into one of ten German or Danish frigates which have the exact same launchers (only bigger, so more effective) frequenting Danish and German territorial waters 200 km from Redzikowo, which, given the range of the missiles, put them practically in the same distance from Russia?

The bases quite dramatically increase first strike capability (both in the ABM and nuclear capacity) above what would just be normally "hanging around". — boethius

No, an immobile base 900 km from Russia with missiles with max. range of 1200 km does not dramatically increase nuclear OFFENSIVE capacity. As pointed out above, a single frigate present in German or Danish territorial waters (i.e. in its regular habitat) provides more potential offensive capacity than the Redzikowo base. And, shocking as it may be, German and Danish frigates quite frequently are in German and Danish territorial waters, possibly even now.

2. ABM is anyways a first strike risk. — boethius

This I have never questioned. If your argument was: 'forward intercepting base in Ukraine would diminish Russian offensive nuclear potential', I would simply agree. But your argument clearly was: 'they could deploy nuclear weapons there'. With this I do not agree, the risk of that is very low for all the reasons given above.

Go through this exchange and maybe consider the fact that not only is my position correct from the start:

1. ABM bases can be converted to launch nuclear missiles.

2. ABM is anyways a first strike risk. — boethius

Two things incorrect here. ABM bases being converted to nuclear launch sites is absolute nonsense. Just look at the Western nuclear deterrence: it's made up of land based missile silos in the heart of the US, submarine launched missiles, aircraft launched cruise missiles and free fall bombs. What is there to "convert" in ABM bases for these weapons? Just what system needs some fixed site?

Secondly, Russia has had actually the first ABM system in operation for decades. It's first operational system was the A-35, which came operational basically in the late 60's early 70's. It's most modern version is the A-135 (Nato codename ABM-4) Gorgon and a newer system is in the works (A-235 Samolet-M). Modern Russian GBAD (Ground Based Air Defense) systems are also capable of target missiles: even a BUK-M1 can destroy a Scud missile (if the target is known and the air defense system is ready for the incoming missile). The S-400 is quite capable, and actually many say that Russian GBAD missiles are better than Western ones as they have focused on the missile development so much (whereas the West focuses on air power).

Thus US created it's Nike Zeus ABM missile, btw also using a nuclear warhead as it's Russian counterpart, but the system was canceled I think by McNamara. Patriot was a lame version and actually didn't shoot anything down in the Gulf War decades ago. Only know Israeli and Western missiles have improved to the level of taking out ballistic missiles.

And thirdly, the ABM treaty talked (perhaps intentionally) only vaguely about "strategic" missiles, namely ICBMs and SLBMs. Hence the A-135 could wiggle it's way out of the ABM treaty. There were Theater Missile Defense negotiations, but these didn't go anywhere. And the Gulf war showed that TMD was something that wasn't limited to US/Russia confrontations.

So again to say that it was US that is breaking the ABM treaty is biased, if and when you don't take into account that Russians never actually cared so much about it and have had ABM systems operational far longer than the US had any.

Two things incorrect here. ABM bases being converted to nuclear launch sites is absolute nonsense. Just look at the Western nuclear deterrence: it's made up of land based missile silos in the heart of the US, submarine launched missiles, aircraft launched cruise missiles and free fall bombs. What is there to "convert" in ABM bases for these weapons? Just what system needs some fixed site? — ssu

The willful ignorance of basic common sense is honestly stupendous.

Why was the US concerned about missiles in Cuba when the Soviets had silos, and submarines and aircraft launched missiles and free fall bombs and so on?

By your (and others') logic here, the Cuban missile crisis was about literally nothing.

Russia doesn't like missile bases close to itself for the same reason the US doesn't like missile bases close to itself.

For a bunch of reasons ABM in Eastern-Europe isn't as provocative as actual nuclear missiles in Cuba, so did not solicit the same kind of response, but it is the same kind of thing, just a lessor degree.

Secondly, Russia has had actually the first ABM system in operation for decades. Its first operational system was the A-35, which came operational basically in the late 60's early 70's. — ssu

Are these positioned anywhere close to the USA?

And thirdly, the ABM treaty talked (perhaps intentionally) only vaguely about "strategic" missiles, namely ICBMs and SLBMs. Hence the A-135 could wiggle it's way out of the ABM treaty. There were Theater Missile Defense negotiations, but these didn't go anywhere. And the Gulf war showed that TMD was something that wasn't limited to US/Russia confrontations. — ssu

When did I say the USA was breaking the ABM treaty?

It removed itself from the ABM treaty and therefore wasn't breaking a treaty it was no longer in.

Vague notions are obviously up for debate, and if the US was still in the treaty then obviously Russia would argue these ABM assets are "strategic" in scope and nature etc.

However, my points have nothing to do with accusing the US of breaking the terms of the treaty it exited from. The point of mentioning the ABM treaty is to demonstrate that ABM is of obvious first strike concern, as that was the point of the treaty.

Obviously you can argue that these ABM bases are of "little" first-strike use at their rated specifications, though I object to the argument that they are entirely insignificant.

The main reason of concern would be covert or overt increase in specifications somewhere down the line, such as launching intermediate range nuclear missiles, and also the proliferation of more such bases.

For example, let's say the ABM treaty was still a thing, and indeed it's as you say that the A-135 could "wiggle" out of the ABM treaty, then one may naturally wonder if enough such bases and enough such missiles all around Russia would have the same overall strategic effect that is banned by the treaty. Whether it's technically "legal" or not, obviously Russia wouldn't like that and would react to it.

There's also many escalations scenarios, and what is the common thread between all those scenarios is that it does actually matter what military assets are where in terms of what you can do or not do.

This is all extremely basic common sense.

US doesn't like Soviet or Russian missile bases close to itself and neither does Russia. Assuring the Russians that there's no other missiles that would ever be thought to be launched from the bases and the ABM missiles that are there aren't "so significant" etc. they simply may not find convincing.

Obviously there's a probability such assurances are true and a probability such assurances are false, and, either way, what is of genuine intention today could change tomorrow.

What anyone with any analytical ability at all would conclude about these bases is that: yeah, sure, maybe the US doesn't have missiles ("strategic" ABM or hypersonic intermediate range missiles) so relevant for a first strike today, but maybe that can change in the future; therefore, maybe they are building out their base infrastructure now while it "seems benign" and then later when they have the missiles (which they may already have) we have no way of knowing anyways if they are deployed to these bases or not.

The US likes "strategic ambiguity" so even if they didn't forward deploy first strike weapons, there's no way to be sure of that. Indeed, even if the US doesn't even develop first strike weapons, there's no way to be sure of that.

As a military man, I'm sure you understand that the Russians view de facto US bases close to Russia as long term strategic threats.

We can talk all day long about weapons that exist and the public knows about and discuss their public specifications, but that's not how strategic analysis works. Obviously whatever first strike capabilities the US lacks today can be developed and deployed tomorrow.

Therefore, it's a prudent strategic move to try to prevent these bases getting even closer to Russia's border. You can argue that invading Ukraine wasn't the best way of doing that, but it is a way.

And the Russians say themselves in the NY article that I cited their main concern was the bases being able to launch other kinds of missiles, including nuclear missiles, and Putin says in his long interview (which I have no problem agreeing is good evidence that Putin's main concern is reconquering "historical lands") that his reaction on hearing about this ABM plan of the US was that they'd be forced to react in various ways and proposing non-escalatory ways to achieve the US "rogue state" ABM goals.

Denial of this common sense military reality (the bases of one's adversary are a threat) is truly stupendous and, like other topics we discuss, I'm sure this is another one in which we actually agree.

Does Ukraine have a "right" to host US bases and US missile bases? Certainly it does in the current international law framework.

Does Russia have a "right" to invade Ukraine to prevent it from doing so? In principle we could argue all day (or year ... or even years at this point) about who attacked who first (maybe it really was Girkin who attacked Ukraine first and started the civil war), but in practice Russia can just veto any resolution. And that's how legal systems work: before there is some actual authoritative decision on the matter then the various arguments for and against aren't "resolved" and are open questions, no matter how preposterous.

More importantly, can we easily predict Russias invasion of Ukraine? Yes. Can Ukraine "win". No.

So whatever you feel about the law, the movement of NATO and NATO bases closer to Russia and then trying to go even closer is obviously provocative and results in the predictable outcome of this war in Ukraine. As RAND already informs us, this strategy of unbalancing Russia by getting aggressive in Ukraine is one way to harm Russia but at the "expense" of Ukraine, and, more presciently, if the USA pushes and provokes a bigger and Russia then wins that war then it could easily backfire in terms of USA prestige.

boethius, so, in short, you say Russia is not really a threat to anyone, but NATO is an existential threat to Russia. :D *hah* — jorndoe

We literally already went through this trope several times:

Is Russia a legitimate threat to NATO?
— Jabberwock

Obviously, has thousands of nukes. — boethius

But if you want to go through the same tropes again, I'm pretty sure I have time to entertain even more idiocy.

Mearsheimer has argued that Crimea would be, or is, a great geo-political-power-military asset to Russia, which the Kremlin apparently couldn't pass up. Land grab. Then a variation of "neo-imperialism" or "neo-colonialism" or whatever. — jorndoe

Mearsheimer is correct.

The Black Sea is an important energy and other export corridor and Crimea is a strategically important position in the Black Sea.

Now, the Kremlin could obviously pass up land-grabbing ... since that's obviously what it did until 2014. What changed in 2014 is that risks to its naval base significantly increased (obviously not short term, but long term having a naval base in a hostile country isn't so great strategically).

So, in 2014 the diplomatic costs of conquering Crimea were outweighed by the military threat to their naval base and position in the Black Sea.

Where Mearsheimer is also correct is that when threatened the great powers react to those threats, will give up quite a bit in economic position and diplomatic position to secure their military position, which is an observation of how the world actually works (not how it should work).

USA does the same thing all the time, just for Americans this is natural and good but anyone else doing so is unnatural and evil.

Why was the US concerned about missiles in Cuba when the Soviets had silos, and submarines and aircraft launched missiles and free fall bombs and so on? — boethius

Because they were actual offensive weapons! Not just SAM sites.

By your (and others') logic here, the Cuban missile crisis was about literally nothing. — boethius

Real strawman there. Now your way off.

Do you understand what nuclear weapons the US, France and the UK have? Those weapons don't need ABM missile sites or any kind of fixed forward sites to operate. In fact, bringing them closer to Russia just increases the ability to Russia to strike them. Please educate yourself first on the nuclear strategy of the Western powers. A fixed site has severe disadvantages: it can be targeted itself by nukes and other weapon systems. Hence there's a reason just why the US fixed silos are in the center of the US. And why Russian fixed silos aren't on the Russian border. Or that fixed Chinese sites are in the middle of China, not on the seashore.

Russia doesn't like missile bases close to itself for the same reason the US doesn't like missile bases close to itself. — boethius

Yes. But NOT for the reason you gave. Converting ABM sites to offensive missiles sites is nonsense. The fact is simple: ABM systems shoot down ballistic missiles and thus they present a challenge to either a first strike or to a counter strike. Hence the whole reasoning for an ABM treaty.

For example, let's say the ABM treaty was still a thing, and indeed it's as you say that the A-135 could "wiggle" out of the ABM treaty, then one may naturally wonder if enough such bases and enough such missiles all around Russia would have the same overall strategic effect that is banned by the treaty. Whether it's technically "legal" or not, obviously Russia wouldn't like that and would react to it. — boethius

A-135 is operational. They basically have it for one place: Moscow. That the way to counter MIRVs and basically the complexity of hitting an extremely fast tiny object that actually slows down extremely fast when hitting the lower parts of the atmosphere has been to use an airburst nuke. Well, even if that doesn't have the similar effect than an ordinary nuke, I wouldn't like to be under the detonation. But I guess it's OK for other places around Moscow.

And simply there are economical limits to such costly weapon systems. If they would be cheaper, I guess the Soviet Union would have built them a lot more.

As a military man, I'm sure you understand that the Russians view de facto US bases close to Russia as long term strategic threats. — boethius

Of course.

Therefore, it's a prudent strategic move to try to prevent these bases getting even closer to Russia's border. You can argue that invading Ukraine wasn't the best way of doing that, but it is a way. — boethius

I think the disagreement is only in that I think that there were also other crucial reasons than just NATO enlargement for Putin to invade Ukraine. Putin has made them quite clear in his writings, speeches and actions.

I was clearly referring to this statement and all my arguments referred to this. I am not sure why you were unable to follow it, I tried to be as clear as possible. — Jabberwock

First, my statement that they could obviously deploy nuclear weapons there is in response to your statement that the nuclear threat is "nonsense", but now apparently you're comment that started this discussion was in response to my comment that happened later?

Your argument literally require time travel now.

Obviously a nuclear threat would include both nuclear weapons and whatever systems enable to use of those weapons. So "enabling weapons systems" such as ABM fall under the category of nuclear threat.

Which now turns out you agree that ABM is indeed a first strike capability threat, so obviously the "nuclear threat" is not "nonsense" simply due to the nature of ABM itself.

So your original position that the bases representing a nuclear threat is "nonsense" you have since debunked yourself.

Moving the goalposts to the idea you only meant nuclear weapons being deployable from these missile bases is "nonsense" is also wrong.

As I stated, obviously you could put nuclear weapons there and launch nuclear weapons from ABM tubes; you could develop the capacity covertly or overtly, today or tomorrow, so an adversary is going to include that in their risk-analysis.

And I have asked you specifically which missiles you have referred to. — Jabberwock

Again, the Russians say themselves their concern is that the tubes could easily be converted to fire other missiles.

It is literally a tube where you put in a missile and fire said missile. There's nothing special about the tube that would prevent you from firing things other than ABM missiles, and you could also put a nuclear warhead in an ABM missile if you wanted to.

If the US doesn't have this capacity today it could easily develop the capacity tomorrow. It's really not a an insane complicated task that no one has ever accomplished before and pushes up against the laws of physics to take (or develop) a missile of the appropriate size for the tubes or then develop a nuclear warhead that you simply put in the ABM missiles (the literally put nuclear warheads in artillery shells in the past, so I'm sure the US military industrial complex could manage the feat).

Oh, so you did not look at the map, how unsurprising. Hint: Redzikowo is not 'close to Russia'. With current missiles it would reach about 300 km behind the Russian border (another hint for non-users of maps: Russia is a bit bigger than that). — Jabberwock

There's no need to look at a map, the New York Times calculated the distances:

As he threatens Ukraine, Mr. Putin has demanded that NATO reduce its military footprint in Eastern and Central Europe — which Washington and European leaders have flatly refused to do. Mr. Putin has been fuming about American missiles near Russia’s border since the Romanian site went into operation in 2016, but the Polish facility, located near the village of Redzikowo, is only about 100 miles from Russian territory and barely 800 miles from Moscow itself. — On the Edge of a Polish Forest, Where Some of Putin’s Darkest Fears Lurk

That is called way closer to Russia than the status quo during the Cold War.

At no point did I say these missiles covered the whole of Russia, so thrashing at this straw man is particularly stupid.

The missile bases increase US first strike capability, as I've stated any first strike would involve plenty of other systems too.

The first critical thing to do in a first strike is hit command and control to disrupt, delay, and ideally prevent a strategic counter-strike even being ordered. With a little bit of delay one's chances of hitting those strategic nuclear launch facilities and other equipment increase dramatically.

So missile bases getting closer and closer increase the effectiveness of a first strike. The closer you are, the less warning time and so more able to decapitate the leadership and other systems.

Sure, you can say "well I don't think nuclear war is likely anyways, so people should be complacent" but you seem to fail to appreciate that the people in charge of said nuclear weapons systems aren't complacent; if the threat model increases noticeable they pay particular notice (since the consequences are so high anything noticeable at all becomes of serious concern).

Because they were actual offensive weapons! Not just SAM sites. — ssu

That's why, if you followed the exchange, the Russians say their main concern is the ability to convert the cites to launch other kinds of missiles:

The Polish base, the heart of which is a system known as Aegis Ashore, contains sophisticated radars capable of tracking hostile missiles and guiding interceptor rockets to knock them out of the sky. It is also equipped with missile launchers known as MK 41s, which the Russians worry can be easily repurposed to fire offensive missiles like the Tomahawk. — On the Edge of a Polish Forest, Where Some of Putin’s Darkest Fears Lurk

Everything I've explained is not just "my theory about it", it is literally the New York Times explaining to us the Russia's views on the topic. I'm simply explaining the common reasons someone would have to express such an opinion.

You guys seem to expect the world to operate on the principle of "everyone should take the United States at its word, and if they say their missile bases aren't a threat to you and you should just go ahead and ignore them, then that's just the way it is".

It's really bizarre. I empathize a lot better now when Mearsheimer says he just doesn't get how people can be so dense and not get how Russia views our missile bases as obvious threats.

Real strawman there. Now your way off.

Do you understand what nuclear weapons the US, France and the UK have? Those weapons don't need ABM missile sites or any kind of fixed forward sites to operate. In fact, bringing them closer to Russia just increases the ability to Russia to strike them. Please educate yourself first on the nuclear strategy of the Western powers. A fixed site has severe disadvantages: it can be targeted itself by nukes and other weapon systems. Hence there's a reason just why the US fixed silos are in the center of the US. And why Russian fixed silos aren't on the Russian border. Or that fixed Chinese sites are in the middle of China, not on the seashore. — ssu

So had the Soviets brought in only "ABM" equipment, the US would have been totally cool with that?

Let's even imagine there was no ABM treaty or then the missiles the Soviet (say they) bring in can "wiggle out" of the ABM treaty.

You're saying the response from the US would have been nada?

That's really what you're saying, comparing the two scenarios is a straw man?

Now, obviously they aren't exactly the same scenario, and I've pointed out where differences lead to differences (that Russia did not start military action directly against the bases; but instead developed new systems and prevented further bases getting built in Ukraine, by maintaining a border dispute and then later a general invasion of Ukraine).

My argument (if you bother to read up before interjecting in the conversation) is that forward deployed ABM is a first strike capability so (even ignoring the ability to deploy nuclear missiles to the sites anyways) the Cuban Missile crisis is in the same category of one power reacting to their adversary increasing first strike capability.

Yes. But NOT for the reason you gave. Converting ABM sites to offensive missiles sites is nonsense. The fact is simple: ABM systems shoot down ballistic missiles and thus they present a challenge to either a first strike or a counter strike. — ssu

Ok, so please explain why the New York Times writes:

It is also equipped with missile launchers known as MK 41s, which the Russians worry can be easily repurposed to fire offensive missiles like the Tomahawk. — On the Edge of a Polish Forest, Where Some of Putin’s Darkest Fears Lurk

Key word "easily".

Why doesn't the New York Time explain the "simple fact" that ABM systems "ABM systems shoot down ballistic missiles".

And again, even if we ignore that you can obviously put nuclear missiles and warheads in a metal tube (the threat is more the logistics are more opaque and psychologically more compatible for soldiers to do compared to setting up nuclear warheads in Polish barns, as I've explained, than the tubes themselves), you again repeat the obvious: "they present a challenge to either a first strike or a counter strike."

The fact forward deployed ABM present a threat to counter strike is what makes them a first-strike enabling system.

Rear deployed ABM protecting your own silos is where you'd put your ABM if you were just concerned about surviving a first strike and maintaining a counter strike deterrence (to then hopefully dissuade a first strike).

It honestly seems bizarre how you, and the others, accept anyways this premise that ABM is a first-strike capability (an "enabling weapons system" as Wikipedia describes it) but then simply deny that firs strike capability in some vague sense does not increase by deploying these first-strike-enabling systems.

Anyways, the point I was making has less to do with Ukraine and more to do with your understanding of democracy vs totalitarianism. Replacing a top general (popular or unpopular) from leading the armed forces in wartime is not something incompatible with democracy AT ALL. Making unpopular decisions in wartime like imposing martial law, mass mobilization, and replacing a popular&competent top general is not something incompatible with democracy AT ALL. — neomac


Though I agree with you here, using martial law to ban critical media, ban any dissent of the war policies, banning political parties, postponing elections are all anti-democratic and despotic and arguably totalitarian.

Ukraine is only a democracy on paper at this point. — boethius

Yet, as far as I’m concerned, your argument is pointing less to a specific problem of Ukraine than to a more general problem for democracies in war times. Indeed:
1) My premise is NOT that Ukraine is a consolidated/flawed democracy but a hybrid/transitional regime with some democratic institutions (so more fragile than consolidated/flawed democracies, yet still better than institutions of actual consolidated authoritarian regimes and vested interest to more Westernization/Democratization). And the other premise is that this hybrid/transitional regime of Ukraine is engaged in a defensive war for its political self-determination and territorial sovereignty against Russia. Russia instead is a consolidated authoritarian regime with hegemonic ambitions, so with a penchant for heavily interfering with other countries’ business and bitterly hostile to greater Westernisation of Ukraine. On such premises, there is little to be surprised if Ukraine may take unpopular measures such as postponing elections, mass mobilization, and removing top generals non-aligned with the government’s objectives in war time. And if there are pro-Russian collaborationists in Ukrainian politics and media (which is something very much plausible given the historical and ethnic ties between Russia and Ukraine) then Ukrainians OBVIOUSLY are compelled to silence and ban them in war time (maybe also in the ways Ukrainians have learnt from the Russians) to prevent them from sabotaging the government’s activity. National unity is vital in war times for all regimes, authoritarian AND DEMOCRATIC. And even democracies could not reasonably allow parties collaborating with an aggressor arguably genocidal towards them. Of course, pro-Russian propaganda can then predictably spin the narrative of a Ukrainian totalitarian regime due to such unpopular/controversial measures with the aim of duping Western masses (coz Russians don’t need it, and enough of them are rather happy with their consolidated authoritarian regime and home propaganda). And Western populists who are eager to be duped by anti-American/NATO/EU/West propaganda will obviously echo such pro-Russian propaganda, since they already have such a penchant for publicly and extensively whining about censorship and authoritarian measures in their democracies during peacetime, that the Western support for Ukraine, an “allegedly” totalitarian state, is just a too convenient hanging fruit up for grabbing for more whining. In any case, as I said many times, I don’t find predictable manipulative claims particularly compelling (even if there is some truth to them).
2) To my understanding, states at war are not engaged in a beauty contest and wars OBVIOUSLY can degrade democratic representativity and solicit unpopular measures also in Western democracies (the infamous democratic backsliding): Churchill too postponed elections in wartime, and in the US there was a fierce persecution/paranoia targeting communist collaborationists during the Cold War. After all, democracies are grounded on more fragile institutions than authoritarian regimes, i.e. they can consolidate and be functional ENOUGH under certain favourable circumstances (which very much likely do not include wars), otherwise they can not consolidate or, worse, they can turn dysfunctional to the advantage of hostile authoritarian regimes. Which is also pretty bad news for Western democracies, because that means they can be hijacked by powerful and hostile authoritarian regimes (e.g. through infowars, economic/security blackmailing and bribing/lobbying) aiming at playing divide et impera within the West, and wearing out Western popular support for their regimes way more easily than the other way around. So thanks to this institutional asymmetry democracies can more easily be destabilised and lead either to dysfunctional political polarization (see the case of the US) or to reliance on more unpopular (or even authoritarian) measures to quell corrosive political antagonism and actual/incumbent civil unrest. In other words, as far as democracy is concerned, Westerners have more to lose than the Ukrainians if Russia brings home a strategic victory against the West. That’s also why, as I argued in previous posts, the West is strongly compelled to counter the Russian threat and frustrate Putin’s ambitions to destabilise the West and lead an anti-Western coalition. And that’s also why I can’t take the infamous American neoliberal agenda to export democracy in the World, as simply or mainly motivated by hypocritical humanitarian concerns to cover actual and economic exploitation (at least, according to the Western populist and pro-Russian propaganda for which only the West is exploitative, hypocritical, and with no security concerns while the Rest is the opposite). Indeed, the spread of democracy is very much important also for security concerns (of the US and other Western democracies too), independently from any propaganda.
3) The Ukrainian unpopular measures don’t look to me as worrisome as you have argued: not only because they still look within a frame of constitutionality and legitimate exercise of presidential powers, as far as I know. Not only because the popular support for Zelensky is still strong enough, as far as I know. But also because there is still enough democratic transparency: indeed, Ukrainians are open to and can access to Western democracies’ monitoring and investigations about the political/military/economic situation in Ukraine, more than the Russians. So if the latter would be missing, then OK I’d start to worry more about the fate of the Ukrainian democratic institutions but still I wouldn’t be much disappointed nor would I find it particularly effective in discrediting Ukraine or the Western support to Ukraine, given the predicament in which they both are under the security threat posed by Russia (and its Western minions).

, again, it wasn't specifically about NATO^†, it was about loss of control (any such control and influence, to anyone), hence the land grab:

Protesters opposed what they saw as widespread government corruption and abuse of power, the influence of oligarchs, police brutality, and human rights violations.^(29)(30) Repressive anti-protest laws fuelled further anger.⁽²⁹⁾ — Revolution of Dignity (Wikipedia)

But, hey, a "dire existential threat" promotes a sense of urgency (fearmongering), and is also neat for picking up any anti-NATO (or anti-West) sentiments anywhere.

^{† 2024Feb5, 2023Dec26, 2023Dec25, 2023Oct15, 2023Oct11, 2022Nov13, 2022Nov4}

↑ nutn' new thread-wize

↪boethius, again, it wasn't specifically about NATO†, it was about loss of control (any such control and influence, to anyone), hence the land grab: — jorndoe

That's why I explain the importance to the Black Sea.

But, hey, a "dire existential threat" promotes a sense of urgency (fearmongering), and is also neat for picking up any anti-NATO (or anti-West) sentiments anywhere. — jorndoe

Maybe why the West keeps on repeating the war is "existential" not only for Ukraine but also NATO.

However, nuclear force issues are actually existential, so moves on one side trying to "slip in" some nuclear first strike capability maybe even with a little "wiggle room" vis-a-vis a treaty that is no longer relevant, are carefully observed and options considered to balance things by the other side.

It's honestly bizarre the trivialization of nuclear war when it's convenient for a narrative.

Everything I've explained is not just "my theory about it", it is literally the New York Times explaining to us the Russia's views on the topic. I'm simply explaining the common reasons someone would have to express such an opinion. — boethius

Fine. Yet this is Russian rhetoric to give one reason more against the ABM sites. It is political rhetoric. Because just why would you put attack cruise missiles in a fixed well known position? Cruise missiles are subsonic. Did the US field ground launched cruise missiles? Actually yes, during the Cold War they had few BGM-109G Ground Launched Cruise Missile, and they were mobile. Something you hide in a warehouse... somewhere, not in fixed site with actually not much if any protection to the missiles. And FYI, those were scrapped in the INF treaty.



What's the purpose of having a slow moving weapon on a fixed, well known site? There is absolutely no logic to this, but for the Russians there is the logic to give more reasons why those ABM bases should not be deployed.

Ok, so please explain why the New York Times writes:

It is also equipped with missile launchers known as MK 41s, which the Russians worry can be easily repurposed to fire offensive missiles like the Tomahawk.
— On the Edge of a Polish Forest, Where Some of Putin’s Darkest Fears Lurk

Key word "easily". — boethius

Hey, those Mk 41. VLS can also easily repurposed to fire the RUM-139 VL-ASROC, an anti-submarine missile. Or they easily be repurposed to fire the Nulka decoy system to leer away anti-ship missiles.

Key word "easily" too!

If you would think about or understand military thinking, the Mk 41 VLS is obviously for a layered air defence system as obviously you won't use the ABM missiles to shoot down things like slow aircraft of attack drones. Because obviously forward based installations can be attacked by a plethora of various weapon systems. Layered air defence is the way you deal with different kinds of threats.

Note the three kinds of different weapons protecting here Russian Hmeymin air base in Syria:

you again repeat the obvious: "they present a challenge to either a first strike or a counter strike."

The fact forward deployed ABM present a threat to counter strike is what makes them a first-strike enabling system. — boethius

Yes, I think we agree on this.

And thus both Russia and the US have put effort to make their GBAD systems capable in the ABM role. S-400 and the S-500 are quite capable in this field, so much that actually the A-135 might be replaced by the S-500. The dubious and questionable nuclear tipped ABM missiles of the 20th Century are now history. After many decades the ideas of Reagans "Star Wars" are emerging into reality. The US has built it's capability around navy warships, which by moving around on the oceans make them far more difficult target than some fixed emplacement that has permanent map coordinates.

Rear deployed ABM protecting your own silos is where you'd put your ABM if you were just concerned about surviving a first strike and maintaining a counter strike deterrence (to then hopefully dissuade a first strike). — boethius

Or, if the possible actor has just few ICBMs and has a limited territory to shoot them from, you put an ABM site between your country and the launch site. Just look what is the shortest range between Washington DC and one certain Middle Eastern country the US hates so much. Which btw the US insisted on being the reason. :smirk:

Russian ICBM go over the Arctic Sea and Canada into the US. Not over Poland. ABM sites in the tundra of Canada and Alaska would be a different issue.

Fine. — ssu

Are things really fine? Let's see.

Yet this is Russian rhetoric to give one reason more against the ABM sites. It is political rhetoric. Because just why would you put attack cruise missiles in a fixed well known position? Cruise missiles are subsonic. Did the US field ground launched cruise missiles? Actually yes, during the Cold War they had few BGM-109G Ground Launched Cruise Missile, and they were mobile. Something you hide in a warehouse... somewhere, not in fixed site with actually not much if any protection to the missiles. And FYI, those were scrapped in the INF treaty. — ssu

As I've explained many times, if you wanted to conduct a totally by surprise out-of-the-blue first strike, you could literally put missiles on fishing boats and just sort of drift into the Russian coast.

These bases are still relevant of course in terms of being able to join in saturation fire of both nuclear missiles (which if you're covertly launching missiles from fishing boats it is definitely within your ability to retrofit ABM missiles or just develop entirely new missile to fire from the ABM bases) as well as the original purpose of ABM and track missiles in the theatre generally speaking and so on.

Such an out-of-the-blue strike would be premised on the assumptions:
1. One, or a few choice launches (as close as you can get) could destroy critical command and control. Fishing boats, farms in Poland or heck let's do Estonia too as well as "routine" flights, certainly submarines, and whatever other way to get as close as you can to hit as fast as you can. Of course, ideally you'd fire all your missiles in this first attack, but the more you fire the more likely your opponent would initiate counter strike. So there's some optimum that is as much as you can get away with before the leadership is dead.

2. Then a a saturation attack would target as much further command and control and counter-strike capability as possible: subs, silos, planes, airfields, etc.

3. ABM then shoots down whatever counter strike capability manages to launch. A volley of ABM missiles can be launched at the the silos or any potential launch location in parallel to step 2 above to try to "time it" and intercept ICBM's in the boost phase. This is where computer modelling comes into to help optimize all these factors.

Whether you neutralize counter-strike capability with a nuclear strike or ABM is of no difference as long as it's neutralized. Sure, even one ICBM can have multiple warheads and decoys, but if they are small enough in number and you have enough ABM maybe you can get them all. As mentioned, anyone conducting a first strike would accept multiple of their own cities as acceptable loss for the total obliteration of the their opponent. The theory is to "be better off" in a post exchange world.

This is why deployment of ABM to cover a wide area, both protecting your own cities and assets (such as Europe and the bases in this case) as well an additional launch site of missiles for various purposes in the 3 steps above, is, as Wikipedia informs us, is a "first strike enabling weapon".

A first strike would be an immensely complicated task involving all sorts of assets.

The ABM bases are one of those assets you'd want in place (and as many such bases as possible) to conduct a first strike.

Cruise missiles are subsonic. Did the US field ground launched cruise missiles? Actually yes, during the Cold War they had few BGM-109G Ground Launched Cruise Missile, and they were mobile. Something you hide in a warehouse... somewhere, not in fixed site with actually not much if any protection to the missiles. And FYI, those were scrapped in the INF treaty. — ssu

If you were conducting a first strike you'd do so with the fastest missiles possible for obvious reasons.

Converting ABM missiles to nuclear warheads would make more sense than cruise missiles.

Maybe US doesn't have hypersonic nuclear missiles undisclosed to the public, maybe they do. Russia can't be sure about the today nor in the future.

And you guys simply ignore the future entirely.

Nuclear assets in place today are in place for decades. We don't know how things will evolve, who will be in power in the US. So this sort of analysis quickly ignores how people "feel" today.

What analysis worry about is mostly escalation pathways in some totally different geopolitical situation in the future, new weapons systems that don't exist today and so on.

We also don't know what the future stakes are. Today we don't feel any reasonable person would think it reasonable to risk the total destruction of even one of their major cities, in addition to the wide range of nuclear winter outcome risks and fallout and so on, but maybe there is some crisis in the future in which this sort of risk starts to seem acceptable.

Deterrence is not necessary just the ability to get through one missile against a first strike, you really need to be confident your opponent is confident their entire society will be obliterated for all meaningful purposes and they won't be "better off" after a nuclear exchange.

Hence, the non-proliferation architecture was all about pulling back first strike capability: ABM, Open Skies, INF were all about providing confidence to the other side that one wasn't in a position to do a first strike, but could definitely do a counter strike.

This is the dynamic that establishes MAD.

Otherwise, you get on the slippery slope (some may call a "rollercoaster" instead" of going towards what I call MAD CRACK, where one side tries to crack the MAD equilibrium by getting enough assets in place to deliver a devastating first blow.

US claims the right to deliver a first strike.

US withdraws from the ABM treaty, which is not just one pillar of a first strike it is the essential enabling part as a first strike really needs to assume that whatever counter-strike gets through can be reasonably dealt with by ABM. Reasonable in this context is New York may still be blown up anyways, but Ohio, glorious Ohio may just survive and thrive.

US starts forward deploying its ABM capability.

US withdraws from the INF treaty ... the other critical weapons systems to conduct a first strike of taking out command and control in the first phase, while insisting Russia accept it's terms of renegotiation that were never even offered.

US partisans are just like "nothing to see here, move along, trust us bro".

No reasonable analysis would see these things and be like "hmm, that's totally normal, nothing to worry about."

Or, if the possible actor has just few ICBMs and has a limited territory to shoot them from, you put an ABM site between your country and the launch site. Just look what is the shortest range between Washington DC and one certain Middle Eastern country the US hates so much. Which btw the US insisted on being the reason. :smirk:

Russian ICBM go over the Arctic Sea and Canada into the US. Not over Poland. ABM sites in the tundra of Canada and Alaska would be a different issue. — ssu

Obviously rogue states are a legitimate threat, no argument from me here.

But capacity to deal with rogue nations is also capacity to deliver a first strike, in particular against Russia if you put those assets close to Russia.

Likewise, if you don't even bother to try to renegotiate the treaties to maintain the non-proliferation architecture while dealing with rogue nations (which are also a problem for Russia), again that's not a good sign.

But it doesn't really matter anyways opinions on people's intentions now, since once the assets are in place a totally different administration could be in power in the future.

We just recently experienced Trump threatening to turn North Korea into a lake of fire, maybe there's someone even more unhinged in power in the future.

Likewise, even if "normal politicians" are in power, as mentioned above, there's no way to predict the stakes that maybe at play in the future.

Therefore, if you're vulnerable to a first strike you would conclude it is likely to happen given enough time and the immense scope of totally unpredictable things that can happen in the world.

As mentioned, it would be probably undoable to order seal team six to go launch a nuclear missile from a fishing boat on some totally innocuous day to start WWIII. However, after a series of escalations it's much more likely missiles would be "moved into place" for defensive measures in completely routine logistics etc. and in a "proper place" and then if tensions get to high everyone understands they'll need to launch if ordered to do so.

There needs to be a sort of "social tension" for people to start to believe they are actually about to launch nuclear weapons; a tension that has existed before, such as the Cuban missile crisis.

So the rational course of action when first strike capability is deployed, is to conduct the risk analysis based on what people can actually do with this new capacity and react to mitigate the risk. If there's no actual intention to carry out a first strike then great! the moves are redundant but you'll still feel better.

Okie then, you concur, land grab, because power and such, NATO or not. (By the way, they have other Black Sea presence + Sea of Azov.)

Their "dire existential threat" rhetoric was/is a call for nationalism (unity), without which waging wars is more difficult; goes hand in hand with their...other efforts. Also, you might have noticed that nuclear posturing is on them, though North Korea is more worrisome.

And to what end?

^(hint)

Looks like Yandex departs Russia, joining whatever others (ExxonMobil, McDonald's, Rönesans Holding, Payoneer, Match Group), for whatever reasons.

Faisal Islam: Russia’s war economy cannot last but has bought time
^{— Faisal Islam · BBC · Feb 10, 2024}

No doubt there are / will be effects, but they're hard to predict. Forecasts, anyone? Effects on their war efforts?

Obviously a nuclear threat would include both nuclear weapons and whatever systems enable to use of those weapons. So "enabling weapons systems" such as ABM fall under the category of nuclear threat. — boethius

When you have described the 'nuclear threat', you have specifically used the phrase 'they could deploy nuclear weapons there'. Pretending that it was not your main point is just silly.

So your original position that the bases representing a nuclear threat is "nonsense" you have since debunked yourself. — boethius

My original point was that it is nonsense that there is significant risk that US will deploy nuclear weapons in Ukraine. You can try to obfuscate that as much as you want, it will not change the fact that you are unable to support that claim.

Again, the Russians say themselves their concern is that the tubes could easily be converted to fire other missiles.

It is literally a tube where you put in a missile and fire said missile. There's nothing special about the tube that would prevent you from firing things other than ABM missiles, and you could also put a nuclear warhead in an ABM missile if you wanted to.

If the US doesn't have this capacity today it could easily develop the capacity tomorrow. It's really not a an insane complicated task that no one has ever accomplished before and pushes up against the laws of physics to take (or develop) a missile of the appropriate size for the tubes or then develop a nuclear warhead that you simply put in the ABM missiles (the literally put nuclear warheads in artillery shells in the past, so I'm sure the US military industrial complex could manage the feat). — boethius

It is hilarious how hard you are trying to undermine your original argument... If the Redzikowo base is just a tube in the ground and Americans can shoot nuclear missiles from anything, then the base loses all sigificance, as it would be equally easy to put the said tubes in the ground covertly and quickly anywhere else.

There's no need to look at a map, the New York Times calculated the distances: — boethius

Then maybe that should be the lesson that you should not take anything that the press publishes for granted...

Yes, the '100' sounds scary, unless you are familiar with the geography. 100 is to Kaliningrad, which is actually a tiny piece of Russian territory wedged in between NATO countries. Yet somehow the New York Times does not write about the Russian missiles 40 miles from the Polish territory and 300 miles from Warsaw... So if two Russian frigates leave the Kaliningrad port, they immediately have three times the firepower twice as close to NATO borders than Redzikowo. Should NATO leaders be fuming?

The first critical thing to do in a first strike is hit command and control to disrupt, delay, and ideally prevent a strategic counter-strike even being ordered. With a little bit of delay one's chances of hitting those strategic nuclear launch facilities and other equipment increase dramatically.

So missile bases getting closer and closer increase the effectiveness of a first strike. The closer you are, the less warning time and so more able to decapitate the leadership and other systems. — boethius

Then I ask for the third time: how does the Redzikowo base used for OFFENSIVE purposes DRAMATICALLY increase the offensive potential as compared to a German frigate sailing on German teritorrial waters?

https://www.straitstimes.com/world/swedish-prosecutor-plans-nord-stream-blast-decision-this-week

We'll know more about the Nordstream sabotage soon. — Benkei

Did we?

Okie then, you concur, land grab, because power and such, NATO or not. (By the way, they have other Black Sea presence + Sea of Azov.) — jorndoe

You seem to always be arguing with someone else.

I have zero problem recognizing Russia's actions are imperialistic. Russia's "national interest" is defined on the exact same basis as US "national interests": preserving and expanding imperial power.

We had no problem calling the Tzarist Empire, spanning nearly the entire Northern Asia, an Empire and it's basically the same size now.

And I have zero problem with people who condemn both US Imperialism and Russian Imperialism.

For myself, I'm an anarchist so I don't believe nation states (empire or otherwise) have any intrinsic value in themselves. So I don't care about borders or national pride or any of the trappings of country of empire in themselves.

Where nations and their dramas and sagas are of relevance to me is in their consequence on real people.

To put that in perspective, if Americans are painting stripes and stars on their faces and running around screaming USA! USA! USA! With flags as capes and so on. That doesn't bother me. If that's their level of philosophical understanding and how they choose to identify themselves and it gives them some pleasure, why not. Likewise any other display of some other national pride by anyone else.

Where I take notice of this whole nation thing, is when the US and Russia are in a great power rivalry and escalating cover and overt attacks on each others Imperial interests, which don't matter much to me but obviously do matter to them and their management.

In this sort of thing, what exactly is happening is much more important (compared to questions such as how many stars exactly to they have painted on their faced) as the consequences (for real people, not mythical representations of "a people") and potential future consequences are very big.

The world has a lot of problems we anyways have to deal with, so my preferred outcome is diplomatic stability. If the people of the world insist they have nations states as we know them today, then it is better to avoid wars and each people need figure things out for themselves, and hopefully cooperate with other nations where that's possible.

Based on that you would certainly conclude that I am against the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

If that was the whole situation, then I would be, but the more important question in anywise is "what do we do about it". Being morally against something is not a course of action.

However, as it stands things are more complicated. The situation is not that there's poor innocent defenceless Ukraine and then a random attack by Imperialist Russia.

US is also interfering in Ukraine since many decades and also increasing nuclear tensions (starting with reneging on ABM, insisting they'll get Russia to agree to new terms first ... then never even negotiate that). The interference of the US is also manipulative and bad faith, dangling the NATO carrot without ever having the intention to have Ukraine join NATO (and the US could just make a bilateral defence agreement with Ukraine any moment of the day if it was so concerned).

Then there is the war on the Donbas. Since I don't care about nation states, I do not care much when pieces secede and declare their own nation state (if it's more-or-less the same thing as before, maybe a good economic move or maybe a bad one).

The very foundation of anarchism is that you have no moral obligation to political structures you find yourself in. Political structures much justify their existence by providing real and accountable value, not by swearing oaths and creating myths for school children and so on.

In my view there is no moral obligation to stay part of a political alliance (such as being a citizen of a country) and one has every right to secede individually or collectively at anytime. It's a constant moral right, and the right the US founders claim in their own secession form the British empire

The question is not moral but rather "is it a good idea?". If you secede as an individual and then starve in a forest, maybe not the best strategy for whatever it is you're trying to do.

Likewise, if you secede as a collective and then are demolished militarily by the political structure, no matter how repressive, you just seceded from ... again maybe wasn't the best idea. Of course there can be situations where fighting a losing battle is the best moral choice, but I'm sure we'd all agree it's good to be both in the right and also win.

Donbas secedes. It's messy, like most secessions are, but they manage to maintain their independence. They need Russian support, but so too did the US need French support; once you're a new political entity it is incumbent on you to seek out support where you can find it.

The US guards jealously its right to secede from the British; the war of independence was costly and bloody but they won (with the help of foreign powers hostile to Britain).

I don's see why I would reduce in meaning the Donbas Declaration of Independence.

Ukraine tries to reconquer the Donbas, fails, creates the inevitable intervention of Russia to resolve the situation.

All I see is that Ukrainian elites have mismanaged things diplomatically and militarily, perhaps because they are among the most corrupt in the world, and I don't see why I'd have sympathy for that.

Now, if despite all that, the West intervened militarily to defend "Ukrainian sovereignty" I would not have a problem with that either.

The rights of nations are what is called "underdetermined"; there are more claims than can be coherently resolved (hence the real solution is to no longer have the nation-state system).

My main problem is with sending arms in lieu of honour, as I've said there is a pretty wide consensus that supplying arms in a conflict does not change the outcome but simply results in more death and damage (mainly to the losing side).

The West is cynically using Ukraine for our own purposes, up to and including the predation of Ukrainian farm titles by Western multinational agribusiness.

If it was actually about democracy, then I'd be more sensitive to that goal and what strategies could actually preserve and strengthen democracy in Ukraine. But it's not about democracy, that idea is a mythical smear of shit over a horrifying truth.

Beside the obvious nonsense of 'nuclear threat' (again, no nuclear missiles have been deployed in any of the new NATO countries, so why exactly should that be an issue?) — Jabberwock

When you have described the 'nuclear threat', you have specifically used the phrase 'they could deploy nuclear weapons there'. Pretending that it was not your main point is just silly. — Jabberwock

It is my main point.

That you can deploy nuclear weapons to these bases is a larger threat than the ABM missiles.

It is not logistically as easy to deploy nuclear weapons to a barn or seal team six on the USS rusty fishing boat than it is to a military base. If tensions starts to rise, it's far easier to deploy nuclear missiles to the bases in "routine" shipments than other locations.

You'd have no way of knowing. Likewise, ABM missiles themselves are duel-use and can be programmed to attack a ground target and loaded with warheads.

Russia has been regularly accused of using ABM missiles on ground targets (including Poland), no one has been like "but ABM can only go up, only up!! Never down!!"

Now, just so happens that ABM anyways is a nuclear first-strike system, as I've explained.

It is not the case here that you've dealt with one of my points but "forgot" that ABM is anyways a nuclear first strike "enabling system" so are somehow 1 for 2.

You have dealt with neither issue.

My original point was that it is nonsense that there is significant risk that US will deploy nuclear weapons in Ukraine. You can try to obfuscate that as much as you want, it will not change the fact that you are unable to support that claim. — Jabberwock

More terrible bad faith.

We were talking about forward deployed bases. There is significant risk that the US deploys nuclear missiles to those bases, if not today then maybe tomorrow, as well as that they'd continue to march their bases closer to Russia, and so into Ukraine, if Russia let them.

Why wouldn't they?

If your opponent allows you (or then can't prevent you) from gaining some strategic advantage, why wouldn't you do that?

In addition to your bad faith, you have a terrible imagination. These bases will be there for decades, so who knows what American leadership will be in decades to come.

The bases are there, the US de facto controls them, the US has nuclear weapons, therefore the US could deploy nuclear weapons to the bases for a first strike (with either existing missiles we may not even know about, or then develop missiles in the future, again we may not even know about).

That is the basic risk analysis of the situation, and it is just foolish to believe that Russia would not react to an increased first strike threat.

The US attitude and justification of these kinds of nuclear escalation moves is basically "suck our dicks", and US sycophants, such as yourself, manage to genuinely maneuver themselves into believing it and being all like "yeah, what gives, why not suck America's dick? I don't get it, what's with these people, why the fuss".

If you say the risk is significant (because it can easily be done) but is small of being used in a first strike today. Sure, the risk is small. However, a small risk multiplied by many days, many years, many decades, in all sorts of totally unknown future scenarios, easily becomes a much larger risk.

Your argument is basically "well I don't think the US would conduct a first strike today, they're just worried about Iran and just want to flex on the Russians, and aren't worried about nuclear war because that's unlikely, so there's nothing to worry about".

It is hilarious how hard you are trying to undermine your original argument... If the Redzikowo base is just a tube in the ground and Americans can shoot nuclear missiles from anything, then the base loses all sigificance, as it would be equally easy to put the said tubes in the ground covertly and quickly anywhere else. — Jabberwock

I've explained this several times, as I did above, again.

You definitely could launch a nuclear missile from just about anywhere: farm, fishing boat, a yacht, etc.

However, it's much easier from a military base. If you ordered people to take a nuke off base in the back of a mini-van, they'd be like "WTF are we doing?".

You'd have to convince a whole bunch of commanders and soldiers to take a nuke off base and randomly launch it at Russia. There's a whole bunch of psychological and logistical issues involved in such an operation that make is less likely (fortunately).

However, moving military equipment between bases is much more logistically "normal".

You could have some AMB missiles retrofitted with nuclear warheads and instruct a ground attack without even informing 99% of the base they even have nuclear weapons. Which is the common sense operational approach to a first strike, as the less people who know the less likely the information would leak and also the less likely anyone would refuse orders on moral grounds.

Once the first strike is irreversible, then it becomes a more usual "shoot them first" situation and most people would be in a psychological state of "we gotta do what we gotta do".

As mentioned, a first strike is pretty unlikely just randomly out of the blue; it is much more likely when tensions are already extremely high and several escalation steps have already been passed, and one side thinks their first strike can really work (maybe a few cities are destroyed, but that's acceptable losses in the kind of situation we're talking about).

This is why first strike capability such as forward deployed missile bases are destabilizing.

Why literally having a first strike policy in the first place is destabilizing.

Why withdrawing from the AMB and INF and Open Skies treaty is destabilizing.

And why all this instability? Apparently because of a fear of a rogue nation being able to launch a single nuke ... well how does that make sense, why increase the odds of getting hit with a hundred or a thousand nukes (even a tiny bit) for fear of being hit by one rogue nuke launch?

Then maybe that should be the lesson that you should not take anything that the press publishes for granted...

Yes, the '100' sounds scary, unless you are familiar with the geography. 100 is to Kaliningrad, which is actually a tiny piece of Russian territory wedged in between NATO countries. Yet somehow the New York Times does not write about the Russian missiles 40 miles from the Polish territory and 300 miles from Warsaw. — Jabberwock

Why does Russias actual border not count again?

How close was Cuba to Washington?

These distances simply aren't very far for missiles flight time, much less far than the bases not-being there.

So if two Russian frigates leave the Kaliningrad port, they immediately have three times the firepower twice as close to NATO borders than Redzikowo. Should NATO leaders be fuming? — Jabberwock

"NATO borders" aren't the US' borders. Poland is not close to Washington. You would not launch a first strike against the US to take out command and control etc. from Poland or Estonia.

You're trying to conflate "NATO borders" with a threat to counter-strike capability.

That Poland, Latvia, and Estonia are close to Russia is not a risk to the US counter strike capability, as their counter strike capability is not in Poland, Latvia or Estonia.

You just completely leave the realm of common sense. Truly remarkable.

Again with the moving the goalposts.

You're initial point was, to remind you:

Then I ask for the third time: how does the Redzikowo base used for OFFENSIVE purposes DRAMATICALLY increase the offensive potential as compared to a German frigate sailing on German teritorrial waters? — Jabberwock

"Nonsense" then you defended this position by simply ignoring that ABM is anyways a nuclear first strike enabling system, and focusing on the "insignificance" of these bases, by comparing the missiles (so far) deployed to these bases to all the missiles tubes in the entire US navy.

I've explained how that it is just completely wrong. For the entire US navy to be of equal threat, it would need to be equally close and maybe Russia would be like "hmm, wonder why all these ships are coming to our shores".

I do not once use the world "DRAMATICALLY".

I've explained what role the bases would play (both in launching nuclear missiles by surprise and their ABM capability) in a first strike. Of course, plenty of other assets would be needed as well.

The more first-strike systems you have (such as ABM) the more able you are to craft an operational plan that would more likely work.

The US is accumulating first strike capability.

Why any increase in first strike capability is taken seriously is because even a small increase in daily risk of something like nuclear obliteration of your entire society, multiplied over a long amount of time becomes a big risk.

Your whole framework is basically the risk of nuclear war isn't "a big deal". If the US builds out appreciable increases in first strike capability (while withdrawing from all the treaties that were signed to prevent that) your basic position is "nuclear shmuclear, Who cares! Boats man! Boats! They already have nukes!"

You have zero clue what you're talking about.

If you wanted to conduct a first strike, or then analyzing your opponents capability of conducting a first strike, each category of weapons systems has a diminishing return on investment.

For example, you can launch nukes from planes, obviously, but you can't put all your planes in the air and send them to Russia as that trigger a reaction from Russia. So, maybe you decide you can casually have 5 planes that "just so happen" to be doing routine flights in key locations to launch some nukes. Likewise with submarines, if you send them all to Russia shoreline maybe they'll be noticed, but maybe you can get through 1 or 2. Then there's whatever ships normally have in theatre. Finally, there's your bases in theatre.

The basic plan would be to build up enough capacity, ideally without your opponent being aware of it but if they are then hopefully underestimate it.

The bases are a major category of first strike system, and your point is basically the Russians should ignore that since there's plenty of nuclear capability anyways.

But then why create these nuclear provocations, send all these signals of withdrawing from treaties and building bases, and so on all in the context of not even repudiating a first-use policy. Sure, could be the goal, right now, is just have ourselves a little arms race as that's highly profitable. But even if that was the case, once the capacity is built up, who's to say some future administration wouldn't then use it because they have it.

And again, the reasoning framework of "these are the weapons systems the US has publicly disclosed right now, therefore nothing else exists now or in the future" is just dumb.

We just recently experienced Trump threatening to turn North Korea into a lake of fire, maybe there's someone even more unhinged in power in the future. — boethius

We've recently experience Trump being the best of friends with Kim Jong Un. No other US president ever has met with the North Korean dictator. So go figure.



And btw during Trump's administration, North Korea tested quite large nuclear weapons in 100+ kiloton range. So at least now the US isn't in denial about the North Korean nuclear weapon... as it for the first test said it might be just a large conventional explosion. But a 6,9 earthquake on the Richter scale you don't get with conventional explosives.

We've recently experience Trump being the best of friends with Kim Jong Un. No other US president ever has met with the North Korean dictator. So go figure. — ssu

It was a love firelake relationship.

And btw during Trump's administration, North Korea tested quite large nuclear weapons in 100+ kiloton range. So at least now the US isn't in denial about the North Korean nuclear weapon... as it for the first test said it might be just a large conventional explosion. But a 6,9 earthquake on the Richter scale you don't get with conventional explosives. — ssu

Definitely no doubt about the rogue nation threat.

However, the Russian perspective (at least according to Putin) was they were willing to renegotiate ABM and other treaties to deal with rogue nuclear threats while maintaining the non-proliferation architecture.

Furthermore, if you're analyzing this sort of thing in the Russian's equivalent of the pentagon—I'm going to hazard a guess that it's some sort of quadragon—then you could believe this is the main reason for it, but if it has a secondary effect of building up first strike capability against Russia then that's what you're going to be concerned about.

Especially the long time frames involved in nuclear strategy, very quickly the dominant factor is whether or not you're vulnerable to a first strike.

Now, all I've tried to explain on the subject is that building ABM missile bases closer to your nuclear opponent is a noticeable increase in first strike capability (certainly worth analyzing and placing on the list of risks to consider mitigatory action). Obviously for the Russians it's a big enough concern to take diplomatic action against.

However, how much of a risk Russian analysts or high-command view it and if it makes sense or noth, we'd need access to their top secret intelligence.

People (mostly on reddit) already like to say most of the Russia's nuclear arsenal is defunct in some way and the US could already easily carry out a first strike today. Maybe that's true. I doubt it, but a big difference in today's world vis-a-vis the Cold War is much more sophisticated signal intelligence as well as computation. Perhaps with just the right mix of weapon systems and sophisticated deployment and computer management (presumably even better now with AI) of the whole affair, a first strike is "doable" in at least some computer simulations. Or maybe it's basically not doable today or in the near future. But in terms of reacting to maintain the nuclear balance of power and ensure MAD, that it's not doable today doesn't exclude mitigatory action as you don't know what weapons systems will exist in the future.

That you can deploy nuclear weapons to these bases is a larger threat than the ABM missiles. — boethius

No, it is not. The main Russian concern is the defensive capability of ABMs. However, for obvious reasons that does not sell as well, as I have already explained.

It is not logistically as easy to deploy nuclear weapons to a barn or seal team six on the USS rusty fishing boat than it is to a military base. If tensions starts to rise, it's far easier to deploy nuclear missiles to the bases in "routine" shipments than other locations.

You'd have no way of knowing. Likewise, ABM missiles themselves are duel-use and can be programmed to attack a ground target and loaded with warheads. — boethius

No, the ABM missiles deployed in the bases are not capable of carrying nuclear missiles. To load the tubes with nuclear missiles, Tomahawks would need to be delivered (and the tubes rearmed). So yes, it would be quite obvious if the base was under surveillance (and of course it is). And even Tomahawks with greater range would not be that effective as a first strike OFFENSIVE weapon. That is why the article on the doctrine does not list any ABMs as the likely or potential offensive weapon.

We were talking about forward deployed bases. There is significant risk that the US deploys nuclear missiles to those bases, if not today then maybe tomorrow, as well as that they'd continue to march their bases closer to Russia, and so into Ukraine, if Russia let them.

Why wouldn't they? — boethius

For the same reason they have not deployed any nuclear missiles in any new countries since the sixties.

"NATO borders" aren't the US' borders. Poland is not close to Washington. You would not launch a first strike against the US to take out command and control etc. from Poland or Estonia.

You're trying to conflate "NATO borders" with a threat to counter-strike capability.

That Poland, Latvia, and Estonia are close to Russia is not a risk to the US counter strike capability, as their counter strike capability is not in Poland, Latvia or Estonia. — boethius

And Russian command and control center is not within the reiiable range of the missiles deployed at the ABM missile site. As you would know if you have looked at the map, which you flatly refused to do.

"Nonsense" then you defended this position by simply ignoring that ABM is anyways a nuclear first strike enabling system, and focusing on the "insignificance" of these bases, by comparing the missiles (so far) deployed to these bases to all the missiles tubes in the entire US navy.

I've explained how that it is just completely wrong. For the entire US navy to be of equal threat, it would need to be equally close and maybe Russia would be like "hmm, wonder why all these ships are coming to our shores". — boethius

I see the question was too hard. OK, I will try again:

How does the Redzikowo base used for OFFENSIVE purposes DRAMATICALLY increase the offensive potential as compared to ONE German frigate sailing on German teritorrial waters?

Be sure to notice the word ONE (1). It means that I ask you to compare the offensive potential of the Redzikowo base to a SINGLE German frigate. That means a number less than two. Will I get an honest answer to that question or not?

I do not once use the world "DRAMATICALLY". — boethius

What is this then?

The bases quite dramatically increase first strike capability (both in the ABM and nuclear capacity) above what would just be normally "hanging around". — boethius

You cannot remember your posts which are on the current page? That explains SO much...

I've explained what role the bases would play (both in launching nuclear missiles by surprise and their ABM capability) in a first strike. Of course, plenty of other assets would be needed as well. — boethius

Sure, the issue is that you are just wrong. The base does not have missiles which are capable of carrying nuclear warheads, and even if they were, their range would be too short for the first strike. The tubes could be loaded with different missiles, but that cannot be done easily or covertly. Not to mention that it would be rather pointless, given that a single frigate sailing where it is regularly sailing could have the exact same effect.

Ukrainian corrupt Nazi losers and Western lapdogs keep provoking Russian honorable men in the Black Sea and Sudan:
"Ukrainian Special Forces Interrogate Wagner Mercenaries in Sudan"
https://www.kyivpost.com/post/27637
Russian landing ship Tsezar Kunikov hit in Black Sea, it has sunk
https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/02/14/7441777/

No, it is not. The main Russian concern is the defensive capability of ABMs. However, for obvious reasons that does not sell as well, as I have already explained. — Jabberwock

To defend against a Russian first strike?

And where do you even get what the "Russians really think" from?

You just makeup total bullshit, whatever is required to simply directly contradict obvious common sense.

Nuclear threats, first strike threats, are far greater than an ABM threat to your own first strike.

This whole areas is far from US shores ... this ABM base does not protect Washington (or any part of the US counter-strike arsenal), from a first strike.

Totally moronic point.

No, the ABM missiles deployed in the bases are not capable of carrying nuclear missiles. — Jabberwock

Please explain how these missiles are simply "not capable" of having their ABM warhead swapped out for a nuclear warhead. We can literally put nuclear warheads in artillery shells but this feet is just not possible.

Your points are just a series of direct denials of common sense statements, without argumentation or evidence.

For the same reason they have not deployed any nuclear missiles in any new countries since the sixties. — Jabberwock

Therefore, if the same tensions emerged as in the sixties we could expect the US to deploy nuclear weapons to new countries.

Your imagination levels are literally zero. You can't even imagine something that has already happened, and a key point of yours, simply happening again.

It's honestly difficult to believe you're really that dull, but maybe you are.

I see the question was too hard. OK, I will try again:

How does the Redzikowo base used for OFFENSIVE purposes DRAMATICALLY increase the offensive potential as compared to ONE German frigate sailing on German teritorrial waters?

Be sure to notice the word ONE (1). It means that I ask you to compare the offensive potential of the Redzikowo base to a SINGLE German frigate. That means a number less than two. Will I get an honest answer to that question or not? — Jabberwock

Again, a ship you can get your own submarines, planes, other ships closer to than an inland base.

It's also easier to sink a ship than a land-base.

The land bases are also simply in different positions so expand the radar coverage and missile coverage.

This is really the most basic common sense possible that a single ship is less capable than a ship + land base.

If it was so insignificant why would such a base be built? Answer: because it's not insignificant but increases capabilities in the theatre.

I do not once use the world "DRAMATICALLY".
— boethius

What is this then?

The bases quite dramatically increase first strike capability (both in the ABM and nuclear capacity) above what would just be normally "hanging around".
— boethius — Jabberwock

"DRAMATICALLY" does not equal "dramatically".

"DRAMATICALLY" is significantly more dramatic than merely "dramatically".

A citation should be exact, I do not all-caps words because I can rely on "arguing a point".

Sure, the issue is that you are just wrong. The base does not have missiles which are capable of carrying nuclear warheads, and even if they were, their range would be too short for the first strike. The tubes could be loaded with different missiles, but that cannot be done easily or covertly. Not to mention that it would be rather pointless, given that a single frigate sailing where it is regularly sailing could have the exact same effect. — Jabberwock

Ah yes, They can't! ... but if they could (because they obviously can) here's another goalpost move.

We've literally but nuclear warheads in artillery shells, so what's your argument that swapping out the warhead in these ABM missiles is beyond what US engineers are "capable" of?

Go on, I'm all ears.

As for "easily or covertly" just loading different missiles: if you're carrying out a first strike you aren't in "easy" territory but maybe willing to do things that are somewhat difficult, maybe even medium difficultly.

And can't be done covertly?

Again, just making up bullshit direct contradictions against obvious common sense reality.

You're really saying that the missiles couldn't be modified (such as the ABM missiles or otherwise) to more easily fire from these tubes, and if went beyond what was "easy" in preparing your first strike, you couldn't do the difficult task of converting the tubes in some covert way, part of regular maintenance etc. on your own base?

However, the Russian perspective (at least according to Putin) was they were willing to renegotiate ABM and other treaties to deal with rogue nuclear threats while maintaining the non-proliferation architecture. — boethius

Good insert that according to Putin. Because when you look at modern surface to air missile development, the longer range systems are all basically developed to engage ballistic missiles. So the idea of any ABM treaty now is a bit hypocritical. So it's not only the Russians who are here hypocrites.

For example Israel had no trouble of hitting the Houthi ballistic missiles and the success of the Arrow system obviously can be seen from the simple fact that the Houthis aren't lobbing long range missiles to Israel anymore. Much time has gone from the time Saddam Hussein was firing Scuds to Israel and basically got half of the USAF fighter bombers searching in vain the empty vast desert of Western Iraq.

Now, all I've tried to explain on the subject is that building ABM missile bases closer to your nuclear opponent is a noticeable increase in first strike capability (certainly worth analyzing and placing on the list of risks to consider mitigatory action). Obviously for the Russians it's a big enough concern to take diplomatic action against. — boethius

Of course it's a concern to the Russians. But basically those ABM sites in Poland would basically protect... France and the UK. It's a simple fact that Russian nukes launched from Russia will fly over the Arctic, over Canada to hit continental US and the USAF missile silos in the center of the US. If those sites were planned to be in the tundra wastes of northern Canada, then the role would be totally obvious. ABM missiles have to be very close to the actual flight paths of the missiles as simply there isn't much time to defend against an ICBM launch.

Opinions over Syrskyi "the butcher":
https://www.politico.com/newsletters/national-security-daily/2024/02/08/zaluzhny-is-out-the-butcher-is-in-00140206
https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1720814139600232737?s=20
https://twitter.com/NeilPHauer/status/1756470879142170805

Good insert that according to Putin. Because when you look at modern surface to air missile development, the longer range systems are all basically developed to engage ballistic missiles. So the idea of any ABM treaty now is a bit hypocritical. So it's not only the Russians who are here hypocrites. — ssu

Their proposal (and what Bush said publicly he'd insist on Russia accepting) was to renegotiate the ABM treaty to update it to recent threats, such as North Korea.

Russia doesn't want to be nuked by North Korea or some other rogue nation or terrorist cell either.

Without a treaty obviously Russia can do what it wants, so I don't see the hypocriticalness on their part you're talking about.

For example Israel had no trouble of hitting the Houthi ballistic missiles and the success of the Arrow system obviously can be seen from the simple fact that the Houthis aren't lobbing long range missiles to Israel anymore. Much time has gone from the time Saddam Hussein was firing Scuds to Israel and basically got half of the USAF fighter bombers searching in vain the empty vast desert of Western Iraq. — ssu

To what extent ABM is effective against the most advanced missiles is always an open question as we see few such engagements.

However, the most advanced systems of your opponent are going to be limited in number.

Presumably if you're going to deliver a first strike your belief is that your ABM systems are going to be able to deal with whatever counter-strike gets through.

However, there's a lot of "knowledge based risk" in nuclear escalation analysis, such as was clearly demonstrated in Strange Love. Maybe your plan has no chance of succeeding but you think it will.

Hence, first strike assets in place are destabilizing and lead to further arms escalation because you want to be certain your opponent knows you have survivable counter-strike capability. You might believe you do anyways, but you want to be sure your adversary believes it too.

Hence what stabilized the nuclear arms race was a series of treaties to wind down first-strike capability well below what each side was confident was inadequate (as well as each side confident the other side was confident).

Now that those treaties have gone away, we see escalation in at least arms if not also the invasion of Ukraine partly due to the collapse in nuclear trust.

It's easy for nuclear considerations to dominate the discussion (in high places). "Ah but nukes" is always a powerful rebuttal, and we saw a significant amount of Cold War policy driven by fear of nuclear weapons. The soviets were particularly paranoid as they were technologically behind and the US demonstrated its willingness to use nuclear weapons to blowup cities.

But as I said, we'd need to know Russias top secrets to know what they actually think and on what basis.

They may have high confidence in the survivability of their counter-strike assets and very low confidence in American (or any for that matter) ABM systems to deal with a counter-strike. That's definitely their public position but we can't really know what they really think or are worried about.

However, fears of nuclear war is always one piece of the puzzle in understanding geo-politics today.

What we can say for sure is that the US doesn't help assuage those fears by declaring a no-first-use policy; they like to keep us guessing, so here we are.

And that is one way to sum up the idiocy of American apologetics on this issue: If America's official policy is to "strategic ambiguity" so adversaries fear a nuclear strike and they can leverage that fear (for deterrence of "American interests") then you can't say "well yeah, we need strategic ambiguity is so adversaries fear a first strike, but they also have nothing to fear! Haven't deployed nukes to new countries since the 60s!!"

If your public policy is that adversaries should live in fear of nuclear annihilation, you can't really then blame adversaries from acting out of fear.

Of course it's a concern to the Russians. But basically those ABM sites in Poland would basically protect... France and the UK. It's a simple fact that Russian nukes launched from Russia will fly over the Arctic, over Canada to hit continental US and the USAF missile silos in the center of the US. If those sites were planned to be in the tundra wastes of northern Canada, then the role would be totally obvious. ABM missiles have to be very close to the actual flight paths of the missiles as simply there isn't much time to defend against an ICBM launch. — ssu

That's why I've been mostly focused on the so called "decapitation strike" potential of the missile bases, and that it's logically and psychologically far easier to do from base than a fishing boat.

Obviously you could launch your decapitation strike from fishing boats and barns, but it would be a pretty complicated situation.

A more realistic scenario is that tensions increase, there's some escalation steps caused by whatever, and the decision is made to forward deploy the nukes "just in case", and then because the nukes are there the "just in case" turns into "we need to strike first" and the first-strike plan is put into action.

In the same scenario it would be much harder to "deploy the nuclear fishing boats".

When things are calm, even relatively calm with a hot war in Ukraine, it's easy to "feel" like people won't launch nuclear weapons. But if you increase the stakes and the stress enough that changes along with people doing crazy things under stress.

This is why you don't just want "probably" a survivable deterrent, you want your adversary to be convinced your counter-strike will most definitely survive, so that this belief persists even into high stress situations.

There's also the fear that if your command and control is destroyed and your society is essentially obliterated, that remaining commanders will not "see the point" in revenge.

Hence, the nuclear powers are sensitive to increases in first strike capability; why the Cuban Missile crisis was a "serious thing" and not "but they have boats and subs anyways, a 1 in 1000 increase in capability that was totally meaningless". Literally no serious analyst has ever deployed this "bases aren't a deal yo" to the Cuban missile crisis.

As for the ABM capability itself, presumably there would be nukes also going towards Europe you'd want to destroy.

You'd of course need other ABM assets to deal with nukes going from different directions. Might need literally hundreds of thousands of ABM missiles to be "somewhat confident" your first strike plan will work.

May simply be not feasible today, which is why I explain that the problem (from the Russian perspective) is also the trend. Maybe today there's just not enough ABM missiles in the world to deal with a counter-strike, but what about tomorrow? What if they let these bases proliferate and then tomorrow there's effective ABM systems in vast quantity that exist? And with AI to distinguish decoys and be more accurate, organize the whole effort, etc. you could need way less missiles per target than today.

Opinions over Syrskyi "the butcher":
https://www.politico.com/newsletters/national-security-daily/2024/02/08/zaluzhny-is-out-the-butcher-is-in-00140206 — neomac

If you read the article, he seems to be called the "the butcher" not exactly in a good way:

But Syrskyi’s also known for leading forces into a meat grinder in Bakhmut, sending wave after wave of troops to face opposition fire. In the end, Kremlin-backed Wagner Group mercenaries captured the city.

For that and other reasons, Syrskyi is deeply unpopular with Ukraine’s rank-and-file. — Zaluzhny is out, the ‘butcher’ is in

If you read the article, he seems to be called the "the butcher" not exactly in a good way: — boethius

That's why I posted it. If you read my links, all of them are criticizing Zelensky's choice of replacing Zalushny with the Butcher.

Honestly, the article is really surprising to see in a Western media outlet.

Another person knowledgeable of Syrskyi’s operations echoed that view. His appointment is unlikely to have a positive effect for Ukraine, as Syrskyi is seen by those on the frontlines as a stern Soviet-style general who callously puts his men in danger.

This person added that Ukrainian troops have given Syrskyi a gruesome nickname: “Butcher.” The captain confirmed that the nickname has stuck, as has “General200” — which stands for 200 dead on the battlefield.

The negative reviews keep pouring in: “General Syrski’s leadership is bankrupt, his presence or orders coming from his name are demoralizing, and he undermines trust in the command in general,” a Ukrainian military officer posted on X. “His relentless pursuit of tactical gains constantly depletes our valuable human resources, resulting in tactical advances such as capturing tree lines or small villages, with no operational goals in mind.”

A Ukrainian soldier also tweeted a message in a group chat of veterans of the Bakhmut fight: “We’re all fucked.” — Zaluzhny is out, the ‘butcher’ is in

I think useful to highlight that I, personally, wouldn't base any conclusions on anonymous X posts, so I wouldn't say this is good journalism, so no surprise there, but it is surprising to see this level of criticism coming from a Western media outlet.