Semantics is about meaning, which is about how and what words relate to what underlying content; and has nothing to do with that underlying content itself. Nature does not care what word you call it.

The only reason I brought it up was because another person in this thread, that I am discussing with, was thinking that the metaphysical mode of modality was tied solely to semantics of the metaphysical theory at hand, which is false.

Semantics is about meaning, which is about how and what words relate to what underlying content; and has nothing to do with that underlying content itself — Bob Ross

This is not true Bob. In fact, it is not even true by your own assertion "Semantics is about words—i.e., what is the best or chosen word to describe something". There would be no semantics without the "something" about which the word is. You can't say that semantics is both related to content and yet "has nothing to do with content." Your assertions would be (are) self-contradictory.

I see, by incoherent it seems you mean something that degenerates information within that proposition, even it is not contradictory.

With that in mind, I will reply to your post before this.

Secondly, you threw a curveball here because you posited !X as itself simply affirmed in M, so, of course, affirming M ^ X leads to a logical contradiction (in this case) — Bob Ross

It might be a curveball yes but it was what I was originally struggling to express.

However, it is important to note that the logical contradiction here does not lead to X being logically impossible, it leads us to X ^ !X being logically impossible — Bob Ross

Right.

No this is a logical contradiction, not a non-logical contradiction or incoherence — Bob Ross

We agree then :grin:

This is because M ^ X leads to a logical contradiction which is only due to the fact that one also affirms M which leads to !X—so X is not logically impossible but, rather, it is logically impossible for it to be true that M ^ X in this case because it can be expanded to [M → !X] ^ X. — Bob Ross

Which was what I was trying to express, though in a more simplified and lax manner, when I said that "In S, P is logically impossible", which point conceded, it is not impossible as P is consistent, but indeed that "that S and P are true is logically impossible". Which ties to my point about a specific metaphysics (the second last paragraph).

I understand that [M → !X] ^ X and (M → Y) ^ !(Y ^ X) are different. But, if Y = !X, I believe that one implies the other, meaning ((M → ¬X) ∧ X) → ((M → ¬X) ∧ ¬(X ∧ ¬X)).
I think the issue of the matter is what Y would be, and therefore how Y could oppose X. My argument is exactly that we can only know !(Y ^ X) if there is a contradiction in terms between Y and X, (X ∧ ¬X) extending from (X ∧ Y), and thus the only meaningful type of contradiction is logical contradiction, instead of incoherence. Using your example, whether hair is long or short is relative to one's opinion, and even to the circumstances on which it will be judged. Maybe we disagree on this issue, I do operate under a somewhat nominalistic mindset.

When we choose a certain metaphysics M, a statement that goes against it, for me, would be a statement that goes against one of the theorems of that metaphysics (t.i. logical contradiction), and assuming that every theorem of M ultimately goes back to the axioms of M, we would have (X ∧ ¬X) extending from (X ∧ Y) extending from (X ∧ M).

I hope my argumentation was sound and understandable.

Yes. Consider the logical touchstone of analytic truth. If x is red then x is coloured. Its analyticity derives from the metaphysical reality of the species-genus relationship. If you denude a proposition of all connection to this categorical content, you are left with a purely formal construct that has no meaning. — Pantagruel

Perfectly and elegantly put :ok:

Of course the word relates to content, but another word can be swapped for that word and related to the same content; thus, the word is distinct from the content. The fact that the word relates to the content does not entail that the content is somehow modified or transformed depending on the word used. That's all I am trying to point out for the sake of the conversation I was having with the other person, and I don't think it is that controversial (but correct me if I am wrong).

Of course the word relates to content, but another word can be swapped for that word and related to the same content; thus, the word is distinct from the content. The fact that the word relates to the content does not entail that the content is somehow modified or transformed depending on the word used. That's all I am trying to point out for the sake of the conversation I was having with the other person, and I don't think it is that controversial (but correct me if I am wrong). — Bob Ross

The word is dependent on the content. I suppose you could say it that way too. It's distinctness comes from its dependence. What's in a name?

When we choose a certain metaphysics M, a statement that goes against it, for me, would be a statement that goes against one of the theorems of that metaphysics (t.i. logical contradiction), and assuming that every theorem of M ultimately goes back to the axioms of M, we would have (X ∧ ¬X) extending from (X ∧ Y) extending from (X ∧ M).

I believe I agree with everything except for this part. I just don't think that 'going against one of the theorems [or beliefs or statements]" in M entails necessarily a logical contradiction. I also don't see why every incoherence with M would be derivable back to, ultimately, an axiom which results in !X.

I don't see how one can "extend" !(Y ^ X) to (X ^ !X) in virtue of some axiom in M, such that every possible metaphysical theory, M<i>, has that setup.

The word is dependent on the content. I suppose you could say it that way too. It's distinctness comes from its dependence. What's in a name?

I don't have a problem with this: that's what I was essentially saying too.

I just don't think that 'going against one of the theorems [or beliefs or statements]" in M entails necessarily a logical contradiction. — Bob Ross

I don't think that makes sense. Under physicalism, it is axiomatic that only physical things exist. Any statement that entails a spiritual being is contradicted by that axiom.

While it's correct to say that a spiritual being is logically possible, it's a contradiction to say a spiritual being exists & physicalism is true.

I don't have a problem with this: that's what I was essentially saying too. — Bob Ross

:ok:

While it's correct to say that a spiritual being is logically possible, it's a contradiction to say a spiritual being exists & physicalism is true.

My point is that X is not logically impossible because X is metaphysically impossible; and pointing out that !(X ^ M) doesn't help prove that it is otherwise. Just because positing X and M entails a contradiction it does not follow that X is logically impossible. I only bring this up because you said something originally along the lines of 'every metaphysical system which X contradicts, makes X logically impossible'. Metaphysical impossibility does not entail logical impossibility. That X ^ M is logically impossible is not the same as X being logically impossible, which is what you need for this to work.

Likewise, I don't even think that all propositions which are regarded as metaphysically impossible are reducible to an axiom in the metaphysical theory. To take your example, physicalism is typically the view that reality is fundamentally 'mind-independent': it may still be metaphysically impossible for their to be a spiritual being even though it does not produce a logical contradiction with this fundamental belief to the theory, as they may say it is metaphysically impossible because the being, let's say, would violate the laws of nature and, let's say, in this particular physicalist theory, everything must be natural--so spiritual beings cannot exist because that is incoherent with, not logically contradictory to, these beliefs they have.

I just don't think that 'going against one of the theorems [or beliefs or statements]" in M entails necessarily a logical contradiction — Bob Ross

Because for me, that is the only way to definitely go against the theorems. Other ways, such as short or long hair, are debatable and not definitive. The burden of proof would therefore be on the person who claims that there is a way to categorically oppose a theorem (nothing that is up to opinion) besides stating something that logically contradicts it.



To use physicalism as an example as well, my point, which I originally used epiphenomenalism for, runs around this:
A spiritual being is logically possible. :up:
A spiritual being is metaphysically possible. :chin:
A spiritual being is physically possible. :down:

We are able to make judgements about the first and third because we know what the laws of physics and the laws of logic are. The second requires the question of what the laws of metaphysics are. Until we define what metaphysical system we are operating under, we don't know what laws that would be (unless we find metaphysical laws that apply to every metaphysical system). If we then choose physicalism as a metaphysical system M, we are affirming M, which implies affirming all its axioms (A1, A2, A3... An) and consequently from the axioms its theorems (T1, T2, T3). Therefore, by choosing physicalism, we state A1 "there are only physical things", A1 due to the laws of logic can be rewritten to "there are no non-physical things". So, by stating P "there is a spiritual thing" — which due to the definition of these words can be rewritten to "there is a non-physical thing" — we are denying A1. We end up with A1 and notA1, or P and notP, which is a logical contradiction.

So, to summarise, my argument is that as soon as we choose a metaphysical system, which will have its own semantic system (such as equating "all that exists" and "physical things"), the metaphysical impossibility collapses with logical impossibility. Giving us no way of finding something logically possible but metaphysically impossible.

I don't even think that all propositions which are regarded as metaphysically impossible are reducible to an axiom in the metaphysical theory. — Bob Ross

I agree.

That X ^ M is logically impossible is not the same as X being logically impossible, which is what you need for this to work. — Bob Ross

Both work, but one needs to be clear what one means. Your approach is appropriate when comparing metaphysical systems, mine is appropriate when considering what is possible within a metaphysical system.

my argument is that as soon as we choose a metaphysical system, which will have its own semantic system (such as equating "all that exists" and "physical things"), the metaphysical impossibility collapses with logical impossibility. Giving us no way of finding something logically possible but metaphysically impossible. — Lionino

I agree.

let's say, in this particular physicalist theory, everything must be natural--so spiritual beings cannot exist because that is incoherent with, not logically contradictory to, these beliefs they have. — Bob Ross

This metaphysical system is incoherent because it entails a contradiction.

I don't even think that all propositions which are regarded as metaphysically impossible are reducible to an axiom in the metaphysical theory.
— Bob Ross
I agree. — Relativist

What would be an example of something that is metaphysically impossible but does not reference the axioms of the operating metaphysical system?

What would be an example of something that is metaphysically impossible but does not reference the axioms of the operating metaphysical system? — Lionino

Anything that is broadly logically impossible, such as the existence of square circles or married bachelors.

That is true. But Bob's statement was in reference to my argument that metaphysical impossibility collapses with logical impossibility. So just bringing up logical impossibilities sort of turns Bob's claim into a moot point. Maybe we can wait for his reply.

I cannot provide an actual answer as I am ignorant of the true metaphysical principles of reality. However, it would seem that the distinction is not so clear. Even so as I find little distinction between what is "logic" and what is "metaphysics".

Giving us no way of finding something logically possible but metaphysically impossible.

I disagree. Let’s take this by analogy (to actual impossibility):

X = “A human being can fly”

Firstly, X is not logically impossible. Secondly, I think your line of reasoning, and correct me if I am wrong, is that X becomes logically impossible if we accept a theory in physics, P, that posits !X; but this is false.

X is not logically impossible even relative to P when !(X ^ P): instead, we just find it logically impossible to hold X and P—this is different. If X were logically impossible in P, then the logic in P would produce, itself, (X ^ !X); which is does not in the case that P → !X.

Instead, P → !X because of an incoherence, not a logical contradiction in P, with positing X within P. E.g.,:

Y = “X violates the law of gravity”

Which, what they would want to say in this case is that, !(Y ^ X) ^ Y → !X. P, in this case, does not produce a logical contradiction with X such that X ^ !X but, rather, that X ‘violates’ the law of gravity, which Y, and posits if that is true than it is “incoherent”, albeit not logically contradictory, with X. It is perfectly logically validly to posit that “a human being can fly” and “’a human being can fly’ violates the law of gravity”: nothing logically wrong with that.

I think you are conflating the logical impossibility of someone accepting X outside of the theory logically contradicting the theory (i.e., !{X ^ [P → !X] }) with the theory itself demonstrating the logical impossibility of positing X.

In this example, it is logically possible that X but actually impossible that X; but according to your reasoning actual impossibility would collapse into logical impossibility: which does not happen here.

So, with that in mind,:

A spiritual being is logically possible. :up:
A spiritual being is metaphysically possible. :chin:
A spiritual being is physically possible. :down:

For brevity, let’s say “a spirit exists” = X and let’s assume, like you, a physicalistic theory, P, that demonstrates some incoherence with the theory and X such that !X.

1. X is logically possible and is logically possible relative to the axioms and inferences of P.
2. X is metaphysically impossible, because there is at least one proposition, Y, in P that is incoherent with X such that !(Y ^ X) ^ Y → !X.
3. X is actually possible, since you defined it as a “non-physical thing”, as it does not violate the laws of nature, being above nature itself.

Hopefully that helps, let me know.

In this example, it is logically possible that X but actually impossible that X; but according to your reasoning actual impossibility would collapse into logical impossibility: which does not happen here. — Bob Ross

Yes, I agreed to that. X is not logically impossible, (X ^ P) is logically impossible.

Note 1: When we say "physically", we are already talking from within a framework, which are the known laws of physics.
When we say "metaphysically", there is no framework assumed so far, as we have not said which metaphysics we are operating under.

Which, what they would want to say in this case is that, !(Y ^ X) ^ Y → !X. P, in this case, does not produce a logical contradiction with X such that X ^ !X but, rather, that X ‘violates’ the law of gravity, which Y, and posits if that is true than it is “incoherent”, albeit not logically contradictory, with X. It is perfectly logically validly to posit that “a human being can fly” and “’a human being can fly’ violates the law of gravity”: nothing logically wrong with that.

I think you are conflating the logical impossibility of someone accepting X outside of the theory logically contradicting the theory (i.e., !{X ^ [P → !X] }) with the theory itself demonstrating the logical impossibility of positing X. — Bob Ross

Sorry, I am having lots of trouble with these two paragraphs, some sentences are not understandable.

It is perfectly logically validly to posit that “a human being can fly” and “’a human being can fly’ violates the law of gravity”: nothing logically wrong with that. — Bob Ross

Right. I understand what you mean. That {stating a proposition P that breaks some framework F} and {stating that P breaks F} is not a logical contradiction, it is simply a proposition and an account of the facts, fair. However stating P and F is a logical contradiction.

We go back to your original comment:

Metaphysical impossibility is any proposition which violates the presupposed metaphysical theory, no different than how actual/physical possibility is predicated on our scientific theories. — Bob Ross

Likewise, stating P "minds can interact with bodies" and J "P violates parallelism" is not a logical contradiction. However neither of these statements lead to a metaphysical impossibility. J is simply a valid statement. But stating P and parallelism is a logical contradiction, in virtue of J.

In this example, it is logically possible that X but actually impossible that X; but according to your reasoning actual impossibility would collapse into logical impossibility: which does not happen here. — Bob Ross

My reasoning is in fact that metaphysical impossibility collapses with logical impossibility. Physical impossibility does not collapse with anything for me.

1. X is logically possible and is logically possible relative to the axioms and inferences of P. — Bob Ross

Fine.

3. X is actually possible, since you defined it as a “non-physical thing”, as it does not violate the laws of nature, being above nature itself. — Bob Ross

I would not say so because it does not reference physics at all, but it is not really important because this thread does not really discuss physical possibility unless for illustrative purposes, so I will move on.

2. X is metaphysically impossible, because there is at least one proposition, Y, in P that is incoherent with X such that !(Y ^ X) ^ Y → !X. — Bob Ross

Here I think the issue lies. X is metaphysically impossible. But what does that mean? It is impossible because it violates a metaphysical proposition. Here, we are clearly talking about physicalism. When we accept physicalism, we state all its axioms (from A1 to An), and all its theorems (from T1 to Tn); the theorems derive from the axioms. Y is either a an axiom or a theorem here, since it is in P as you say. Unless we state P, we cannot talk about the metaphysical impossibility of X. Before we state P, X remains metaphysically possible. Throwback to Note 1.
Therefore, we are stating P. We are also stating X. Thus, we are stating P and X. As I demonstrated here:

If we then choose physicalism as a metaphysical system M, we are affirming M, which implies affirming all its axioms (A1, A2, A3... An) and consequently from the axioms its theorems (T1, T2, T3). Therefore, by choosing physicalism, we state A1 "there are only physical things", A1 due to the laws of logic can be rewritten to "there are no non-physical things". So, by stating P "there is a spiritual thing" — which due to the definition of these words can be rewritten to "there is a non-physical thing" — we are denying A1. We end up with A1 and notA1, or P and notP, which is a logical contradiction. — Lionino

it entails logical contradiction.

Of course, only stating "X" and "X violates P" is not a logical contradiction, it is fine. But the goal of the thread was to find something logically possible and metaphysically impossible. X violating P is not a metaphysical impossibility; not only is it possible but it is also necessary. And X by itself is not a metaphysical impossibility because we have not yet stated a system (P) that denies it.

a physicalistic theory, P, that demonstrates some incoherence with the theory and X such that !X — Bob Ross

A physicalist theory P that demonstrates some incoherence with itself? I don't understand.

X becomes logically impossible if we accept a theory in physics, — Bob Ross

The Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines physical possibility as:
p is physically possible iff p is consistent with the laws of nature.

Broadly accepted scientific laws (including laws of physics, chemistry, biology...) are typically accepted as proxies for laws of nature, and these are therefore used to assess whether something is physically possible. This helps us differentiate the different modalities of possibility. This basis is appropriate only for those who accept the terms - that there ARE laws of nature, and that science at least approximates them. If you're going to challenge that, then there's no common ground for labellng something physically (im)possible - so that modality is off the table for discussion.

X is not logically impossible even relative to P — Bob Ross

This is how one might discuss different theories of natural law. Under one theory, humans flying might be physically impossible, while under another theory -it's physically possible. But it seems pointless to even discuss physical modality in this sort of context.

I think you are conflating the logical impossibility of someone accepting X outside of the theory logically contradicting the theory (i.e., !{X ^ [P → !X] }) with the theory itself demonstrating the logical impossibility of positing X. — Bob Ross

No, I'm not conflating it - I just think the discussion context is what matters. There's often common ground about using known science to identify what is physically possible. Only then does it even make sense to discuss physical possibility. If there's not this common ground, then it's meaningless to reference physical possibility - it might only make sense to discuss what is entailed by one theory of laws vs another.

I will try to organise it as much as TPF-ly possible. We are dealing with metaphysical and logical possibilities only, not physical possibilities.

P is the proposition "body can act on mind". It is simply saying that bodies can interfere with minds somehow, nothing beyond that.
M is the metaphysical framework of parallelism, a dualist theory in which there are two substances, mind and body, and the two cannot interact with each other, mind can only act on mind and body on body.
M has at least two axioms:
A = "body can only act on body"
B = "mind can only act on mind"
From A, B, and the laws of logic, we can derive several theorems, but the only ones that matter for us are:
T = "body cannot act on mind"
U = "mind cannot act on body"

P is a logically possible statement.
P is a metaphysically possible statement — indeed it is, in the dualist doctrines of epiphenomenalism and interactivism.

So where is the metaphysical impossibility? Well, it can only arrive if we state M ∧ P, I don't see any other way. But because M→(A∧B) and (A→T)∧(B→U) and T→¬P entail M→¬P, M ∧ P is a logical impossibility too.

Therefore, we are stating P. We are also stating X. Thus, we are stating P and X. As I demonstrated here:
…
it entails logical contradiction.

I think we may be circling back around, and I am not sure how else to explain my point of view here other than by repeating: that !(P ^ X) does not entail X is logically impossible—not even relative to P. You are just noting that accepting P and X results in a logical contradiction because !X is affirmed on a non-logical contradiction.

But the goal of the thread was to find something logically possible and metaphysically impossible

Let’s take metaphysical theory, Znot, which posits that philosophical zombies are metaphysically impossible, and let’s call the claim ‘philosophical zombies can exist’ Z, albeit logically and actually possible. Z is considered false in Znot because it is incoherent with another proposition (or set of propositions), let’s say A, that Znot affirms such that !(A ^ Z) ^ A.

This is an example of exactly what you are asking for. Z is logically possible and metaphysically impossible relative to Znot.

metaphysically impossible relative to Znot — Bob Ross

When you say relative to Znot, are you not stating Znot?
As in, is it really metaphysically impossible that Z, or only that (Z∧nZnot)?
There is an ambiguity in phrases such as "in Znot" and "relating to Znot".

My point is exactly that Z is both logically and metaphysically possible. It is only when we state Z∧Znot that we end up with a metaphysically impossibility.

P is a metaphysically possible statement — indeed it is, in the dualist doctrines of epiphenomenalism and interactivism.

So where is the metaphysical impossibility? Well, it can only arrive if we state M ∧ P, I don't see any other way. — Lionino

And A, for me, has to be ¬Z.

A metaphysical impossibility contradicts reality. Viz. "Nothing exists". So it's logically possible that "nothing exists" but it's metaphysically impossible.

Logic is a construct, metaphysics is a concept, the concept of the real. There may be no "universal logic"; however there certainly is a universal metaphysics, the reality of the real. You cannot in any sense constrain or extend the latter by the former (which is what the notion of "possibility" seems to suggest), only characterize or represent it.

Plenty of debatable claims there.

The whole notion of a "possible reality" or possible worlds gets a lot of airplay. Metaphysics is about the real. You can't get more real than real, certainly not through possibility. Collingwood does talk about "meta-metaphysics." But only in the sense of there being a priori presuppositions underlying the historically self-making concrete mind. He says that when people become absorbed in a viewpoint (e.g. Logic) then they make that their metaphysical-rational basis. This is what he describes as a first-level ontological dogmatism. Reflective analysis leads to a pluralistic understanding, that embraces the diverse truths of the various categorical modes of thought - aesthetic, religious, positivistic, scientific, historical. Culminating in a synthesis which is a categorical thinking founded on universal a priori propositions (as mentioned). He has a penchant for the "concrete universal" and the "concrete mind" where the historical fusion of thought and reality are transcendentally real. He says metaphysics is "the science of beliefs."

It is only when we state Z∧Znot that we end up with a metaphysically impossibility

Z ^ Znot cannot be determined, without clarifying the underlying metaphysical theory N being used, to be metaphysically impossible or possible; Z is, though, relative to Znot. The metaphysical mode of modality is not used in a way such that P is metaphysically impossible iff P ^ M is metaphysically impossible: the latter is a totally different proposition than the former. P does not expand into P ^ M, and it nevertheless metaphysically impossible relative to M. By ‘relative to M’, I mean that this mode of modality is relative to the underlying metaphysical theory, M, being used. Think of it this way: ‘Z ^ Znot’ = X, and X is not metaphysically impossible because Z is; nor does it make much sense to ask if Znot, being a metaphysical theory, is metaphysically impossible or not, relative to another metaphysical theory—it can be done, but it is odd.

Now, I think what you are conveying, and correct me if I am wrong, is that the justification for Z being metaphysically impossible is that we posit Znot and that is incoherent, at the least, with Z; so Z is metaphysically impossible. You represent this as Z ^ Znot, but this is not accurate because you are conflating the proposition which is metaphysically impossible with the justification for it being such. Z is metaphysically impossible, and the justification is that !(Z ^ Znot) ^ Znot → {metaphysically impossible} . Saying ‘Z ^ Znot’ is metaphysically impossible shifts the focus to a different proposition, X, which would have to be evaluated relative to a specified metaphysical theory, N.

Z ^ Znot cannot be determined, without clarifying the underlying metaphysical theory N being used — Bob Ross

I agree. You said previously that the underlying metaphysical theory is Znot, so I simply stuck to your choice of terminology:

Let’s take metaphysical theory, Znot, which posits that philosophical zombies are metaphysically impossible — Bob Ross

I knew the use of Znot would be confused with proposition not-Z but decided to stick to it anyway :razz:

By ‘relative to M’, I mean that this mode of modality is relative to the underlying metaphysical theory, M, being used — Bob Ross

With the terms we are using here (I have thrown out "In M, P" in favour of "P and M"), I don't think that P relative to M means anything other than P and M.

Z being metaphysically impossible is that we posit Znot and that is incoherent, at the least, with Z — Bob Ross

Now I don't know whether you are using Znot as a theory or a proposition. But that does seem like what my point is. Though my point is stated clearly here:

P is a metaphysically possible statement — indeed it is, in the dualist doctrines of epiphenomenalism and interactivism.

So where is the metaphysical impossibility? Well, it can only arrive if we state M ∧ P, I don't see any other way. But because M→(A∧B) and (A→T)∧(B→U) and T→¬P entail M→¬P, M ∧ P is a logical impossibility too. — Lionino

---

You represent this as Z ^ Znot, but this is not accurate because you are conflating the proposition which is metaphysically impossible with the justification for it being such. Z is metaphysically impossible, and the justification is that !(Z ^ Znot) ^ Znot → {metaphysically impossible} . Saying ‘Z ^ Znot’ is metaphysically impossible shifts the focus to a different proposition, X, which would have to be evaluated relative to a specified metaphysical theory, N. — Bob Ross

I will approach this section later when I have more time to think and once I have a reply of whether Znot is a metaphysical theory or a proposition.

To avoid confusion, I am going to use capital letters for theories, and lowercase for propositions.

With the terms we are using here (I have thrown out "In M, P" in favour of "P and M"), I don't think that P relative to M means anything other than P and M.

My point is that ‘p is metaphysically impossible’ != ‘p and M are metaphysically impossible’ != ‘p ^ M is metaphysically impossible’ != ‘!(p ^ M)’.

Now I don't know whether you are using Znot as a theory or a proposition.

ZNOT is a theory, not a proposition.

To avoid confusion, I am going to use capital letters for theories, and lowercase for propositions. — Bob Ross

Alright.

My point is that ‘p is metaphysically impossible’ != ‘p and M are metaphysically impossible’ != ‘p ^ M is metaphysically impossible’ != ‘!(p ^ M)’ — Bob Ross

Right, I agree with that, maybe I caused confusion previously by exchanging "p and M are" with "p ^ M is".

To reply to the thing I meant to reply to:

You represent this as Z ^ Znot, but this is not accurate because you are conflating the proposition which is metaphysically impossible with the justification for it being such. Z is metaphysically impossible, and the justification is that !(Z ^ Znot) ^ Znot → {metaphysically impossible} . Saying ‘Z ^ Znot’ is metaphysically impossible shifts the focus to a different proposition, X, which would have to be evaluated relative to a specified metaphysical theory, N. — Bob Ross

I think that by "!(Z ^ ZNOT) ^ ZNOT → {metaphysically impossible}" you mean "!(z ^ ZNOT) ^ ZNOT → {z is metaphysically impossible}".
I believe that the source of our disagreement is that, for you, z is metaphysically impossible in reference ("coherence" as you say) to the fact that !(z ^ ZNOT) ^ ZNOT. A statement (z) can be evaluated as metaphysically impossible without explicitly stating the theory ZNOT that contradicts it, through the fact that !(z ^ ZNOT), right?

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There has to be a whole binding all the parts of something from the top-down for it to be coherent, you can't actually building anything by "combining parts" without that, despite what a pragmatic heuristic it is to think so. — Hallucinogen

How is that contradictory with reductionism? And before all, I would ask that you specify what kind of redutionism you are talking about.

It seems logically possible for syntax to be sufficient for semantics — Hallucinogen

I have not studied this subject sufficiently to give a reply on it — specially the Chinese room experiment, it did not make an awful lot of sense to me when I last read it.

It just turns out when we investigate with thought experiments like the Chinese room argument, that syntax is actually insufficient for semantics. But without knowing that beforehand, it appears possible that we might understand the meaning of some symbol purely by looking at the instructions of which it is a part. — Hallucinogen

This seems to agree with my proposal earlier in the thread. That although nothing about 'semantics' implies that syntax is insufficient for it (analytic), we learn later, if we are to agree with the CR experiment, that it has to be the case that it is insufficient, and it has to be insufficient — a synthetic necessity.

Reflective analysis leads to a pluralistic understanding, that embraces the diverse truths of the various categorical modes of thought - aesthetic, religious, positivistic, scientific, historical. Culminating in a synthesis which is a categorical thinking founded on universal a priori propositions (as mentioned). He has a penchant for the "concrete universal" and the "concrete mind" where the historical fusion of thought and reality are transcendentally real. He says metaphysics is "the science of beliefs." — Pantagruel

I admit that I have not read Collingwood, and there is a good chance I will never read one of his books back to back, like I won't to many many writers out there, but from the description given here, at a surface level I don't agree with any statement. Especially:

He says that when people become absorbed in a viewpoint (e.g. Logic) then they make that their metaphysical-rational basis — Pantagruel

I don't see how logic could not be our rational basis; rational discourse is destroyed without logic.