However, the first ball being blue is compatible with the box now containing 99 red balls — Michael

But it's not equally compatible with the hypothesis "The box contains 100 blue balls". For example, OJ's DNA found at the crime scene is compatible with "he did it" AND "the police framed him" but it is only confirmation for "he did it".

To use the "approaching John" example, if I see evidence that is equally compatible with John approaching and John not approaching (e.g., it's a blurry figure approaching me that might or might not be John), my probability that John is approaching won't change. The evidence can't move the needle unless it's more compatible with one hypothesis over another.

You have demonstrated that you have no interest in discussing the judgement by which something is labeled as evidence, not even agreeing with me that a judgement is required to label something as evidence. Discussion is pointless.

What about the factor I mentioned though (…), recognition that my judgement may be mistaken? — Metaphysician Undercover

That’s experience talking. You’ve been wrong before, so, given only so much evidence, you might very well be wrong again. Here, though, you haven’t the evidence to falsify the initial judgement you’ve made, re: “I think it is John”.

So as much as I believe that the approaching thing is John, I am uncertain because I know that my eyes are not good, and this uncertainty would be circumstantial evidence supporting the approaching object as being not-John. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure, no doubt. With the evidence limited to perception of an approaching object alone, you’re not yet at the point of certainty regarding what the object actually is. If you were, you’d not be limited to “I think it is John”.

I’m not comfortable with the notion that evidence supporting an affirmative judgement is at the same time circumstantial evidence supporting its negation. You just confuse yourself if you say this evidence allows me to think it’s John, but it also allows me to think it isn’t. Rather arbitrary methodology, I should think, whereas, given some initial evidence, you would be perfectly justified in thinking it is John and at the same time not knowing it is.

As for your eyes…..the weather, the crowd, you’re being intentionally tricked, a whole menagerie of incidental evidence….. each is the content of an individual judgement, the compendium of which determines the experience you’re going to have, affirming your thought, in which case you know the approaching object is John, or negating it, in which case you know the approaching object isn’t John.

In the interest of critical though, then, just as it is impossible to determine an object by a single conception, it is also impossible to obtain an empirical certainty with evidence only sufficient for determining a single judgement. Hidden in that little tidbit, is the formal distinction between belief and knowledge.

I think your unwillingness to look the very plain-as-day things in the face is what makes the discussion pointless. You said your evidence was that you saw a guy who looks like John approaching - that's not some kind of misrepresentation by me, that's what you said. You also ackowledge that you could, feasibly, see the same thing in a world where John is not approaching. That's not a trick, this is again something you've said or implied. Therefore, your evidence that John is approaching is compatible with a world in which John is not approaching.

I don't have to write paragraphs and paragraphs about the minutiae of the philosophy of judgement, all I have to do is point to a couple plain facts that you've agreed with, and what I'm saying pops out cleanly and nicely.

It looks to me like you want to write paragraphs and paragraphs about the ins and outs of judgement as a way to avoid looking at the simple, straight forward argument I'm making. Don't avoid it, look at it. Look at it directly.

As for your eyes…..the weather, the crowd, you’re being intentionally tricked, a whole menagerie of incidental evidence….. each is the content of an individual judgement, the compendium of which determines the experience you’re going to have, affirming your thought, in which case it is John, or negating it, in which case it isn’t. — Mww

So this is the doubt which flannel jesus is obsessed with. Flannel seems to think that the doubt created by all that "incidental evidence" implies that when I judge my experience of the empirical object, either "evidence of John", or "not evidence of John", I am assuming that the one judgement is compatible with the opposing judgement.

As this appears to be illogical, then how does a person actually relate to this incidental evidence, doubt, which is contrary to one's actual judgement? I believe this would be a psychological issue and the answer would vary between one person and another, and even within the same person, from one situation to another, depending on the type of doubt involved.

So, consider this example. The object is approaching at a distance, and my eyes are not very good (incidental evidence), so I'm hesitant to make the judgement call. However, I am expecting John (incidental evidence), so I am inclined to make the judgement that it is John. Now we have two distinct types of incidental evidence, my past experience of weak eyes inclining "do not judge", and my anticipation, intention to meet John, inclining "make the judgement".

Notice what I've done. I've classed the incidental evidence as influencing whether or not the primary judgement is actually made. I believe that is the proper representation of "doubt". When an individual is in doubt, judgement is suspended. Some forms of incidental evidence remove doubt, increasing certitude, (like @Michael's example), and incline "make the judgement" while others increase doubt inclining "do not judge".

So, when we go back to look at the primary judgement, the object is approaching at a distance, and I am considering whether my experience of seeing that object is evidence of "John is approaching" or not. Some incidental evidence will incline me toward a hasty judgement, and some will incline me toward a tardy judgement. A hasty judgement is a feature of an underlying attitude of certitude (I'm expecting John, it must be him), and a tardy judgement is a feature of an underlying attitude of doubt (my eyes are weak I ought not judge). The same person will have certitude in some respects, and be doubtful in other respects, depending on how the individual apprehends one's own strengths and weaknesses. And in some situations, like if my eyes are weak and I am expecting John, the two attitudes will be conflicting.

You said your evidence was that you saw a guy who looks like John approaching — flannel jesus

Strawman. I said:

I'm standing on the street and I see something at a distance. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't have to write paragraphs and paragraphs about the minutiae of the philosophy of judgement... — flannel jesus

That is why I am disinterested and have designated discussion with you as pointless. I'm here for the philosophy.

Strawman. I said: — Metaphysician Undercover

Absolute baloney lmao! It's not a straw man at all! In addition it to it being an obviously fair paraphrasing of what you said, especially given the reply to it, you've been replying to me for many posts now where I've said that's your evidence, and not once in all of your replies to my posts did you say "that's not my evidence", until now. If it was really a straw man, you would have clarified right away instead of pocketing it for some convenient moment later. When someone misunderstands me, I try to correct them as soon as I notice. You didn't do that, so I very much doubt I misunderstood you.

And you ended that post with " I conclude that what I see is evidence that "John is approaching" is true."

Don't give me this straw man Baloney, be honest please.

You have demonstrated that you have no interest in discussing the judgement by which something is labeled as evidence, not even agreeing with me that a judgement is required to label something as evidence. Discussion is pointless. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know with any precision how you think of "judgement" in this context, but it seems unlikely to me that your view of what happens in such scenarios as seeing John approaching is a matter of consciously making judgements.

The discussion we had awhile back, about the ability to read text with scrambled letters, is of relevance. It seems more likely to me that you recognize John approaching as a matter of subconscious pattern recognition, rather than as a matter of conscious judgement. Just as the neural networks in our brains yield fault tolerant recognitions of words, other neural networks in our brains yield fault tolerant recognitions of people.

Why think, "judgement is required to label something as evidence", is true? (As opposed to, " We subconsciously categorize perceptions as evidence for seeing John approaching, when perceptions sufficient to trigger the relevant pattern recognition has occurred.)

A relevant anecdote... Early in my first semester at college, I came back to my dorm room and recognized my roommate 'Dan', said, "Hi.", (to which 'Dan' responded as he typically did) and sat down to read.

However, I had a nagging sense that something was off. I looked up at 'Dan' and he had an amused smile for no reason apparent to me, but I couldn't figure out why something seemed off, so I went back to reading. Still I was bothered and looked up again, at which point 'Dan' introduced himself as Dave, Dan's identical twin.

It seems to me that in that case I had intuitive recognition of evidence that it wasn't actually my roommate that was in my dorm room, even though I had no conscious recognition of what that evidence was. What role (if any) do you think "judgement" played? And why not think that we can have recognition of evidence without judgement?

It should be all clear now. I asked him for an example where he had evidence but he wasn't sure, he provided that example, and it became very clear that the evidence he had was also compatible with his conclusion not being true.

Evidence can be examined in terms of relevance and adequacy. Sometimes the evidence is inadequate for concluding that that is John or not.

Yep. The autonomous workings of the mind are often neglected here in this forum, as are considerations/accounts of how simple thought begins and complex thought becomes autonomous.

the place where his use of these terms differs from everyone else is that he thinks he has to add all sorts of abstractions about judgements, when in fact how everyone else uses the word "evidence", the judgement phase is already included.

I think what he's been implying but not saying directly is that when he "judges something as evidence", it might not really be evidence. Like, to him, it's only REALLY evidence if the thing it's evidence for is also true. It can be judged as evidence, but only mistakenly, if it's not true.

But to everyone else, there's no difference between judging something as evidence, and evidence. Those mean the same thing.

Like, if you say "I believe X" and I say "why? What's your evidence?" you might say "my evidence is this this and this, but I'm still not certain" while his vocabulary would force him to say "I have judged this this and this to be evidence, but I'm still not certain". Nobody else needs to add the word "judged" in there, it's already implicit.

Perhaps another way to phrase it is, for him, "evidence" can only be objective (evidence can only be objectively true signs of objectively true facts), so if he wants to talk about subjective reasons for believing something, he has to add the word "judged" in to subjectivify it. But to everyone else, "evidence" already has that subjective nature implied.

And of course it already has subjectivity baked in. Objective truths don't care about objective evidence, evidence is how imperfect human beings share ideas about their uncertain beliefs. The only reason "evidence" is a word at all is because it's useful in cases where humans are sharing their judgements about their uncertainties, and to convince other people of their conclusions. We don't need to add words to subjectivify "evidence", it's baked in.

Courts say 'present your evidence', not 'present what you have judged to be evidence'. To native English speakers, "what you have judged to be" is redundant.

…..one judgement is compatible with the opposing judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

Assuming I’ve understood what you mean, and from the perspective of critical thought, I’m not sure how much sense it makes to grant compatibility to opposing judgements. I think the approaching object is John, judgement A, has nothing to do with judgement B, ……but my eyes ain’t so good no more. A relates a perception to a representation through experience, re: John, but B relates to a representation to its relative quality, so while both relate to the same representation, they don’t relate to each other. Dunno how compatibility has anything to do with it.

So, consider this example. The object is approaching at a distance, and my eyes are not very good (incidental evidence), so I'm hesitant to make the judgement call. — Metaphysician Undercover

This incidental evidence relates to your eyes, not to the approaching object. The former is a judgement with respect to the quality of a given representation, the latter is a judgement with respect to the validity of it. The former is contingent in accordance with physiology, the latter necessary in accordance with rules.

So what judgement call are you actually hesitant in making? That the approaching object is John? Haven’t you tacitly made that call already, by not thinking it is any particular object at all, insofar as your proposition makes no mention of what you think the approaching object may or may not be? In effect, you’ve thought it unjustifiable to name the approaching object, which your proposition in fact represents. Another way to say you’re hesitant in making a judgement call, is to say you just don’t know. Which is fine, of course.
————-

Notice what I've done. — Metaphysician Undercover

I understand and can accept most of that, with the exception of suspending judgement. From the perspective of critical thought, to think is to judge, from which follows suspension of judgement is impossible.

Anyway….not much more I can add here.

Yep. The autonomous workings of the mind are often neglected here in this forum, as are considerations/accounts of how simple thought begins and complex thought becomes autonomous. — creativesoul

Yes, a topic I am quite interested in. It would be a good thread topic I think.

Go there! It's more interesting than most stuff on here currently.

So this is the doubt which flannel jesus is obsessed with. Flannel seems to think that the doubt created by all that "incidental evidence" implies that when I judge my experience of the empirical object, either "evidence of John", or "not evidence of John", I am assuming that the one judgement is compatible with the opposing judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not the judgments are compatible, its that the experience is compatible with both conclusions. If it was not compatible with both conclusions, then there would be no doubt.

The parts of the experience that might lead you to think John is approaching
are hard to consider evidence that John is not approaching.

But in in a situation where you are not sure John is approaching, but you think he is, the overall experience you are having contains evidence that he is not approaching. There is something about the entire experience that leads to doubt.

If there was nothing about the experience, nothing at all, that gave any indication this might not be John, well, that's a different situation.

So, there must be elements of the experience that FIT with it not being John approaching.

(and for what it's worth, it seems to me FJ has been fairly patiently trying to get his point across and felt it was important that you come up with the scenario and also that the scenario had specific features. I certainly could have missed things, but it seemed like your reactions included some negative assumptions about his attitudes and intentions which did not help the discussion. )

I'm moving this discussion back to this thread where it is more appropriate.

...But they insist nevertheless that at the end of the day such items are physical, or at least bear an important relation to (or supervene on) the physical.
-SEP

That is what I'm disputing. But it doesn't mean that I believe that evolution or the Big Bang didn't occur, or that the Universe is not as science describes it, or other empirical facts. There's no need for me to do that. — Wayfarer

Again, I brought up young earth creationism as an example of science denialism, not to say that you have the same view as a YEC. There are all sorts of science denialism, such as AGW denialism.

It seems that you are avoiding looking at, whether the following statement of yours is indicative of science denialism.

There is no scientific evidence for physicalism. — Wayfarer

Go there! It's more interesting than most stuff on here currently. — creativesoul

I was hoping you would start the thread. :wink:

I'm better at riffing off things others have said. It's not clear to me how I would start such an OP without it becoming much too long and meandering.

So what judgement call are you actually hesitant in making? That the approaching object is John? Haven’t you tacitly made that call already, by not thinking it is any particular object at all, insofar as your proposition makes no mention of what you think the approaching object may or may not be? In effect, you’ve thought it unjustifiable to name the approaching object, which your proposition in fact represents. Another way to say you’re hesitant in making a judgement call, is to say you just don’t know. Which is fine, of course. — Mww

The judgement I was speaking of was whether or not the approaching object is John. But I think I see your point, this implies that I've already judged that it is a person, and for some reason, or reasons, I've singled out John as the person it may be. This would be what is at issue, the reason why I've decided it may be John, because this would be the "evidence " which I am considering, what justifies naming the approaching object with that name.

So the situation is, that the name "John" has come to my mind as possibly the correct name for the thing I already have judged as an approaching person. And "John" I associate with a particular individual whom I am acquainted with. Since the name "John" has come to my mind, and is the name I am considering, I ought to conclude that there is some thing, or things, which I have already judged as evidence of John. We have distinguished two types of evidence, direct evidence, as the consideration of the visual image, and the indirect, incidental, as things like the quality of my visual capacity, and the fact that I am expecting John.

It appears to me, like as @Michael pointed out, the incidental evidence is actually much stronger than the direct empirical evidence. The direct evidence in this case relies on making an association between the immediate visual image, and the memory. But this association must be allowed to be overruled by the incidental evidence. This means that direct, immediate, empirical evidence is at a low level in the scale of reliability. Incidental evidence, prior knowledge, like knowledge about the fallibility of the senses and memory, and in this case knowledge about John's habits and intentions, must be allowed to overrule direct empirical evidence.

In relation to arguments for "Physicalism", I would say that this is strong evidence against physicalism. Physicalism is mostly supported by the idea that direct empirical evidence is the most reliable. However, it is now quite clear that direct empirical evidence places very low on the scale of reliability. We must allow that logical arguments based in prior knowledge are far more reliable as evidence for or against physicalism. And the logical arguments which have stood the test of time are mostly against physicalism.

I understand and can accept most of that, with the exception of suspending judgement. From the perspective of critical thought, to think is to judge, from which follows suspension of judgement is impossible. — Mww

I think that the exact relation between thinking and judgement is a very difficult issue. And, depending on how one would define each, both being somewhat ambiguous in general use, would dictate the relationship established. But if "judgement" occurs on a multitude of different levels, then some thinking would be prior to some judgements and posterior to other judgements. Any way, if you feel inclined, I'd like to see the principles from which you draw that conclusion: " From the perspective of critical thought, to think is to judge, from which follows suspension of judgement is impossible."

It's not the judgments are compatible, its that the experience is compatible with both conclusions. If it was not compatible with both conclusions, then there would be no doubt. — Bylaw

The simple claim "the experience is compatible" is simply meaningless without clarification. Experience is meaningless without some sort of interpretation of it, and this would require a description in words, or at least some form of association. How we choose the words, such as "John" in the example, as a form of association, is a form of judgement. So talking about "experience" without judgement makes no sense. There is judgement inherent within any sort of reflection on experience.

The parts of the experience that might lead you to think John is approaching
are hard to consider evidence that John is not approaching.

But in in a situation where you are not sure John is approaching, but you think he is, the overall experience you are having contains evidence that he is not approaching. There is something about the entire experience that leads to doubt. — Bylaw

As Mww has (I believe) accurately described above, these different judgements are completely distinct judgements. "The thing looks like John", and "my eyes are faulty" are not necessarily related at all. Even distinct judgements of the visual impression itself are not necessarily related. "The coat looks like John's", "The type of walk does not look like John's", for example. Without the question "is that John", the individual parts of the sensual experience are unrelated, "red coat", "favours the right leg". Then, upon the question "is that John", the incidental evidence also becomes very important, "I am expecting John", "my eyes are bad so the visual sense experience is not reliable", etc., are now very important aspects of the overall experience.

The doubt, is dependent on how the various distinct judgements, direct empirical, and the indirect incidental, which are all part of the overall "experience", are related to each other. So, we must apply a further formula, or system of judgement to classify the distinct judgements as reliable and unreliable. And, as I showed above, direct empirical judgement needs to be be classed as low on the level of reliability.

So, there must be elements of the experience that FIT with it not being John approaching.

(and for what it's worth, it seems to me FJ has been fairly patiently trying to get his point across and felt it was important that you come up with the scenario and also that the scenario had specific features. I certainly could have missed things, but it seemed like your reactions included some negative assumptions about his attitudes and intentions which did not help the discussion. ) — Bylaw

FJ refused to separate different judgements which are very clearly distinct, as Mww shows. "That coat looks like John's coat", "my eyes are not very good", and "I am expecting John at this time", are all very distinct, and fundamentally unrelated judgements. FJ refused to separate these very distinct judgements, conflating them as one self-contradicting judgement. That is what my scenario shows, that FJ conflated very distinct judgements into what was claimed by FJ to be one judgement, which was demonstrably a self-contradicting judgement if it was actually one judgement.

I think that the exact relation between thinking and judgement is a very difficult issue. And, depending on how one would define each, both being somewhat ambiguous in general use, would dictate the relationship established. — Metaphysician Undercover

Oh absolutely. Definitions, relationships and whatnot are generally predicated on a specific theory, and that theory establishes an understanding for how all that stuff works together as a system. Still worthwhile to bear in mind the talking about the system is to reify its components, the cardinal sin of proper metaphysicals itself on the one hand, but necessary for metaphysical discourse on the other. So we’re screwed from the get-go, with regard to obtaining sufficient agreement on much of anything.
————-

In relation to arguments for "Physicalism", I would say that this is strong evidence against physicalism. — Metaphysician Undercover

Pretty much, yeah, under the assumption physicalism is the be-all, end-all of whatever one can think of. Which seems self-contradictory from the start, insofar as thinking quite literally is a non-physical activity. So….screwed again.

It seems that you are avoiding looking at, whether the following statement of yours is indicative of science denialism.

There is no scientific evidence for physicalism — wonderer1

Because you're not getting the distinction between an empirical theory and a metaphysical stance.

Because you're not getting the distinction between an empirical theory and a metaphysical stance. — Wayfarer

I'm afraid that a lot of time spent in these sorts of dicussions has taught me to interpret statements like that as you sticking your fingers in your ears and saying, "La, la, la, I can't hear you!"

Absolute bullshit. I provide ample citations, links to SEP articles with definitions, copious arguments. If there's anyone with blinkers on, it's you. :rage:

a lot of time spent in these sorts of dicussions has taught me — wonderer1

It's taught me that you have little insight into or knowledge of the subject matter of this forum.

As you're an affeciando of ChatGPT, I've done likewise with respect to the question at hand, as follows:

User: I've made the claim that a distinction can be made between an empirical theory and a metaphysical stance. That could be illustrated with reference to Karl Popper's criterion of 'falsifiability', could it not?

ChatGPT: Yes, your claim can indeed be illustrated by referring to Karl Popper's criterion of 'falsifiability'. Popper introduced the concept of falsifiability as a demarcation criterion to distinguish between what he considered to be scientific theories and non-scientific theories, including metaphysical stances.

Empirical Theory
An empirical theory, in the context of Popper's philosophy, is one that is testable and falsifiable through observation or experiment. For Popper, the hallmark of scientific theories is their openness to being proven wrong by empirical evidence. A theory is empirical if it makes predictions that can be tested and potentially refuted by observation or experimentation. The possibility of falsification is crucial; it means that a theory can be tested against the real world and discarded if it does not hold up. This does not mean the theory is true but that it has yet to be proven false, maintaining a provisional status.

Metaphysical Stance
On the other hand, a metaphysical stance refers to a position or theory that addresses questions beyond the physical realm, often dealing with the fundamental nature of reality, existence, or the universe that are not subject to empirical testing or falsification in the same way as scientific theories. These stances or theories are not necessarily concerned with empirical evidence and cannot be tested through empirical means. As such, they do not meet Popper's criterion of falsifiability.

User Right! But 'physicalism', the metaphysical claim that 'everything is ultimately physical', would *not* be an empirical theory, according to this criterion, would it?

ChatGPT: Indeed, 'physicalism'—the metaphysical claim that everything is ultimately physical in nature—would not qualify as an empirical theory according to Karl Popper's criterion of falsifiability. Popper's criterion suggests that for a theory to be considered scientific, it must be testable and falsifiable; that is, it must be possible in principle to refute it through observation or experiment.

Physicalism, as a metaphysical stance, posits a broad claim about the nature of reality that is not directly amenable to empirical testing or falsification. It makes a general assertion about what exists or what everything is made of, rather than proposing specific, testable hypotheses about the physical world. While physicalist views may be compatible with empirical sciences and can inspire scientific research, the claim itself—'everything is ultimately physical'—does not offer a way to be proven false through empirical means. It operates more as a foundational assumption or a lens through which one interprets empirical data rather than an empirical theory in its own right.

Thus, according to Popper's criteria, physicalism would be categorized outside the realm of empirical science and instead within the domain of metaphysics. This distinction highlights the difference between what can be empirically tested and what constitutes a broader philosophical or conceptual framework for understanding the nature of reality.

that's a very interesting post, but also a bit of a kamikaze move by the non physicalists. In order to demonstrate what you have about physicalism (which I'm fine with, by the way, not disagreeing), you first have to claim that there's no test you can run to demonstrate any kind of non-physicalist phenomena. Because if you could, physicalism would then be falsifiable, right?

Is that what non physicalist generally believe? That there's no possible test or experimental data to demonstrate non physical phenomena?

The reality of non-physical actuality is demonstrated by logic, and the logic proceeds from premises derived from physical activity. The aspects of physical activity which lead to the conclusion of the non-physical cannot be understood by "physics", so the non-physicalist concludes that these aspects of reality can be approached through other processes of understanding, metaphysical principle which allow for the reality of the non-physical.

The physicalist metaphysics however, renders these aspects of reality as fundamentally unintelligible. So for example, we have everything within the realm of science which gets designated as "random" (random mutations of genes and abiogenesis, random fluctuations of quantum fields and symmetry-breaking), being rendered as fundamentally unintelligible by physicalism, whereas the non-physicalist would argue that such things are actually intelligible, if approached through non-physicalist premises.

This is good and I agree, in principle. Might I suggest one small change, re:

….metaphysical principle which allow for the reality (validity) of the non-physical. — Metaphysician Undercover

Insofar as the perspective is from logic alone rather than typically scientific experimentation, just seems fewer eyebrows would raise just before requiring you to prove the reality of, e.g., the abstract objects or ideas that ground principles a priori.

Just sayin’…..

That is the heart of the issue. With logic, we might demonstrate the "validity" of the non-physical, but if the logic is sound, it would also demonstrate the truth or "reality" of the non-physical. The physicalist would argue that valid logic does nothing to prove the non-physical because so much logic proceeds from fictitious, fantasy, or imaginary premises, and such is the claim to a priori.

The task of metaphysicians then, is to ground the a priori in sound principles. Sound principles are derived from the way that we "experience" reality. Principles consistent with experience are considered to be sound. Now "experience" must be allowed to extend beyond simple sense observation (the trap that empiricism gets looked into), to include the inner most experiences of being, as phenomenology does for example. In this way the metaphysician brings the validity of the arguments for the non-physical into the position of being sound as well. We just need to escape the empiricist trap, which is a metaphysical belief that sound principles of "experience" can only be provided by sense observation.
And if the physicalist argues that all experience is simply a response to sense stimuli this is demonstrably false.

We just need to escape the empiricist trap, which is a metaphysical belief that sound principles of "experience" can only be provided by sense observation. — Metaphysician Undercover

While I might agree with the notion of escaping the empiricist trap, I’d still ask whether a pure empiricist could have a metaphysical belief. At least from Hume, even the suggestion of metaphysical constructs of any kind are considered either absurd, impossible, or merely reckless.

Sound principles are derived from the way that we "experience" reality. Principles consistent with experience are considered to be sound. — Metaphysician Undercover

You do get it that reality, like a feral black cat in the middle of a dark night, slipped by you here, yes?

Is that what non physicalist generally believe? That there's no possible test or experimental data to demonstrate non physical phenomena? — flannel jesus

Any supernatural event or miracle could be explained by physicalism in the guise of simulation theory. Maybe if there were messages hidden in Pi from God, it would count against physicalism. The one data point that I think defeats physicalism (or makes it very unlikely), is the fact that I'm conscious. Physicalism cannot explain that and most likely never will.