Well, that, nothing to spacetime, cannot happen. I think we agree that spacetime is a substance. — MoK

I think you've made a pretty good argument so far, but here is where you're stuck. I think its fine to call spacetime a substance, but plugging it into the argument we haven't proven that spacetime cannot come from nothing. We never noted that substances couldn't come from nothing, only that they needed spacetime. Saying, "Nothing to spacetime cannot happen" is the conclusion, so we can't use it as a premise. We have to have true premises that necessarily lead to the conclusion being true, without the premises needing the conclusion to be true.

What is before the beginning of time and nothing to something are sides of the same coin. It is not proper to say what is before the beginning of time since there is no time before the beginning of time. — MoK

Here you run into another problem. If there is no time before the beginning of time (spacetime), then what is there? There can't be something that's different from spacetime because you required that spacetime exist for change to happen. And you can't have infinitely regressive time as you've already ruled that out. The only option left is that nothing was before spacetime.

P1: T ↔ C — Bob Ross

I suspect it's an implication - "if there is a change then there is a passage of time" or some such. — Banno

Though OP says time is needed for change, he does not say it is sufficient. Time is needed for change, so where there is change there is time, always. However, it is not always that where there is time there is change.

We are looking for this, where X is the result.

So it would be instead that T ← C.

https://www.ncl.ac.uk/webtemplate/ask-assets/external/maths-resources/economics/sets-and-logic/necessity-and-sufficiency.html
https://sites.millersville.edu/bikenaga/math-proof/truth-tables/truth-tables.html

I think you've made a pretty good argument so far, but here is where you're stuck. I think its fine to call spacetime a substance, but plugging it into the argument we haven't proven that spacetime cannot come from nothing. We never noted that substances couldn't come from nothing, only that they needed spacetime. Saying, "Nothing to spacetime cannot happen" is the conclusion, so we can't use it as a premise. We have to have true premises that necessarily lead to the conclusion being true, without the premises needing the conclusion to be true. — Philosophim

OK, this is the last arrow in my quiver: Any theory in which time is an emergent property within must be a dynamical theory (for example the theory that explains nothing to spacetime). Time however is the main variable in any dynamical theory. This means that time has to be emergent and at the same time the main variable of such a theory. This is however problematic since time is required for the emergence of time.

Here you run into another problem. If there is no time before the beginning of time (spacetime), then what is there? There can't be something that's different from spacetime because you required that spacetime exist for change to happen. And you can't have infinitely regressive time as you've already ruled that out. The only option left is that nothing was before spacetime. — Philosophim

There is simply no point before the beginning of time so we cannot say what is before the beginning of time. Think of the beginning of time as a solid and impenetrable wall. We cannot get through this wall and ask what is before. In fact, we are committing an error in saying what is before the beginning of time since before indicates the existence of a time before the beginning of time. This time however does not exist since we are talking about the beginning of time.

I can define nothing as a condition that there is no thing, no spacetime, no material,...

P1) Time is needed for change
P2) There is no change when there is no time (From P1) (HP)
P3) Nothing to something needs a change in nothing (HP)
P4) There is no time in nothing
C1) Therefore, change in nothing is not possible (From P2 and P4)
C2) Therefore, nothing to something is not possible (from P3 and C1) — MoK

Nothing to something is F, change is C, nothing is n, time is t.
P1) ∀x(C(x) → t)
P2 is a repetition of P1.
P3)
P4) n → ¬t
C1)
C2) ¬∃x(F(x))

This the best that I managed after a few tries, but I can't write change in nothing.

The idea of 'nothing', especially in regard to 'something' is complicated because it combines the mathematical with the linguistic. At its basis, the mathematics of nothing is zero; but how it comes into play linguistically conceptually may be more complex. — Jack Cummins

:up:

Nothing to something is F, change is C, nothing is n, time is t.
P1) ∀x(C(x) → t)
P2 is a repetition of P1. — Lionino

I see what you mean.

P3) ∀x(F(x) → C(x))
P4) n → ¬t
C1)
C2) ¬∃x(F(x))

This the best that I managed after a few tries, but I can't write C1, so C2 is likely troublesome too. — Lionino

Thank you very much for putting in the effort to convert my pseudo-syllogism into a syllogism.

So my argument looks like this after your correction:

P1) Time is needed for change
P2) Nothing to something needs a change in nothing
P3) There is no time in nothing
C1) Therefore, change in nothing is not possible (From P1 and P3)
C2) Therefore, nothing to something is not possible (from P2 and C1)

T ← C. — Lionino

We don't usually write the implication backwards. C ⊃ T.

But, in the absence of further clarification, I Understand to be making the claim that time is necessary and sufficient for change, hence T ≡ C.

I think this an incorrect assumption, and that time can pass without change.

But again, I think the whole framing of this issue here is misguided. Logic does not allow us to derive anything that is not in the assumptions, and hence logic alone cannot deduce the existence of god or of a first cause or of something never coming from nothing. A logic does not have ontological implications outside of whatever presumptions that logic makes.

Logic is just a way of talking clearly.

OK, this is the last arrow in my quiver: Any theory in which time is an emergent property within must be a dynamical theory (for example the theory that explains nothing to spacetime). Time however is the main variable in any dynamical theory. This means that time has to be emergent and at the same time the main variable of such a theory. This is however problematic since time is required for the emergence of time. — MoK

Trying to throw in some extra vocabulary doesn't solve the issue. Lord knows its a common tactic among many on the forums. :D We should be able to explain everything in simple terms. Simply put, if your conclusion is part of your premises "that something cannot emerge within nothing" then its not a viable argument. Remember as well, time cannot exist on its own, so we always have to be referencing spacetime as well. Spacetime is a substance, not emergent.

There is simply no point before the beginning of time so we cannot say what is before the beginning of time. Think of the beginning of time as a solid and impenetrable wall. We cannot get through this wall and ask what is before. In fact, we are committing an error in saying what is before the beginning of time since before indicates the existence of a time before the beginning of time. — MoK

Again, the added vocabulary and sentence structure does not negate the simple fact. There was either something, or nothing. If you claim we cannot reference before spacetime, that means there was nothing before spacetime. If you claim spacetime always existed, then we have an infinite regress. There is no third option, just a desire that we not pick one of the two. 'Nothing' and 'something' are binaries. If there is not something, there is nothing. If there is not nothing, there is something.

A convention is just that, a convention.

But, in the absence of further clarification, I Understand ↪MoK to be making the claim that time is necessary and sufficient for change, hence T ≡ C. — Banno

I thought you were making the point that T → C when replying to Bob. But nevermind.

Logic does not allow us to derive anything that is not in the assumptions, and hence logic alone cannot deduce the existence of god or of a first cause or of something never coming from nothing. — Banno

Exactly. The good old defining something into existence.

Spacetime is a substance and has a curvature around massive objects. Spacetime can affect the motion of any other objects so in this sense it exists and has a property, its curvature. — MoK

Please provide a link to this information. As far as I know it is nothing but a concept used to refer to points in time in space. But I an interested in viewing anything you have to further my knowledge.

We don't usually write the implication backwards. C ⊃ T.

But, in the absence of further clarification, I Understand ↪MoK to be making the claim that time is necessary and sufficient for change, hence T ≡ C. — Banno

I think the correct statement is that time is necessary for change. By this, I mean that there cannot be any change if there is no time.

I think this an incorrect assumption, and that time can pass without change. — Banno

You are correct. Time can pass without any change (for example in the state of heat death).

But again, I think the whole framing of this issue here is misguided. Logic does not allow us to derive anything that is not in the assumptions, and hence logic alone cannot deduce the existence of god or of a first cause or of something never coming from nothing. A logic does not have ontological implications outside of whatever presumptions that logic makes.

Logic is just a way of talking clearly. — Banno

Thanks. I get your point. I couldn't argue anything without those premises.

Trying to throw in some extra vocabulary doesn't solve the issue. Lord knows its a common tactic among many on the forums. :D We should be able to explain everything in simple terms. Simply put, if your conclusion is part of your premises "that something cannot emerge within nothing" then its not a viable argument. Remember as well, time cannot exist on its own, so we always have to be referencing spacetime as well. Spacetime is a substance, not emergent. — Philosophim

Ok, I can simplify this even further. I think we can agree that spacetime is necessary for change. I think we can agree that nothing to spacetime is a change as well. This means that we need spacetime for this change, nothing to spacetime. But there is no spacetime in nothing therefore nothing to spacetime is not possible.

Again, the added vocabulary and sentence structure does not negate the simple fact. There was either something, or nothing. If you claim we cannot reference before spacetime, that means there was nothing before spacetime. If you claim spacetime always existed, then we have an infinite regress. There is no third option, just a desire that we not pick one of the two. 'Nothing' and 'something' are binaries. If there is not something, there is nothing. If there is not nothing, there is something. — Philosophim

Well, non. :) I said before that nothing to something and nothing is before the beginning of time are sides of a coin. If we accept that there is nothing before the beginning of time then it follows that nothing to something is possible. That is what I am trying to prove, nothing to something is not possible. So if we agree that nothing to something is not possible then it follows that it is improper to say that there was nothing before the beginning of time.

Please provide a link to this information. As far as I know it is nothing but a concept used to refer to points in time in space. But I an interested in viewing anything you have to further my knowledge. — Sir2u

Well, that is a lot of reading but here you go (what I quote and write may be enough):

1) Introduction to general relativity

General relativity is a theory of gravitation developed by Albert Einstein between 1907 and 1915. The theory of general relativity says that the observed gravitational effect between masses results from their warping of spacetime.

2) This, gravitational lens, explains how a massive object bends light from a distant source as it travels toward an observer.

3) Gravitational wave

Gravitational waves were later predicted in 1916 by Albert Einstein on the basis of his general theory of relativity as ripples in spacetime. Gravitational waves transport energy as gravitational radiation, a form of radiant energy similar to electromagnetic radiation.

Ok, I can simplify this even further. I think we can agree that spacetime is necessary for change. I think we can agree that nothing to spacetime is a change as well. This means that we need spacetime for this change, nothing to spacetime. — MoK

No, I don't think so because what you've concluded is that we need spacetime for other changes besides spacetime. You haven't proven that spacetime itself cannot come from nothing. We could also say change must involve spacetime. Nothing to something is a change, and it involves spacetime.

So if we agree that nothing to something is not possible then it follows that it is improper to say that there was nothing before the beginning of time. — MoK

This is assuming the conclusion is assuming the conclusion is true. This is classical logical fallacy called "Begging the question". If the only way your premises work is if you assume the conclusion is true, then nothing has been proven.

I think it was a good start, but you've reached the logical end with the premises and definitions you've put forth. I'm not saying you shouldn't keep trying, but at this point you'll need a new tact. Either new definitions, or a revision of premises is required.

No, I don't think so because what you've concluded is that we need spacetime for other changes besides spacetime. You haven't proven that spacetime itself cannot come from nothing. We could also say change must involve spacetime. Nothing to something is a change, and it involves spacetime. — Philosophim

We have to agree whether nothing to spacetime is a change or not. Yes or no?

This is assuming the conclusion is assuming the conclusion is true. This is classical logical fallacy called "Begging the question". If the only way your premises work is if you assume the conclusion is true, then nothing has been proven.

I think it was a good start, but you've reached the logical end with the premises and definitions you've put forth. I'm not saying you shouldn't keep trying, but at this point you'll need a new tact. Either new definitions, or a revision of premises is required. — Philosophim

Actually, I have two strategies to argue that it is improper to say what is before the beginning of time: (1) There is no point before the beginning of time. If there was such a point then it means that spacetime exists before the beginning of time so what we assume as the beginning of time is not the beginning of time and (2) Nothing to something is impossible which is the subject of discussion.

We have to agree whether nothing to spacetime is a change or not. Yes or no? — MoK

Yes. :) And the above still applies.

(1) There is no point before the beginning of time. — MoK

If there is no point prior to spacetime (remember, you noted earlier time cannot exist alone, its a property of spacetime) then there is nothing.

If there was such a point then it means that spacetime exists before the beginning of time so what we assume as the beginning of time is not the beginning of time — MoK

But spacetime is a substance, and has the property of time. You can't say spacetime existed before time. That would be like saying my red hat existed before red. Its not about what we assume to be the beginning of time, its about if there is something before time.

(2) Nothing to something is impossible which is the subject of discussion. — MoK

Right, but as its been noted, that's your conclusion. If you assume the conclusion is true, you haven't proven the conclusion is true. Its just a belief at that point.

With how you've defined everything, you've worked yourself into a corner. You can't have something before spacetime, which means that nothing was before spacetime. And you can't have infinite amount of time that has passed prior to now, which means spacetime couldn't have always existed. But keep trying!

I'm having a bit of difficulty in bringing out the validity of the OP. Three assumptions and a conclusion - something is usually missing, or superfluous.

I had a go at parsing the argument in to something that was valid, but I can't see it.

Anyone? — Banno

I'm not sure it's valid. I see a conflict of scope in the way "nothing" is used (you've made a post somewhere pretty much addressing this).

Let me make it as short as possible:

The two P's I'd accept inuitively:

P1) Time is needed for any change.
P2) There is no time in nothing.

The logical conclusion here is: There is no change in nothing.

Now let's assume:

P3) Nothing to something is a change.

The logical conclusion here is, then: The change from nothing to something doesn't occur in nothing.

I sort of have a hunch that either P2 and P3 are inconsistent with each other, or they're not the same modality ("P3) If nothing to something occurs it's a change.") But who knows.

Maybe set-theory can help? The set of all existing things is called "nothing" when empty, and "something" when not. There's temporal continuity, and what's in the set depends on "when" we look. That would leave the empty set with an undefined time if there's no time before the beginning of time (as he later states). We can't check the empty set, because there's no time t(n-1) at t(0), and at t(0) the set is no longer empty, as it contains t(0). Not familiar enough with set-theory to know if that makes any sense (I have a hunch that the "set of all sets that don't contain themselves" may trip me up here).

Yes. :) And the above still applies. — Philosophim

Well, if nothing to spacetime is a change then we need spacetime for it! That is true since spacetime is necessary for any change.

If there is no point prior to spacetime (remember, you noted earlier time cannot exist alone, its a property of spacetime) then there is nothing. — Philosophim

No, please see below.

But spacetime is a substance, and has the property of time. You can't say spacetime existed before time. — Philosophim

True, and that is the problem. Saying that nothing exists before the beginning of time assumes that there is a point at which nothing exists at that point.

Right, but as its been noted, that's your conclusion. If you assume the conclusion is true, you haven't proven the conclusion is true. Its just a belief at that point.

With how you've defined everything, you've worked yourself into a corner. You can't have something before spacetime, which means that nothing was before spacetime. And you can't have infinite amount of time that has passed prior to now, which means spacetime couldn't have always existed. But keep trying! — Philosophim

Let's see how our debate proceeds in regards to nothing to something is impossible.

Please note that I renewed my argument because of a hidden premise (HP). Please find the new argument in the following:

P1) Time is needed for change
P2) Nothing to something needs a change in nothing (HP)
P3) There is no time in nothing
C1) Therefore, change in nothing is not possible (From P1 and P3)
C2) Therefore, nothing to something is not possible (from P2 and C1)

Ah, I missed that. I'll need some time to think (primarily, if I can construct a coherent theory of change and time based on what you've said).

P1) Time is needed for change
P2) Nothing to something needs a change in nothing (HP)
P3) There is no time in nothing
C1) Therefore, change in nothing is not possible (From P1 and P3)
C2) Therefore, nothing to something is not possible (from P2 and C1) — MoK

The argument seems valid. The issue is that many premises are doubtable. Is it even possible — or rational — to talk nothingness about and what properties it has? "There is no time in nothing" seems to mean absolutely nothing without further elaboration.

None of this is new to me, but you have still failed to provide a link to backup your claim that spacetime is a substance. That is what I would like a link to.

I think the correct statement is that time is necessary for change. By this, I mean that there cannot be any change if there is no time. — MoK

Well, this has proved to be a contentious issue, which is to me somewhat puzzling. There are plenty of folk hereabouts who will agree with you, but I am not one. I see no reason not to say that changes can occur across distances, as well as times. And I think the mathematics and physics back up this approach, since we can calculate change over distance (Δx/Δy) for various things, and we have the physics of statics, Hook's law and so on.

I'd be interested in why you think this to be the case.

I get your point. — MoK

Cheers.

(I have a hunch that the "set of all sets that don't contain themselves" may trip me up here). — Dawnstorm

I suspect so. The usual conclusion is that one cannot have a set of all sets. If that is what your "set of all existing things" is, then it's ill-formed. But a big part of the problem here is that it is very unclear what "nothing" and "existing" and "something" are doing; they are not being used in the way they are usually used, and so it is unclear what conventions are in place.

And I'd point out again that it seems highly contentious that a logical argument could reach a conclusion that was not somehow implicit in the assumptions of the argument - that something could "pop into existence in a puff of logic", to misquote Douglas Adams.

Again, I think the style of this argument is corrupt, that there is something amiss in the way the issue is framed.

Seems like we're going round and round here at this point. Which is fine, it just means its likely time to end it.

Well, if nothing to spacetime is a change then we need spacetime for it! That is true since spacetime is necessary for any change. — MoK

But if spacetime appears, we have spacetime. If you're saying we need spacetime before spacetime, that doesn't make any sense. The only thing you've noted is that we need spacetime for other changes besides spacetime itself. You have not proven, only asserted, that spacetime cannot come from nothing. That doesn't work. Prove it, and you have an argument. If not, you're stuck.

But spacetime is a substance, and has the property of time. You can't say spacetime existed before time.
— Philosophim
True, and that is the problem. Saying that nothing exists before the beginning of time assumes that there is a point at which nothing exists at that point. — MoK

Its not an assumption, its a logical conclusion based on your point. If you say spacetime has a beginning, and spacetime is the only way for other things to change, there can only have been nothing before spacetime. You can't win on this one Mok. If you say, "Begin" that implies there was something before. If there was not something before, then nothing was before. And if you say something was before, then it looks like something can cause spacetime to appear. And if that's the case, what is that something? So either way, you cannot prove that something cannot come from nothing with your current set up.

But ~∃x (x) is not well-formed - it doesn't say anything.

Is says “there does not exist any proposition x, such that is it true”; and this was not my original intention, admittedly, but it is nevertheless well-formed—unless you were referring to how it isn’t a successful parsing of nothingness into logic.

And ~∃x (Exists<x>)?

Predicate logic. “There does not exist any entity such that it has the property of ‘existing’”.

The thing about parsing is that one has to be specific about what one means, and that is absent in the OP.

Fair enough, and agreed.

Time is not ontological entity. Time is epistemic entity.

That doesn’t make any sense, unless you are just conveying that time is just the form of experience. — Bob Ross
It says what it means. It is a simple and clear statement which reflects the nature of time. I am not sure if it needs explanation.

There cannot be such a thing as a ‘epistemic entity’ because it is, when taken literally, a contradiction in terms: an entity implies something within the ontology of reality, and epistemology pertains solely to knowledge (and specifically not ontology).

□∀M -> □∃T
∃M1t1∃M2t2 →□Ag,T,M

I don’t know what this is supposed to be conveying. — Bob Ross
M = Motion
t = time
Ag = agent

Ok, so ‘□∀M -> □∃T’ is ‘it is necessary that every motion is ??? and that entails that it is necessary that there exists a time”. That doesn’t make any sense to me.

‘∃M1t1∃M2t2 →□Ag,T,M’ means ‘there exists a motion and time such that there exists another motion and time’ and that entails ‘it is necessary that there is an agento, time, and motion’. Again, I don’t know what this is trying to convey.

P1) Time is needed for change
P2) There is no change when there is no time (From P1) (HP)
P3) Nothing to something needs a change in nothing (HP)
P4) There is no time in nothing
C1) Therefore, change in nothing is not possible (From P2 and P4)
C2) Therefore, nothing to something is not possible (from P3 and C1)

I see. Here’s my understanding of it in syllogisms (and let me know if I am misunderstanding):

P1: If an entity is the pure negation of all possible existence, then it cannot be subjected to temporality.
P2: ‘Nothing’ is the pure negation of all possible existence.
C1: Therefore, ‘nothing’ cannot be subjected to temporality.

P3: Change requires temporality.
P4: ‘Nothing’ cannot be subjected to temporality.
C2: Therefore, ‘nothing’ cannot be subjected to change.

P5: ‘Nothing’ becoming ‘something’ requires change.
P6: ‘Nothing’ cannot be subjected to change.
C3: Therefore, ‘nothing’ cannot be subjected to becoming (something).

Firstly, I underlined ‘entity’ in P1 to denote that this sort of entity is not something but must be analyzed as if it were: it is the incoherent positing of something which is itself nothing—and there is no way, in language, to say it otherwise. Analyzing ‘nothing’ is a tricky endeavor.

Secondly, this whole argument rests on time (i.e., temporality) being identical to motion—which I have my doubts. I don’t see anything incoherent with positing that literally movement/motion is only a biproduct of how we represent the world and not something that is happening in the world as it is in-itself.

Thirdly, the crux of the argument is that in order for nothing to become something, nothing must change. I am fine with this, as long as you define nothing like P2.

Fourthly, and most importantly, none of this proves that it is logically impossible for nothing to become something.

Secondly, I think you are thinking that nothing being unrestrained by time entails it cannot spontaneously be involved with temporal sequences, which doesn’t necessarily follow. I don’t see why one would believe that. — Bob Ross
I cannot follow you here. Do you mind elaborating?

This is what I just spoke of with respect to time being identical to motion (in the sense of actual movement). I personally would go for a metaphysic of time where the temporal ordering of things is real (i.e., exists in reality mind-independently) but that the motion we experience is just a biproduct of the modes by which we intuit and cognize objects. In other words, I literally envision reality in-itself as a motionless web of relations, of which one of those relations is temporal ordering, and our brains-in-themselves are interpreting them, from the standpoint motionlessness, into motion. As odd as that may seem prima facie, I think there’s sufficient philosophical and scientific reasons to believe this. My point is just to give you a counter position to digest and chew on.

(1) Time is needed for any change and (2) Time is a substance.

I reject 2.

2) According to general relativity, time is a component of spacetime. Spacetime is a substance though. By substance, I mean something that exists and has a set of properties. Spacetime's property is its curvature. Two phenomena confirm that spacetime is a substance or in other words confirm general relativity, namely gravitational wave and gravitational lens.

I think general relativitiy works fine without that metaphysical assumption. One can posit that temporal relations are real but that they exist as a giant block (a time block) (or even a space/time block) and, as such, the literal motion you experience is no where to be found—but the relations governing that motion are real.

If one goes the #2 route, then either (1) everything is in motion and extension or (2) space and time, as substances, exist in a void. #1 is less parsimonious than positing what I said above, and #2 is absurd.

Is says “there does not exist any proposition x, such that is it true”; — Bob Ross

No, it doesn't. See here. It's doesn't say anything, because it is not well-formed. Literally, it says there does not exist an x such that x - which says nothing.

It cannot be constructed using the rules of syntax for a first order logic.

There cannot be such a thing as a ‘epistemic entity’ because it is, when taken literally, a contradiction in terms: an entity implies something within the ontology of reality, and epistemology pertains solely to knowledge (and specifically not ontology). — Bob Ross

How would you know if something is an entity without knowing what it is?

Ok, so ‘□∀M -> □∃T’ is ‘it is necessary that every motion is ??? and that entails that it is necessary that there exists a time”. That doesn’t make any sense to me. — Bob Ross

That is not propositional logic. It is an EL (Epistemic Logic) operator which means, Agent "knows". It could have been "K" for knows in general, but the box implies knowing via observation.

‘∃M1t1∃M2t2 →□Ag,T,M’ means ‘there exists a motion and time such that there exists another motion and time’ and that entails ‘it is necessary that there is an agento, time, and motion’. Again, I don’t know what this is trying to convey. — Bob Ross

If there was Motion1 to Motion2 with time1 to time2, then the Agent knows Time generated from the Motion via Observation. This is what it means.