There's an awful lot packed in here.

In the argument that I was referencing, true agnosticism (not knowing whether p) is probabilistically unlikely (almost impossible), as the overall doxastic sway will almost always be towards p or not-p. — Lionino

What makes equally balanced agnosticism "true"? I can see what makes a 90 degree angle a right angle, but that doesn't mean that the only true angles are right angles. There's a complication here, because although right angles are not the only true angles, there is such a thing as a true right angle. But I think that only shows that one needs to be clear about what criterion of truth is at work in each use. You can choose to call equally indifferent agnosticism the only true agnosticism if you like. But I need a better reason than that.

I mixed the actual sense of 'agnostic' with its sense in the discussion of belief in God here. — Lionino

I don't see that agnosticism with a preference one way or the other is restricted to the context of religious belief.

I quote Matthew McGrath — Lionino

I'm puzzled about suspension of judgement. It is one of the non-genuine doxastic attitudes, and yet you use the same phrase to describe "true" agnosticism.

If any non-epistemic factors make a belief "non-doxastic" (not that I'm sure I know what that means), then religious beliers held on faith are non-doxastic. But why would believing that religious beliefs are non-doxastic be non-doxastic?

not doxastic but declarative. — Lionino

I don't quite get this distinction. I suppose you mean that religious beliefs are not rational. I think that is true, but the thread, as I understand it, limits the discussion to rational belief - I'm not sure whether there's such a thing as non-rational knowledge, but there might be, or perhaps some non-rational factors can be part of a knowledge system. After all, scientific beliefs are supposed to be based on a commitment to truth. Isn't that a non-epistemic factor?

But it does seem important to me to note that religious belief may not be entirely rational. — Ludwig V

If it is faith alone then it is believing without knowledge which is irrational.
Belief/faith as a function of knowledge is rational.
We are trying to establish the terms for referring to people's mental states, so in order for those terms to be clear, the connections between definitions need to also be rational. Sacrifice that and we end up mired in the confusing mess that the new atheists have succeeded in creating.

What makes equally balanced agnosticism "true"? — Ludwig V

Let me put this way, I believe you will agree with me. In the debate of belief in God, there are those that believe and those that don't believe. There is also the word 'agnostic'. In this debate, people use this word in many ways, including but not exhausting: suspending belief, finding the idea incoherent, having no clue, etc. "Agnostic" is somewhat used as a catch-all word for the third position. But that is just how many people seem to use the word, very lax. As we know, agnosticism means not knowing, which is what I call true agnosticism, trying to constrast it from suspending belief or others.

Now, I see another argument in your reply, which is

I can see what makes a 90 degree angle a right angle, but that doesn't mean that the only true angles are right angles — Ludwig V

To make the analogy with angles, for me, believing that P would be a straight angle, believing that not-P would be a zero angle, and "true agnosticism" the right angle of 90º. My belief is exactly that we are seldom 180º about any proposition, because of point C here, and that most things we believe could be a 160 or 97 degrees angle, the things we disbelieve a 30 or 70 degrees angle. I think that you are questioning why I don't think that 80 or 100 degrees is agnosticism instead of only 90. My reason is that, if we accept 80 or 100 degrees to be agnosticism, there is no fine line to separate agnosticism from believing that p or not-p — thus agnosticism would become an arbitrary concept, while belief and disbelief would at least have limits on one side (180º and 0º) —; the only fine line for accurate terminology would be 90º or nothing.

I am aware a counterargument would be the colour 'red'. We don't know where red starts or ends as distinct from violet and orange, the colour red is somewhat arbitrary, yet we productively use the concept of red all the time.
I would reply that {leaving "agnosticism" to an arbitrary range that we are supposed to intuit whether we fall under or not in the moment}, like 'red', is not productive, and it is better to make agnosticism 90º, 95º weak belief and 85º weak disbelief, while 175º strong belief and 5º strong disbelief.

Hopefully my text was not confusing.

But I think that only shows that one needs to be clear about what criterion of truth is at work in each use. — Ludwig V

Right, maybe the text above expresses the criterion of truth I am working with.

I don't see that agnosticism with a preference one way or the other is restricted to the context of religious belief. — Ludwig V

My explanation on that was also not clear. With "its sense in the discussion of belief in God here" I meant here in this thread. In the first paragraph in this text I specified what I was referring to. The ocurrence of those usages is something I verified here in this thread.

I'm puzzled about suspension of judgement. It is one of the non-genuine doxastic attitudes, and yet you use the same phrase to describe "true" agnosticism. — Ludwig V

That was not my intention, maybe you are referring to one my previous posts that you saw before I made a correction. Indeed, 'suspending belief' is not a true doxastic attitude.
Being that an exactly 90º degrees angle is almost impossible — and, for the sake of ease, let's say impossible —, we are left with two regions, 90.0̄1 to 180 degrees, and 89.9̄ to 0 degrees. In that sense, there are two doxastic attitudes (or regions), and one that is almost impossible to truly occur. Thus, if we want to have a third position that does occur often, it would be not a genuine doxastic one, which for me is suspending judgement, which can coexist with weakly believing and weakly disbelieving — true doxastic attitudes.

If any non-epistemic factors make a belief "non-doxastic" — Ludwig V

Every belief is doxastic by definition, no?

I suppose you mean that religious beliefs are not rational. I think that is true, but the thread, as I understand it, limits the discussion to rational belief — Ludwig V

I didn't really think about religious belief specifically.

After all, scientific beliefs are supposed to be based on a commitment to truth. Isn't that a non-epistemic factor? — Ludwig V

I believe that scientific belief is more about "will this also happen in the future?" than anything else. There is a commitment to regularity in scientific beliefs for sure, I am not sure if I would call that an epistemic or non-epistemic factor.

Here are my definitions. The exact % is arbitrary.

Knowing something indicates a certainty of 95-100%

Believing something indicates a certainty of 50-95%

Having faith in something is when you simply choose to add a percentage of certainty. E.g. 55% belief + 41% faith = knowing that God exist.

How do you feel about this?

If I don't believe in the existence of God, any god, because there is no evidence for its existence, what does that makes me? An agnostic, an atheist, an agnostic atheist?

If I don't believe in the existence of God, any god, because there is no evidence for its existence, what does that makes me? An agnostic, an atheist, an agnostic atheist?

To me you're describing classic atheism. You're not saying the jury's out on the existance of gods, you're saying in the absence of evidence I don't believe in any gods.

"Agnostic" is somewhat used as a catch-all word for the third position. But that is just how many people seem to use the word, very lax. — Lionino

I don’t see any problem with that. As you point out we manage perfectly well with no fine line between “red” and “violet”. Picking out and sorting through the varieties of agnosticism is quite interesting. But what is the actual problem that all this is intended to solve? Or is it just a tidy mind?

there is no fine line to separate agnosticism from believing that p or not-p — Lionino

This proposal, presumably, makes both belief and non-belief rare to impossible just as your similar proposal for agnosticism makes that rare to impossible. What's the advantage in that? I think not accepting p and not accepting not-p is much more than a fine line.

I would reply that {leaving "agnosticism" to an arbitrary range that we are supposed to intuit whether we fall under or not in the moment}, like 'red', is not productive, — Lionino

I think the problem is your obsession with arranging everything on a single scale. The obsession with degrees of belief makes for a tidy diagram but smothers the distinctions that might actually matter here. WHat is the problem you are trying to solve here?

Thus, if we want to have a third position that does occur often, it would be not a genuine doxastic one, which for me is suspending judgement, which can coexist with weakly believing and weakly disbelieving — true doxastic attitudes. — Lionino

I don't follow this at all. I can understand being agnostic with a leaning towards theism and being agnostic with a leaning towards atheism. But the business with percentages and doxastic attitudes is over my head - especially as we now have true agnosticism and truly doxastic. Perhaps I just haven't kept up with the argument.

I believe that scientific belief is more about "will this also happen in the future?" than anything else. There is a commitment to regularity in scientific beliefs for sure, I am not sure if I would call that an epistemic or non-epistemic factor. — Lionino

Even if you are right about what scientific belief is about, it is still a commitment to truth.
It would help me if I had some examples of clearly epistemic and clearly non-epistemic factors. Ditto for doxastic and non-doxastic.

f I don't believe in the existence of God, any god, because there is no evidence for its existence, what does that makes me? An agnostic, an atheist, an agnostic atheist? — Alkis Piskas

I think you are missing the difference between not believing in the existence of God and believing in the non-existence of God. Admittedly, for some purposes, the difference may not matter much. But if you believe that "God" is an incoherent concept, it does matter.

To me you're describing classic atheism. You're not saying the jury's out on the existance of gods, you're saying in the absence of evidence I don't believe in any gods. — LuckyR

Right. :up:

You're not saying the jury's out on the existance of gods, you're saying in the absence of evidence I don't believe in any gods. — LuckyR

Can you figure how these are different?

IN the absence of evidence, not believing amounts to the jury still being out. But perhaps out of hte building, rather than still in the deliberation room. I can't see any practical difference.

I think not accepting p and not accepting not-p is much more than a fine lin — Ludwig V

They are fundamentally different things. I think one of the sophistical tricks of (perhaps the religious?) some in this thread is to pretend that not accepting p is the same as accepting not-p.

In the former, the subject may not know about p. In the former, the know, and reject it positively. Very, very different situations. The misuse of these words hurts my head, and the weak defenses of their misuses even more so.

Can you figure how these are different?

IN the absence of evidence, not believing amounts to the jury still being out. But perhaps out of hte building, rather than still in the deliberation room. I can't see any practical difference.

Not so much. Most common entities without evidence for their existance are in the "I don't believe in it" category not the "well, it's possible" category of most.

Where are unicorns in your mindset? Or ghosts? No doubt some believe in and numerous common folk don't disbelieve in ghosts (which an example of what you're referring to). But that number is severely diminished in intellectually rigorous circles (such as here).

IN the absence of evidence, not believing amounts to the jury still being out. But perhaps out of hte building, rather than still in the deliberation room. I can't see any practical difference. — AmadeusD

Me neither.
— Do you believe in a green donkey (it had copper poisoning) orbiting behind Jupiter in such a way that it is tidally locked with respect to Earth, that is, it is always behind Jupiter and we could never see it with a telescope?
— No...
— Well, do you have eViDeNcE it is not there though?
— I guess not.
— ThEn you can't discard the pOsSiBiLity of a green donkey behind Jupiter!

Not so much. Most common entities without evidence for their existance are in the "I don't believe in it" category not the "well, it's possible" category of most. — LuckyR

I don't see how this is not the same thing, without expressing the same.
Anyone who claims absolutely that unicorns are not possible, is kidding themselves.

But that number is severely diminished in intellectually rigorous circles (such as here). — LuckyR

I am not convinced this is either true, or matters. Not considering something seriously isn't the same as positively affirm disbelief that it is possible.

— OkAy, do you have evidence it is not there though? — Lionino

A good example. The jury is out. Out of hte building. No energy spent on the proposition. But affirmative disbelief is not there. It's merely not engaging.

:up: It's fascinating how this discussion has become so protracted and labyrinthine. It's such a small a matter; belief versus knowledge.

Absolutely. Certain moves almost seem like a wind-up LOL. But there we go - such is discussion of belief and knowledge :) Enjoying it, despite hte headaches.

Picking out and sorting through the varieties of agnosticism is quite interesting. But what is the actual problem that all this is intended to solve? Or is it just a tidy mind? — Ludwig V

Isn't philosophy's goal to tidy up our minds? :grin:

This proposal, presumably, makes both belief and non-belief rare to impossible just as your similar proposal for agnosticism makes that rare to impossible — Ludwig V

Since I take a more Bayesian view of belief (according to the SEP the dominant view of partial belief), I would be happy to grant that, but I would say "A bachelor is a single man" is very close to 180º degrees (belief with certainty), while "A bachelor is a married man" to 0º degrees (disbelief). If we wish to talk about synthetic propositions, we could use "A square has four inner angles", very close to 180º also. The law of identity could be said to be 180º degrees, as it is the basal rock that every other belief depends on.

I think the problem is your obsession with arranging everything on a single scale. The obsession with degrees of belief makes for a tidy diagram but smothers the distinctions that might actually matter here. WHat is the problem you are trying to solve here? — Ludwig V

If there is a problem to solve, for me, it is that true agnosticism (90º degrees belief) hardly exists. Once we are aware of that, we can talk more accurately and honestly about our beliefs. Some of the confusion in this thread would vanish therefore.

but smothers the distinctions that might actually matter here — Ludwig V

Which are?

I can understand being agnostic with a leaning towards theism and being agnostic with a leaning towards atheism — Ludwig V

For me, agnostic is the same as being exactly between p and not-p in terms of belief. Suspending belief would be different. Suspending belief is where, for epistemic reasons (such as not having as much evidence as we conceive we could have about the topic) and/or non-epistemic reasons (such as being able to judge better in the future), we intentionally don't make a judgement, even though we could.
Thus you can suspend belief while leaning towards either. True agnosticism would be leaning towards neither.

It would help me if I had some examples of clearly epistemic and clearly non-epistemic factors. Ditto for doxastic and non-doxastic. — Ludwig V

Epistemic factors, Matthew McGrath:
a. How strongly or weakly your evidence supports p (or not-p).
b. Whether you know or appreciate (a).

Non-epistemic factors, indidem:
1. Whether you will later have better (worse) evidence concerning whether p than you now
have.
2. Whether you will later be a better (worse) assessor of your evidence.
3. How valuable, or how much you value, knowing whether p.
4. How likely it is that, if you inquired further and acquired more evidence, you could come to
know whether p.

Doxastic attitudes: believing that p and its adverbs (strongly, weakly), disbelieving that p or believing that not-p and its adverbs, believing neither.
Non-doxastic attitudes: not making judgement, inquiring into the matter, not having heard of.

And I am glad to announce that a beautiful diagram has been made, much to our irony:


Edit: I forgot to add and I am not uploading the file all over again. Left arrow is 180º degrees, right arrow 0º degrees, and upwards arrow 90º degrees.

Isn't philosophy's goal to tidy up our minds? — Lionino

Not necessarily. I prefer an overview of what's happening. When I understand that, I might do a bit of tidying up, but only if it serves some purpose. Tidying up just for the sake of a system is regimentation, which has its uses (in mathematics and science, for example) but I see no virtue in it for its own sake - and it can be oppressive to people and misleading in philosophy.

Edit: I forgot to add and I am not uploading the file all over again. Left arrow is 180º degrees, right arrow 0º degrees, and upwards arrow 90º degrees. — Lionino

It's OK. Your diagram was clear enough for me to work that out. It is a lovely diagram.

Doxastic attitudes: believing that p and its adverbs (strongly, weakly) — Lionino

These lists are very helpful. I wasn't expecting anything like that. I would have counted everything you've listed as epistemic or doxastic. Does emotional commitment (like belief in God) count as believing strongly and believing something reluctantly (like believing that your friend has scammed you) count as believing weakly?

If there is a problem to solve, for me, it is that true agnosticism (90º degrees belief) hardly exists. — Lionino

But that's just a consequence of how you present the phenomena. a single point on the scale seems improbable. 89 degrees is also highly improbably, But a range between 85 and 90 is more probable. You assign so many values to all the other beliefs that you create a specific impression of the relationship between them. It's got nothing to do with what's actually going on.
It's the difference between a dimmer and a light switch.

The question is whether to see all varieties of agnosticism as the same kind of thing, like a bowl full of apples, or as different varieties, like a bowl with apples and oranges and kiwi fruit and maybe a few nuts. I go for the latter. Agnostic because there's no (not enough) evidence is one thing; agnosticism because the concept of God is incoherent is another; agnosticism because religion is the cause of much evil is yet another. I can't fit those on to a single scale. Why do I have to?

It is true that all those varieties of agnosticism can be held strongly or weakly, so it would be comprehensible if one proposed a separate scale for each variety. But then the same will apply to atheism and to theism.

I think you are fastening on a specific feature of belief - that it can be strong or weak - and turning that into an entire system. But belief is more complicated than that.

Sorry, this post is a bit scattered.

Belief is connected to knowledge through rationality. — Hallucinogen

The epistemological status of belief is relevant only to those who insist it must be.

Not considering something seriously isn't the same as positively a firm disbelief that it is possible.

Agreed, though atheism isn't (for most) possession of proof positive that gods don't exist, it is the disbelief in gods (regardless of the source of the disbelief).

After all, nonexistance does not require impossibility. It's possible I could have had eggs for breakfast, yet I most certainly did not.

The epistemological status of belief is relevant only to those who insist it must be. — Arne

I'm not sure what you're getting at here. There's no doubt that many beliefs are held, but not on rational grounds; that doesn't mean the people who hold them are irrational or that they don't really hold those beliefs. But it is always interesting to ask whether a belief is held on rational grounds and if one wants to know whether that belief counts as knowledge, it is essential to ask that question.

.... though atheism isn't (for most) possession of proof positive that gods don't exist, it is the disbelief in gods (regardless of the source of the disbelief). — LuckyR

So in the terms in that quotation, agnosticism would be neither belief not disbelief, but, perhaps suspension of judgement or a belief that the question is malformed and therefore unanswerable.

It does seem to be the case that some (many) people don't think the distinction between agnosticism and atheism is important. And indeed, for some purposes, it isn't. But then, for other people, on other occasions, it is.

The epistemological status of belief is relevant only to those who insist it must be. — Arne

I don't understand what that means.

Tidying up just for the sake of a system is regimentation, which has its uses (in mathematics and science, for example) but I see no virtue in it for its own sake - and it can be oppressive to people and misleading in philosophy. — Ludwig V

That is understandable. You will also understand me once I tell you that my background and (one of my) passions are physics and mathematics.

emotional commitment (like belief in God) count as believing strongly and believing something reluctantly (like believing that your friend has scammed you) count as believing weakly? — Ludwig V

I have to say I have not thought much about emotional commitments yet, I was dealing primarily with rational belief, where evidence and logic are used as justification. I tried searching into irrational belief and emotional belief and I could not find much unfortunately.
I can say however that emotional commitments such as "I believe my wife is not cheating" can sometimes not be belief. Sure, they say "I believe", but what they really mean is that they "want to believe", but in the back of their heads they know it is not true. I am not sure if in someone's psychology reason and emotion will always be separate in belief-formation, or if they mix sometimes.
I would say that for believing something reluctantly, the "reluctantly" is the "I want to believe part", which can be discarded when we give an assesment of the strenght of the belief.

Agnostic because there's no (not enough) evidence is one thing; agnosticism because the concept of God is incoherent is another; agnosticism because religion is the cause of much evil is yet another. — Ludwig V

That is our difference, I only count the first as agnostic. Recognising p as incoherent for me implies believing not-p.

I think you are fastening on a specific feature of belief - that it can be strong or weak - and turning that into an entire system. But belief is more complicated than that. — Ludwig V

I would say otherwise. Many people hold the black-and-white view of belief where you either believe something or you don't, or the black-white-grey view where you believe, don't believe, or disbelieve. I open the folding fan and show there are many shades inbetween. Whether we want to call a region of those shades "strongly believe" and the other "weakly disbelieve" is simply a semantic detail.

my background and (one of my) passions are physics and mathematics. — Lionino

Well, that certainly seems to make sense. But that may be stereotyping, No doubt you will feel that it makes sense also that I have no background whatever in those disciplines. Apart from philosophy, you could say that my background is in literature, music and history. That doesn't mean I don't think that physics and mathematics are unimportant in any way. I've always taken an interest in what's going on as part of the laity.

That is our difference, I only count the first as agnostic. Recognising p as incoherent for me implies believing not-p. — Lionino

H'm. Do you have a background in logic, specifically the truth-functional calculus? In that system, everything is either true or false. The law of excluded middle applies. When a sentence is malformed (Chomsky's "colourless green ideas sleep furiously" is a good example), you have a problem. You can say that it is not a sentence or a malformed sentence (not a wff) and hence no truth-value can be assigned or that it belongs in some third class (truth-value). But you cannot say or believe that it is true and you cannot say or believe that it is false. The same applies to the contradictory - "Colourless green ideas do not sleep furiously" in this case.

I was dealing primarily with rational belief, where evidence and logic are used as justification. I tried searching into irrational belief and emotional belief and I could not find much unfortunately. — Lionino

I don't think philosophers are comfortable with irrational belief. But many beliefs have emotions attached to them. We're not machines.

I can say however that emotional commitments such as "I believe my wife is not cheating" can sometimes not be belief. Sure, they say "I believe", but what they really mean is that they "want to believe", but in the back of their heads they know it is not true. I am not sure if in someone's psychology reason and emotion will always be separate in belief-formation, or if they mix sometimes. — Lionino

Something that sometimes happens is a bad basis for generalizing about the concept. Your example is a case of what some people would call "wishful thinking". But I don't accept that you can rule it out as a belief just because it is awkward for you.
I think they often mix. To say that they don't represents us as disinterested machines. Some beliefs don't matter to us, but some do.

I would say that for believing something reluctantly, the "reluctantly" is the "I want to believe part", which can be discarded when we give an assesment of the strenght of the belief. — Lionino

What do you mean "discarded"? If I come, reluctantly, to the conclusion that my spouse is cheating, the emotion doesn't disappear. Most likely, it will be reinforced.

Many people hold the black-and-white view of belief where you either believe something or you don't, or the black-white-grey view where you believe, don't believe, or disbelieve. — Lionino

I've no problem with you unfolding the fan. But it wasn't clear to me that you think that the strength or weakness of belief is proportional to the evidence, - or perhaps you mean "should be" proportional to the evidence? I just think that's not the whole story. One factor that hasn't been mentioned is the idea that some propositions have a special status in that they are foundational and more or less immune to refutation. This is the category of what used to be called a priori or "analytic".

Whether we want to call a region of those shades "strongly believe" and the other "weakly disbelieve" is simply a semantic detail. — Lionino

H'm. Surely what your diagram means is not just a detail?

But it is always interesting to ask whether a belief is held on rational grounds and if one wants to know whether that belief counts as knowledge, it is essential to ask that question. — Ludwig V

I agree. People do tend to treat their beliefs as if they were facts and no good comes of it. On the hand, I am resistant to the notion that established knowledge is supposed to be the only basis for action.

If I don't believe in the existence of God, any god, because there is no evidence for its existence, what does that makes me? An agnostic, an atheist, an agnostic atheist? — Alkis Piskas

If you're claiming to know that no God exists because to you, lack of evidence is indistinguishable with, or indicates, lack of existence, then you are an atheist.

If you don't know whether God exists, and hence lack belief, you are an agnostic.

Knowing something indicates a certainty of 95-100%

Believing something indicates a certainty of 50-95% — mentos987

There's a binary distinction between certainty and uncertainty. But not between belief and knowledge (they can coincide, and they do if we're rational). If you try to impose a boundary between belief and knowledge at 95% certainty, not only do you disrupt the fact that they often coincide, but you also create a category (in knowledge) where certainty and uncertainty are paradoxically included. This contradicts the fact that they're disjoint from each other. Knowledge about something only comes from certainty about some detail, not uncertainty. Likewise, if we only have uncertainty at our disposal, then we don't have belief in it. We would just have lack of belief. We can have degrees of belief about something if we know (and therefore have certainty) about some of the details, but not all of them.

The same fallacy arises on the other side of the spectrum. Lack of belief can't mean less than 50% certainty, because lack of belief only (rationally) comes from lack of certainty/knowledge. If you have 0% certainty about something, then you don't have any knowledge regarding it. If you then become 1% certain in it, it means you now know some detail about it. But that means you believe something about it. So trying to push 0% certainty and 1 - 49% certainty into the same category is going to be paradoxical.

This is based on my previous comment that it's rational to believe in something that you know and to not believe in something you lack knowledge of. The same applies to any model of belief and knowledge in terms of certainty and uncertainty that we try to create.

Having faith in something is when you simply choose to add a percentage of certainty. E.g. 55% belief + 41% faith = knowing that God exist.

How do you feel about this? — mentos987

I just wouldn't agree that definition of faith.

My goal is to just shed some light on the opposing schematic approach which you have denied any legitimacy too; although I do not myself use it.

For the sake of brevity, I will refer to your schematic approach as a variant of the ‘traditional’ schematics and the other as a variant of the ‘etymological’ schematics. I label yours (as a variant of the) traditional (approach) because it is primarily the widely accepted view traditionally in the actual theological literature; whereas I label the other (a variant of the) etymological (approach) because it is a relatively new development, mainly derived by common folk, by reading the etymology, as opposed to the literature, behind the terms.

The crux of your specific argument for the traditional approach is that belief and knowledge are related such that the latter entails the former (e.g., “I know X” → “I believe X”, etc.) due to, as you say, rationality (because, according to your argument, it is only rational to believe X iff one knows X).

The etymological schema is going to completely deny this and, on the contrary, is going to claim that one can believe X, even rationally, without knowing X.

I think the best way to defend this schema, in this case, is to note some problems with your own formulation of the traditional schema first: you have the relation backwards between beliefs and knowledge. Knowledge, traditionally, is a true, justified, belief. A belief is not determined after one recognizes they have knowledge; but, on the contrary, they believe and then, if it turns out to be true and justified, then it is reaches the status of knowledge. When you say things like “If you believe something and you're rational, it's because you know something.”, this reverses the relationship such that one has to know X before they believe X (or perhaps simultaneously, which is seems pretty implausible) which is impossible (given the standard epistemology in the literature).

The etymological schema is going to say that we formulate beliefs, which are not yet knowledge, all the time (e.g., I believe that the tree I walked passed 3 days ago is still there even though I have little justificatory support for it, etc.); and they usually argue that it is not knowledge because it has not met the threshold of necessary justification to count as knowledge—like the court of law, where we could have a belief that someone did X, and even have some relatively good reasons to support that claim, but it nevertheless falls short in court.

If this is the case (that one can have beliefs about something while not knowing it), then there is a meaningful difference between those who claim to only believe something and those who believe it and know. This is not adequately represented, or so the argument goes, in the traditional schema: agnosticism is both the lack of belief and lack of knowledge, not just the former.

So, this would mean, if it is true, that ‘agnostic theism’ is the view that one believes at least one god exists, but doesn’t claim to know it. Likewise, an ‘agnostic atheist’ is the view that one does not believe in any gods but doesn’t claim to know it.

Now, if we properly re-reverse the relation between belief and knowledge in your view we can still salvage a defense of the traditional schema as well (just on different grounds): one could just say that, within academic and serious dialogue, people should only care about those beliefs which have (or at least purport to have) sufficient justification for them being true (and thusly having knowledge)--for, otherwise, one is discussing trivially held beliefs.

However, depending on how steep the threshold is for justification (for knowledge), which makes it less and less trivial, it may turn out meaningful in a colloquial conversation to ask if the person thinks they have justification to meet that threshold or if they just think they have good reasons to believe it. For example, if a person is thinking epistemically like they do scientifically, then they may mean by ‘knowledge’ some relatively high standard (like that of a scientific theory) when they say ‘I don’t know’ and they may still have pretty good reasons to believe it when they say “but I believe it” (like a pretty rigorously tested hypothesis, but not quite a theory yet in science).

Hopefully this helps.

There's a binary distinction between certainty and uncertainty — Hallucinogen

Not to me. The term “uncertain” would indicate 5-95% certainty. "Certain" would be 95-100%.

But not between belief and knowledge (they can coincide, — Hallucinogen

Not to me, knowing is a step above believing.

where certainty and uncertainty are paradoxically included — Hallucinogen

I think that knowledge can contain a small degree of uncertainty.

Likewise, if we only have uncertainty at our disposal, then we don't have belief in it. We would just have lack of belief. — Hallucinogen

I don't follow.

The same fallacy arises on the other side of the spectrum. Lack of belief can't mean less than 50% certainty, because lack of belief only (rationally) comes from lack of certainty/knowledge. — Hallucinogen

I do not follow. Lack of belief can come from contradictions, no?
5-50% certainty would indicate disbelief.
0-5% certainty would indicate knowing that something is not true.

You and I do not share definitions. If you see any logical fallacies in the way I use my definitions, feel free to point them out.

you have the relation backwards between beliefs and knowledge. Knowledge, traditionally, is a true, justified, belief. A belief is not determined after one recognizes they have knowledge — Bob Ross

The relationship is not temporal but one of dependency. If we're rational, belief depends on knowledge.

The etymological schema is going to say that we formulate beliefs, which are not yet knowledge — Bob Ross

But those are irrational beliefs. Beliefs that we formulate without knowledge are usually predictions or estimations. The knowledge involved is what the predicted entity is, what it means, as well as all the wheres and whats involved. The knowledge that might be missing could be the hows. If this is missing, the belief would still be irrational, i.e., not based on knowledge. It's based on knowledge of some details, but the knowledge detailing the hows, and therefore the full proposition in which one believes, is still lacking. That's what makes it irrational.

e.g., I believe that the tree I walked passed 3 days ago is still there even though I have little justificatory support for it, etc — Bob Ross

Your justificatory support is the knowledge that there's a tree there, and the knowledge that trees don't typically disappear over a period of 3 days.

then there is a meaningful difference between those who claim to only believe something and those who believe it and know. — Bob Ross

It's rationality.

. If you see any logical fallacies in the way I use my definitions, feel free to point them out. — mentos987

Not to me. — mentos987

Certainty in X cannot coincide with uncertainty in X, so suggesting that they're not disjoint is a fallacy.

But not between belief and knowledge (they can coincide, — Hallucinogen
Not to me, knowledge is a step above believing. — mentos987

Belief and knowledge don't coincide to you? One cannot believe in something and have knowledge of it?

I think that knowledge can contain a small degree of uncertainty. — mentos987

I explained in my previous comment that it couldn't.

Likewise, if we only have uncertainty at our disposal, then we don't have belief in it. We would just have lack of belief. — Hallucinogen
I don't follow. — mentos987

If you only have uncertainty in something, then you don't have belief to any degree in it, only lack of belief.

Lack of belief can come from contradictions, no? — mentos987

Understanding that there's a contradiction in something is a form of knowledge.

5-50% certainty would indicate disbelief.
0-5% certainty would indicate knowing that something is not true.
The term “uncertain” would indicate 5-95% certainty. — mentos987

Already debunked all of this.

And what do you call someone who does, other than "atheist"? — Hallucinogen
Antitheist. — Lionino

Antitheism means opposition to the existence of a God. Other definitions even say opposition to religion. Opposition shouldn't be read to mean "denial of". If I deny the existence of unicorns, we don't say I'm opposed to them. Although there are definitions of it the way you mean it. Whichever definition one gives the word, it's defined as such based on what the position purports to know, which underlines that that's how these words should be defined.

Certainty in X cannot coincide with uncertainty in X, so suggesting that they're not disjoint is a fallacy. — Hallucinogen

When I say I "know" something I mean that I am highly confident, not 100% certain. So yes, my "knowing" does contain a degree of uncertainty.

Belief and knowledge don't coincide to you? One cannot believe in something and have knowledge of it? — Hallucinogen

No, to me you either believe it or you know it. Knowing is stronger than believing.

If you only have uncertainty in something, then you don't have belief to any degree in it, only lack of belief. — Hallucinogen

Not to me, being uncertain only means that you are not certain. You can still believe something and be uncertain of it. uncertain 5-95%, believing 50-95%

Already debunked all of this. — Hallucinogen

In that case, I did not follow.

It seems to me that your definition of "believing" is a lot stronger than mine.