I do not think that GPT has been adequately dealt the capacity to judge what counts as "evidence". GPT has not been trained in critical thinking. It will just cite things which people like flannel jesus, who judge evidence illogically, state is "evidence".

The above Chat GPT examples concern logical behaviourism rather than physicalism. — sime

ChatGPT
I apologize for any confusion. The top ten list provided earlier predominantly focuses on neuroscientific findings that align with physicalism rather than logical behaviorism. These findings highlight the connections between mental processes and the physical structures or activities of the brain. Logical behaviorism, which emphasizes observable behaviors as the primary focus for understanding the mind, is not as directly tied to the neural and physiological evidence outlined in the list. If you have specific questions about logical behaviorism or if you'd like information more tailored to logical behaviorism, feel free to ask!

https://chat.openai.com/share/c5d5be26-4ed6-461b-9dcd-bf6771ec9008

No, I would not accept that, it's what I insist is illogical. If the object is judged as compatible with not-X it is illogical to judge it as evidence of X. — Metaphysician Undercover

Okay, you disagree with both me and on that point. Would you like to know why we disagree with you? Would you like to know why Bayesians disagree with you?

I think you've already told me why you disagree. If you think you can justify what appears to me to be very clearly illogical behaviour, with an appeal to authority, then be my guest, give it a try.

I'm going to ask you to think of a situation again. Last time I tried this you got caught up on some tiny detail so I'm going to ask in a different way:

Can you think of a situation where you have evidence for a claim, but the evidence does not leave you certain that the claim is true? Please describe that situation, the evidence, and why you're not certain the claim is true even after finding that evidence.

If you can't think of a situation like that, let me know.

Can you be a little clearer about what appears to be a bit of a corner you're drawing up.... What's the relevance of inconclusive evidence, and why does it appear that you're unsure it exists?

that will become clearer when he answers with an example

I shall await.

In the meantime, while I appreciate the game you're playing, I'm specifically asking - do you feel that inconclusive evidence is incoherent as a concept?

quite the opposite

Ok Gotcha. Makes the wait a little more exciting :)

*

Can you think of a situation where you have evidence for a claim, but the evidence does not leave you certain that the claim is true? Please describe that situation, the evidence, and why you're not certain the claim is true even after finding that evidence.

If you can't think of a situation like that, let me know. — flannel jesus

Ok, I will try to put myself into that imaginary scenario, so we can proceed. I am considering the truth or falsity of a claim. Someone presents me with something said to be evidence of the truth of the claim, or perhaps I simply find something which I would like to judge as to whether or not it is evidence of the claim. Is this consistent with the imaginary scenario you suggest?

If so, let me continue. To judge it as evidence for the claim being true, I would be obliged by due diligence to ensure that it is inconsistent with, or incompatible with, the claim being false. If the potential "evidence" is apprehended by me as compatible with the claim being false, I could not judge it as evidence of the claim being true. So to continue with your imaginary scenario, let's say I judge it as indicative of the claim being true, which implies that I have also judged it as incompatible with the claim being false, and so I label it "evidence" of the claim being true.

The degree of certitude which I have concerning the truth of the claim, following the judgement that the item is "evidence", is irrelevant. I may be highly certain, somewhat certain, or still very skeptical. This would depend on how indicative the evidence is, how much other evidence there is, and the relations between the evidence.

So let's proceed in the way you suggest. I have judged the item to be "evidence" of the claim being true, and this implies that I have judged it as incompatible with the claim being false, as warranted by the obligation described above. However, I am still uncertain as to whether the claim is true or not, because the evidence is insufficient to thoroughly convince me.

Is that what you mean?

I just want a simple example. Something like:

I'm a jury member on a murder trial. The prosecution has show me <some piece of evidence> which I rationally consider evidence that the defendant committed the murder, BUT that evidence still doesn't leave me 100% sure the defendant committed the murder. I'm not 100% sure because <...>.

Just a simple example. Doesn't have to be murder, could be evidence that you have milk in your fridge, or that your doctor got their medical degree from Yale, or that your shoes were made in China. Just a simple example of a scenario where you have evidence, but despite seeing that evidence, you're still not sure. Can you come up with an example like this? Please share it if you can.

I'm a jury member on a murder trial. The prosecution has show me <some piece of evidence> which I rationally consider evidence that the defendant committed the murder, BUT that evidence still doesn't leave me 100% sure the defendant committed the murder. I'm not 100% sure because <...>. — flannel jesus

Did you not read my post? I answered that question already, here:

So let's proceed in the way you suggest. I have judged the item to be "evidence" of the claim being true, and this implies that I have judged it as incompatible with the claim being false, as warranted by the obligation described above. However, I am still uncertain as to whether the claim is true or not, because the evidence is insufficient to thoroughly convince me. — Metaphysician Undercover

Clearly I said that I judged the item as 'evidence" of the claim being true, without being certain of the truth of the claim that it is evidence for.

Why do you not agree with me that to rationally consider the item as evidence that "the person committed the murder", or that "the milk is in the fridge", it is necessary to judge that the item is incompatible with "the person did not commit the murder", "or "the milk is not in the fridge". Why would you dispute this?

I think it would be illogical to judge the item as evidence for the truth of "the person committed the crime" or "the milk is in the fridge" yet also believe that the item is compatible with the falsity of the statement. How could you honestly say that the item supports the truth of X, while you believe that it is compatible with not-X? The two, X and not-X are clearly incompatible, they cannot be consistent with one another, and everything consistent with X is not consistent with not-X. Clearly it is illogical to judge the item as consistent with not-X, yet also supportive of X, as "evidence" of X.

And why do you think the degree of certitude is at all relevant? Something can be accepted as evidence without the requirement that it produces certainty.

I answered that question already, here: — Metaphysician Undercover

The request was for you to come up with and present a specific scenario. You haven't done that. Nothing in your post was a specific scenario.

Here's what I said:

Can you think of a situation where you have evidence for a claim, but the evidence does not leave you certain that the claim is true? Please describe that situation, the evidence, and why you're not certain the claim is true even after finding that evidence.

I do not see a description, from you, of any of that stuff. Do you understand what I'm asking for?

Can you think of a situation where you have evidence for a claim, but the evidence does not leave you certain that the claim is true? Please describe that situation, the evidence, and why you're not certain the claim is true even after finding that evidence. — flannel jesus

OK, if you don't want to come up with your own example, here's something nice and simple for you. I'm standing on the street and I see something at a distance. I think that it is a person approaching, and I think that it is John, so I conclude that what I see is evidence that the claim "John is approaching" is true. I'm not certain that it is John approaching, yet I conclude that what I see is evidence that "John is approaching" is true.

Does this suffice?

Yes, perfect.

So, you have information that you rationally interpret as evidence for the statemnt "John is approaching".

However, that information you have, that evidence, is COMPATIBLE with the statement "John is not approaching", isn't it? You're not certain John is approaching - the only reason you're not certain is because you know there's a way where you could experience seeing what you're seeing, while it's simultaneously true that John is not approaching. So the statement "I see what I think is John approaching" is completely compatible (but not evidence for, just compatible) with the statement "John is not approaching" - compatible because they can both be true at the same time.

If they couldn't both be true at the same time, then you would be certain John was approaching.

Make sense?

If they couldn't both be true at the same time, then you would be certain John was approaching. — flannel jesus

Either "John is approaching" is true or "John is not approaching" is true.

This doesn't entail that I am certain that "John is approaching" is true.

Those aren't the two statements I said were compatible. "John is approaching" vs "John is not approaching" - I did not say these two statemnts could be true at the same time.

My mistake.

no worries brother.

However, that information you have, that evidence, is COMPATIBLE with the statement "John is not approaching", isn't it? — flannel jesus

No, of course not! Why would I judge it as evidence of "John is approaching" if I thought it was compatible with "John Is not approaching"?

You're not certain John is approaching - the only reason you're not certain is because you know there's a way where you could experience seeing what you're seeing, while it's simultaneously true that John is not approaching. — flannel jesus

I am not certain because I know I might be mistaken. I do not in any way think that "John is not approaching" is consistent with what I see, or else I would be inclined not to judge what I see as evidence of "John is approaching". That "I might be mistaken" is a completely distinct judgement, a recognition of my underlying fallibility. It is not a judgement that what I see is compatible with "John is not approaching".

So the statement "I see what I think is John approaching" is completely compatible (but not evidence for, just compatible) with the statement "John is not approaching" - compatible because they can both be true at the same time. — flannel jesus

That statement is a strawman. The correct representation is "I judge what I see as evidence that John is approaching". When you acknowledge the proper representation you ought to see that if I judge what I see as evidence of X, there is no way that I can consistently claim that I also judge it as compatible with not-X.

If they couldn't both be true at the same time, then you would be certain John was approaching.

Make sense? — flannel jesus

Not at all, you use a strawman to make your point. When you say "I see what I think is..." you incorporate the judgement about the fallibility of my judgement, about what I see, into that statement. The fallibility is implied by "what I think is...". But this statement represents the conditions posterior to the two distinct judgements. That is to conflate two distinct judgements, that I judge what I see as John, and that I judge my judgement as fallible, incorporating them into one statement.

Obviously, if I couldn't recognize the thing I saw, as John, I could not claim that it is evidence of John. And that is what makes your representation plainly wrong. I must recognize what I see as John, judge it to be John, and incompatible with not-John, or else I have nothing that would indicate that what I see is evidence of John. There are two distinct levels of judgement which must be respected if you want to properly understand the situation. Each is a judgement of "is" which excludes "is not". I judge what I see as John, excluding is-not John. And, I judge my judgement as fallible, excluding is-not fallible. If I in any way allow doubt into my judgement as to whether or not what I see is John, I have no warrant to "evidence of John".

So, let's look at the situation properly. I know myself to be fallible, that is an underlying attitude. I see something which I judge to be compatible with "John is approaching" and incompatible with "John is not approaching". Since I know my underlying fallibility, I conclude that what I see is "evidence" of John approaching, rather than certainty that John is approaching.

Make sense?

To me, it makes perfect sense how I framed it. You have evidence. The evidence you have increases your confidence that John is approaching, but you're not certain it's John approaching because the thing you're experiencing as evidence, you could also experience if John were not approaching. I don't think there's anything outlandish about what I'm saying here.

Do you believe that John is approaching?
Yes.
Why? What's your evidence?
I see someone that looks like John approaching.

That evidence, clearly, is compatible with the statement "John is not approaching". That's why you're not certain.

To me, it makes perfect sense how I framed it. — flannel jesus

I know it makes sense to you, because as I've already mentioned you think, in an illogical way. Some study of critical thinking may be useful.

You have evidence. The evidence you have increases your confidence that John is approaching, but you're not certain it's John approaching because the thing you're experiencing as evidence, you could also experience if John were not approaching. — flannel jesus

You demonstrate a fundamental misunderstanding of "evidence". Evidence is a judgement that the object supports the hypothesis. However, you begin with the assumption "you have evidence", without reference to the required judgement. Therefore you have prejudice, you believe that the object supports the hypothesis prior to the judgement, because it is taken for granted as "evidence".

This prejudice is clearly evident in your reference to physicalism. You seem to think that the occurrence of a physical reality, and the scientific understanding of it, are evidence of physicalism, without the requirement of a judgement against these objects which are supposed to be the evidence. They are received as "evidence". So you seem to say, it could still turn out to be the case that physicalism is wrong, but I'll adhere to physicalism until someone proves to me that physicalism is false. In the meantime, I will not review the evidence because it has already been granted the status of "evidence".

I don't think there's anything outlandish about what I'm saying here. — flannel jesus

It's not outlandish, just prejudiced, which unfortunately is the norm.

I think I understand @flannel jesus's point, and that it can be explained like this:

A box contains 100 balls. Either all 100 are blue or 1 is blue and 99 are red, determined by a fair coin toss. A ball is picked at random from the box and it is blue.

Do you believe that the box now contains 99 blue balls or 99 red balls?

The probability of the first ball being blue is 100% if the box contains 100 blue balls and 1% if the box contains 1 blue ball and 99 red balls. As such, given that the first ball was blue, it is much more likely that the box now contains 99 blue balls.

The first ball being blue is strong evidence that the box now contains 99 blue balls. However, the first ball being blue is compatible with the box now containing 99 red balls, i.e. the first ball being blue does not prove that the box doesn't now contain 99 red balls.

Therefore you have prejudice, you believe that the object supports the hypothesis prior to the judgement, because it is taken for granted as "evidence". — Metaphysician Undercover

What? YOU'RE the one who told ME it was evidence. If I'm prejudiced by granting that it's evidence, SURELY you are too, right? YOU told ME it was evidence.

In fact, that's the entire reason why I asked you to come up with a scenario and an example of evidence instead of providing one myself - I was predicting exactly this sort of thing from you. I present a scenario, I say such-and-such is evidence, and you find some weird reason to decide "that's not evidence". I thought I'd sidestep that by letting YOU choose the evidence, so you can't find some silly reason to deny that it's evidence afterward. Apparently I underestimated your ability to ... do whatever it is you're doing.

The reason I, and every other person who has jumped into this conversation, disagrees with your take, is pretty easy to see. Just google "examples of evidence in a criminal trial". Every single example you see follows the pattern at hand:

The "evidence" points to one thing being the case, but it's not certain, and you can always conceive of ways in which you would have that eviddence, even if that conclusion is not the case. Fingerprints - a person can be on trial, and have evidence be submitted that their fingerprints are at the crime scene, and nevertheless they didn't commit the crime. It's possible for your fingerprints to be somewhere and you still did not commit a crime there? Those two things are... compatible.

Testimonies are evidence, but someone could testify against you and it still be the case that you didn't commit the crime, can't it?

The rest of the world treats the word "evidence" in a similar way to what I'm saying here. Evidence is not synonymous with proof. A piece of information may be evidence, and still be *compatible with the opposite conclusion*. Perhaps you don't like that the rest of the world talks about evidence in these terms, but language is there for mutual understanding, and if you want to have mutual understanding with other english speakers, it would help you to understand what the rest of us mean by 'evidence'.

Some study of critical thinking may be useful. — Metaphysician Undercover

First thing that presented itself to me was, the compound judgement in the form, “I see something coming”, subsequently complemented by “…. I think that it is John”.

The first is a general empirical judgement grounded in a perception alone; the second is a discursive judgement grounded in antecedent experience, insofar as the thought of a particular object approaching wouldn’t be represented as “John” without it. Pretty clear, really “I see (something)….”, followed by “……I think (John)”.

With respect to evidence, it follows that the evidence for the primary judgement, being a mere perception, cannot be contrary to the approach of something, insofar as the evidence just is the approach, in the form of motion over time.

As for the evidence of the complementary judgement, consequential to perception, insofar as the thought of the approaching object already has a representation belonging to it, such evidence is experience, which, given only these conditions, cannot be contradictory, for otherwise the thought that the approaching object is “John”, would not arise at all. To call it “John” presupposes all that is necessary for “John” to be that thought.

The only logical permission for the evidence to not support the approaching object as being “John”, is upon the instantiation of additional evidence in the form of different empirical qualities derived from subsequent perceptions, but not of the same evidence by which the representation was determined. It is by the analysis of these different qualities, and those of sufficient disparity from the antecedents, that the thought of the approaching object cannot in fact be “John”, which is, of course, a significantly distinct and entirely separate judgement in itself.

Rhetorically speaking. For what it’s worth.

You spoiled the fun. I was waiting to see how long it would take flannel jesus to actually justify what was claimed, through a description of probability like you did, rather than repeatedly asserting the same thing over and over again without justification.

The first ball being blue is strong evidence that the box now contains 99 blue balls. However, the first ball being blue is compatible with the box now containing 99 red balls, i.e. the first ball being blue does not prove that the box doesn't now contain 99 red balls. — Michael

The only thing I can say here is that maybe probability does not actually qualify as "evidence" in a strict and proper sense of the word. I'd like to dismiss your example, because it is manufactured,. The scenario must be staged, two boxes, with the right coloured balls must be produced, and then the person who doesn't know which is which, must choose a blue one and make the judgement. So I'd say your example, and therefore the evidence of what you are trying to prove, is manufactured. In other words, you've manufactured evidence to support flannel jesus' claims.

So let me offer a different example. Take my example of seeing something approaching on the street. Now suppose that since I've seen John approaching everyday at about the same time for the past month, I apply this probability as "evidence" that what I see is John approaching. This supposed "evidence" is not directly related to the thing being judged, but related through some general principles of inductive reasoning. So the problem which Hume demonstrated is relevant. I agree that the observations of John at all those other times, and the resulting probability is still "evidence", as it still supports the truth of the claim, but it is a slightly different sort of "evidence". Rather than being directly related, it relates through a logical inference. So we can categorize two distinct types of evidence. Isn't this other type of evidence what is commonly known as "circumstantial evidence"?

The same principle would apply to your box of balls example. Even though the example is structured so that you can assert "strong evidence", nevertheless, it is still circumstantial evidence, not being directly related to what is in the box, but related by some form of inference.

What? YOU'RE the one who told ME it was evidence. If I'm prejudiced by granting that it's evidence, SURELY you are too, right? YOU told ME it was evidence. — flannel jesus

That's exactly the point. You ought not take someone else word for it, when they hand you something and say "this is evidence of X". You need justification, and this allows you to make the judgement yourself as to whether or not it is evidence. Otherwise, someone will hand you many different items saying these are all evidence of X, and you'll come away thinking X must be true because there's a mountain of evidence for X. That, I propose is the way that you behave toward physicalism. Someone else makes the judgement "X is evidence of physicalism", and since it's consistent with the hypothesis you already believe (physicalism), you accept "X is evidence" as true.

That is prejudice, no judgement of what is claimed as evidence, by you, because it is claimed to be evidence of what you already believe. Then more and more people may claim it as evidence in that prejudiced way, while the originators of that claim die off, until there is a small percentage of those who believe that it is evidence, who have actually judged whether the supposed evidence is evidence or not.

Then "X is evidence of Y" could become the bias of convention. And, we could have a large percentage of the overall population claiming "X is evidence of Y", and only a small percentage saying "X is not evidence of Y", solely because "X is evidence of Y" is the bias of convention. But if we look only at the people who have actually judged for themselves, whether X is evidence of Y or not, it could turn out that the vast majority of them believe X is not evidence of Y.

n fact, that's the entire reason why I asked you to come up with a scenario and an example of evidence instead of providing one myself - I was predicting exactly this sort of thing from you. I present a scenario, I say such-and-such is evidence, and you find some weird reason to decide "that's not evidence". — flannel jesus

If you cannot defend you judgement "X is evidence" by justifying this claim, then I suggest that there is something wrong with that judgement. If you are simply saying "X is evidence of Y", because you have a prior belief in Y, and someone told you that X is evidence of Y, then you are prejudiced.

The "evidence" points to one thing being the case, but it's not certain, and you can always conceive of ways in which you would have that eviddence, even if that conclusion is not the case. Fingerprints - a person can be on trial, and have evidence be submitted that their fingerprints are at the crime scene, and nevertheless they didn't commit the crime. It's possible for your fingerprints to be somewhere and you still did not commit a crime there? Those two things are... compatible. — flannel jesus

I already pointed out to you, that context is the key factor to evidence, so this type of example is simply useless. Just because a person's fingerprints are at a crime scene doesn't mean that those fingerprints are evidence against the person. So this type of example is pointless.

Evidence is not synonymous with proof. — flannel jesus

You are not understanding what I am saying. In no way did I say that evidence is proof. This is because the judgement of "evidence" is subjective in the way that I described. And, the opinion of a subject does not constitute proof. That is why I need to justify my claim of "evidence", and you ought not take what I claim to be "evidence" as evidence without justification.

As I said, an individual knows oneself, and also knows one's own judgements to be fallible. So when I recognize what I see down the street as John, I take this recognition as evidence that John is approaching. However, I am in no way certain that John is approaching because I also recognize the fallibility of my capacity to recognize a person at such a distance.

The only logical permission for the evidence to not support the approaching object as being “John”, is upon the instantiation of additional evidence in the form of different empirical qualities derived from subsequent perceptions, but not of the same evidence by which the representation was determined. It is by the analysis of these different qualities, and those of sufficient disparity from the antecedents, that the thought of the approaching object cannot in fact be “John”, which is, of course, a significantly distinct and entirely separate judgement in itself. — Mww

What about the factor I mentioned though, an underlying doubt, or attitude of uncertainty, recognition that my judgement may be mistaken? I think that this would have a source other than empirical evidence. So as much as I believe that the approaching thing is John, I am uncertain because I know that my eyes are not good, and this uncertainty would be circumstantial evidence supporting the approaching object as being not-John.

if you want to use the word evidence in a different way from English speakers, be my guest. For the rest of us, evidence is not synonymous with proof, and it often leaves uncertainty. If it leaves uncertainty, it follows that the experience we're labelling "evidence" is also compatible with a world in which the thing it's evidence for did not happen. Given that you yourself gave an example where you have evidence of something, but you're still uncertain, you clearly agree with this and just haven't thought it through yet.

If the evidence you have for John approaching wasn't also compatible with John not approaching, you would be certain. You are not certain, so it must be compatible. In other words, it's not difficult to imagine a world where you have the evidence you say you have, and yet John is not approaching.

As I said, an individual knows oneself, and also knows one's own judgements to be fallible. So when I recognize what I see down the street as John, I take this recognition as evidence that John is approaching. However, I am in no way certain that John is approaching because I also recognize the fallibility of my capacity to recognize a person at such a distance. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, you're saying it yourself here. You take the recognition as evidence, and yet you're aware that the recognition is compatible with a world in which it's not John. You are literally saying all the words required to agree with me, so I'm not really sure why you don't.