I see there is a need to distinguish between "process" as a particular process, a particular event which is happening to a particular physical object, or objects, and "process" in the sense of a generalized, or universal, type of event which may happen with objects. The former is a physical event, the latter is not, being conceptual and applicable to many different physical events, in a descriptive way. If "time" is said to be a sort of process, it is the latter, a generalized or universal conception, and therefore not physical. — Metaphysician Undercover

Simply asserting that conceiving of a universal is not the outcome of a physical process is unpersuasive in light of understanding things like this:

I don't think they know the causes of psychosis or even claim to know. It's like they are sure it must be physical but they can't show the mechanism. — Mark Nyquist

Let's compare psychiatry with cosmology. Currently only 5% of the known universe is sufficiently explained by the standard cosmological model. It might seem like a bad result, but the subject matter is huge, and partly beyond reach. Under these conditions 5% is probably a reasonable result, and now the James Webb telescope might help us improve that result a bit. I don't know if some non-physical approach could help, but some say that the universe is fundamentally mathematical.

Okay, I'll quit with the psychiatry/psychology theorizing. A bit off topic.

The idea is that physicalism needs to extend into our mental worlds, or else we should abandon physicalism.

However the form,

Brain; (mental content)

works for me. All the abstractions we have get pinned down to brain state in time and location and physicalism holds. And I don't see anything that is a counter example to disprove it.

FTR, I've only read to the bottom of this page (29) and no further in the ensuing exchange.

I think I'm running with MU's line - I understand that what you're saying is that the evidence isn't 100%. Sure. No evidence is, really. My point was that, even if the evidence available points to 'mind being closely intertwined with neural activity' which would satisfy current "physicalist" accounts, surely all this rules out entirely is pure idealism (i.e, no connection between mind and (physical)brain). I'm trying to sort out how the 'evidence for physicalism' is actually for physicalism, and not just evidence against pure idealism.

even if it does just rule out <one thing that isn't physicalism>, that's still loosely evidence for physicalism. It would be evidence for everything that's not pure idealism, which physicalism isn't.

You're running with MUs line because you and he share a conclusion, or because you like what he has to say about evidence?

even if it does just rule out <one thing that isn't physicalism>, that's still loosely evidence for physicalism. It would be evidence for everything that's not pure idealism, which physicalism isn't. — flannel jesus

That's probably true, but I would think it inaccurate to claim that as evidence for Physicalism. Its just information that doesn't negate it - whereas, it has specific application in negating whatever criteria that constitute the conditions in whcih Absolute Idealism could be true.

Like, if there's nine of waiting for a draw of some kind, and it goes from 10-1 with the last-pulled winning a prize - as each number is pulled, and they are all the other guy's number/s up to (2)...It doesn't say anything about whether yours will be pulled as the prize-winner. It only means those guys can't win now. It doesn't mean you're more likely to win when the winning number is pulled.

You could say "well, no, less systems in the running ipso facto make the remaining systems more likely true" to which I would just say, why? THey could be wrong.

You're running with MUs line because you and he share a conclusion, or because you like what he has to say about evidence? — flannel jesus

I like that he seems to grok my issue with using unrelated findings to go toward confirming physicalism to some degree or another.

However the form,

Brain; (mental content) — Mark Nyquist

How about the relationship between books and stories. In what sense is the meaning of a story contained by a book? Is it physical in the sense that the ink and paper is physical?

The way I do it is information (the story) only exists as,
Brain; (information)

So the book would be paper and ink.

The process is,
Book ---->Eyes --->Brain; (Information in the book)

We encode and decode matter to communicate brain to brain.

We encode and decode matter to communicate brain to brain — Mark Nyquist

Just like that, eh ;-)

You got me thinking about psychosis again.
You mentioned stories.
One of the symptoms of psychosis that comes up is self referencing when hearing a story or watching a movie. Instead of getting the normal messaging it's possible to decode a parallel secondary message specific to an individuals circumstances.

It's not a biological failure but an information processing quirk.

The way I do it is information (the story) only exists as,
Brain; (information) — Mark Nyquist

How does a bunch of neurons firing release* the information from the book? Or was the information already in the book to begin with?

*I know that's really imprecise language, but I can't think of a better word.

The person who wrote the book is the source of the information (in his brain). He encodes it into a book. The book is encoded physical matter. The person reading the book hopefully decodes the book in the way it was intended.

If you think the information is in the book, travels through the air, your eyes, your optic nerve and arrives in your brain fully formed and unaltered from it's origin....well that's not necessary. The image is just decoded in your brain and that's where information is reformed.

You're waffling too much for me. It seems like you're deliberately trying not to understand, but it's possible this is really just all too much for you. Since you can't answer my straight forward question, I'm going to bow out of this conversation with you. I don't see it going further if you cannot give a simple answer to my simple question. — flannel jesus

Your question is simple trickery as I explained, like the old example 'have you stopped beating your wife?' Answering it would be to agree to your terms which demonstrate a gross misunderstanding of the nature of "evidence".

So, are you now admitting that you do not have a clue what the word "evidence" means? Do you agree that "evidence" is a judgement, and that it is incoherent to claim the very same object to be evidence both for and against the truth of a particular statement?

Simply asserting that conceiving of a universal is not the outcome of a physical process is unpersuasive in light of understanding things like this: — wonderer1

I was not asserting that conceiving of a universal is not the outcome of a physical process. I was claiming that the thing conceived (time in this case) is not a physical thing regardless of whether it was conceived by a physical process. Would you say that fictitious things created by the imagination are physical things just because they are the product of a physical process?

The person who wrote the book is the source of the information (in his brain). He encodes it into a book. The book is encoded physical matter. The person reading the book hopefully decodes the book in the way it was intended. — Mark Nyquist

But your description is simplistic and vague. There are many unknowns in all phases of this process. What the relationship is between the physical activities of the brain, and the symbolic forms that characterise language and logic, is not at all understood. And furthermore, they belong to completely different kinds of description.

An example I often give is that an idea (like a formula or a recipe) can be represented in all kinds of different languages and symbolic forms without loosing its meaning. The representational medium, paper and ink, or physical bits on a hard drive, is different in each case, but the meaning stays the same. So how can the meaning be something physical when it can be transformed into different physical media and symbolic systems? The form changes, but the meaning remains constant through such transformations. And I say that challenges a physicalist account.

Simply asserting that conceiving of a universal is not the outcome of a physical process is unpersuasive in light of understanding things like this: — wonderer1

That's a good video, and a good source, but I would question the sense in which neural networks are a purely physical process. Such systems are reliant on human invention and programmed by humans to produce outcomes. They reflect and embody human intentions. Surely all of those processes are instantiated in physical systems, but the overall process is intellectual rather than physical, as it relies on ideas. Saying that it 'proves' or 'shows' that intelligence is physical begs the question, by assuming that the computing process can be wholly understood in physical terms, when an intrinsic foundation of the process is mathematical in the first place. And it's far from settled that mathematics can be reduced to the explained in physical terms. In fact it seems rather the contrary, as physics itself is highly dependent on mathematical abstractions.

I got busy with my taxes so can't give a long answer.

I'm guessing public education taught you wrong and you just need to reset.

I'm guessing public education taught you wrong and you just need to reset. — Mark Nyquist

I've at least bothered to read some books on it.

I'm guessing public education taught you wrong — Mark Nyquist

That is an ad hominem argument.

like that he seems to grok my issue with using unrelated findings to go toward confirming physicalism to some degree or another. — AmadeusD

You think the finding is unrelated? The finding in question seems very very related to me.

Your question is simple trickery as I explained, like the old example 'have you stopped beating your wife?' Answering it would be to agree to your terms which demonstrate a gross misunderstanding of the nature of "evidence". — Metaphysician Undercover

Literally any other person would be able to answer the question with ease. It's not trickery, you're just weird.

it is incoherent to claim the very same object to be evidence both for and against the truth of a particular statement

Please don't talk to me if you're going to keep being dishonest. I've explained to you before that I did not say this. I've told you explicitly that I did not say this. Don't lie, don't be dishonest. If you think I've said this, find me a quote where I said this. If you keep putting these words in my mouth when I've explained that I didn't say this, don't talk to me at all please, it's dishonest and exhausting. Please grow up.

I'll explain what I did say again one last time and allow you a fair chance to be more honest next time you post to me: what I said was not "it is EVIDENCE for and against a claim", I said you can have something that is evidence for one claim and COMPATIBLE with another claim. If you want to know the difference, feel free to ask.

Literally any other person would be able to answer the question with ease. It's not trickery, you're just weird. — flannel jesus

This is simple denial of the trickery you employed. If you do not address the issue that I mentioned, which exposed your question as trickery, I will continue to assert that you are simply denying the trickery employed.

Do you agree that "evidence" is a judgement? And if so then please stop talking about evidence as if it is some sort of independent object.

I'll explain what I did say again one last time and allow you a fair chance to be more honest next time you post to me: what I said was not "it is EVIDENCE for and against a claim", I said you can have something that is evidence for one claim and COMPATIBLE with another claim. If you want to know the difference, feel free to ask — flannel jesus

Look flannel, "EVIDENCE" is a judgement made concerning the object, that the object supports the truth of the statement. "COMPATIBLE" means consistent with. Whatever object is consistent with S is not consistent with not-S, by way of contradiction, unless the object is completely irrelevant. If the object is completely irrelevant it is not evidence. If the object is judged as consistent with S, (supporting S, is evidence of S), then it cannot also be judged as COMPATIBLE (consistent) with not-S without contradiction.

If the object is judged as consistent with S, (supporting S, is evidence of S), then it cannot also be judged as COMPATIBLE (consistent) with not-S without contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

You lack imagination, or you don't know what evidence means.

You think the finding is unrelated? The finding in question seems very very related to me. — flannel jesus

Yeah, I actually literally woke up in the middle of the night and answered this better than I did before...

What I was trying to illustrate was that evidence against someone else's "something" simply not being evidence against your 'something' is, I don't think, claimable by your 'something' as relevant to its legitimacy.

that's a little too abstract for me. Care to tie it in more explicitly with the evidence that began this conversation?

Totally understandable.

I understand that most 'evidence's for physicalism amount to mainly evidence that mental states are 'intertwined' with, or 'closely related to' neural activity. — AmadeusD

So, this began my little line here. If there was some previous that was relevant, I'm, unsure what that was. I came in and noted the comment i've quoted from there was unrelated to previous discussions - but what's quoted is the crux of what I was getting at.

From what I understand, all of the pieces of evidence put forward for Physicalism are actually bits of evidence against other positions. And yes, in terms of probability, that necessarily increases the likelihood of Physicalism obtaining - the same way my Raffle example works. Meaning, those pieces of evidence are not for physicalism but against other positions.

And, in terms of the specifics such as the close, but not particularly great, neural correlates to certain mind-states, those pieces of evidence seem to function better, and more relevantly as evidence precluding Absolute Idealism (well, that's what I was positing, anyway. Doesn't have to be restricted to that conclusion).

I'm not really trying to notice any benchmark for evidence - more that the function of the particular information used in this way seems to not quite be 'evidence for'.

I don't understand how you think that quote is unrelated to physicalism. That quote is surely EXACTLY the prediction physicalism would make. Like, imagine you're in a world where we have no idea if brain states correlate to mental states, but someone's developed a tool to check. If you ask the physicalists what they expect, they'd say exactly your quote. Right?

Not In light of other positions, no.

As i say, the quote would only serve to preclude certain other positions. The idea that mind states are 'closely linked' with brain activity obviously goes toward physicalism in some way - But again, only in the way the Raffle example works. Its incidental, imo. Though, i guess my position is taht i think Physicalists are wrong for making the cliam you're making.

It isn't anything specific to Physicalism. A 1:1 would have me agreeing with your sentiment above. If We have 'direct' correlates, I'd say that's exactly what Physicalism would predict. Not weak, likely indirect correlation. This seems to me to put a tiny amount of daylight between the facts and physicalism. If its not 1:1, its highly unlikely the mind state arises from the neural activity, imo.

you think we have the resolution to be able to tell if it's 1:1 or not? I don't.

But still, even so, if we assume it's equal evidence for everything that isn't pure idealism (which I don't - I don't think it's equal, but let's grant it), it would still be evidence for physicalism, in the sense that it's equal evidence for everything that isn't pure idealism.

You start out with some probability that pure idealism is the case, you get this new information that says pure idealism isn't the case, and you then distribute the probability you gave to pure idealism amongst the other options. Every option is thus more probable than it was before receiving this information, which is exactly what evidence is - information that makes claims more or less probable.

I think we would, if Physicalism were any more likely than other positions that aren't Absolute Idealism. If a 1:1 match can't be found, that, to me, is a direct knock to physicalisms probablitily.

Yeah, I don't disagree witht his methodology - But I return to my actual gripe(edited for spelling):

Though, i guess my position is that I think Physicalists are wrong for making the claim you're making. — AmadeusD

Every (other) option being more probable because of preclusive evidence in another position, isn't evidence for any of them, imo. It's just a position - there's no real argument to be had here I don't think.

because of preclusive evidence in another position, isn't evidence for any of them, imo. — AmadeusD

So you don't think information that raises the probability that a statement is true is evidence for that statement?

That's right. I don't think it can be taken as such, anyway, even if, on technical lines, it 'is'.

If there's 100 positions.
We find a piece of 'evidence' which precludes one of them.

I cannot bring myself to pretend that's evidence for the other 99. Seems really misleading and silly to me.