The idea of 'causation' presupposes time, because a cause is defined as prior to its effect, and causation is a temporal process.

Therefore, it makes no sense to posit a cause of time, as that would necessitate a time before time, which is a contradiction. The idea of causation has a field of application within the universe and cannot be applied beyond it as in a "cause of the universe".

Thus notions of 'a being' 'outside time and space' 'acting' to 'create' are all allegorical and cannot be taken literally. Events happen eventually in time, and events outside of time are ... hush, nothing can be said at all.

The idea of 'causation' presupposes time, because a cause is defined as prior to its effect, and causation is a temporal process. — unenlightened

The bowling ball causes the depression in the cushion.

Cause is not always prior to effect. Indeed sometimes it is impossible to decide which event is the cause and which the result.

There was more than just quantum weirdness in the thread cited.

The reasoning demonstrates that even an infinite regress falls into a finite regress of causality.
— Philosophim

Why is that? I'm a little slow today — jgill

That's the OP. Basically if you state that everything has a cause, you either get to the point where you you have the potential for a finite chain of causality, or an infinite regress. The point is that if you take the entire set of the infinite regress and ask, "What caused it to be an infinite regress?" you realize that's the finite end. It simply is, there's no prior explanation for its being.

Meh. Causality is not found in formal logic.

Certainly not in modal logic.

A first cause is not logically necessary. — Banno

Its found in the logic of the OP. And yes, its concluded that if causality exists, there is a first cause. Feel free to show why its wrong, I would be happy to see if someone can poke a hole in it! I summed it above to jgill. Feel free to ask any questions for clarity on the OP.

We know some things don't (have causality). That ought be enough to put this to rest. — Banno

That would confirm my point actually. Something that does not have a prior cause is a first cause. What examples were you thinking about?

But logic in general is our best tool to analyze whether ideas fit in with the nature of existence as we know it. — Philosophim

this only begs the question. Even if "our" best tool required a first cause, then that would only mean that "our" best tool required a first cause. There is no basis for asserting that being or the "nature of existence" (whatever that means) must conform to "our" best tools.

Being is still not required to conform to logic even if logic is "our" best tool.

A first cause is not logically necessary. — Banno

I agree. But that does not mean a first clause is precluded.

this only begs the question. Being is still not required to conform to logic even if logic is "our" best tool. — Arne

If you think existence does not follow logic, that's fine. But if you follow logic, its still logically necessary. I even noted that a first cause has no explanation for its being, it simply is. Even with that, it becomes logically necessary. This is not about your opinion. Can you demonstrate that the argument itself is flawed? Please respond showing a contradiction or flaw in the OP, not an assertion that does not reference the OP in any way.

Look at the logic I point out about being — Philosophim

I looked at your OP several times and it is void of your understanding of "being" and "nature of existence".

The notion of such a thing as a "logic of being" is interesting but hardly self explanatory. Many are likely to share an understanding of "logic" while not sharing an understanding of "being".

Simply put, there is nothing in your OP that explains your understanding of "being" and how your understanding of being and your understanding of logic are related.

but it is when we look at the logic of being
— Philosophim

Seriously, what is "the logic of being"? — Arne

Look at the logic I point out about being. Look at the OP and the actual argument. Opinions without referencing the argument are just assertions of one's own opinion. I'm interested in discussing the logic, not personal opinions.

nature of existence — Philosophim

What does that even mean? What do you mean by "existence"?

nature of existence
— Philosophim

What does that even mean? What do you mean by "existence"? — Arne

Please read the entire OP. That's just an introduction. The details are in reading the rest. Feel free to ask me again if after reading the entire thing, you do not understand. Lets have an honest discussion please.

@Philosophim

I would like to just make a suggestion, reading through this OP for the second time I realized you don't seem to be actually claiming a first cause is logically necessary: instead, it is from the idea that all the options lead to a first cause based off of empirical claims. So, I would suggest, to avoid confusion, amending the title. There is nothing in your OP that proves that the logic itself necessitates a first cause, and I think this is the issue for most people reading your OP for the first time, like @Banno, because they are immediately misguided by the title. Thusly, Banno is absolutely right in pointing out that a first cause is not logically necessary because logic does not necessitate anything empirical; and Philosophim is perfectly right in pointing out that this critique completely sidesteps the actual argument.

Just food for thought (:

I would like to just make a suggestion, reading through this OP for the second time I realized you don't seem to be actually claiming a first cause is logically necessary: instead, it is from the idea that all the options lead to a first cause based off of empirical claims. — Bob Ross

I appreciate the suggestion Bob, but I don't think I use any empirical claims. In fact, when we spoke about this last time I believe the point you noted was despite the logic of the claims, you were one of the only people who noted we lacked empirical fact to back it. I agreed with you then and still do today. The claim is not that it is empirically necessary that there be a first cause, but logically based off of the definition of a first cause vs an infinitely regressive cause.

Just to be sure, I'm offering more than just that. The notion of cause being used is broken.

There's the classic philosophical assault from Russell in On The Notion Of Cause, in which he argues that 'the word "cause" is so inextricably bound up with misleading associations as to make its complete extrusion from the philosophical vocabulary desirable'.

There's the more recent, and perhaps more influential, Causality and Determination from Anscombe.

There's also various criticisms of determinism and causation from within physics, such as in Has physics ever been deterministic?

And then least of all the undermining of causation in quantum accounts.

In addition, the very notion in the OP that something is cause to exist is problematic in logical terms. In classical logic things pretty much either exist or they do not; their existence is guaranteed by the domain of discourse. The special existential predicate "∃!" requires it's own special variant.

Finally, the structure of the argument in the OP is quite unclear.

I'm going to hold you to a higher standard than others in the forum Banno, as I know you're well versed.

The notion of cause being used is broken. — Banno

If you believe that, indicate in the OP where or why something is broken. Generic references to papers are not a discussion, nor do they indicate whether or not you read and understood the OP's use of causality.

In addition, the very notion in the OP that something is cause to exist is problematic in logical terms. In classical logic things pretty much either exist or they do not; their existence is guaranteed by the domain of discourse. The special existential predicate "∃!" requires it's own special variant. — Banno

This is not problematic in terms of logic at all.

1. A causes B

This is a proposition that is either true or false.

Finally, the structure of the argument in the OP is quite unclear. — Banno

This is the only legitimate point made so far. I wrote this a while ago and it may be unclear, that's true. At what point do you need some guidance or clarity?

The fuse burning down, or at some point the burning fuse and the explosion occurring at the same time. — tim wood

Certainly there is examining causality within a slice of time, then examining prior causality, which involves time. The OP is covering causality. Choose your favorite time measurement, be that second, minutes, hours, etc.

And I am under the impression that scientists do not concern themselves much with cause-and-effect except either informally or when they know exactly what they mean — tim wood

No, causality is a staple of science. There are debates over what causality is in philosophy of science, but it is still used and understood fairly clearly in science proper.

I appreciate the suggestion Bob, but I don't think I use any empirical claims. In fact, when we spoke about this last time I believe the point you noted was despite the logic of the claims, you were one of the only people who noted we lacked empirical fact to back it. I agreed with you then and still do today. The claim is not that it is empirically necessary that there be a first cause, but logically based off of the definition of a first cause vs an infinitely regressive cause.

I apologize: I mis-re-read it: nevermind! I re-read it again and, yes, this is purporting that a first cause (an ‘alpha) is logically necessary, since the form of the argument is that there are 3 exhaustive options (A, B, and C) and both A and B entail C, so C is logically necessary.

I really should not indulge myself in this OP while we have two pending discussions going, but I can’t help it (:

Let me just ask: what sense of the term ‘cause’ is being used here? It doesn’t seem to be physical causality but, rather, mere explanation: am I remembering correctly?

If it is ‘cause’ in the looser sense of ‘having a reason for its existence’, then my worry is that your concept of an ‘infinite causality’ presupposes that we can validly quantify it into one ‘thing’ (to then ask of it what reason it has for its existence): I don’t think someone who denies a ‘first cause’ in this sense would agree to that. They would say that the reasons are themselves an infinite chain, an absolute infinity, such that each time you bundle up the current ‘thing’ (into a ‘thing’) and ask for a reason for its existence you can always do that for the next one and so on. Now, I would imagine your response is that we can abstract that absolute infinity such that it would have no reason for its existence, but this crucially misapprehends the concept of an ‘absolute infinity’ which has been presented, since if it existed then your abstraction of it into one thing would be impossible.

then examining prior causality, — Philosophim

And what exactly is prior causality? Whatever it is it cannot be causality, unless "prior" is meaningless. And not being causality, then what is it?

Two examples. Revisiting mine with the dynamite. In one sense we might say that the burning fuse causes the dynamite to explode when the burn and the explosion occur at the same time in the same place in the same instant. And this makes sense for the reasons listed above. Or, I light the fuse, run and shelter behind a rock, and in a short time the dynamite explodes, and I caused it. Or, I need a stump removed and hire a man to use dynamite to remove it, which he does, and again I caused the dynamite to explode. Or I negligently leave the dynamite in a shed where it deteriorates and explodes, and again I caused it.

Second example, not original with me. A car turns over on a highway; what caused it? A road engineer might say the angle of the road camber caused the accident. Another might say road conditions caused it. Another, excessive speed. Another that the suspension on the car is responsible. And so it goes. And in passing that is why I claim scientists talk about cause and effect either only informally, or when as a term of art they know exactly what they mean.

Informally, of course, it makes sense to suppose that cause-and-effect are at work in the world. It certainly makes for simple descriptions and understandings. But looked at closely and I am not even sure the notion is coherent. It seems reasonable, then, before claims are made about first causes or any causes, that the person making the claim do the hard work of laying out an laying bare exactly what they mean by cause, and that not-so-easy to do.

The idea of 'causation' presupposes time, because a cause is defined as prior to its effect, and causation is a temporal process. — unenlightened


The bowling ball causes the depression in the cushion.

Cause is not always prior to effect. Indeed sometimes it is impossible to decide which event is the cause and which the result. — Banno

This will be fully dependent on what is interpreted by the term “causation”. That causation expressed in the phrase, “my aim of expressing the ideas of this post was the cause of me writing the words in this sentence,” is not today taken by most philosophers and scientists to be a valid instantiation of causation—even though it is a valid form of Aristotle’s final causation in his framing of causal pluralism. And even though the expressed sentence makes cogent sense (just as much as does the statement of a ball causing a cushion’s depression).

I'll argue that Kant’s rebuttal to Hume in claiming that simultaneous causation occurs in many instances of efficient causation—which the ball and cushion example epitomizes—misses the entire point of what efficient causation is supposed to be. Here’s one reputable source’s definition:

The efficient cause or that which is given in reply to the question: “Where does change (or motion) come from?”. What is singled out in the answer is the whence of change (or motion). — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-causality/#FourCaus

There is no motion or change taking place in a bowling ball’s state of rest atop a depressed cushion. Hence, here, there can be no efficient cause to an effect (of change or motion), for no such effect occurs.

Then again, the ball’s being in a state of rest on the cushion causes the cushion’s given curvature just as much as the cushion’s given curvature causes the ball to be in a state of rest. Both are equally viable from their different, respective vantages of interest. Here, then, the ball's state of rest on the cushion is a simultaneous cause and effect in relation to the cushion's given curvature, which is also a simultaneous effect of and cause to the former. This relationship, then, produces so much havoc in our understandings of (efficient) causation as to render the term useless and, thereby, meaningless.

Here is one possible alternative understanding of how the resting ball causes the cushion’s depression: teleologically, rather than efficiently. In short, the ball’s set of teloi (including that end of being optimally proximate to Earth’s center) interacts with the far more malleable cushions’ set of teloi so as to result in an equilibrium wherein the ball is at rest and the cushion is depressed. This equilibrium (which, of itself, is changeless) is thereby teleologically caused by the ball just as much as it is by the cushion—this since it results from an interaction between both teloi-driven things. Utterly foreign to our modern ears, but in no way illogical.

As @unenlightened specified, for efficient causation to hold, the occurrence of the cause will then need extend prior to the occurrence of the effect—which does not happen in the ball and cushion example. With this traditional understanding of efficient causation, however, one can then validly affirm that, “the person letting the bowling ball slip from their hands (efficiently) caused the change in the form of the cushion that lied just underneath,” for the first occurrence as (efficient) cause extends prior to the time-span of the second occurrence as effect (despite the teleology previously mentioned remaining intact—to here not address the formal and material causes which could also be argued to occur). And, from a different vantage, one can then also validly affirm that “the cushion’s placement caused the falling bowling ball to come to its specific state of rest” for, here again, the cushion’s placement, as cause, necessarily extends prior to the bowling ball’s state of rest as effect.

But, again, a ball resting atop of cushion does not efficiently cause the cushion’s depression. This for the same reasons that change in temperature does not efficiently cause change in barometric pressure.

Since this issue of causality is of interest to me, I’m curious to see what disagreements there might be with the just expressed.

------

To contribute to the OP: where there to be no disagreements, this would then make the argument expressed in ’s post quite valid.

Here is my contribution:

First of all, it seems to me that to raise the possibility of a first cause one must start from a simple entity [non-composite: since if it is composite we cannot speak of a cause in the singular but of causes in the plural].

Secondly, the creation of the world [as an effect] must be treated as a binary relationship Where A causes B. More than two make several causes, and not a single cause.

Thirdly, this binary relationship must be understood as creation from nothing [as God is supposed to have created the universe from nothing: Creatio ex nihilo]. Since if there were a thing B affected by a thing A, B would have to be presupposed coexisting with A.

Fourthly, the first cause cannot be a single thing differentiating itself (monism) or being the cause of itself. That destroys the difference between cause and effect. The creator and the created.

_______________________________

So:

How can the first cause affect nothingness to produce the world?

Can not. Ex nihilo nihil fit.

From my point of view, what we call causality in its minimum expression is the power of an agent A to affect a thing B, achieving an effect C [but there can be more agents A, and more things B. And C can be a third thing itself or C as B altered by A]. Three elements are necessary for there to be a causal relationship. Consequently, we cannot say that a first cause has caused the world as if one thing A had created a second thing B distinct from it without the intervention of a pre-existing B already to produce C. Taking an analogy as an example, It is as if somehow a mother A gives birth C without the need for a man B, or a sperm, etc [And not only that but also as saying that the father , or the sperm, is created by the Mother] . And if someone argues that a cell can divide itself, it must be pointed out that it is because a cell is a composite thing, and there is a causality inside that is also tripartite.

Conclusion: The notion of first cause can only consist of creatio ex nihilo [Something affecting nothingness]. But that is merely irrational.

Let's not forget that in Aristotelian philosophy, the final cause of a match is a fire. This is because the lighting of fires is the reason matches exist. IN this sense, the 'final cause' of the existence of something is also one of the reasons for its existence, even if it is temporally later than the thing it is the cause for. With the abandonment of teleology in Western philosophy, that may be something important that has been forgotten.

Cause is not always prior to effect — Banno

In that case, though it presumably is. The cushion had no depression prior to the introduction of the bowling ball. Unless it did, in which case the bowling ball did not cause it. A brick lying amid the shattered glass and nothing moving, need not deceive us into imagining that the chucked brick did not cause the window to break. And we understand that an explosion is a causal sequence of reactions that cause each other very fast so as to produce a cumulative effect, which we treat as one momentary affair for convenience.

sometimes it is impossible to decide which event is the cause and which the result. — Banno

Then in such a case there is no objection being made to what I said, except that sometimes it is impossible to see things clearly.

The priority is acknowledged in the very search for a first cause and not a first effect. But it is a mistaken search because it looks beyond the realm of causation for a cause of causation. Or else it attempts to derive a feature of existence from the logic of talk, an even more erroneous effort. Kant tried, but Hume rules!

With this traditional understanding of efficient causation, however, one can then validly affirm that, “the person letting the bowling ball slip from their hands (efficiently) caused the change in the form of the cushion that lied just underneath,” for the first occurrence as (efficient) cause extends prior to the time-span of the second occurrence as effect (despite the teleology previously mentioned remaining intact—to here not address the formal and material causes which could also be argued to occur). — javra

Teleology is perfectly well accounted for if it is simply understood that the intended result is imagined in the mind. Thus it is not the effect that precedes the cause, but the imagination. I put my key in the door because I imagine it will unlock it. But the cause of my imagination is that it did so yesterday, not that it will do so today. Someone may have squirted glue into the lock.

As to quantum weirdness, it may turn out that causation as we experience it is a statistical effect of the large scale of our experiences, and the minutiae of the world work by weirdness - superposition, entanglement, spooky action at a distance or time travel. But the result of whatever it is, is that keys tend to work locks unless they have been glued up or rusted or broken or the wrong key is used, and minds tend to exploit such regularities of the universe and call it 'causation'.

Various quantum effects, for a start. — Banno

That the cause is unknown to us does not imply that there is no cause.

In general, this is the problem with free will, and intention, as "cause", we do not properly know this type of causation, but this does not imply that we can exclude intention as a cause

The bowling ball causes the depression in the cushion. — Banno

The bowling ball example is a misrepresentation. Since there is not an action described, only a static object, "the bowling ball", there is not the premise required to say that the ball causes anything. It is always an activity of an object which is causal. We do however assign causal capacity to objects in the case of intentional acts, final cause, when "the object" is an intentional being. In this case we say that the act which is causal, comes from within the intentional being itself.

Cause is not always prior to effect. Indeed sometimes it is impossible to decide which event is the cause and which the result. — Banno

This makes no sense. Whenever it is impossible to determine which is prior, we can conclude that it is impossible to determine which is the cause and which is the effect. There is no premise to allow us to conclude that in cases where we cannot determine which event is prior, and which is posterior, we can conclude that the cause is posterior to the effect.

I apologize: I mis-re-read it: nevermind! I re-read it again and, yes, this is purporting that a first cause (an ‘alpha) is logically necessary, since the form of the argument is that there are 3 exhaustive options (A, B, and C) and both A and B entail C, so C is logically necessary.

I really should not indulge myself in this OP while we have two pending discussions going, but I can’t help it (: — Bob Ross

Ha ha! Not a worry! I am always glad to have you in any discussion Bob. I understand the passion.

Let me just ask: what sense of the term ‘cause’ is being used here? It doesn’t seem to be physical causality but, rather, mere explanation: am I remembering correctly? — Bob Ross

Its about 'Why does X exist? Because Y happened a second prior.'

And what exactly is prior causality? — tim wood

Great descriptions tim wood! Lets add some specifications to causality. Measured causality vs total causality. Total causality includes everything everywhere in a all possible time positions that ultimately had a hand in determining the outcome of some X. That is largely unknowable.

But just like a line is 'infinite' we can measure it by feet. Measurable causality is when we put restrictions such as 'time'. The only restriction I'm putting on causality here is time, and that there is something else besides the existence itself that causes the existence to be at any particular time slice. It doesn't matter to me how many other sources are involved in creating X. In fact, my theory does not state that there cannot be multiple first causes, nor that first causes and entities that have prior causality cannot mix.

So then there are two options. Either everything is caused by something else than itself at a prior time slice, or we reach a point in which something exists that is not explained by something prior that is not itself. This first is caused, the second is a first cause, or something that has no prior explanation for its existence.

Since we cannot know the full specific chain of measurable causality, we can use sets. A set containing a first cause would simply go down the chain of causality until we reached a first cause. So we can take your dynamite example and start with one of the reasons you lit the dynamite was because three days ago somebody cut you off. I'm using the more absurd example to demonstrate that it doesn't matter where in the chain we start the measurement. Out of all the causes that lead up to the other man cutting you off, we choose one, then examine that. Choose one, then examine that, and so on. In a finite causality set, eventually we get to a point where our selection has no prior causality. This is a first cause.

So now lets examine an infinite set. Here we capture the set of infinite causality. However, there is still one question left within the set. What caused existence to have infinite causality? There is nothing prior and outside of the set, therefore this is a first cause. There is no outside reason or explanation for its existence, it simply is. As such, no matter the situation, everything always boils down to there being a first cause, or a point of existence which cannot be explained by anything prior and outside of itself.

First of all, it seems to me that to raise the possibility of a first cause one must start from a simple entity [non-composite: since if it is composite we cannot speak of a cause in the singular but of causes in the plural].

Secondly, the creation of the world [as an effect] must be treated as a binary relationship Where A causes B. More than two make several causes, and not a single cause.

Thirdly, this binary relationship must be understood as creation from nothing [as God is supposed to have created the universe from nothing: Creatio ex nihilo]. Since if there were a thing B affected by a thing A, B would have to be presupposed coexisting with A.

Fourthly, the first cause cannot be a single thing differentiating itself (monism) or being the cause of itself. That destroys the difference between cause and effect. The creator and the created. — JuanZu

Perfect except for one thing. A first cause does not necessitate that it is a 'creator'. A creator would be a complex conscious being with intention. I am not arguing that here at all. I'm just noting that there must exist at least one first cause, which does not require consciousness.

How can the first cause affect nothingness to produce the world?

Can not. Ex nihilo nihil fit. — JuanZu

Agreed. Something cannot create another from 'nothing'. The chain of causality demonstrates this. Once there is 'nothing' prior to there being something, that something is called a first cause. Now, there is a logic as to what is possible within a first cause, but that's not what this argument is about. Its just noting that there logically must be at least one first cause. If you agree with the logic here and want to discuss what that potentially means, I posted it here. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12847/if-a-first-cause-is-logically-necessary-what-does-that-entail-for-the-universes-origins/p1

I had to divide it up because people got caught up on the later logic without understanding the former logic here.

But not physically necessary! — Vaskane

Not that I disagree, but what do you mean by this? This is more of a cheerleader quote, we should back why we're cheering something. :)

With mischievous playfulness/smart assed remarks. — Vaskane

Ha ha! An honest troll with a sense of humor? You made me crack a smile over here. Genuinely, have a good day!

The problem I see is that we are talking about reasons for things existing, and so if we posit that reasons themselves are an infinite series, then it is incoherent to ask "what is the reason for that infinite series of reasons?" since that reason would actually be a part of that infinite series and not outside of it.