Does God have emotions and passions like humans? I would regard that as anthropomorphic projection. — Wayfarer

Have you not read the bible? I recall God saying "Let there be light, and there was a light. God was happy to see the light in the world he created." - The Genesis

Spinoza's substance (i.e. nature or god) is a metaphysical supposition , not an empirical theory. — 180 Proof

How much credence should we give to this supposition? Can a finite limited part know the infinite unlimited whole?

What are we to make of the significance of Spinoza's signet ring: "CAUTE"? He had good reason to be cautious, but he often seemed more daring then cautious. What was it that he dared not say or said only in a veiled way?

The Ethics is not a theological work. His concern is with the perfection of human freedom, which can only be achieved via adequate knowledge of a particular thing, himself.

We should not pass too quickly over the question of the relationship between ethics and freedom. If one thinks of ethics as a set of obligations and constraints imposed on us then freedom might seem to be at odds with ethics.

Therefore the more knowledge of this kind that each of us can achieve, the more conscious he is of himself and of God, i.e. the more perfect and happy he is.

(Part V, "The Power of the Human Intellect or Human Freedom, Proposition 31:

The mind in being itself eternal is the formal cause of the third kind of knowledge.

(scholium)

Although it is presented in geometric method, in the style of proof or demonstration, it can be read fruitfully, and perhaps more appropriately as a work of rhetoric, that is, as Aristotle says, the counterpart of dialectic. As a mode of persuasion rather than proof.

God was happy t — Corvus

The KJV says 'And God saw the light, that it was good.’ The attribution of emotion is yours.

How much credence should we give to this supposition? Can a finite limited part know the infinite unlimited whole? — Fooloso4

That is an interesting feature of the supposition. One cannot affirm the existence of a party one will never be invited to by definition.

The distance does provide a ground to display the prejudices of humans. The list of projections in Bk1, Proposition 36 tie ignorance to seeing the intent of other people and the world as a whole to an error we could stop making. While we cannot close the gap between the finite and the infinite, looking for motives when they are not there is something we all have experienced and can recognize how that causes suffering.

I think you are right about the element of persuasion. A comparison with Aristotle is interesting because I think the Peripatetic would agree with:

The mind in being itself eternal is the formal cause of the third kind of knowledge

The more we understand increases the chance of a better life according to our nature.

But I don't think Aristotle would be on board with considering Final Causes or telos as motivated principally by stories we tell ourselves.

So, what does Spinoza's God do for Spinoza or for the rest of us in this planet? — Corvus

Each reader has to answer that for herself after studying Spinoza (or any other metaphysician) for herself. My spoon-feeding apparently isn't helping you better understand Spinoza's God (i.e. substance/natura naturans (re: reality)).

Spinoza's substance (i.e. nature or god) is a metaphysical supposition , not an empirical theory.
— 180 Proof

How much credence should we give to this supposition? — Fooloso4

No more than its logical validity, or reasonableness, can bear.

Can a finite limited part know the infinite unlimited whole?

Spinoza argues in the negative.

What are we to make of the significance of Spinoza's signet ring: "CAUTE"?

Only that it was a personal reminder like wearing a skull ring or carrying a coin inscribed with "Memento Mori".

He had good reason to be cautious, but he often seemed more daring then cautious. What was it that he dared not say or said only in a veiled way?

For starters, that religious sects e.g. Protestant, Catholic & Jewish are merely superstitions which, lacking logically valid arguments (i.e. rationality), anthropomorphically project 'a supernatural personality that superintends the world it also transcends' that each tradition attributes miracles to, petitions with prayers and calls "God".

I suspect this basic appeal to rationality – critique of Torah & Judaism as consisting of mostly irrational beliefs – got him excommunicated from the Jewish community of Amsterdam, and being a non-Christian outcast in a Christian country (even one as 'tolerant' as Holland) during an era riven by violent schisms and wars of religion who was expelled for irreligion was extremely dangerous – Spinoza's every word and deed, whether overtly irreligious or otherwise unorthodox in any way, were always at risk of being suspect by church and/or civil authorities. Since his philosophy mostly follows necessarily from this appeal to rationality (or PoSR),

Spinoza's writings were circulated in strictest confidence among intellectuals/scholars he trusted and were, on the prudent advise of friends, published anonymously lifetime or published posthumously.

Wouldn't it be the case, then to relate / attribute God to substance seem an ambiguous attempt in logical connection. — Corvus

Sorry, I don't understand what that means.

In what sense did he? — Corvus

I will have to be honest with you and tell you that I got that information off of the internet. I have not read Spinoza first-hand yet, only read about his philosophy instead from secondary sources, so I can't really say how Spinoza is clearly influenced by Descartes. I am a bit busy these days resting (no joke) and it's not a terribly exciting matter for me, so maybe you could bring us the answer to that question? :smile:

God was happy t
— Corvus

↪Corvus The KJV says 'And God saw the light, that it was good.’ The attribution of emotion is yours. — Wayfarer

The attribution of emotion wasn't mine. I can confirm that I was not there when God was creating the world and light. There was no one around in the vicinity when God saw the light, and felt good. It must have been God who felt good. Not me.

And there are many occasions when God was either happy or angry due to the people's conduct and situation in the bible as far I am aware. Therefore the Christian God in OT was a personified God with humanistic emotions and passions.

Each reader has to answer that for herself after studying Spinoza (or any other metaphysician) for herself. My spoon-feeding apparently isn't helping you better understand Spinoza's God (i.e. substance/natura naturans (re: reality)). — 180 Proof

Not asking for spoon feeding, but thought it would be nice if you elaborated on the metaphysical suppositions of Spinoza since you have volunteered to decipher on the God concept.
If each reader has to read Spinoza and has to come to their own answers, then it sounds like it is not in the realm of the objective system.

then it sounds like it is not in the realm of the objective system — Corvus

Philosophy does suck like that sometimes, sadly.

I will have to be honest with you and tell you that I got that information off of the internet. I have not read Spinoza first-hand yet, only read about his philosophy instead from secondary sources, so I can't really say how Spinoza is clearly influenced by Descartes. I am a bit busy these days resting (no joke) and it's not a terribly exciting matter for me, so maybe you could bring us the answer to that question? :smile: — Lionino

Sure, no problems. Take it easy, and enjoy being busy resting. That sounds pretty a good way of life actually. :D

What is an example of an objective system?

Each philosopher requires a lot of effort to hear what is being said. Is "objectivity" being able to answer simple questions without all that work?

then it sounds like it is not in the realm of the objective system
— Corvus

Philosophy does suck like that sometimes. — Lionino

Philosophy is "Auf dem Weg Sein" according to Heidegger. An existence on the road heading for endless journeys via the dialectic process.

What is an example of an objective system?

Each philosopher requires a lot of effort to hear what is being said. Is "objectivity" being able to answer simple questions without all that work? — Paine

Each of us start from subjective point, but aims to arrive at the objective ideas and concepts which is called truths.

How does that translate into a method for reading philosophers?

Reading feeds the historical ideas and concepts on the subject. Reading helps widening your perspectives.

So, when you check Spinoza off your list before reading him because the responses are too variable, it sounds like you are closing a circle rather than opening one.

Was just saying to 180 that, it would be better if each folks who read Spinoza and arrived at their own answers could come out into the open public forum to share their own answers. 180 proof sounds he did, so why not do so, was a suggestion.

↪Corvus
What is an example of an objective system?

Each philosopher requires a lot of effort to hear what is being said. Is "objectivity" being able to answer simple questions without all that work? — Paine

:up: :up:

Many folks are just intellectually lazy.

Not asking for spoon feeding, — Corvus

:roll:

↪Paine Many folks are just intellectually lazy.

Not asking for spoon feeding,
— Corvus — 180 Proof

It sounds like a coward nonsense uttered by a grumpy old man fearing to give answers he claimed to possess, when asked. That itself is laziness. :chin:

If you say so ...

If you say so ... — 180 Proof

Just sayin ... :D

What are we to make of the significance of Spinoza's signet ring: "CAUTE"?

Only that it was a personal reminder ... — 180 Proof

Machiavelli wrote:

And truly there was never any orderer of extraordinary laws for a people who did not have recourse to God, because otherwise they would not have been accepted.
For a prudent individual knows many goods that do not have in themselves evident reasons with which one can persuade others. Thus wise men who wish to take away this difficulty have recourse to God. So did Lycurgus; so did Solon; so did many others who have had the same end as they. — Discourses, 35 (1.11)

Some interesting work has been done on Machiavelli's influence on Spinoza.

Montaigne tells us that he lives in a time “when we cannot talk about the world except with
danger or falsely.” Therefore, as he states elsewhere, they spoke falsely: “dissimulation is
among the most notable qualities of this century.”
– Michel de Montaigne, Complete Essays, 623 (3.3), 505 (2.18)

Melzer

Francis Bacon’s essay On Simulation and Dissimulation is about the wisdom of “hiding and veiling of a man’s self”.

Descartes took his motto from Ovid: He who lived well hid himself well.

It is not just the philosopher but his work that must be protected. The careful reader too must be cautious. When the writer hides there is more to what is said than meets the eye.

A comparison with Aristotle is interesting because I think the Peripatetic would agree with:

The mind in being itself eternal is the formal cause of the third kind of knowledge — Paine

In the appendix to proposition 36 Spinoza says:

Now all the prejudices that I undertake to expose here depend upon a single one: that human beings commonly suppose that, like themselves, all natural things act for a purpose. — Ethics, Spinoza, translated by Silverthorne and Kisner

The assumption underlying this prejudice is that all natural things are like human beings in acting for a purpose. If this assumption is rejected as anthropomorphic then doesn't this hold for mind as well?

The assumption underlying this prejudice is that all natural things are like human beings in acting for a purpose. If this assumption is rejected as anthropomorphic then doesn't this hold for mind as well? — Fooloso4

That is a good question. Spinoza's argument is certainly a contrast to Aristotle saying: "All men, by nature, desire understanding." I am no expert on this but will attempt an answer as to why Spinoza does not see a contradiction in his method:

God is the only "free" cause. The appearance that beings are acting for their own purposes comes from not knowing the causes of their actions. Our understanding will always be limited in this regard, but we can improve the results of the tug of war between reason and emotions by increasing our knowledge of ourselves and the world. Framed in the language of Descartes, the mind seeks a relative measure of freedom from the compulsions of the body. The desire for freedom is in the nature of reason.

In Part 5, Proposition 4, Spinoza points back to 1p 36 to show how the compulsion of appetites can be decreased:

Proposition 4
There is no affection of the body that we cannot form some clear and distinct ​concept of.

Proof:
Things which are common to all can only be conceived adequately (by 2p38), and thus (by 2p12 and L2 following 2p13) there is no affection of the body that we cannot form some clear and distinct concept of. Q. E. D.
​
Corollary
It follows from this that there is no emotion that we cannot form some clear and distinct concept of. For an emotion is the idea of an affection of the body (by the general definition of the emotions), and therefore (by 5p4) it must involve some clear and distinct concept.

Scholium
There is nothing from which some effect does not follow (by 1p36), and we understand clearly and distinctly whatever follows from an idea which is adequate in us (by 2p40). It follows that each person has the ability to understand clearly and distinctly himself and his emotions, if not absolutely, at least partly; and consequently to ensure that he is less acted on by them. One must therefore devote oneself above all to the task of getting to know each emotion, as far as possible, clearly and distinctly, so that from an emotion the mind may be determined to think those things that it clearly and distinctly perceives and in which it is fully content, and thus the emotion itself may be separated from the thought of an external cause and be connected with true thoughts. The upshot of this will be that not only love, hatred, etc. will be destroyed (by 5p2), but also that the appetites or desires which usually arise from such an emotion will be unable to be excessive (by 4p61). For one must note, above all, that it is one and the same appetite by which a human being is said both to act and to be acted on. For example, we have shown that human nature is so constituted, that everyone wants other people to live in conformance with his own character (see 3p31s). And this appetite in a person who is not led by reason is a passion; it is called ambition ​and it does not differ very much from pride. ​By contrast in a person who lives by the dictate of reason, it is an action or a virtue, and it is called piety ​(see 4p37s1 and 4p37, alternative proof). In this manner all appetites or desires are merely passions insofar as they arise from inadequate ideas; and they are accounted virtue when they are aroused or generated from adequate ideas. For all the desires by which we are determined to do some action can arise as much from adequate ideas as from inadequate ideas (see 4p59). And (to return to the point from which I digressed) no better remedy for the emotions that lies within our abilities can be devised than that which consists in a true cognition of them, since there ​is no other power of the mind available than that of thinking and forming adequate ideas, as we have shown above (by 3p3). — Ethics, Spinoza, Part 5, Prop 4, translated by Silverthorne and Kisner

The desire for freedom is in the nature of reason. — Paine

I don't follow.

Just as we should not assume that nature acts for a purpose, we should not assume that nature acts out of a desire for freedom.

As you quoted, in the scholium he says:

For one must note, above all, that it is one and the same appetite by which a human being is said both to act and to be acted on. — Ethics, Spinoza, Part 5, Prop 4, translated by Silverthorne and Kisner

What may be right conduct according to reason is a different question from that of acts of God/Nature and the ascription of mind to God/Nature.

I did use "nature" in a contradictory way. A more Spinoza way to put it is to say that the love of God brings a kind of happiness only possible through the freedom of reason as a principle of action. The conclusion of Ethics emphasizes that the condition is not the result of reason but is done through its work:

Blessedness consists in love for God (by 5p36 and its scholium), a love which arises from the third kind of cognition (by 5p32c). Therefore this love (by 3p59 and 3p3) must be related to the mind insofar as it acts; and accordingly (by 4def8) it is virtue itself. That is the first point. Then, the more the mind enjoys this divine love or blessedness, the more it understands (by 5p32), i.e. (by 5p3c) the greater the power it has over its emotions and (by 5p38) the less it is acted on by emotions that are bad. Therefore because the mind enjoys this divine love or blessedness, it has the ability to restrain lusts. And because a person’s power to restrain emotions lies in the intellect alone, no one enjoys blessedness because he has restrained his emotions; on the contrary the ability to restrain lusts arises from blessedness itself.
Q. E. D. ​

Scholium
With this I have completed everything I wanted to prove about the power of the mind over the emotions and about the freedom of the mind. It is clear from this how potent a wise person is and how much more effective he is than an ignorant person who is driven by lust ​alone. For apart from the fact that an ignorant person is agitated in many ways by external causes and never has true contentment ​of spirit, he also lives, we might say, ignorant ​of himself and of God and of things, and as soon as he ceases to be acted on, at the same time he also ceases to be. Conversely, a wise person, ​insofar as he is considered as such, is scarcely moved in spirit, but being conscious ​of himself and of God and of things by some eternal necessity, he never ceases to be, but always has possession of true contentment of spirit. Now if the way that I have shown to lead to this looks extremely arduous, it can nevertheless be found. It must certainly be arduous because it is so rarely found. For if salvation ​were easily available and could be found without great labor, how could it happen that nearly everybody ignores it? But all noble things are as difficult as they are rare. THE END — ibid. part 5 proposition 42

A more Spinoza way to put it is to say that the love of God brings a kind of happiness only possible through the freedom of reason as a principle of action. — Paine

Another way to put this is that the more capable we are of reasoning correctly, the more perfect and happy we are (Part V, "The Power of the Human Intellect or Human Freedom, Proposition 31). In other words the more perfect our knowledge the more godlike we become.

But what prompted my question was the appropriateness of attributing mind to God. In what you just quoted Spinoza is talking about the mind of human beings.

That question of appropriateness is a big one. The theological assumption is comparable to Aristotle appealing to the agent intellect and the unmoved mover. The emphasis upon being given a "true contentment of spirit" seems to be an important difference, however. The problem of the isolated individual struggling within themselves is the focus of Spinoza rather than man, as man, trying to find out what they are in the world of becoming.

This suggests to me that the "theological" often seems to point at the same things when particular articulations are not.

:

The theological assumption is comparable to Aristotle appealing to the agent intellect and the unmoved mover. — Paine

Indeed!

Another way to put this is that the more capable we are of reasoning correctly, the more perfect and happy we are (Part V, "The Power of the Human Intellect or Human Freedom, Proposition 31). In other words the more perfect our knowledge the more godlike we become. — Fooloso4

This is comparable to a passage from the Nichomachean Ethics:

if happiness [εὐδαιμονία] consists in activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it should be activity in accordance with the highest virtue; and this will be the virtue of the best part of us. Whether then this be the Intellect [νοῦς], or whatever else it be that is thought to rule and lead us by nature, and to have cognizance of what is noble and divine, either as being itself also actually divine, or as being relatively the divinest part of us, it is the activity of this part of us in accordance with the virtue proper to it that will constitute perfect happiness; and it has been stated already* that this activity is the activity of contemplation — Nichomachean Ethics

This quoted passage is also directly comparable:

Therefore this love (by 3p59 and 3p3) must be related to the mind insofar as it acts; and accordingly (by 4def8) it is virtue itself. That is the first point. Then, the more the mind enjoys this divine love or blessedness, the more it understands (by 5p32), i.e. (by 5p3c) the greater the power it has over its emotions and (by 5p38) the less it is acted on by emotions that are bad. Therefore because the mind enjoys this divine love or blessedness, it has the ability to restrain lusts — ibid. part 5 proposition 42

likewise could be taken virtually unchanged from many a volume of the philosophia perennis, and even from some religious tracts (even some East Asian Buddhist religious tracts on Buddha Nature).

But in all these, 'reason' is being understood in a sense much nearer to 'logos' than today's 'instrumental reason', is it not? Spinoza seems much nearer to Aristotle than to current conceptions of reason in this regard, does he not?

Spinoza is following many aspects of Descartes in the consideration of emotions as a kind of idea. The duality of mind and body put forward is not a version of hylomorphism. What Aristotle expressed in terms of 'contemplation' is a battleground of decision for Spinoza. Do you not put forward Descartes as the poster child for "instrumental reason"?

I am arguing that similar connections made in different contexts are not all one message.