Maybe physicalism is first and foremost a form of life in Wittgenstein's sense. And he's another who seems to speak truth without rigor. We're in the land of metaphor.

Well that doesn't bode well for physicalism! :D

But then the land of metaphor can express literal truths, too. And what is the relationship between these predicates?

Which, while I can see that it felt off-topic, is why I started in with the economic form of physicalism: say what you will about the formal relationships between classes of objects, as long as you have a job. In a way it brings home what matters to us -- if economic physicalism is correct then work-life is what ends up defining these concepts that we're using. So it's not so much that our work-life "generates" reality, but that the concepts we are using come from a physical work-life that's hard to deny because we all have economic needs, and surely that influences how we think.

Well I kept having this feeling that there's something wrong with creating a logical argument for physicalism, though I couldn't put my finger on it. But I think you're pointing to it: it's foundation problem. Let me try to put it in words:

A physicalist believes interaction with the world is primal. Logic is a realm of pure abstraction and universality. The physicalist says that realm is abstracted from our constant communication with the world. We ask the world questions, like what do I need to do to ease my hunger? Then I listen for the answer. What is my purpose? I listen for the answer, hoping I'm clear eyed enough to see the truth amidst the wishful thoughts and fears I give life to everyday.

Physicalism has to do with the truth. Give me the answer that has nothing to do with my fantasies. And to find that, I appreciate a little logic, but that's not the final source of truth because logic can also be manipulated to rationalize my fond stories. Look to where the rubber meets the road. That's the beginning of it all. Let the metaphors flow from there.

I think you hit the nail on the head the first time. :grin:
@Banno would be proud.

Clearly, the "harmony", or what you are calling "attunement" is something distinct from the material instrument itself. — Metaphysician Undercover

Attunement is how Horan translates it. It is how Sedley and Long translate it. It is how Brann translates it. It is how many others translate it as well. The Greek term is ἁρμονία (harmonia) and is transliterated as harmony.

As I said above:

The tuning of a lyre exists apart from and prior to any particular lyre. The tuning, the harmony, is an arrangement of frequencies that exists even when a particular lyre is not in tune. Although the tuning of a particular lyre does not endure once that lyre is destroyed, it does not follow that the attunement, the Harmony, is destroyed. — Fooloso4

Your use of "attunement" only creates ambiguity between "attunement" as the general principles by which an instrument is tuned, and "attunement" as a specific condition of a particular instrument. — Metaphysician Undercover

A specific instrument is in tune when the tension of the strings correspond to a ratio of frequencies that are not dependent on that instrument .

OK, so you dismiss the first of the three arguments, because you do not believe in the theory of recollection. — Metaphysician Undercover

The myth of recollection is fraught with problems. If we start with the premise that knowledge is recollection then there would never be a time when knowledge was learned. But it cannot be recollected if it had not at some time first been learned.

In the Phaedo the soul might in the next life be that of an ass. In that case an ass has the same innate knowledge as a man. While I cannot accept this, it does seem that some men seem to possess no more knowledge than as ass.

The very fact which you cite, that a person can act to improve one's health, or improve the attunement, demonstrates that the attunement is posterior to the physical body. — Metaphysician Undercover

To improve does not mean to bring into existence. One cannot improve something that does not exist.

First, do you recognize that it is the bodily instrument which is either well tuned or poorly tuned? Therefore you cannot say "both a well tuned and poorly tuned soul is still a soul" to be consistent with the argument, because the body is analogous to the instrument, and is what is tuned; it is not the soul which is tuned. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right, it is not the soul which is tuned. The soul is the attunement, the arrangement and tension of the parts of the body, not what is tuned.

Next, do you agree that if the instrument is not well tuned there will be some degree of dissonance, and that dissonance is inconsistent with harmony? — Metaphysician Undercover

Heraclitus says:

Men do not know how what is at variance agrees with itself. It is an attunement of opposite tension, like that of the bow and the lyre.

(Fragment 51)

And, since there is a multitude of strings, some may be in harmony and others dissonant. — Metaphysician Undercover

When the instrument is in tune the strings are in harmony to each other.

But "soul" by the theory, can only be harmony, it cannot be dissonance. — Metaphysician Undercover

The more harmonized the soul the less its dissonance. A soul that is in poor health, a soul with a great deal of dissonance, is still a soul.

The premise "the soul rules" is proposed as a true proposition, validated by the evidence explained. And, it is specifically proposed as inconsistent with "the soul is a harmony". There is nothing deliberately misleading here. — Metaphysician Undercover

A soul that is well attuned, a soul that is in harmony and balance, rules well. One that is in discord does not. Harmonized means that there is not one element of the attunement that rules.

The "harmony", or what you call the "attunement", is explicitly stated as something distinct from the instrument. — Metaphysician Undercover

The attunement is the condition of the instrument. Your being in good or bad health is not something distinct from you, but you are not the condition you are in.

The "spirited part" is the third part, the medium between body and mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

Where does it say that the spirited part is the medium between body and soul?

Either the the source is the mind, if the soul is healthy, or the body is the source if the mind is ill. — Metaphysician Undercover

The source of Odysseus' anger is not his body. He is angry at the suitors but controls himself.

Sometimes it [the soul] chastises them more severely with painful processes based upon gymnastics, or medicine, sometimes more gently by threatening and admonishing, talking to the desires, passions and fears as though they constituted a separate entity.

It treats them as though they are constituted by a separate entity, but they are not.

you claim that the "attunement" is a part of the body of the instrument. — Metaphysician Undercover

What I claim is that the attunement is not apart from the body, not that it is a part of the body. It is not some part in addition to the parts.

Attunement is how Horan translates it. It is how Sedley and Long translate it. It is how Brann translates it. It is how many others translate it as well. The Greek term is ἁρμονία (harmonia) and is transliterated as harmony. — Fooloso4

The particular word used is not relevant. What is relevant is how Plato describes what is being talked about. We have the passage from Simmias which I quoted, "a harmony is something invisible, without body, in the attuned lyre, whereas the lyre itself and its strings are physical, bodily, composite, earthy and akin to what is mortal". Replace the word translated as "harmony" with "attunement" if you will, but that does not change the description presented.

Then we have Socrates' description at 92c, "...the lyre and the strings and the notes, though still unharmonized, exist; the harmony is composed last of all, and is the first to be destroyed." Go ahead, replace "harmony" with "attunement". This does not change the thrust of the argument because the context provides the meaning.

The tuning of a lyre exists apart from and prior to any particular lyre. — Fooloso4

This is nonsense. Yes, it is true that the principles by which a lyre is tuned exists apart from any particular lyre. But "the tuning of a lyre" is the tuning of a lyre, and that means that a particular lyre is being tuned. This is your sophistry. When Plato talks about a particular lyre, a bodily composite of elements, wood, pegs, and strings, which is tuned to produce a "harmony" or "attunement", you claim that he is talking about the general principles by which a lyre is tuned.

The context clearly indicates that you are wrong in your interpretation. First, in Simmias' statement, the harmony or attunement is something which exists "in the attuned lyre", it is not a separate principle by which the lyre is tuned. Then in the context of Socrates' statement, "the harmony is composed last of all". Obviously this "harmony" or "attunement" is not the principles by which the lyre is tuned, because that would be prior to the attunement, and not "last of all".

These statements in Plato's Phaedo are very explicit, and completely contrary to your interpretation above.

The myth of recollection is fraught with problems. If we start with the premise that knowledge is recollection then there would never be a time when knowledge was learned. But it cannot be recollected if it had not at some time first been learned. — Fooloso4

Yes "recollection" is fraught with problems, as it leads to eternal objects of knowledge, commonly known as "Platonism". But the problem of preexisting knowledge, knowledge which preexists the individual, which shows up within the individual, as instinctual know-how, and the capacity to learn, which the theory of recollection was designed to resolve, still exists if we deny the theory of recollection.

To improve does not mean to bring into existence. One cannot improve something that does not exist. — Fooloso4

Put this into context though. To improve would be to bring harmony from dissonance. This very clearly indicates bringing harmony into existence.

Your final statement, "One cannot improve something that does not exist" represents the exact point of Plato's argument. To improve an evil person is not to bring harmony to dissonance, because that would imply that the evil person, being dissonant, does not even have a soul. Being dissonant means the harmony does not exist, and therefore neither would the soul.

But that is not the case in reality, the evil person does have a soul, and so do all sorts of other living things. Therefore improving on the attributes or properties of the soul, may be described as bringing harmony to something dissonant, but the soul cannot be the harmony because it exists even when there is dissonance, prior to the harmony.

Right, it is not the soul which is tuned. The soul is the attunement, the arrangement and tension of the parts of the body, not what is tuned. — Fooloso4

Now you are being ambiguous with your use of "attunement". Each body, or musical instrument, has parts and an arrangement which are particular to that body or instrument. You've said already that the "attunement" in your peculiar interpretation exists prior to the instrument, as the set of principles by which the instrument might be tuned. Now, you cannot turn around and say that the attunement is "the arrangement and tension of the parts of the body", and pretend to be consistent. That arrangement and tension is particular to the individual body, and is therefore posterior to the existence of the body.

When the instrument is in tune the strings are in harmony to each other. — Fooloso4

Again, you are playing your equivocation.

The more harmonized the soul the less its dissonance. A soul that is in poor health, a soul with a great deal of dissonance, is still a soul. — Fooloso4

You are not getting the point. The soul is harmony, attunement. That is the theory. It cannot be more or less harmonized, or in any way dissonant or else it would not be a soul. That is the precept of the theory, the soul is harmony. Therefore, by the precept of the theory a soul cannot have "a great deal of dissonance", because this is contrary to harmony, and by the theory the soul is harmony. The proposed "great deal of dissonance" would indicate a supposed soul with a great deal of non-soul, but that is contradictory.

A soul that is well attuned, a soul that is in harmony and balance, rules well. One that is in discord does not. Harmonized means that there is not one element of the attunement that rules. — Fooloso4

If the soul is a harmony, or attunement, then every soul, necessarily, is well tuned, by definition. By this theory, "the soul is a harmony", there can be no such thing as a discordant soul. That would be contradiction.

The attunement is the condition of the instrument. Your being in good or bad health is not something distinct from you, but you are not the condition you are in. — Fooloso4

Again, you are equivocating with "attunement". By what you said at the beginning of the post, "The tuning of a lyre exists apart from and prior to any particular lyre", the attunement is not "the condition of the instrument". It is something separate from any particular instrument, as the principles by which an instrument might be tuned.

Your equivocation allows you to blatantly contradict yourself. First, the attunement is apart from and prior to any particular instrument, and now it is "not something distinct", it is "the condition of the instrument".

Where does it say that the spirited part is the medium between body and soul? — Fooloso4

Read "The Republic" please.

What I claim is that the attunement is not apart from the body, not that it is a part of the body. It is not some part in addition to the parts. — Fooloso4

Hmm, the final part of the post directly contradicts the beginning of your post. This is due to the equivocation I pointed to. Do you proof read? That could help you to avoid embarrassment. Look, this is the top of your post:

The tuning of a lyre exists apart from and prior to any particular lyre. The tuning, the harmony, is an arrangement of frequencies that exists even when a particular lyre is not in tune — Fooloso4

By your new statement "the attunement is not apart from the body", do you agree with what Plato has Socrates say, that the attunement is posterior to, as dependent on the body? It is last to be produced, and first lost at corruption of the body And do you agree that an attunement is not random, but according to some principles which constitute "harmony". So if the soul is supposed to be a harmony, or attunement, the tensions of the bodily elements must exist in this specific way in order for that body to be endowed with "a soul"? That is the position which Plato is arguing against. And I suggest it is much the same as modern physicalism

Then we have Socrates' description at 92c ... — Metaphysician Undercover

You skip over the first part:

Now are you aware,” he said, “that these are the consequences of what you propose whenever you assert that the soul exists before it enters the form and body of a human being, and on the other hand, that it is constituted from elements that do not yet exist?

These consequences do not follow if one does not assert that the soul exists before in enters the body. Simmias' argument is a refutation of this assertion, but poor Simmias has become as confused as you are.

But "the tuning of a lyre" is the tuning of a lyre, and that means that a particular lyre is being tuned. — Metaphysician Undercover

The tuning of a lyre, that is the frequencies to which a lyre is tuned, and the process of tuning a lyre are not the same. A particular lyre is tuned to those frequency ratios which exist prior to it. A lyre is well tuned when it comes close to matching those frequencies and poorly tuned the more it deviates.

First, in Simmias' statement, the harmony or attunement is something which exists "in the attuned lyre", it is not a separate principle by which the lyre is tuned. — Metaphysician Undercover

Simmias' first statement is:

Someone might propose the very same argument in relation to attunement, and a lyre, and its strings, saying that the attunement is indeed an unseen, non-physical, entirely beautiful and divine element in the tuned lyre, while the lyre itself and its strings are, by contrast, physical objects, with physical form.

The relation is between attunement and a lyre. A relation of the one to the other. The tuned lyre is one in which the proper ratio of frequencies is achieved.

Put this into context though. To improve would be to bring harmony from dissonance. This very clearly indicates bringing harmony into existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

To improve would be to lessen dissonance. Again, it is a matter of degree not either or. Analogously, the circles we find in the world are not perfect circles, but they are circles nonetheless.

To improve an evil person is not to bring harmony to dissonance, because that would imply that the evil person, being dissonant, does not even have a soul. — Metaphysician Undercover

One soul might be more in tune than another but both a well tuned and poorly tuned soul is still a soul.

You've said already that the "attunement" in your peculiar interpretation exists prior to the instrument, as the set of principles by which the instrument might be tuned. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is not a set of principles, it is a ratio of parts. In the case of a lyre it is the ratio of frequencies of the vibrating strings. Those ratios exist prior to the lyre. They are mathematical relations and can be heard. It is this ability to hear them that allows someone to tune a lyre.

Now, you cannot turn around and say that the attunement is "the arrangement and tension of the parts of the body", and pretend to be consistent. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is entirely consistent. In the case of the lyre it is the arrangement and tension of the strings. In the case of the human body it is the arrangement and tension of its parts. In Simmias' words:

It is as if our body is tempered and held together by hot and cold, dry and moist, and the like, and that our soul is a blend and attunement of these very elements once they are properly mixed with one another in a measured way.

(86b-c)

That arrangement and tension is particular to the individual body, and is therefore posterior to the existence of the body. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is not as if the human body comes into existence and is then arranged and tensioned. In this way it is not like a lyre. As I said in a prior post, this is where the analogy with the lyre breaks down.

It cannot be more or less harmonized, or in any way dissonant or else it would not be a soul. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is Socrates objection. You take it to be decisive, but it is not. The fact is, an instrument can be more or less harmonized, more or less in tune. It is a matter of degree and falls short of perfect harmony. There is an old saying about tuning a guitar: "Close enough for rock and roll".

Again, you are equivocating with "attunement". By what you said at the beginning of the post, "The tuning of a lyre exists apart from and prior to any particular lyre", the attunement is not "the condition of the instrument". — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not equivocating. What is confusing you is that you are conflating the process of tuning with the standard by which the instrument is tuned. The tuning of a lyre is that set of frequencies that determine that some particular lyre is in tune. The lyre is tuned, the strings tightened and loosened, in order to come into accord with those established frequencies, that is, the tuning of a lyre.

Where does it say that the spirited part is the medium between body and soul?
— Fooloso4

Read "The Republic" please. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you took your own advice you would know that the tripartite soul is not divided in this way. Spiritedness is said to be the middle part of the soul, not something between the soul and the body.

Hmm, the final part of the post directly contradicts the beginning of your post. — Metaphysician Undercover

It does not. It is two sides of the same coin. What is at issue is the question of whether the soul is an attunement. The question cannot be addressed without establishing on the one side what an attunement is and on the other the body it is said to be an attunement of.

So if the soul is supposed to be a harmony, or attunement, the tensions of the bodily elements must exist in this specific way in order for that body to be endowed with "a soul"? — Metaphysician Undercover

The body is not endowed with a soul. The soul is, according to the argument, just that specific way in which the elements of the body are arranged, combine and function.

These consequences do not follow if one does not assert that the soul exists before in enters the body. Simmias' argument is a refutation of this assertion, but poor Simmias has become as confused as you are. — Fooloso4

Sorry I don't see the relevance. What I pointed to was Socrates' description of "harmony", to show you that it is inconsistent with your description of "attunement". By Socrates' description, "harmony" is the last composed and first destroyed. You had said attunement is prior to any particular instrument.

I was not talking about any "consequences", only showing the discrepancy between Socrates' description of "harmony, or "attunement", and your interpretation.

The tuning of a lyre, that is the frequencies to which a lyre is tuned, and the process of tuning a lyre are not the same. A particular lyre is tuned to those frequency ratios which exist prior to it. A lyre is well tuned when it comes close to matching those frequencies and poorly tuned the more it deviates. — Fooloso4

If you were familiar with string instruments you would know that this is not true. An instrument is not necessarily tuned to any specific frequencies. There are ratios between the different parts of the instrument which must be upheld to produce harmony, but there is no necessity for specific frequencies. Furthermore, any string instrument can be tuned in a multitude of different ways. The ratios of the different tunings may be said to be understood, and preexist, but these are principles of music theory, they are clearly not "the tuning of a lyre". We might call it some sort of instructions for tuning a lyre, but "the tuning of a lyre" is the act of actually putting the instrument in tune.

The relation is between attunement and a lyre. A relation of the one to the other. The tuned lyre is one in which the proper ratio of frequencies is achieved. — Fooloso4

No, this is not the case. The tuned lyre has properly tensioned strings according to the size of the strings. The tuned lyre has the required relationship between its parts to qualify as being in tune.

One soul might be more in tune than another but both a well tuned and poorly tuned soul is still a soul. — Fooloso4

You're still not getting the point, or else simply denying it. A poorly tuned instrument does not have "harmony", or "attunement". If the soul is "harmony", the body cannot be poorly tuned and still be a soul. "Harmony" or "attunement" is a good tuning, not a poor tuning. The soul is defined as having a good tuning "harmony" or what you call "attunement". If the body is not properly tuned (poorly tuned) there is not harmony nor attunement, therefore there would be no soul. But this is inconsistent with the evidence. We see that some people are evil, and some are good, yet they all have a soul, while "harmony" or "attunement" is only proper to a good tuning.

Here's an example which may help you. Let's take the concepts of "understanding" and "misunderstanding", and compare them to harmony and dissonance. Suppose a person understands, and this is like a harmony in the person. However, it's also possible that the person misunderstands, yet believes oneself to understand. If we say that understanding is a descriptive property of the person's soul, we must also allow that misunderstanding might also be a property of the person's soul. Understanding is the good, and misunderstanding is the bad. Likewise, harmony is the good, and dissonance is the bad. We cannot restrict "the soul" simply to the good property, harmony, because this is inconsistent with observed reality, the soul also has the bad property, dissonance, just like it has both understanding and misunderstanding.

To improve would be to lessen dissonance. Again, it is a matter of degree not either or. — Fooloso4

But the soul is a matter of either/or. That's why there is an incompatibility between "soul" and "harmony". To make "harmony" compatible with "soul" we have to make it a matter of either/or, because that's the way soul is, either a body has a soul or it does not. Now, either the instrument has harmony or it does not, to be consistent with a body either having a soul or not. But then dissonance is excluded from soul, if soul is harmony, and this is inconsistent with the evidence. The evidence indicates that the soul has both the contraries, bad and good, not just the good, harmony.

One soul might be more in tune than another but both a well tuned and poorly tuned soul is still a soul. — Fooloso4

Exactly! That's why "soul" is inconsistent with "harmony". A poorly tuned instrument does not have harmony, yet a "poorly tuned soul is still a soul".

It is not a set of principles, it is a ratio of parts. In the case of a lyre it is the ratio of frequencies of the vibrating strings. Those ratios exist prior to the lyre. They are mathematical relations and can be heard. It is this ability to hear them that allows someone to tune a lyre. — Fooloso4

This makes no sense. You do not hear "a ratio of parts", nor do you hear "mathematical relations". You hear sounds, harmony and dissonance.

The fact is, an instrument can be more or less harmonized, more or less in tune. — Fooloso4

An instrument can be more or less harmonized, but a body does not have more or less a soul. That's why the theory "soul is a harmony" fails. A body might have more or less of whatever quality you define, but this is not the case with "soul". That's why soul cannot be a property of a body, like "attunement", or "harmony".

I am not equivocating. What is confusing you is that you are conflating the process of tuning with the standard by which the instrument is tuned. The tuning of a lyre is that set of frequencies that determine that some particular lyre is in tune. The lyre is tuned, the strings tightened and loosened, in order to come into accord with those established frequencies, that is, the tuning of a lyre. — Fooloso4

You can define "the tuning of a lyre" however you want. The problem is that the way you describe it is not consistent with the way that Plato does, as "composed last of all and the first to be destroyed". So whatever arguments you make, based on your definition, are irrelevant to what Plato wrote. Plato is using "the tuning of a lyre in a completely different way, the common way, the act of tuning a lyre. As such. it is the aspect of the instrument "composed last of all and the first to be destroyed". And if you insist that your argument, which uses a different definition, is relevant, that is equivocation.

The question cannot be addressed without establishing on the one side what an attunement is and on the other the body it is said to be an attunement of. — Fooloso4

As I said, you can define what "an attunement" is however you want, but if it is not consistent with what Plato has presented your definition is not relevant.

What I pointed to was Socrates' description of "harmony", to show you that it is inconsistent with your description of "attunement". By Socrates' description, "harmony" is the last composed and first destroyed. You had said attunement is prior to any particular instrument. — Metaphysician Undercover

A human being is not a lyre.

I was not talking about any "consequences", only showing the discrepancy between Socrates' description of "harmony, or "attunement", and your interpretation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Socrates is not describing "harmony". He is arguing that:

... your attunement and what you are comparing it to are not really alike

This is true in so far as a human being, unlike a lyre, is not crafted, strung up, and tuned. But the pitches to which a lyre is tuned do not come into existence after the lyre is made. The musical scale to which the lyre is tuned exists before the lyre that is being tuned.

What Socrates does not say, and what you cannot see, is that the attunement of a lyre is like a preexisting soul. Musical harmony exists prior to the lyre.

We might call it some sort of instructions for tuning a lyre, but "the tuning of a lyre" is the act of actually putting the instrument in tune. — Metaphysician Undercover

And by putting it is tune you are matching the frequencies of the strings to the preexisting musical scale.

The tuned lyre has properly tensioned strings according to the size of the strings. — Metaphysician Undercover

The size of the string determines how tight it must be tensioned to produce a desired pitch, but it is the pitch and not the size of the string that determines whether or not the lyre is in tune. Those pitches are not determined by the lyre.

A poorly tuned instrument does not have "harmony", or "attunement". — Metaphysician Undercover

The harmony of an instrument is always imperfect. Dissonance is not eliminated. There is always some degree of dissonance. Compromises must be made to compensate. It is called "musical temperament"

But the soul is a matter of either/or. — Metaphysician Undercover

If the soul is the harmony of the body it is not either/or.

To make "harmony" compatible with "soul" we have to make it a matter of either/or, because that's the way soul is, either a body has a soul or it does not. — Metaphysician Undercover

This begs the question of what the soul is.

You believe that you have found the answer to that question in the pages of the Phaedo. I am in agreement with those scholars who recognize that the question is not answered. The dialogue ends in aporia.

The size of the string determines how tight it must be tensioned to produce a desired pitch, but it is the pitch and not the size of the string that determines whether or not the lyre is in tune. Those pitches are not determined by the lyre. — Fooloso4

As I said, you do not at all understand the tuning of a stringed instrument. It is not necessarily tuned to any specific pitch. The notes which the instrument makes must be in tune relative to each other, not relative to any specific pitch. So the base note could be 180 hertz, 160, 175, !90, whatever. The particular pitch does not matter. So long as all the strings are properly tensioned in relation to each other the instrument will produce harmony, and can be said to be in tune. Not only that, but stringed instruments have a wide range of possible tunings. This is why your interpretation of "attunement", or "the tuning of a lyre" as a standard which needs to be adhered to when tuning a lyre, is simply incorrect. There would have been many different ways to tune a lyre in Plato\s time, and nothing specific as "the way".

Anyway you've gone off on a tangent and refuse to address Plato's argument, insisting that "attunement" is something other than the way that Plato described it. Maybe you are correct, and the true description of "attunement" is as you say, and not as Plato said. However, this is irrelevant because Socrates' arguments are directed against "the soul is an attunement", by the description of "attunement" presented in the text, not the one presented by you.

So your dismissal of the arguments seems to be based on a claim that Plato does not properly present what "attunement" is. You think that Plato does not actually refute the Pythagorean theory that the soul is a type of harmony because he makes a strawman of "harmony", and refutes that instead. I believe it is you who has made the strawman, by not following the conventional translation of "harmony", which has a clear meaning consistent with Plato's description, and opting for the more ambiguous "attunement" instead. The ambiguity allows you to produce the strawman.

As I said, you do not at all understand the tuning of a stringed instrument. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, you did say that. But it is not true. I have played string instruments for most of my life. I have put in the time to study music theory and harmony. I have also set-up guitars and have the specialized tools to do so. Including cutting nuts, adjusting neck relief, and setting intonation I also play upright bass which does not have frets. Here playing in tune requires more precision to get the length of the stopped string right.

The notes which the instrument makes must be in tune relative to each other, — Metaphysician Undercover

Right. This is what I said near the beginning of this exchange:

The harmony is not what is played on the lyre it is the condition of the lyre, the proper tension of the strings in ratio to each other that allow it to play in harmony. — Fooloso4

And this:

In the case of a lyre it is the ratio of frequencies of the vibrating strings. — Fooloso4

So long as all the strings are properly tensioned in relation to each other the instrument will produce harmony, and can be said to be in tune. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right again. But those ratios existed prior to the instrument being in tune. The harmony produced is
something that had been produced countless times before by various instruments. The harmony exists prior to this instrument.

This is why your interpretation of "attunement", or "the tuning of a lyre" as a standard which needs to be adhered to when tuning a lyre, is simply incorrect. — Metaphysician Undercover

I used the example of standard tuning so an not to confuse you any more than you already were. But you have come around. What must be adhered to is the ratio of frequencies from one string to another. The ratio of frequencies, exists independently and prior to the instrument. Both standard and non-standard tuning must adhere to those preexisting ratios.

Again, here is the argument:

The tuning of a lyre exists apart from and prior to any particular lyre. The tuning, the harmony, is an arrangement of frequencies that exists even when a particular lyre is not in tune. Although the tuning of a particular lyre does not endure once that lyre is destroyed, it does not follow that the attunement, the Harmony, is destroyed. — Fooloso4

It says nothing about adhering to standard tuning. What is at issue is the preexistence of harmony. This harmony exists whether the instrument is in standard or alternative tuning.

Socrates' arguments are directed against "the soul is an attunement", by the description of "attunement" presented in the text — Metaphysician Undercover

Here again is Simmias' description:

... the attunement is indeed an unseen, non-physical, entirely beautiful and divine element in the tuned lyre, while the lyre itself and its strings are, by contrast, physical objects, with physical form

(85e-86a)

The attunement is not the tuning of the lyre. It is not the tightening and loosening of the strings. For that is physical. It is something that is present when the lyre is in tune. But, as Socrates points out, a man differs from a lyre. To take the analogy further is misleading.

It continues:

He would claim, rather, that the attunement itself must somehow still exist, and the wood and strings must rot away first before anything happens to that. And in fact, Socrates, I think you yourself are aware that this is the sort of thing we actually take the soul to be. It is as if our body is tempered and held together by hot and cold, dry and moist, and the like, and that our soul is a blend and attunement of these very elements once they are properly mixed with one another in a measured way.

(86b-86d)

The attunement of the human body is the proper mix and measure, the harmony of its parts.

You think that Plato does not actually refute the Pythagorean theory that the soul is a type of harmony because he makes a strawman of "harmony", and refutes that instead. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. I think he corrects certain mistakes as to what it means for the soul to be an attunement, for the body to be in harmony.

This is how Socrates concludes his objections:

“Then, my excellent friend, it is not at all appropriate for us to state that soul is an attunement, for it seems we would be disagreeing with the divine poet Homer and with ourselves.” (94e-95a)

Why would disagreement with "the divine poet Homer" be decisive? Are we to take the side of the poets in the "ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry"? (Republic 607b) Socrates defense is a defense of Homer and the beliefs of the city educated by him. An education in shadows. (Republic 514a - 515c)

The weaknesses of Socrates' arguments in defense of a separate soul that enters and leaves the body are the weaknesses of the traditional beliefs of the city of Athens and others about the soul as taught by Homer. But it is not the belief described by Simmias of Thebes.

Banno would be proud. — frank

:blush:

A glimmer of clarity in the gloom...

Yes, you did say that. But it is not true. I have played string instruments for most of my life. I have put in the time to study music theory and harmony. I have also set-up guitars and have the specialized tools to do so. Including cutting nuts, adjusting neck relief, and setting intonation I also play upright bass which does not have frets. Here playing in tune requires more precision to get the length of the stopped string right. — Fooloso4

Then you obviously know that the instrument does not need to be tuned relative to any specific pitch, pitches, to be "in tune" and produce harmony. And, only if it has to be played along with other instruments must a particular "pitch" be chosen. Furthermore, you must also know that there are numerous different possible "tunings" for the same instrument.

However, I do not think that this is really relevant.

Right again. But those ratios existed prior to the instrument being in tune. The harmony produced is
something that had been produced countless times before by various instruments. The harmony exists prior to this instrument. — Fooloso4

Sure the ratios are pre-determined and pre-exist, but not the tuning, nor the "attunement" , which is a property of the instrument. The fact is, "attunement", as well as "harmony" require an instrument. That is why "the soul is a harmony", or "attunement" is a materialist/physicalist position which Socrates is arguing against. The attunement is the last thing to be created and first to be destroyed.

The predetermined ratios which are used in the process of tuning, are not part of the argument, and are irrelevant to the theory "the soul is a harmony". The materialist/physicalist does not even accept that there must be a hand (mind)-that-tunes the body, if a soul is to emerge, They don't even want to consider the requirement of pre-existing ratios being applied in the artificial construction of harmony, they want to say that attunement/harmony (mind/soul) arises naturally.

That is the position Socrates is arguing against, the materialist/physicalist argument that attunement arises naturally from a body. That is why it is described as the last to be produced, and first to be destroyed. The issue of whether an attunement could be naturally created without a hand(mind)-that-tunes is not even considered.

I used the example of standard tuning so an not to confuse you any more than you already were. But you have come around. What must be adhered to is the ratio of frequencies from one string to another. The ratio of frequencies, exists independently and prior to the instrument. Both standard and non-standard tuning must adhere to those preexisting ratios. — Fooloso4

Yes,, we agree that the ratios pre-exist as principles by which an instrument is tuned. Where we disagree is on the relevance of this (can we call it a fact?). I say that this is not at all relevant to Socrates' arguments. He is arguing about the attunement, or harmony itself, as a property of the instrument. Look again at Simmias' statement. The attunement is "in" the instrument. Look at Socrates' statement, it is the last composed and first destroyed.

This is what Plato is arguing against, the materialist/physicalist position that the soul is like a harmony, which arises from an attuned instrument. I believe it is important to recognize that Plato refutes this materialist/physicalist theory "the soul is a harmony" without appealing to the requirement of pre-existing ratios and a hand(mind)-that-tunes. These are metaphysical principles unacceptable to the materialist/physicalist, and principles which you seem to recognize, cannot really be proven. So Plato refutes the materialist/physicalist theory on its own terms, that the soul is like a harmony which emerges naturally from a well tuned body.

The attunement is not the tuning of the lyre. It is not the tightening and loosening of the strings. For that is physical. It is something that is present when the lyre is in tune. But, as Socrates points out, a man differs from a lyre. To take the analogy further is misleading. — Fooloso4

That's right. Now do you respect the statement that the attunement is "in the lyre". And, as you say, it only exists "when the lyre is in tune". Therefore the attunement is completely dependent on the material existence of the lyre. That is why it is a materialist/physicalist theory. It is not something which preexists the lyre as a set of ratios or anything like that, it is something which only exists when the body is properly tuned. The harmony emerges from the tuning of the body.

This is what Socrates demonstrates, with the three arguments, is a faulty theory. The most convincing is also the most difficult to understand, and that is the middle argument about degrees of existence. If the soul only emerges from the body when the body is properly attuned, then there must be a boundary which is crossed, a point when the soul emerges. This is because it is inconsistent with evidence to say that something has a partial soul, or is partially alive. So the body either has a soul or it does not, it is alive or not. This implies that if the soul is a harmony or attunement, it is a sort of perfection to the tuning, there is a point where the tuning is perfect, and a soul/life appears. But this is completely inconsistent with observed evidence, souls exist with all sorts of imperfections. Therefore it is logically impossible that the soul is like an attunement or harmony which is the result of (emerges from) a body becoming well-tuned.

What is at issue is the preexistence of harmony. — Fooloso4

That is absolutely false. It appears to be the result of a biased or prejudiced interpretation. The "pre-existence of harmony" is not at all presented even as a possibility. What is stated is that the harmony is a property of the well-tuned instrument and it is the last aspect of the instrument to be composed, and the first to be destroyed. That is the materialist/physicalist (Pythagorean derived) presentation of "the soul" which Plato is arguing against. The concept of "the preexistence of harmony" is not at all a part of this materialist/physicalist presentation, and therefore cannot be considered at all. Plato refutes the materialist/physicalist theory on its own terms without the need to appeal to a preexistent harmony. The closest he comes is in Socrates' first argument where he appeals to "recollection".

The attunement is not the tuning of the lyre. It is not the tightening and loosening of the strings. For that is physical. It is something that is present when the lyre is in tune. But, as Socrates points out, a man differs from a lyre. To take the analogy further is misleading. — Fooloso4

Notice "in the lyre". The attunement is the product of the tuning of the lyre. That is the materialist/ physicalist principle, the mind/soul is like a harmony which arises, or emerges, from the well tuned body. The materialist/physicalist principle pays not respect to the fact that the composition of the instrument is artificial, and there is a hand(mind)-that-tunes, simply assuming that the well-tuned body could arise naturally. So Plato refutes the principle without even appealing to the need for the preexistent principles of tuning, thereby refuting the materialist/physicalist theory on its own terms.

“Then, my excellent friend, it is not at all appropriate for us to state that soul is an attunement, for it seems we would be disagreeing with the divine poet Homer and with ourselves.” (94e-95a) — Fooloso4

You, it appears place far too much emphasis on Plato\s reference to "the divine poet", without actually taking the time required to understand the arguments. All he is saying, is that the refutation provided by "ourselves: is consistent with the position presented by "the divine poet Homer". This merely supports 'the logical way of thinking' provided by Socrates. It is not the argument itself, but a reference to a similar way of logical thinking in an authority figure.

The weaknesses of Socrates' arguments in defense of a separate soul that enters and leaves the body are the weaknesses of the traditional beliefs of the city of Athens and others about the soul as taught by Homer. But it is not the belief described by Simmias of Thebes. — Fooloso4

This is way out of context and completely irrelevant. The belief described by Simmias of Thebes, that the soul is a sort of harmony, is decisively refuted by Plato, through the three arguments presented by Socrates. The idea of "a separate soul that enters and leaves the body" is a completely different belief, and is completely irrelevant here.

We have a fundamental disagreement regarding how to interpret the dialogue. I will leave it there.

Plato doesn't like the analogy because it would imply that the soul (harmony) must disappear when the body (instrument) is destroyed. — Count Timothy von Icarus

While the importance of harmony can be confidently ascribed to Pythagoras, many other ideas are on shaky grounds. This SEP article gives a brief account of the centuries of dispute of who was or was not a Pythagorean. This is particularly a problem regarding the views of immortality and reincarnation being addressed in Phaedo.

When Aristotle discusses these matters, the role of what might be immortal or not is seen through the problem of agency and movement.

There is another absurdity, however, that follows both from this account and from most of the ones concerning the soul, since in fact they attach the soul to a body, and place it in a body, without |407b15| further determining the cause due to which this attachment comes about or the condition of the body required for it. Yet this would seem to be necessary. For it is because of their association that the one acts, whereas the other is acted upon, and the one is moved, whereas the other moves it. None of these relations, though, holds between things taken at random. These people, however, merely undertake to say what sort of thing the soul is, but about the |407b20| sort of body that is receptive of it they determine nothing further, as if it were possible, as in the Pythagorean stories, for any random soul to be inserted into any random body, whereas it seems that in fact each body has its own special form and shape.96 But what they say is somewhat like saying that the craft of {13} carpentry could be inserted into flutes, whereas in fact the |407b25| craft must use its instruments, and the soul its body. — Aristotle, De Anima, Bk 1:3, 407b14, translated by CDC Reeve

In the context of the mind/body distinction you made above, Aristotle is saying it is the "Pythagoreans" who devalue the 'body'.

Entirely related to any previous comments (well, with any intent anyway!):

I understand that most 'evidence's for physicalism amount to mainly evidence that mental states are 'intertwined' with, or 'closely related to' neural activity.

Is this not, though, a slippery way to state that evidence? If it only presents correlation of close relationship, this seems to leave most positions except Absolute Idealism alive?

If it only presents correlation of close relationship, this seems to leave most positions except Absolute Idealism alive? — AmadeusD

I say the following as a physicalist: most positions, including absolute idealism, ARE alive. The evidence for physicalism doesn't push the probability of those other ideas to 0. That's okay, the available evidence doesn't have to push other ideas to 0 - I, as a physicalist, have no problem with that. "The probability that I am wrong is above 0" is not a particularly hard thing for me to say here.

What are you saying, I'm a physicalist but I'll own up to the possibility that physicalism might be wrong? I'm a physicalist and I don't mind admitting that the probability that physicalism is right is about .999...?

The guy I was responding to said that the best evidence for physicalism still leaves the door open to other theories. I'm just expressing that *that's okay*. I'm okay with that, I don't see a problem with that.

I would think that "physicalism" is quite strict, not allowing for the possibility of an open door. Isn't that what physicalism is, saying that there is no possibility of anything other than the physical? Opening the door would be rejecting physicalism.

Me, as a physicalist, saying "the evidence for physicalism could also plausibly still be compatible with non-physicalist ideas" is not me rejecting physicalism.

I would think that "physicalism" is quite strict, not allowing for the possibility of an open door. Isn't that what physicalism is, saying that there is no possibility of anything other than the physical? Opening the door would be rejecting physicalism. — Metaphysician Undercover

From my perspective, anthropomorphizing physicalism, as something that can be "strict" seems weird.

Perhaps it is because I come from a more science based perspective, but I would expect a physicalist to be open to physicalism being falsified, as a matter of intellectual integrity. I don't see any problem with leaving the door wide open for evidence which might falsify physicalism. Having left the door open for a long time, and never having seen any evidence falsifying physicalism walk through the door, is why I am a physicalist. That and the explanatory power of relevant scientific understanding.

:up: I'll repeat what I have already said: physicalism is true if there are mind-independent existents, in other words if there is no mind at large, no mind that has not emerged in complex life-forms. We don't know for certain if there are mind-independent existents, but all the evidence, all our experience, seems to point to it being the case.

To me you just said that all the evidence in the form of our experience (I presume in our minds) points to mind-independent existents. That seems like a contradiction.

You presume or stipulate that our experience is in our minds rather than of our bodies. Even if I accept your stipulation that experience is "in our minds" it certainly doesn't follow that what gives rise to that experience is in our minds; in fact, it seems we are consciously blind to what gives rise to our experience.

Me, as a physicalist, saying "the evidence for physicalism could also plausibly still be compatible with non-physicalist ideas" is not me rejecting physicalism. — flannel jesus

I don't see the logic. If it is compatible with non-physicalist ideas, then it is not evidence for physicalism because it's equally evidence for non-physicalism.

Perhaps it is because I come from a more science based perspective, but I would expect a physicalist to be open to physicalism being falsified, as a matter of intellectual integrity. I don't see any problem with leaving the door wide open for evidence which might falsify physicalism. Having left the door open for a long time, and never having seen any evidence falsifying physicalism walk through the door, is why I am a physicalist. That and the explanatory power of relevant scientific understanding. — wonderer1

Do you understand what "evidence" is? Evidence consists of facts which support the hypothesis. Evidence doesn't walk through the door, it must be sought. That's why experimentation is a significant aspect of the scientific method, through experimentation we seek evidence. If you are happy with your physicalism you will not seek evidence to falsify it, and the evidence will never walk through the door. Real scientific understanding recognizes that evidence does not walk through the door.

Do you understand what "evidence" is? Evidence consists of facts which support the hypothesis. Evidence doesn't walk through the door, it must be sought. That's why experimentation is a significant aspect of the scientific method, through experimentation we seek evidence. If you are happy with your physicalism you will not seek evidence to falsify it, and the evidence will never walk through the door. Real scientific understanding recognizes that evidence does not walk through the door. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, I much prefer my beliefs being based in evidence. Can you point out any good evidence for a mind existing sans an information processing substrate? I mean, I can't say I've looked on the moons of Jupiter for evidence of brainless minds, and I think that would be asking a bit much. So do you have any reasonable suggestions?

The reality of time is good evidence for the existence of non-physical aspects of our world.

The reality of time is good evidence for the existence of non-physical aspects of our world. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why do you think so?

Time consists of three parts, past present and future, none of which is physical.

Time consists of three parts, past present and future, none of which is physical. — Metaphysician Undercover

I suspect you would have a hard time finding physicists who agree with that assertion.

In any case, do you have an argument for the claim?