Then I don't know what your criteria for atemporality is or how you're reaching any conclusion about what is temporal and what isn't.

Atemporality is the property of being timeless—having no temporal order. You were saying that the belief in X is atemporally dependent on knowledge of X. This makes no sense: how do I non-temporally acquire knowledge of X and then a belief in X without that inevitably being a temporal process?

Exactly, so you could believe that the next president will be Bob without knowing it: — Bob Ross

No, I can have an irrational belief that turns out to be incorrect, based on fallacy or just lack of knoweldge, or I can have a rational belief that turns out to be correct based on knowledge.

That’s not what you implied thought with:

I have to know what the president of the United States is in order to have a belief about who will become president in the future.

This implies that one only needs some knowledge which is not the thing about to be beleived for that belief to be rational (i.e., one needs knowledge of some Y for belief in X to be rational, not knowledge of X). If this is true, then you could believe that the next president will be Bob, given the knowledge you have, without knowing it will be Bob.

how do I non-temporally acquire knowledge of X and then a belief in X without that inevitably being a temporal process? — Bob Ross

I didn't say this. I gave an example of a kind of belief that can turn out to be irrational or rational on some temporal dependency.

"No, I can have an irrational belief that turns out to be incorrect, based on fallacy or just lack of knoweldge, or I can have a rational belief that turns out to be correct based on knowledge."

That’s not what you implied thought with:

"I have to know what the president of the United States is in order to have a belief about who will become president in the future." — Bob Ross

Why is it necessary for one of those two statements of mine to imply the other?
Of course the former doesn't imply the latter. The latter is a much simpler claim about rational beliefs than what the former says about rational beliefs that have some temporal dependency. They are not in contradiction, either.

This implies that one only needs some knowledge which is not the thing about to be beleived for that belief to be rational — Bob Ross

Because you insisted on talking about beliefs with temporal dependency for rationality.
So I gave you an example of those, and now you're writing as if you're undermining the general depency of rational belief in X on knowledge of X.

To have a belief about presidents, you need to know what "presidents" means.
To have a belief about who will become president in the future, I have to know what "becoming president in the future" means.
Those are both examples of atemporal logical/semantic dependency of rational belief on knowledge that beliefs possessing temporal dependency also have.

Is believing a ridged state for you? Are you equally sure about all your beliefs? — mentos987

No, I have different degrees of certainty in my beliefs. Some are based on more knowledge than others.

how do I non-temporally acquire knowledge of X and then a belief in X without that inevitably being a temporal process? — Bob Ross

I didn't say this. I gave an example of a kind of belief that can turn out to be irrational or rational on some temporal dependency.

You definitely said this:

The relationship is not temporal but one of dependency. If we're rational, belief depends on knowledge.

Underline adds by me. And, not to mention, you reiterated it again in your last response:

Those are both examples of atemporal logical/semantic dependency of raitonal belief on knowledge that beliefs possessing temporal dependency also have.

Why is it necessary for one of those two statements of mine to imply the other?
Of course the former doesn't imply the latter. The latter is a much simpler claim about rational beliefs than what the former says about rational beliefs that have some temporal dependency. They are not in contradiction, either.
…
To have a belief about presidents, you need to know what "presidents" means.
To have a belief about who will become president in the future, I have to know what "becoming president in the future" means.

Again, my point is that you are now conflating a belief in X requiring knowledge of X with belief in X requiring background knowledge, Y. Agnostic atheism is perfectly compatible with the latter, not the former. An agnostic atheist claims that they belief X but do not know X; but that they have reasons to back (i.e., some knowledge about) Y such that they think they are justified in that belief [in X]. Your OP was attacking agnostic atheist in the sense that one needs knowledge of X to believe X; but you are no longer claiming this, and this renders your argument against the etymological schema ineffective.

To have a belief about presidents, you need to know what "presidents" means.
To have a belief about who will become president in the future, I have to know what "becoming president in the future" means.
Those are both examples of atemporal logical/semantic dependency of raitonal belief on knowledge that beliefs possessing temporal dependency also have.

I don’t see how any of that is atemporal. In order to know what “becoming president in the future” means to believe Bob is going to be the next president, I need to know the former before the latter.

I need to know the former before the latter. — Bob Ross

Not sure that's true. You can have direct knowledge that Bob will become President (for instance, if you're told he's going to be by a source trustworthy). You might then want to ask what a President is, and have that explained to you - I imagine, barring some mental incapacity, you will pretty automatically fill in the blanks of the original statement (i.e what 'President' means) and have a full understanding of what 'Bob is going to be President' really presents you with.

I may be missing something from further back in the exchange btu this seems a solution to the temporality problem in this case.

It's you that said one is more relevant than the other, not me. I'd say "relevance" of a definition comes down to popularity and history. — Hallucinogen

Relevance of something comes down to whether it is related to the topic at hand. Dictionaries of philosophy seem more relevant than the book of fables and words.

As a way of debunking what the OP is aimed at debunking - the idea that definitions prove what things are. — Hallucinogen

No clue what that means. Definitions give us what a word (symbol) refers to. Nobody claims that definitions have magical access to the noumenal realm.

The only thing your OP supposedly debunks is whether the definition for atheism given somewhere is accurate or contradictory or whatnot.

Not sure that's true. You can have direct knowledge that Bob will become President (for instance, if you're told he's going to be by a source trustworthy).

If by this you just mean that you were told “Bob will become president”, then this does not negate my point. One must know something—i.e., one must believe themselves justified in at least one of their beliefs—to believe that “Bob will become president”. That could be simply being told it.

Then i may be missing something. My understanding is that the conflict in the above exchange is that you are asserting a temporality requirement to the knowledge that Bob will become President, relevant to the order in which knowledge of what President is, and subsequently, that Bob will become one/it, is received. I.e that one must know what a President is, in order to justify the knowledge that Bob will become one/It - that the former piece of information must be presupplied before the assertion of the former could be considered knowledge.

I don't think that's the case. If that's not what the conflict above is about, ignore me haha

My understanding is that the conflict in the above exchange is that you are asserting a temporality requirement to the knowledge that Bob will become President

No, it is that there is a temporal relationship between the knowledge used to believe “bob will become president” and that belief. I am not saying that one needs to know “bob will become president”.

I.e that one must know what a President is, in order to justify the knowledge that Bob will become one/It.

That is an example, not id est. That could be true, but it also could not (as you already rightly pointed out).

For the first response, my clarification was more in the opposite direction. One must know what a President is in order to know that Bob will become one/it. Meaning, knowledge of 'President' must come, in time, prior to being told Bob will become one/it for that to be considered knowledge of same.
It's possible your response still closes that out, I'm just unsure as I wouldn't want to assume where you are putting your defenders in.

On the second, fair enough. I guess what im getting at is that I do not think that is the case, whether a mere example or the essence of hte issue (though, i think id est is a bit out of place in that exact position of your repsonse).

I dont think one needs to know what a President is before being told Bob will become one/it to know that Bob will become one/it.

This could also be pointless - but i need practice for my upcoming papers LOL

I dont think one needs to know what a President is before being told Bob will become one/it to know that Bob will become one/it. — AmadeusD

I think that president is a troublesome word, so let's switch to something more concrete: butterflies.

Does Bob need to know what a butterfly is to know that the caterpillar is going to become one? Let's say that he believes the caterpillar will become a butterfly, that it is true it will become a butterfly, and that he is justified in thinking it will become one because the caterpillar just made a cocoon. It seems that he knows it. If there is one troublesome component is that "he believes the caterpillar will become a butterfly". How could it be that Bob believes that, if he has no mental content of what a butterfly is?

My position here (though, fresh, and likely to change) is that it really, truly, does not matter.
If he has a good notion of cocoon function (in it's most simple i.e Form A->Cocoon->Form B), and that the result is called, by tradition (or perhaps he knows the etymology, but not to what it refers), a butterfly, I don't think he needs to know what a butterfly IS. He need only know that the inevitable result of a caterpillar (which he does know about) entering a cocoon (and not dying) is "a butterfly".

I see the problem. But I don't think it's more than an epistemological discomfort. He' still justified in believing "a butterfly" will result, just doesn't know what it looks like.

Additionally, if someone where to simply tell me "I drew a triangle, but it doesn't have three internal angles" I am justified, despite having zero knowledge of what they drew in reality, of knowing that it isn't a triangle. I can be absolutely certain that a Triangle has not resulted from this drawing session, but i have no idea what the person drew (this one is messy and i expect it to be pulled apart.. go for it)

the result is called, by tradition (or perhaps he knows the etymology, but not to what it refers), a butterfly, — AmadeusD

Then, for him, a butterfly is that which comes out of the cocoon. He may not know what shape, colour, or smell the butterfly is, but for him butterfly means the thing that comes out of the cocoon, so he knows what a butterfly is for him, just not what a butterfly is for people who go outside.

but i have no idea what the person drew — AmadeusD

You know that it was a non-triangle, hence your conclusion.

is for people who go outside. — Lionino

I assume this is aimed his having never been outside being required to not know what a Butterfly appears to be. Fair.

the thing that comes out of the cocoon, so he knows what a butterfly is for him, just not what a butterfly is — Lionino

Even for those people, the butterfly is the thing that comes out of the cocoon. It's appearance is further information than what the thing is, surely? He has, lets say, limited knowledge.

You know that it was a non-triangle, hence your conclusion. — Lionino

Yes, this is merely a reverse of the Butterfly example to try to ensure the logic is consistent (in the sense that knowledge can be derived from aspects of a thing - but that direct knowledge isn't needed. So Bob's knowledge of the A-Cocoon-B flow ensures that once he's told that B is a Butterful, it's knowledge.

Even for those people, the butterfly is the thing that comes out of the cocoon — AmadeusD

Counterexample, (dumb) kids know what a butterfly is without knowing it is the thing that comes out of the cocoon.

I agree they do.
Then, they both(Bob and the dumb kids) know what a butterfly is, and the other pieces of information (in one case, it's appearance, in the other, its origin) don't seem to bear on the respective knowledge claims. It doesn't seem to follow that the opposite (in each case) is required to bring the information to the level of 'knowledge'.

I don't think that's a counter as much as a parallel. They both know what a butterfly is under different criteria.

Could it be that more accurately, Bob knows merely that a butterfly comes from a cocoon? This seems to go the President example pretty squarely - I'm of the view that we can know Bob will become President, regardless of whether we know what a President is.

Your OP was attacking agnostic atheist in the sense that one needs knowledge of X to believe X — Bob Ross

Under rationality*

To have a belief about presidents, you need to know what "presidents" means.
To have a belief about who will become president in the future, I have to know what "becoming president in the future" means.
These are both examples of "To rationally believe X, I have to know what X means".
Another such relationship: "To rationally believe X, I have to know X is a fact"

I don’t see how any of that is atemporal. In order to know what “becoming president in the future” means to believe Bob is going to be the next president, I need to know the former before the latter. — Bob Ross

As soon as you know what X means, you're mentally representing it, so you believe what it means. There isn't a delay. The atemporality is between the two.

So in the terms in that quotation, agnosticism would be neither belief not disbelief, but, perhaps suspension of judgement or a belief that the question is malformed and therefore unanswerable.

It does seem to be the case that some (many) people don't think the distinction between agnosticism and atheism is important. And indeed, for some purposes, it isn't. But then, for other people, on other occasions, it is.

Well, agnosticism means that one doesn't "know" whether gods exist or not. However it is an error to then assume that believers and nonbelievers "know" that gods exist or don't exist. It is more accurate (when dealing with unknowable entities, like gods) to substitute "believe" for "know" on the question of existance.

Well, agnosticism means that one doesn't "know" whether gods exist or not. However it is an error to then assume that believers and nonbelievers "know" that gods exist or don't exist. It is more accurate (when dealing with unknowable entities, like gods) to substitute "believe" for "know" on the question of existance. — LuckyR

For me, since I think that the concept of "God" is incoherent or perhaps empty, I'm inclinced to think that no-one, including me, knows that God exists or that God does not exist. But I do know that the concept of God is incoherent. It is clear, I would say, that believing on faith that God exists (or doesn't) is not knowing that God exists or doesn't. However, people often confuse knowledge with subjective certainty, and belief with subjective uncertainty - and this is not unreasonable; it's just a complication. But then, there's another complication, that religious belief is often called belief rather than knowledge; I'm not quite sure why and this may be an old-fashioned view, but the creed does begin "I believe..." I think this is a specialized use of belief to mean "trust"; it's not unknown outside religion.

But it's important to bear in mind that belief that p is belief that p is true, and hence it is hard to distinguish between belief and knowledge from a subjective point of view. The consequence is that knowledge claims should never be made for one's own beliefs, only for the beliefs of others - except in cases where the belief is "common knowledge" or certainly true.

:up:

But I do know that the concept of God is incoherent — Ludwig V

Have you got a breif sketch of why you might argue this? I take a similar position, but I am curious how others see this.

An atheist says there is no rational or empirical reason to believe in the existence of God, whereas an agnostic says there is no rational or empirical reason to believe that God either exists or does not exist.

in other words, the difference from the agnostic in what the atheist says is that there is every reason not to believe in the existence of God, and further, following from that, every reason to believe in the non-existence of God.

I have been over this many times in this thread, But i do not think this is accurate at all, and many atheist institutions reject that formulation. Happy to go over it again, but It probably doesn't actually mattter :sweat:

Seems to unfortunately be one of those situations where the word has a little bit of wiggle room in meaning. I don't think one definition or the other should be considered "wrong", I think people can just take the time to specify what they mean when asked.

"I'm an atheist" - "Care to go into detail on exactly what you mean by that?" - "Sure, I mean..."

Some words end up with that kind of clarification being required. It's not ideal but it's what we've got.

Your comment is of little use if you don't say why you don't agree.

Agnostic atheism may he a means of labelling uncertainty or a,wider spectrum of being open to varying forms of understanding, based on reading and thinking of philosophy..My concern is that-agnostic atheism' dow not become a 'box', cut off from many varied ways of thinking about philosophy and human life..

For the first response, my clarification was more in the opposite direction. One must know what a President is in order to know that Bob will become one/it

Correct.

Y = a president is one elected to preside over an organized body of people, such as the chief executive of a republic.
X = bob is going to be the next president.

I must know Y in order to know X. @AmadeusD was arguing, in their OP, that agnostic atheism is nonsensical (or irrational) because an analysis of the two words conjoined (i.e., agnostic + atheism) reveals that anyone subscribing to it claims no knowledge of whether gods exist while not believing it; and this argument rests on the assumption, or perhaps defended principle, that one must know what they believe—i.e., they must know X to believe X.

I dont think one needs to know what a President is before being told Bob will become one/it to know that Bob will become one/it.

You are right insofar as one could know that Bob will become something, of which all one is aware of is that it is called ‘presidency’, and thusly one does not completely understand nor know what it means for Bob to become president (without knowing what presidency is).

I can tell you that this wooden block I have in my hand is floovy (in fact, I just did) and you will thereby know, without knowing what floovy means, that the wooden block has a property of something--but not what that property is itself.

This could also be pointless - but i need practice for my upcoming papers LOL

Best of luck, my friend!

To rationally believe X, I have to know what X means

This is perfectly compatible with agnostic atheism. An agnostic atheist knows what it means for god(s) not to exist, so they can “rationally” believe that god(s) don’t exist without knowing god(s) don’t exist.

To rationally believe X, I have to know X is a fact

This is equivalent to saying what I was saying before: according to you, to rationally believe X, one must know X (saying it is a fact is redundant). This is what you haven’t defended but, instead, diverted to the previous principle (quoted above this quote). I don’t think one needs to know X to believe X, which is not the same thing as needing to know what X means to believe X.

Have you got a brief sketch of why you might argue this? — Tom Storm

Not really. My first question would be to find out which concept of God is at stake. When I say "the concept of God is incoherent", I usually have in mind the Christian conception of God. But even that takes many forms. Each thinks that the others are all wrong, but they can't all be right. They can all be wrong, though. But then, how to decide right and wrong here? The trump card is, of course, faith, and arguably coherence and incoherence aren't applicable to questions of faith. Internal consistency might be.

My best first argument is the problem of evil, which I'm sure you are familiar with. It has the virtue of being applicable to all Christian conceptions.

There is an argument whether omniscience and omnipotence are compatible. If God knows everything, can God alter anything?

Then there's the idea that God is everywhere at all times, which makes it hard to understand what his knowledge of the world would be like. Certainly not like ours, since we are at all times located at a specific place and time.

There is a list of more detailed issues, all well known in Christian theology, none of which have what I would call a solution. In alphabetical order, divinity/humanity of Jesus, original sin, redemption through sacrifice or scapegoating, transubstantiation, trinity,

The most general objection is that the concept of God only makes sense in a dualist (or maybe an idealist a la Berkeley) metaphysics.

I would classify God's existence as, for believers, a "hinge" proposition, around which all other issues are seen. But I also think the doctrinal question whether God exists is not as important as Christians (and Muslims) believe it to be. Religion is essentially a question of attitude and way of life. Doctrine is secondary.

Does that help?

:up: Thanks.

There is a list of more detailed issues, all well known in Christian theology, none of which have what I would call a solution. In alphabetical order, divinity/humanity of Jesus, original sin, redemption through sacrifice or scapegoating, transubstantiation, trinity, — Ludwig V

Indeed. I have never understood why a god would ruin his weekend (the crucifixion) and (as per the old quip) sacrifice himself to himself to save us from himself because of a rule he made himself?

The very idea of invisible god/s who can only be known through old books and human testimony seems incoherant. I think the religious term for this is ineffable. :wink:

Then, they both(Bob and the dumb kids) know what a butterfly is, and the other pieces of information (in one case, it's appearance, in the other, its origin) don't seem to bear on the respective knowledge claims. It doesn't seem to follow that the opposite (in each case) is required to bring the information to the level of 'knowledge'.

I don't think that's a counter as much as a parallel. They both know what a butterfly is under different criteria. — AmadeusD

In that case what Bob and the kids "know" as "butterfly" are different things. For Bob,
"butterfly" is the same thing as "the thing that comes out of the cocoon". When Bob thinks of a butterfly he does not have the same mental content as the kids.
Your argument seem to be either that both parties have a mental content at all for the word "butterfly" regardless of whether those contents are alike, or that there is some essential property of "butterfly" you didn't specify that both parties know of regardless of the accidents (shape colour etc) of a butterfly.

Bob knows merely that a butterfly comes from a cocoon — AmadeusD

By the mental content of butterfly to Bob, that would be redundant. The thing that comes from a cocoon comes from a cocoon.

This seems to go the President example pretty squarely - I'm of the view that we can know Bob will become President, regardless of whether we know what a President is. — AmadeusD

What we understand by president is a set of official duties and privileges. If Bob does not understand anything at all by the word "president", I believe that we will end up with a non-proposition, "Bob will become ∅", and belief in the context of knowledge must be propositional.