Semantics is about meaning, which is about how and what words relate to what underlying content; and has nothing to do with that underlying content itself. Nature does not care what word you call it.

The only reason I brought it up was because another person in this thread, that I am discussing with, was thinking that the metaphysical mode of modality was tied solely to semantics of the metaphysical theory at hand, which is false.

Semantics is about meaning, which is about how and what words relate to what underlying content; and has nothing to do with that underlying content itself — Bob Ross

This is not true Bob. In fact, it is not even true by your own assertion "Semantics is about words—i.e., what is the best or chosen word to describe something". There would be no semantics without the "something" about which the word is. You can't say that semantics is both related to content and yet "has nothing to do with content." Your assertions would be (are) self-contradictory.

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Of course the word relates to content, but another word can be swapped for that word and related to the same content; thus, the word is distinct from the content. The fact that the word relates to the content does not entail that the content is somehow modified or transformed depending on the word used. That's all I am trying to point out for the sake of the conversation I was having with the other person, and I don't think it is that controversial (but correct me if I am wrong).

Of course the word relates to content, but another word can be swapped for that word and related to the same content; thus, the word is distinct from the content. The fact that the word relates to the content does not entail that the content is somehow modified or transformed depending on the word used. That's all I am trying to point out for the sake of the conversation I was having with the other person, and I don't think it is that controversial (but correct me if I am wrong). — Bob Ross

The word is dependent on the content. I suppose you could say it that way too. It's distinctness comes from its dependence. What's in a name?

When we choose a certain metaphysics M, a statement that goes against it, for me, would be a statement that goes against one of the theorems of that metaphysics (t.i. logical contradiction), and assuming that every theorem of M ultimately goes back to the axioms of M, we would have (X ∧ ¬X) extending from (X ∧ Y) extending from (X ∧ M).

I believe I agree with everything except for this part. I just don't think that 'going against one of the theorems [or beliefs or statements]" in M entails necessarily a logical contradiction. I also don't see why every incoherence with M would be derivable back to, ultimately, an axiom which results in !X.

I don't see how one can "extend" !(Y ^ X) to (X ^ !X) in virtue of some axiom in M, such that every possible metaphysical theory, M<i>, has that setup.

The word is dependent on the content. I suppose you could say it that way too. It's distinctness comes from its dependence. What's in a name?

I don't have a problem with this: that's what I was essentially saying too.

I just don't think that 'going against one of the theorems [or beliefs or statements]" in M entails necessarily a logical contradiction. — Bob Ross

I don't think that makes sense. Under physicalism, it is axiomatic that only physical things exist. Any statement that entails a spiritual being is contradicted by that axiom.

While it's correct to say that a spiritual being is logically possible, it's a contradiction to say a spiritual being exists & physicalism is true.

I don't have a problem with this: that's what I was essentially saying too. — Bob Ross

:ok:

While it's correct to say that a spiritual being is logically possible, it's a contradiction to say a spiritual being exists & physicalism is true.

My point is that X is not logically impossible because X is metaphysically impossible; and pointing out that !(X ^ M) doesn't help prove that it is otherwise. Just because positing X and M entails a contradiction it does not follow that X is logically impossible. I only bring this up because you said something originally along the lines of 'every metaphysical system which X contradicts, makes X logically impossible'. Metaphysical impossibility does not entail logical impossibility. That X ^ M is logically impossible is not the same as X being logically impossible, which is what you need for this to work.

Likewise, I don't even think that all propositions which are regarded as metaphysically impossible are reducible to an axiom in the metaphysical theory. To take your example, physicalism is typically the view that reality is fundamentally 'mind-independent': it may still be metaphysically impossible for their to be a spiritual being even though it does not produce a logical contradiction with this fundamental belief to the theory, as they may say it is metaphysically impossible because the being, let's say, would violate the laws of nature and, let's say, in this particular physicalist theory, everything must be natural--so spiritual beings cannot exist because that is incoherent with, not logically contradictory to, these beliefs they have.

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I don't even think that all propositions which are regarded as metaphysically impossible are reducible to an axiom in the metaphysical theory. — Bob Ross

I agree.

That X ^ M is logically impossible is not the same as X being logically impossible, which is what you need for this to work. — Bob Ross

Both work, but one needs to be clear what one means. Your approach is appropriate when comparing metaphysical systems, mine is appropriate when considering what is possible within a metaphysical system.

my argument is that as soon as we choose a metaphysical system, which will have its own semantic system (such as equating "all that exists" and "physical things"), the metaphysical impossibility collapses with logical impossibility. Giving us no way of finding something logically possible but metaphysically impossible. — Lionino

I agree.

let's say, in this particular physicalist theory, everything must be natural--so spiritual beings cannot exist because that is incoherent with, not logically contradictory to, these beliefs they have. — Bob Ross

This metaphysical system is incoherent because it entails a contradiction.

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What would be an example of something that is metaphysically impossible but does not reference the axioms of the operating metaphysical system? — Lionino

Anything that is broadly logically impossible, such as the existence of square circles or married bachelors.

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I cannot provide an actual answer as I am ignorant of the true metaphysical principles of reality. However, it would seem that the distinction is not so clear. Even so as I find little distinction between what is "logic" and what is "metaphysics".

Giving us no way of finding something logically possible but metaphysically impossible.

I disagree. Let’s take this by analogy (to actual impossibility):

X = “A human being can fly”

Firstly, X is not logically impossible. Secondly, I think your line of reasoning, and correct me if I am wrong, is that X becomes logically impossible if we accept a theory in physics, P, that posits !X; but this is false.

X is not logically impossible even relative to P when !(X ^ P): instead, we just find it logically impossible to hold X and P—this is different. If X were logically impossible in P, then the logic in P would produce, itself, (X ^ !X); which is does not in the case that P → !X.

Instead, P → !X because of an incoherence, not a logical contradiction in P, with positing X within P. E.g.,:

Y = “X violates the law of gravity”

Which, what they would want to say in this case is that, !(Y ^ X) ^ Y → !X. P, in this case, does not produce a logical contradiction with X such that X ^ !X but, rather, that X ‘violates’ the law of gravity, which Y, and posits if that is true than it is “incoherent”, albeit not logically contradictory, with X. It is perfectly logically validly to posit that “a human being can fly” and “’a human being can fly’ violates the law of gravity”: nothing logically wrong with that.

I think you are conflating the logical impossibility of someone accepting X outside of the theory logically contradicting the theory (i.e., !{X ^ [P → !X] }) with the theory itself demonstrating the logical impossibility of positing X.

In this example, it is logically possible that X but actually impossible that X; but according to your reasoning actual impossibility would collapse into logical impossibility: which does not happen here.

So, with that in mind,:

A spiritual being is logically possible. :up:
A spiritual being is metaphysically possible. :chin:
A spiritual being is physically possible. :down:

For brevity, let’s say “a spirit exists” = X and let’s assume, like you, a physicalistic theory, P, that demonstrates some incoherence with the theory and X such that !X.

1. X is logically possible and is logically possible relative to the axioms and inferences of P.
2. X is metaphysically impossible, because there is at least one proposition, Y, in P that is incoherent with X such that !(Y ^ X) ^ Y → !X.
3. X is actually possible, since you defined it as a “non-physical thing”, as it does not violate the laws of nature, being above nature itself.

Hopefully that helps, let me know.

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X becomes logically impossible if we accept a theory in physics, — Bob Ross

The Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines physical possibility as:
p is physically possible iff p is consistent with the laws of nature.

Broadly accepted scientific laws (including laws of physics, chemistry, biology...) are typically accepted as proxies for laws of nature, and these are therefore used to assess whether something is physically possible. This helps us differentiate the different modalities of possibility. This basis is appropriate only for those who accept the terms - that there ARE laws of nature, and that science at least approximates them. If you're going to challenge that, then there's no common ground for labellng something physically (im)possible - so that modality is off the table for discussion.

X is not logically impossible even relative to P — Bob Ross

This is how one might discuss different theories of natural law. Under one theory, humans flying might be physically impossible, while under another theory -it's physically possible. But it seems pointless to even discuss physical modality in this sort of context.

I think you are conflating the logical impossibility of someone accepting X outside of the theory logically contradicting the theory (i.e., !{X ^ [P → !X] }) with the theory itself demonstrating the logical impossibility of positing X. — Bob Ross

No, I'm not conflating it - I just think the discussion context is what matters. There's often common ground about using known science to identify what is physically possible. Only then does it even make sense to discuss physical possibility. If there's not this common ground, then it's meaningless to reference physical possibility - it might only make sense to discuss what is entailed by one theory of laws vs another.

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Therefore, we are stating P. We are also stating X. Thus, we are stating P and X. As I demonstrated here:
…
it entails logical contradiction.

I think we may be circling back around, and I am not sure how else to explain my point of view here other than by repeating: that !(P ^ X) does not entail X is logically impossible—not even relative to P. You are just noting that accepting P and X results in a logical contradiction because !X is affirmed on a non-logical contradiction.

But the goal of the thread was to find something logically possible and metaphysically impossible

Let’s take metaphysical theory, Znot, which posits that philosophical zombies are metaphysically impossible, and let’s call the claim ‘philosophical zombies can exist’ Z, albeit logically and actually possible. Z is considered false in Znot because it is incoherent with another proposition (or set of propositions), let’s say A, that Znot affirms such that !(A ^ Z) ^ A.

This is an example of exactly what you are asking for. Z is logically possible and metaphysically impossible relative to Znot.

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A metaphysical impossibility contradicts reality. Viz. "Nothing exists". So it's logically possible that "nothing exists" but it's metaphysically impossible.

Logic is a construct, metaphysics is a concept, the concept of the real. There may be no "universal logic"; however there certainly is a universal metaphysics, the reality of the real. You cannot in any sense constrain or extend the latter by the former (which is what the notion of "possibility" seems to suggest), only characterize or represent it.

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The whole notion of a "possible reality" or possible worlds gets a lot of airplay. Metaphysics is about the real. You can't get more real than real, certainly not through possibility. Collingwood does talk about "meta-metaphysics." But only in the sense of there being a priori presuppositions underlying the historically self-making concrete mind. He says that when people become absorbed in a viewpoint (e.g. Logic) then they make that their metaphysical-rational basis. This is what he describes as a first-level ontological dogmatism. Reflective analysis leads to a pluralistic understanding, that embraces the diverse truths of the various categorical modes of thought - aesthetic, religious, positivistic, scientific, historical. Culminating in a synthesis which is a categorical thinking founded on universal a priori propositions (as mentioned). He has a penchant for the "concrete universal" and the "concrete mind" where the historical fusion of thought and reality are transcendentally real. He says metaphysics is "the science of beliefs."

It is only when we state Z∧Znot that we end up with a metaphysically impossibility

Z ^ Znot cannot be determined, without clarifying the underlying metaphysical theory N being used, to be metaphysically impossible or possible; Z is, though, relative to Znot. The metaphysical mode of modality is not used in a way such that P is metaphysically impossible iff P ^ M is metaphysically impossible: the latter is a totally different proposition than the former. P does not expand into P ^ M, and it nevertheless metaphysically impossible relative to M. By ‘relative to M’, I mean that this mode of modality is relative to the underlying metaphysical theory, M, being used. Think of it this way: ‘Z ^ Znot’ = X, and X is not metaphysically impossible because Z is; nor does it make much sense to ask if Znot, being a metaphysical theory, is metaphysically impossible or not, relative to another metaphysical theory—it can be done, but it is odd.

Now, I think what you are conveying, and correct me if I am wrong, is that the justification for Z being metaphysically impossible is that we posit Znot and that is incoherent, at the least, with Z; so Z is metaphysically impossible. You represent this as Z ^ Znot, but this is not accurate because you are conflating the proposition which is metaphysically impossible with the justification for it being such. Z is metaphysically impossible, and the justification is that !(Z ^ Znot) ^ Znot → {metaphysically impossible} . Saying ‘Z ^ Znot’ is metaphysically impossible shifts the focus to a different proposition, X, which would have to be evaluated relative to a specified metaphysical theory, N.

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To avoid confusion, I am going to use capital letters for theories, and lowercase for propositions.

With the terms we are using here (I have thrown out "In M, P" in favour of "P and M"), I don't think that P relative to M means anything other than P and M.

My point is that ‘p is metaphysically impossible’ != ‘p and M are metaphysically impossible’ != ‘p ^ M is metaphysically impossible’ != ‘!(p ^ M)’.

Now I don't know whether you are using Znot as a theory or a proposition.

ZNOT is a theory, not a proposition.

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