Is it a moral fact? We're discussing moral obligations, not non-moral obligations. — Michael

It directly concerns what the alcoholic ought to do despite what anyone might want, or like, the alcoholic to do. I fail to understand how this specific "ought" wouldn't be a moral - or, better yet, ethical - fact: one that thereby regards the notion of the good.

As to obligations, I'm not involving myself with them. The question can always be placed: why ought one honor one's former promise ... and with an innumerable quantity of possible scenarios, some can be found wherein it is morally good for one to not honor one's former promise.

I'm explaining that if ethical non-naturalism is true then being moral has no practical benefit. — Michael

I starkly disagree, here granting that this ethical non-naturalism concerns moral realism. But I'm not here to present a thesis on the subject. I'm here only addressing your quoted proposition and my reply to it.

↪Leontiskos I'm not sure what you want from me. You're putting words into my mouth and I'm simply explaining that I'm not saying what you accuse me of saying.

I'd like you to pass the salt. I'd like you to meet my parents. I'd like you to donate to cancer research. I'd like you to join the protest. None of this implies that I believe in some objectively binding moral obligation. — Michael

↪Michael - I don't think you read beyond the first sentence of that reply. — Leontiskos

Or, let me be more clear. You used it in the sense, "I'd like it if you pursued happiness and tried to avoid causing suffering." It could also be used in the sense, "I'd like it if you wore my favorite color on my birthday." You can imagine a parent saying both of these things to their child. But the curious thing is that "should" captures the valence of both. Still, when we are talking about morality we are talking about something like the former sense. — Leontiskos

You are advising, and the advice is moral because the precept is coextensive with all of human action. The precept bears on all of a person's actions, and not just some. It is something you believe they should take into consideration always, and not just sometimes. — Leontiskos

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When I say that I'd like you to be kind to others and make them happy, that's all I'm saying. — Michael

Do you say it in order to influence my behavior?

Fundamentally, 'oughts' simply impinge on the behavior of others. Moral subjectivists can try to impinge on the behavior of others without impinging on the behavior of others, but they will contradict themselves every time. — Leontiskos

I think there's been some confusion. I said to Leontiskos that I would like it if he would make others happy. He then accused me of telling him that he ought make others happy. I was explaining to him that I wasn't because "I would like it if you did this" doesn't mean "you ought do this". I then presented that biconditional in an attempt to show him that they mean different things. As he is a moral realist I expected him to reject the biconditional and so accept that I wasn't telling him what he ought to do.

But then he confused the matter by accepting the biconditional whilst still claiming to be a moral realist.

It directly concerns what the alcoholic ought to do despite what anyone might want, or like, the alcoholic to do. I fail to understand how this specific "ought" wouldn't be a moral - or, better yet, ethical - fact: one that thereby regards the notion of the good. — javra

Yes indeed.

I can get that, and I did jump into the discussion without reading most of the previous posts.

Make of my reply what you will. To me it does evidence the occurrence of moral realism.

Yes, correct. — Leontiskos

:up:

I don't care if I ought or ought not promote happiness or if I ought or ought not cause suffering. I'm going to promote happiness and not cause suffering either way. — Michael

I can acknowledge that the world would be a different, better place if everyone acted with kindness and empathy and charity, but whether or not kindness and empathy and charity are moral makes no difference. — Michael

Whether or not kindness and empathy and charity make the world a better place does matter though.

I'm curious if I have the general gist of what you've been arguing in this thread.


Seems to me like you're explaining in general terms what makes the world a better place in a manner that allows/permits us to dispose of the term/notion/conception of "moral". That is to say that this, this, and this makes the world a better place, but I do not care if those things are called moral or not, I'll do them because I believe that the world will be a better place if I do, but I'm unwilling to insist that others should do the same.

It seems you're not okay with insisting that others have some obligation to share your beliefs about what makes the world a better place.

If that's close... I agree. They have to get there own their own. One cannot be forced to care about others.

You are advising — Leontiskos

No I'm not. I am expressing how I would feel if you were to behave a certain way. I'm not advising you to do something. I'm not telling you to do something. I am not asserting that there exists some objectively binding moral obligation to do something.

Whether or not kindness and empathy and charity make the world a better place does matter though. — creativesoul

I know it does.

But whether or not kindness and empathy and charity are moral doesn't matter. Kindness and empathy and charity would make the world a better place even if kindness and empathy and charity aren't moral.

Okay.

What about the rest of what I said?

No I'm not. I am expressing how I would feel if you were to behave a certain way. I'm not advising you to do something. I'm not telling you to do something. I am not asserting that there exists some objectively binding moral obligation to do something. — Michael

It is an utterance intended to influence behavior, and therefore it is a normative utterance, pertaining to 'oughts'. You speak because you believe I ought to care how you feel, and 'ought' claims are moral claims according to your post here.

You speak because you believe I ought to care how you feel — Leontiskos

No I don't.

You need to stop telling me what I believe.

Kindness and empathy and charity would make the world a better place even if kindness and empathy and charity aren't moral. — Michael

If by "moral" you mean according to some particular behavioural code, then I agree.

Codes can be mistaken.

No I don't. — Michael

Sure you do. Someone who says, "I would be very sad if you cause them suffering," is obviously attempting to influence behavior.

You need to stop telling me what I believe. — Michael

"Know thyself."

Someone who says, "I would be very sad if you cause them suffering," is obviously attempting to influence behavior. — Leontiskos

That I am trying to influence behaviour isn't that I believe that you have a moral obligation to behave a certain way.

When I try to convince you that I have a bridge to sell I am trying to influence you into giving me your money. That doesn't mean that I believe that you have a moral obligation to give me money. In fact I may be a moral realist who believes that what I am doing is wrong, but I care more about being rich than being good. Or I may be a moral nihilist who doesn't believe that anything is good or bad. But I still want your money.

You're presupposing that... somehow... in some way are... you are privy to Michael's beliefs moreso than Michael.

While - in certain situations it is possible to know what another believes moreso than the other, I do not think Michael is the sort of person that does not know what they believe in this context. Nothing they've written must lead to wherever you've arrived. Entailment fails to be a dependable tool here.

That I am trying to influence behaviour isn't that I believe that you have a moral obligation to behave a certain way. — Michael

Then you'll need to revise your definition. We are discussing whether an 'ought' is involved.

Then you'll need to revise your definition. We are discussing whether an 'ought' is involved. — Leontiskos

And in this case an "ought" isn't involved as I keep saying. Here are a couple of sentences:

1. I would like it if you made others happy
2. I would like it if you were to give me your money

In both cases I am trying to influence your behaviour. In neither case is the word "ought" (or the word "immoral") involved, either explicitly or implicitly.

And in this case an "ought" isn't involved as I keep saying. Here are a couple of sentences:

1. I would like it if you made others happy
2. I would like it if you were to give me your money

In both cases I am trying to influence your behaviour. In neither case is the word "ought" (or the word "immoral") involved. — Michael

I am talking about realities, not words. 'Ought' is a reality that is very often present even when the word is not present. Do you agree or disagree?

'Ought' is a reality that is very often present even when the word is not present. Do you agree or disagree? — Leontiskos

Yes. So I refer you back to what I said here:

That may be true when you say it but it's not when I say it. When I say "I'd like it if you did this" I am only saying this. — Michael

You accused me (here) of saying something that I haven't said (that "we should act in a certain way"). I am simply trying to correct you on this. I have not said this, either explicitly or implicitly. You're reading something into my words that just isn't there and accusing me of believing something that I just don't.

Yes. — Michael

Okay, good. You agree that oughtness can be present even where the word is not present.

Now I say 'ought' involves a judgment about how someone should act. It involves a judgment about how someone should behave. Where such judgments are present, the reality of 'ought' is present. Do you disagree?

Now I say 'ought' involves a judgment about how someone should act. It involves a judgment about how someone should behave. Where such judgments are present, the reality of 'ought' is present. Do you disagree? — Leontiskos

Well yes, because that's a truism: "ought" and "should" are synonyms.

But again I refer you back to what I said here:

That may be true when you say it but it's not when I say it. When I say "I'd like it if you did this" I am only saying this. — Michael

You accused me (here) of saying something that I haven't said (that "we should act in a certain way"). I am simply trying to correct you on this. I have not said this, either explicitly or implicitly. You're reading something into my words that just isn't there and accusing me of believing something that I just don't.

Well yes, because that's a truism: "ought" and "should" are synonyms. — Michael

Okay, good. So you agree that judgments about how one should act or behave bring with them oughtness.

Next, I think that if one is attempting to influence the behavior of another, they are manifesting an explicit or implicit judgment about how that other person should act or behave. Do you agree or disagree?

Next, I think that if one is attempting to influence the behavior of another, they are manifesting an explicit or implicit judgment about how that other person should act or behave. Do you agree or disagree? — Leontiskos

I disagree, as I keep saying. If I'm a conman trying to sell you a bridge I don't own then I am trying to influence your behaviour into giving me money but I don't believe that you have a moral obligation to give me money.

I disagree, as I keep saying. If I'm a conman trying to sell you a bridge I don't own I am trying to influence your behaviour into giving me money but I don't believe that you have a moral obligation to give me money. — Michael

Again, "We are discussing whether an 'ought' is involved" ().

To use your example, if someone is trying to sell Bonita a bridge, and they are trying to influence her to act such that she buys the bridge, do they possess the judgment that Bonita should buy a bridge?

To use your example, if someone is trying to sell Bonita a bridge, and they are trying to influence her to act such that she buys the bridge, do they possess the judgment that Bonita should buy a bridge? — Leontiskos

No they do not. They want her to buy a bridge. They don't think she should.

No they do not. They want her to buy a bridge. They don't think she should. — Michael

I didn't realize that wants were incompatible with oughts. When a lazy husband says to his tired wife, "You should grab me a beer from the fridge," is he expressing a judgment about what his wife ought to do? Apparently on your view if he wants a beer then he can't think that his wife should get him one.

I didn't realize that wants were incompatible with oughts. — Leontiskos

I didn't say that they are incompatible. I am only saying that the one does not necessarily entail the other. In the case of the conman, what he wants her to do and what he thinks she should do are opposed. In the case of the husband, what he wants her to do and what he thinks she should do might be the same.

I am only saying that the one does not necessarily entail the other. — Michael

But the salesman was not merely wanting, he was acting to influence behavior. So too with the husband. In both cases we have cases of people who act to influence behavior on the basis of their desires. Are the salesman and the husband involved in a judgment about what another person should do?

But the salesman was not merely wanting, he was acting to influence behavior. So too with the husband. In both cases we have cases of people who act to influence behavior on the basis of their desires. Are the salesman and the husband involved in a judgment about what another person should do? — Leontiskos

The conman is trying to influence her behaviour into giving him what he wants. He isn't trying to influence her behaviour into doing what he thinks she should do (e.g what is "right" or "good" or "best for her"). Maybe for the husband he's trying to do both.

The conman is trying to influence her behaviour into giving him what he wants. He isn't trying to influence her behaviour into doing what he thinks she should do. — Michael

He doesn't think she should do what he wants her to do?