But you have been shown that this is not correct. — Banno

Oh, sorry I missed that. Can you link to where?

...over the course of this thread.

...over the course of this thread. — Banno

Righto, I haven't closely read it. I'll check your posts again.

2. Go back and re-respond to this here and explain why my response doesn't now apply, particularly to (b). Just plug in Moore's definition of morality into (b), and that offers a reason why it matters what you think is moral for a non-naturalist. — Hanover

Moore doesn't have a definition. As he says in the Principia Ethica:

‘Good,’ then, if we mean by it that quality which we assert to belong to a thing, when we say that the thing is good, is incapable of any definition, in the most important sense of that word.

And as I mentioned before, the way you've worded your examples doesn't reflect the argument I'm making. You are comparing the case where I believe something is moral with a case where I believe that same thing to not be immoral. I'm considering two cases where I believe that something is immoral (or two cases where I believe that something is not immoral), but where in one case the belief is true and in the other case that same belief is false. This is perhaps clearest when phrased like this:

Given that I believe that it is immoral to cause suffering, what follows if suffering is immoral and what follows if suffering is not immoral?

Well, the non-natural moral facts would be involved in the consequences of your actions to the extent that your family won't come to see you because they think you acted immorally. If they didn't think what you did was wrong, presumably they wouldn't be upset with you.

But I do agree that the natural/non-natural distinction seems pretty dicey here, because the two "types" seem to flow into one another quite a bit.

It seems like you could get along with just calling them irreducible and living "natural" out of it.

That's a question that would seem to deal with causality, which would tend to require a naturalistic answer.

The difference for someone like Moore would seem to be precisely that you have acted immorally versus morally in any situation, independent of any causation downstream of your actions. As I understand him, which isn't very well, moral facts aren't reducible to natural facts, and so asking about what changes "in the world," outside of your having acted rightly or wrongly doesn't make sense given his premises. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's precisely my point. If ethical non-naturalism is correct then moral facts entail no consequential outcomes. Suffering is still suffering, so why does it matter if it's moral or not? Would you really seek suffering if it could be proved that suffering is moral? Or, like me, is your visceral aversion to pain and empathy of others all that matters?

Well, the non-natural moral facts would be involved in the consequences of your actions to the extent that your family won't come to see you because they think you acted immorally. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's a consequence of acting contrary to moral beliefs. They won't come to see me because they believe I acted immorally. They might be wrong.

Hanover

Moore doesn't have a definition. As he says in the Principia Ethica:

‘Good,’ then, if we mean by it that quality which we assert to belong to a thing, when we say that the thing is good, is incapable of any definition, in the most important sense of that word. — Michael

He does have a definition of "the good" from what I quoted above, but he claims it is undefined because he says there is no essential component to it. He describes "the good" as having a variety of objectives, and so it is pluralistic, unlike saying the good = that which increases the most pleasure, which would posit a monistic, essentialist definition of "the good. " What Moore is saying is "the good" might include a variety of things, which may include pleasure and other objectives.

But to reject essentialism isn't to argue for meaninglessness or for intuitionism. It is to argue for contextualism. That is, the good is that which satisfies certain particular goals attendant to the circumstances and therefore based upon reason as to what you wish to accomplish under a given scenario.

And so when you ask this question:

Given that I believe that it is immoral to cause suffering, what follows if suffering is immoral and what follows if suffering is not immoral? — Michael

The answer is that the suffering you find immoral will not be moral if contextually it is not defined as moral. That is, if killing babies is moral and you find it immoral, you will be immoral if you don't kill babies, but that will require a rational basis for such killing to be moral under the circumstances at hand.

The consequence of doing wrong under this scenario is the same for the naturalist as the non-naturalist. One just has a simple equation defining the good. The other a fluid one context dependent.

That's a consequence of acting contrary to moral beliefs. They won't come to see me because they believe I acted immorally. They might be wrong.

This is true only if you assume that people's beliefs about morality have nothing to do moral facts. But if people have the moral beliefs they do because of moral facts (at least in part), then there seems to be a clear connection here between evil acts and social consequences.

This is to say nothing of the effects of someone's own evil acts on their own experiences and well being. I can see an argument for moral degeneracy being cumulative. Cruelty becomes a habit. And even if one sees nothing wrong with their evil acts at the time, people later realizing they have acted in an evil manner in the past has caused people no shortage of grief throughout history.

Suffering is still suffering, so why does it matter if it's moral or not?

I think the more valuable point Moore is trying to make is that morality isn't completely reducible to pleasure/suffering. There is a broader dimension. I agree that no one is going to seek out suffering for the sake of suffering, but they might gladly suffer to do good.

But who is going to argue that suffering is good of itself?

The underlying assumption here seems to be that what is "really good" could be anything, even pointless suffering. But the idea that people have absolutely no equipment for determining moral facts seems at odds with the theory itself. It would indeed be odd to claim that there are non-natural moral facts and that they are unknowable.

I'll quote Moore's Principia Ethica — Michael

Okay, thanks. But see my post <here>. Moore's reductionist critique was met with supervenience theories of good (e.g. Hare). Your OP ignores the fact that this critique is no longer relevant. No one is saying that good is reducible to just one thing.

It is in defining goodness in terms of some natural property – in this case, pleasure – that makes it an ethical naturalist theory. And then, according to Moore, deriving the normative claim that we ought pursue pleasure commits the naturalistic fallacy. — Michael

As long as a hedonist does not purport to derive his 'ought' from natural science, he is not a naturalist. He could do this in two ways: he could argue that pleasure is good, but that its goodness is not an object of natural science, or else he could independently claim that the oughtness that attaches to pleasure is not an object of natural science. In either case he is not a naturalist, and all hedonists I have encountered deny that their valuative/obligatory premises are the product of natural science.

I think you are misreading Moore's argument as overdetermined. The so-called "naturalistic fallacy" depends on his Open Question about the ambiguity of goodness. If that ambiguity fails then the fallacy charge also fails.

---

He describes "the good" as having a variety of objectives, and so it is pluralistic, unlike saying the good = that which increases the most pleasure, which would posit a monistic, essentialist definition of "the good. " — Hanover

But what does monistic/pluralistic have to do with naturalistic/non-naturalistic? The idea is perhaps that good motivates, and if an easily identifiable and unified reality is good, then a straightforward (and exclusive) 'ought' will flow from that good (and this is called "naturalism" for whatever reason). Contrariwise, if goodness is pluriform and the various manifestations are irreducible, then the competition between goods can never be satisfactorily resolved and there will be no straightforward 'ought.' Instead there will be a set of 'oughts' that cannot be adjudicated.

Still, I don't know what in the world this is supposed to have to do with naturalism. In this case it would seem to have more to do with whether 'ought' disputes are ultimately adjudicable. Supposing that pleasure were all there is to good, this would not mean that ethics all of the sudden becomes part of natural science. Why is it that if I say pleasure is the only good, I am a naturalist, but if I say honor is also good, I am not? Presumably a monistic scheme would only be naturalistic if natural science could measure and quantify its monistic conception of good. It appears to be a question of commensurability, not naturalism.

I'm trying to make sense of it as well, and I don't know if I'm understanding it or just imposing some linguistic meaning = use philosophy into it. That is, what is any X other than a fluid set of non-essential criteria defined contextually?

A hat is thing you put on top of your head, but suppose it's a 5000 lb iron hat? I guess the putting on your head part is non-essential. And the same holds true for anything you say of the hat or of anything,. But that doesn't mean we don't know what hats are or that we don't know what anything is just because we reject essentialism as it pertains to definitions.

So, we can adjudicate what is the good, just as we can adjudicate what is a hat, and that holds true even though we have no essential element of either. I contend Moore still can provide specific reasons for why something is good, and those reasons are subject to debate and conclusions. If not, then he is saying "moral" is an empty concept, which is clearly not what he's saying.

If you want to say dictionaries have limited use because every word's meaning is contextualized, that is true, which can be taken to mean that terms generally are not fully defined, but that hardly means words have no meaning.

I am an essentialist, but my concern here is that even if we found the magical formula for goodness, @Michael would immediately, given his approach in these threads, say, "I admit that X is good, but why should I do/seek what is good?" I do not object to Moore agonizing over what 'good' means, but the moral skeptic would in no way be satisfied even if Moore were successful. They would say, "Well now we have obtained the commensurability of goodness, but we still don't have 'oughts' or morality." "Non-naturalism," as Michael conceives it, is inherently groundless and irrational.

But the non-naturalist isn't a moral skeptic. He's a moral realist.

And no one is an essentialist anymore. It's like so yesterday.

But the non-naturalist isn't a moral skeptic. He's a moral realist. — Hanover

In this thread @Michael is playing moral skeptic.

The point is that Moore is interested in goodness and indirectly interested in naturalism. Even if Moore's question were resolved, my contention is that this would in no way resolve Michael's inquiry in the OP. For Michael the definition of good will not suffice to provide rationale for moral 'oughts'.

And no one is an essentialist anymore. It's like so yesterday. — Hanover

I also wear bell-bottoms and a cape while smoking a pipe.


Anyway, this is a good line for the thread:

I don't follow why Mill is a naturalist but Moore not. — Hanover

Michael was asked who holds the theory he is critiquing ("non-naturalism"). He said Moore. But it is hard to see why Moore is supposed to be a non-naturalist, or what that term even means.

But if people have the moral beliefs they do because of moral facts (at least in part), then there seems to be a clear connection here between evil acts and social consequences. — Count Timothy von Icarus

It's exactly that question that is the subject of the thread. What is the connection between these moral facts and people's beliefs? You could be a moral intuitionist, perhaps.

As long as a hedonist does not purport to derive his 'ought' from natural science, he is not a naturalist. He could do this in two ways: he could argue that pleasure is good, but that its goodness is not an object of natural science, or else he could independently claim that the oughtness that attaches to pleasure is not an object of natural science. In either case he is not a naturalist, and all hedonists I have encountered deny that their valuative/obligatory premises are the product of natural science.

I think you are misreading Moore's argument as overdetermined. The so-called "naturalistic fallacy" depends on his Open Question about the ambiguity of goodness. If that ambiguity fails then the fallacy charge also fails. — Leontiskos

There's an ambiguity in your proposition that "he could argue that pleasure is good". Are you saying that "this is good" means "this is pleasurable" or are you saying that pleasure happens to have the property of goodness? The former is naturalism, the latter is non-naturalism. I think it important not to get too caught up in the particular labels used. If you prefer, rather than use the labels "naturalism" and "non-naturalism" we can use the labels "Type X" and "Type Y".

The reason this distinction is important can be shown with the question I asked earlier:

Given that I believe that it is immoral to cause suffering, what follows if suffering is immoral and what follows if suffering is not immoral?

If "this is immoral" means "this causes suffering" then part of my question would contain a logical contradiction: my belief that it is immoral to cause suffering would be true by definition, and so we cannot even ask what would follow if that belief was false.

But if "this is immoral" doesn't mean "this causes suffering" then there is no such contradiction and so the question is coherent.

So for the sake of this discussion I am assuming non-naturalism (or if you prefer, "Type Y" moral theories): the propositions "this is immoral" and "this causes suffering" do not mean the same thing and the propositions "this is moral" and "this causes pleasure" do not mean the same thing.

Now given the assumption that "this is immoral" doesn't mean "this causes suffering", what does it mean to say that it is immoral to cause suffering? On some accounts we cannot define the proposition "it is immoral" in any simpler terms. However, given that such claims are intended to be normative, I am assuming that "this is immoral" just means "one ought not do this". At the very least this definition allows us to avoid having to explain why we ought not be immoral.

This then entails that the proposition "it is immoral to cause suffering" means "one ought not cause suffering" (and the proposition "it is moral to seek pleasure" means "one ought seek pleasure").

My question, then, is:

Given that I believe that one ought not cause suffering, what follows if it is a fact that one ought not cause suffering and what follows if it is not a fact that one ought not cause suffering?

The problem I see is that nothing follows in either case. The existence or non-existence of such obligations is inconsequential. It is true that if one ought not cause suffering and I cause suffering then I have done something I ought not, but so what? What is my motivation to obey obligations?

This is true only if you assume that people's beliefs about morality have nothing to do moral facts. But if people have the moral beliefs they do because of moral facts (at least in part)... — Count Timothy von Icarus

This isn't relevant to the argument I am making. Let's take this example:

Half of everyone believes that it is moral to eat meat and half of everyone believes that it is immoral to eat meat.

If it is a fact that it is moral to eat meat then those who believe that it is moral to eat meat do so because it is moral to eat meat, and those who believe that it is immoral to eat meat are, in some sense, delusional.

If it is a fact that it is immoral to eat meat then those who believe that it is immoral to eat meat do so because it is immoral to eat meat, and those who believe that it is moral to eat meat are, in some sense, delusional.

So this grants that moral facts can influence moral beliefs.

Now let's assume that everyone who believes that eating meat is moral eats meat and that everyone who believes that eating meat is immoral doesn't eat meat.

Half of everyone eats meat and half of everyone doesn't eat meat. Why does it matter if eating meat is immoral or not?

It's not the case that if it's immoral to eat meat then those who eat meat are going to suffer from some unwanted consequence as a result of their meat eating (or at least not any consequence that wouldn't also be a consequence even if it is moral to eat meat).

So why the motivation to be moral? There are no practical benefits, either for ourselves or for others. Is it entirely a matter of principle?

Isn't it begging to question to assume the correct moral beliefs are distributed such that being correct about them is a 50/50 proposition? The same seems true with assuming that those who commit immoral acts face no heightened risk of suffering due to later realizing they have acted immorally. It's assuming a scenario where false belief is as likely as true belief, which, if this was the case for all facts, should also make us question essentially everything. But this makes no sense for people who claim that at least some moral principles are more or less "self evident."

I suppose if you assume some sort of historical evolution of morality, e.g. some sort of fusion of this way of thinking with Hegelianism, it might make sense for most people to be wrong about some moral facts at some point, but there the difference made by morality in the world is going to inexorably play out for us in the long run.

So why the motivation to be moral? There are no practical benefits, either for ourselves or for others. Is it entirely a matter of principle?

Doesn't it make a difference to the person who knows they are doing something wrong? The consequences of this seem somewhat inescapable.

Also, consider that moral facts not being reducible to pleasure, suffering, etc. does not entail that they are not connected. There can be "natural" consequences of immoral acts without morality being constituted by these outcomes. It seems prima facie unreasonable to assume that everyone acting morally, as opposed to how they currently do, would have no positive benefits for people. But this is cleared up if "not reducible to," is not understood as "unrelated to."

But this is where the "non-natural," premise really starts to show its weakness IMO. If suffering is "natural" then it seems like the non-natural is ineluctably tied up in the natural, even if it is not reducible to it. It seems to me that this might make us question if they are truly two distinct types. But Moore is writing at a time where reductionism is a lot more popular, so maybe that explains his concern here, since it might be assumed that "natural = reducible."

Isn't it begging to question to assume the correct moral beliefs are distributed such that being correct about them is a 50/50 proposition? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm not saying that they are. 50% was just an example. If you prefer, we can reconsider my question using the actual apparent percentages (according to this):

22% of people believe that eating meat is immoral and 88% don't. Either some (or most or all) of the 22% believe what they do because eating meat is immoral or some (or most or all) of the 88% believe what they do because eating meat is moral.

Why does it matter who is right? The consequences of eating meat (or not eating meat) are the same whether eating meat is immoral or not.

The same seems true with assuming that those who commit immoral acts face no heightened risk of suffering due to later realizing they have acted immorally. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The same is also true of someone who is falsely convinced that they have acted immorally. So it isn't the fact that they have acted immorally that has caused them to suffer but the belief that they have acted immorally that has caused them to suffer. It makes no difference to their suffering if their belief is true or false.

There can be "natural" consequences of immoral acts without morality being constituted by these outcomes. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, but my point is that the immorality of that act is irrelevant. The natural consequences of that act would be the same even if that act wasn't immoral.

The same is also true of someone who is falsely convinced that they have acted immorally. In which case it isn't the fact that they have acted immorally that has caused them to suffer but the belief that they have acted immorally that has caused them to suffer.

This would seem to apply to almost anything. E.g., it's not my wife cheating on me that makes me unhappy, but my belief that she has been unfaithful. It wasn't her being unfaithful that convinced me of this, but my mental perceptions of her being unfaithful when I came home early from work one day. Likewise, I don't take antibiotics because they will cure my infection, but because I believe they will cure my infection.

However, a full analysis would show that I believe antibiotics will cure my infection because they will actually cure my infection, that I think my wife cheated on my because she actually cheated on me, etc. The possibility of false beliefs here doesn't negate this connection if there are ways to come to true beliefs. If beliefs are properly related to facts, including moral facts, I don't see an issue here.

However, a full analysis would show that I believe antibiotics will cure my infection because they will actually cure my infection, that I think my wife cheated on my because she actually cheated on me, etc. The possibility of false beliefs here doesn't negate this connection if there are ways to come to true beliefs. If beliefs are properly related to facts, including moral facts, I don't see an issue here. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I address this in the first part of my post:

22% of people believe that eating meat is immoral and 88% don't. Either some (or most or all) of the 22% believe what they do because eating meat is immoral or some (or most or all) of the 88% believe what they do because eating meat is moral.

I am accepting, for the sake of argument, that whoever is right believes what they do because of the moral facts.

What I want to know is why it matters who is right?

It matters if antibiotics can cure my infection because if they can then if I take them then I won't die. But why does it matter if eating meat is immoral?

Perhaps I can make this easier. Assume, for the sake of argument, that everybody knows with irrefutable certainty that it is immoral to kill wild animals for food. Assume also that we are a fully libertarian society that does not punish people (whether legally or socially) for doing things that they ought not do (except where their actions bring harm to other people).

I know with irrefutable certainty that I ought not kill wild animals for food. I also know that I will not be punished or shunned for killing wild animals for food.

Why does it matter that I ought not kill wild animals for food? What is my motivation to be moral? Perhaps I simply don't care that I ought not kill wild animals for food; I'm going to do it anyway because I like the taste of meat.

What is my motivation to be moral? — Michael

You might be concerned about whether your existence makes the world better or worse.

You might be concerned about whether your existence makes the world better or worse. — frank

I'm concerned about promoting happiness and reducing suffering. I don't care whether happiness or suffering is moral or not.

I'm concerned about promoting happiness and reducing suffering. I don't care whether happiness or suffering is moral or not. — Michael

If you were a Roman stoic, you would say the latter is tied up in the former. What is the cultural framework within which you're using the word "moral?" You have to have some sort of context, otherwise it's language on holiday.

If you were a Roman stoic, you would say the latter is tied up in the former. What is the cultural framework within which you're using the word "moral?" You have to have some sort of context, otherwise it's language on holiday. — frank

I'm not working under any cultural framework. I am assuming, for the sake of argument, that Moore's ethical non-naturalism is correct: that "this is immoral" doesn't mean "this causes suffering". As such it isn't a truism that suffering is immoral.

I'm not working under any cultural framework. I am assuming, for the sake of argument, that Moore's ethical non-naturalism is correct: that "this is immoral" doesn't mean "this causes suffering". As such, it isn't a truism that suffering is immoral. — Michael

You have to have some sort of framework or context for the usage, otherwise there isn't any meaning to your expression. You could just be a hard deflationist about it, so you think the word serves a social function, but otherwise has no meaning. Is that how you mean it? Or what?

You have to have some sort of framework or context for the usage, otherwise there isn't any meaning to your expression. — frank

Then "this is immoral" means "one ought not do this".

I don't care if I ought or ought not promote happiness or if I ought or ought not cause suffering. I'm going to promote happiness and not cause suffering either way.

I don't care if I ought or ought not promote happiness or if I ought or ought not cause suffering. I'm going to promote happiness and not cause suffering either way. — Michael

So there are ideological contexts in which that doesn't make any sense. What you can do is invite others to accept your context. You aren't presenting an argument that requires that they do so.

For instance, a Calvinist will say the only reason for being moral is to glorify God. It doesn't guarantee you entrance into heaven, or anything else. You aren't presenting an argument that shows that it's wrong to look at things that way.

@Michael - Good post.

There's an ambiguity in your proposition that "he could argue that pleasure is good". Are you saying that "this is good" means "this is pleasurable" or are you saying that pleasure happens to have the property of goodness? The former is naturalism, the latter is non-naturalism. — Michael

Yes, I realize there is an ambiguity, and I'm glad you brought this up. As I alluded to @Hanover, if the conception of goodness is monistic then we either assume that one ought do what is good and we simply end up arguing about what 'good' is, or else it is not assumed that one ought do what is good and the focus on goodness is a red herring. But neither of these necessarily involves making morality the product of natural science. Pluralistic notions of good similarly have nothing to do with non-naturalism.

I think it important not to get too caught up in the particular labels used. If you prefer, rather than use the labels "naturalism" and "non-naturalism" we can use the labels "Type X" and "Type Y". — Michael

Okay, good.

Given that I believe that it is immoral to cause suffering, what follows if suffering is immoral and what follows if suffering is not immoral?

If "this is immoral" means "this causes suffering" then part of my question would contain a logical contradiction: my belief that it is immoral to cause suffering would be true by definition, and so we cannot even ask what would follow if that belief was false. — Michael

Agreed.

But if "this is immoral" doesn't mean "this causes suffering" then there is no such contradiction and so the question is coherent. — Michael

Coherent but still confused. This is the better question:

Now given the assumption that "this is immoral" doesn't mean "this causes suffering", what does it mean to say that it is immoral to cause suffering? — Michael

The difference between these two questions is a very important part of this thread. One question pertains to implications, another to reasons. That suffering is moral/immoral implies that causing suffering is permissible/impermissible. But the second question presumably asks why it is immoral to cause suffering. You want to know how to answer the second question on a Moorean ethics, namely an ethics that possesses no definition of what is moral or good. In my opinion the crux of this Moorean account is this lack of a definition, not opposition to reductionism (or opposition to naturalism, either).

On some accounts we cannot define the proposition "it is immoral" in any simpler terms. However, given that such claims are intended to be normative, I am assuming that "this is immoral" just means "one ought not do this". At the very least this definition allows us to avoid having to explain why we ought not be immoral.

This then entails that the proposition "it is immoral to cause suffering" means "one ought not cause suffering" (and the proposition "it is moral to seek pleasure" means "one ought seek pleasure"). — Michael

So if someone says it is immoral to cause suffering they mean that one ought not cause suffering, but this does not tell us anything about whether they are a Moorean or a reductionist (a "Type X" or a "Type Y"). That question depends on the "why."

There are other conceptual problems at play, here. The good and the moral are not the same thing, and Moore is concerned with goodness. Second, "it is moral" does not mean "one ought seek pleasure." It usually means, "the seeking of pleasure is permissible." Morality has three categories: impermissible, permissible, and obligatory (and arguably a fourth: non-obligatory). In any case, you are problematically trying to shoehorn morality into a binary scheme where the impermissible is the contradictory of the obligatory, and this is mistaken.

Given that I believe that one ought not cause suffering, what follows if it is a fact that one ought not cause suffering and what follows if it is not a fact that one ought not cause suffering?

The problem I see is that nothing follows in either case. The existence or non-existence of such obligations is inconsequential. It is true that if one ought not cause suffering and I cause suffering then I have done something I ought not, but so what? What is my motivation to obey obligations? — Michael

Good: motivation. A motivation and "what follows" are not the same, unless we are consequentialists. These are two separate questions, and they cannot be conflated. Anglo philosophy has been trying to fight the hegemony of consequentialism for almost a century now.

Here is how I want to phrase your project:

1. The moral is either monistic or pluriform
2. If it is monistic then it must respond to Moore's open question
3. If it is pluriform, then what is the reason or motivation for moral obligations?

And this is actually what I think is the more accurate version:

1. The moral is either defined or undefined
2. If it is defined then it must respond to Moore's open question
3. If it is undefined, then what is the reason or motivation for moral obligations?

You are interested in (3). As far as I'm concerned, you are Socrates, inquiring into the form of the good, desiring an account instead of examples.

(Note well that I chose to use "moral" instead of "good," and that this could become a problem.)