I think the analogy to water breaks down because water just is that arrangement; it is that physical thing. On a physicalist ontology it is acceptable. Because oxygen and hydrogen and water are all physical things, it makes sense, in principle at least, how O and H could form H2O.

Not so with consciousness.

Why?

Because, again, consciousness is not a physical thing. I am happy to grant that, physically speaking, there are entire organisms, there are atoms, there are neurons and brains, etc. But where in the physical world is consciousness? Answer: it's not there, it is nowhere to be found in the physical world. So how does something physical (brains neurons etc.) cause/result in/produce something non-physical (and in a very limited circumstance)?

Because, again, consciousness is not a physical thing. I am happy to grant that, physically speaking, there are entire organisms, there are atoms, there are neurons and brains, etc. But where in the physical world is consciousness? Answer: it's not there, it is nowhere to be found in the physical world. — NotAristotle

Of course its a physical thing. You're conscious right? Are you a physical thing? I honestly find it bizarre that people think otherwise, and I don't quite understand it. The water analogy is EXACTLY the same thing. You not wanting to believe it does not deny the three points I wrote. Answer at least one of those and you have a point. Otherwise, its just a wish or desire, not a fact.

To assume that I am both conscious and just a physical thing and then to conclude that consciousness is just a physical thing would surely be begging the question.

To assume that I am both conscious and just a physical thing and then to conclude that consciousness is just a physical thing would surely be begging the question. — NotAristotle

Not to speak for @Philosophim, but I treat it as a working hypothesis, and wonder whether you can present any falsifying evidence (while not expecting you to be able to do so).

Spend enough time with such a perspective and it becomes like waiting for people to present evidence that the Earth is flat.

What of your own question begging?

Because, again, consciousness is not a physical thing. — NotAristotle

I too think that consciousness is likely a physical (specifically, biological) phenomenon, but we're being awfully sloppy here, in our talk about what "makes" a physical thing. Consider: Is Sherlock Holmes a physical thing? Everything that could possibly be said to comprise him is physical, but what about SH himself? I find it bizarre and counter-intuitive to say that SH, and any other World 3* phenomenon, must be called physical simply because a physical system produces it.

Again, I don't think this applies to consciousness. I just want to be careful about assuming physicalist truisms.


*From Popper: products or objects of thought, as separated from any given instance of that thought.

...but we're being awfully sloppy here... — J

Agreed, I was thinking as I wrote that previous post, that if the discussion were to get serious, I'd have to do a fair bit of clarification. For example, I don't consider consciousness to be a thing but rather a process.

Still, in light of the scientific evidence on the side of physicalists it seemed worth bringing up the question of why it is physicalists that are supposed to have the burden of proof.

Just what is 'a physical thing'? And what is it about consciousness (or acts of thought) that can be described as physical? According to one source, what is physical is what resists our will - it resists being pushed or lifted, requiring physical energy to do so. But how can (for example) the relationship between ideas be described as physical? Say, an inductive argument - if A, then B. How could the cogency of any such argument be described in physical terms? (This is also discussed in the thread Physical Causation and Logical Necessity.) Did the law of the excluded middle come into being as a consequence of evolution? Surely not - what came into being was our capacity to recognise it. And a great deal of the basic 'furniture of reason' can be understood in those terms - they're not the products of biology, but can only be understood by a sufficiently sophisticated intelligence, which h. sapiens possesses. That's why I'm sceptical of biological reductionism with respect to reason (also the subject of Thomas Nagel's essay, Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion.)

In my view, the impulse behind physicalism in respect of consciousness, is mainly cultural in origin, in that our culture has undermined or disposed of the alternatives to physicalism, mainly as a consequence of Descartes' construal of res cogitans as 'thinking thing', an oxymoronic term. Whereas a thinking being is something else altogether. Which is why various forms of Aristotelian hylomorphism are making a comeback.

Well said, and Nagel is great on this.

Just what is 'a physical thing'? — Wayfarer

Maybe I'm missing the boat, but when we say "physical" I think we mean things like atoms, brains, neurons, entire organisms, and so on. If consciousness is physical in the same way as the things I've just listed, then SH must be entirely physical, mustn't he? Because Sherlock Holmes would just be his brain, arms, consciousness etc.

↪Philosophim To assume that I am both conscious and just a physical thing and then to conclude that consciousness is just a physical thing would surely be begging the question. — NotAristotle

In classical rhetoric and logic, begging the question or assuming the conclusion (Latin: petītiō principiī) is an informal fallacy that occurs when an argument's premises assume the truth of the conclusion. -https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Begging_the_question

I have presented clear evidence and asked you to address one of three points that would bring some evidence for your claim that consciousness is not a physical thing. I am not begging the question, you are. If you believe it is true that consciousness is not physical, please demonstrate it.

I too think that consciousness is likely a physical (specifically, biological) phenomenon, but we're being awfully sloppy here, in our talk about what "makes" a physical thing. Consider: Is Sherlock Holmes a physical thing? Everything that could possibly be said to comprise him is physical, but what about SH himself? I find it bizarre and counter-intuitive to say that SH, and any other World 3* phenomenon, must be called physical simply because a physical system produces it. — J

Fantastic point. The definition of "What is physical" is paramount for any discussion, and can lead to disagreements of context instead of intent" I consider the physical universe to be matter and energy. Thoughts are physical, and this is backed by studies of the brain. Remove the neurons and the chemical communication; you can't have thought.

"What is Sherlock Holmes?" is a question loaded with implicit details. So we make it simple and state, "What is Sherlock Holmes as an idea?" Its a physical thought that describes a fictional brilliant detective who has some drug and anti-social issues. We have the capability as intelligent beings to create a imagined scenario within the world. Its very similar to your computer code processing things, then ultimately displaying a process on your monitor. The code can process things that could not be displayed on the TV (reality), but when it wants to display on the TV it has to follow the physical limitations of the monitor. All of it is physical.

What of your own question begging?

Because, again, consciousness is not a physical thing.
— NotAristotle — wonderer1

I think my argument is something like this:

If consciousness is physical then consciousness can be accounted for in physical terms.
But consciousness cannot be accounted for in physical terms.
Therefore, consciousness is not physical.

What about that argument is question-begging?

Thoughts are physical, and this is backed by studies of the brain. — Philosophim

However, physical studies of the brain invariably fail to capture the subjective dimension of existence. In other words, this claim entirely overlooks the original point of this thread. Likewise, thought-contents, such as the meaning of propositions, can be represented in many different languages, systems, configurations of ideas, all the while retaining their meaning, demonstrating that their meaning is independent of the physical forms they take (a form of the 'multiple realisability' argument - see this ChatGPT dialogue).

However, physical studies of the brain invariably fail to capture the subjective dimension of existence. In other words, this claim entirely overlooks the original point of this thread. — Wayfarer

No, I'm not contrasting what I stated earlier. I agree. It is impossible to objectively capture subjective experience.

Likewise, thought-contents, such as the meaning of propositions, can be represented in many different languages, systems, configurations of ideas, all the while retaining their meaning, — Wayfarer

And all of these are physical things. "Hi" and "Olah" both mean a greeting with the physical difference of intonation and spelling. They do not exists as some platonic form out there in a sub-space. I can translate base ten into base 2, and it exists in base 2 with its own set of particular laws. It is equivalent in many ways, but different in the physical implementation of the system.

Right, that's the problem. It's a kind of reductio ad absurdum, because we know that SH can't be all those things, since he doesn't exist in the material world in the same way that you or I do. So that would seem to suggest that consciousness, if it's a physical process, can create phenomena that aren't physical. This is part of what makes the hard problem so hard.

There is the case of psycho-somatic medicine and the placebo effect, wherein subjects beliefs and emotional states have physical consequences. — Wayfarer

If the subjective beliefs and emotional states that produce the placebo effect are neural (physical) states, why would they not be expected to have physical consequences? Physicalist presuppositions make such things easier, not more difficult, to understand. Presuming that such beliefs and emotional states are somehow non-physical existents makes it impossible to understand how they would have physical consequences.

And all of these are physical things. "Hi" and "Olah" both mean a greeting with the physical difference of intonation and spelling. — Philosophim

But they're not. A sentence or a proposition is not a physical thing which is not meaningfully explicable in terms of physical laws. Language, for instance, is the subject of semiotics, linguistics, and other disciplines, but nothing within physics addresses any of that. Within those disciplines, some will be more inclined to a physicalist worldview, others less so. Noam Chomsky, for instance, says that physicalism is untenable because there is no coherent account of what constitutes a physical body.

When you read these words, you will interpret their meaning and compose a reaction (or not). That reaction has some physical elements - like the keys you depress to type, the appearance of letters on the screen - but the core is negotiating meanings, and that is not a physical process. But it can have physical effects - if I say something that others find deeply confronting or offensive, their pulse rate and blood pressure might increase, but that is not because I've physically influenced them via a medicine or substance, but because of their intepretation of what I'm saying.

With respect to the reality of fictional characters such as Sherlock Holmes, they are plainly cultural constructs, real by virtue of a common set of references in works of literature. To that extent they're real but fictional. But the elements of formal logic and mathematics are in a different category to that. They too are only perceptible by rational thought, so not physical as such, but real nonetheless. They exist in what Frege and Popper call a 'third realm'.

All of it is physical. — Philosophim

What we want to understand is how "a physical thought" could "describe a fictional brilliant detective." Referring to Popper again, he would say that any World 2 event -- that is, a particular thought-event that is the product of a particular brain at a particular time -- is merely a thought of Sherlock Holmes. It isn't SH himself. In order to have SH, we have to move to World 3, where objects of thought are named. Even if we allow that "a physical thought" isn't question-begging (it seems so to me), we still have to explain how an idea that depends on no particular brain for its instantiation can be called physical.

Okay, gotcha, thanks for explaining.

But they're not. A sentence or a proposition is not a physical thing which is not meaningfully explicable in terms of physical laws. Language, for instance, is the subject of semiotics, linguistics, and other disciplines, but nothing within physics addresses any of that. — Wayfarer

There may be a difference in definition between what we're intending. "Physics" is one aspect of the physical world. Language is another. It is the complex interplay using vibrations through the air to communicate an idea within a brain to another brain in such a way as both brains can share a context. This can further be expressed as physical scribbles on a piece of paper, or electronic pixels on a monitor.

When you read these words, you will interpret their meaning and compose a reaction (or not). That reaction has some physical elements - like the keys you depress to type, the appearance of letters on the screen - but the core is negotiating meanings, and that is not a physical process. — Wayfarer

Of course its a physical process. You are physically typing, the physical transfer of binary information across the internet to my TV hooked up to my computer. I will read it with my physical eyes, my physical brain will process the information, and I'll type a physical reply. If I'm wrong, where am I wrong? What is the non-physical part? A sub-space where my consciousness resides? You don't blink at the idea of a computer physically processing ideas, why do you blink at a physical human brain doing that?

Even if we allow that "a physical thought" isn't question-begging (it seems so to me), we still have to explain how an idea that depends on no particular brain for its instantiation can be called physical. — J

First, the default from all the evidence we have is that thoughts are physical. There is zero evidence that they are something different from matter and energy. You only feel that way. Second, are computers not physical then? I can send a file from my computer to another. Does that mean the file isn't a set of physical 1's and zeros on my hard drive? Of course it is. Its obvious.

Did the law of the excluded middle come into being as a consequence of evolution? Surely not - what came into being was our capacity to recognise it. And a great deal of the basic 'furniture of reason' can be understood in those terms - they're not the products of biology, but can only be understood by a sufficiently sophisticated intelligence, which h. sapiens possesses. — Wayfarer

Even if we accept the impossibility of recognition of the value of the law of the excluded middle as a result of biological evolution, despite you simply asserting it, here is a paper suggesting it was a matter of cultural evolution. Lucky thing that we are social primates.

To conclude, cooperative anticipatory planning selects for reasoning abilities, which can apply to all domains of thinking, and reasoners urged to follow public norms for thought. With this result, let me return to the issue of deductive logic.

5 Outlook
Given the evolutionary explanation of hominin reasoning just outlined, what about positions like Schechter’s, which claim that there has been selection for deductive reasoning? As mentioned earlier, such positions mainly suffer from a lack of empirical evidence. Imagining “it would be most useful” is not an evolutionary argument. (Perhaps the situation is different with our tancestors—but, again, this is no help in explaining the phenomenon at issue.) So, what real arrangement of things would foster behavior sequences, which could only be planned by deductive reasoning rules? Which kind of entanglement could make necessary truth preservation a prerequisite? As argued in Section 2, there is no theoretical reason to think such a prerequisite was necessarily required during hominin evolution. So far, there also seems to be no empirical evidence for such an artifact in the niches of the Middle Pleistocene hunters. Hence, there is neither evidence for deductive rules as a universal “model” how the human mind works when engaged in reasoning activities nor much reason to believe in deductive logic as a yardstick for reasoning in general.

Nevertheless, we have deductive logic. Why is that? I would propose the following as a probable explanation. If my account is on the right track, the cognitive prerequisites for deductive logic indeed evolved during hominization. To wit, it is being able to reason domain-generally and being inclined to follow public norms in reasoning. However, as also argued above, such norms for reasoning get always established by local circumstances—based on needs but established as cultural artifacts.Footnote15 If true, the norms for deductive reasoning had to be established in a particular niche due to particular demands.

Following one historical exposition, the deductive method appeared late in human history,Footnote16 first invented, probably, by members of the Athenian elite 2500 years before present. It arose as a specific argumentative practice within debates: as dialogues with the element of persuading one another (Dutilh Novaes 2015: pp. 595–597, 2012; Netz 1999). Here, this method is advantageous. Granted both participants of a dialogue agree on a shared set of premises, any conclusion drawn by deductive steps from this set should be regarded as entirely compelling. Given a logically valid form, no counterexample can be given which would show that premises could be accepted, but the conclusion would remain open to being denied. Because no countermove is possible, the opponent must accept the conclusion or should revise one of his premises otherwise.

From this perspective, deductive reasoning is like reading, writing, or calculating a socially learned practice. Deductive reasoning is neither an evolved biological “constant” nor a “universal” of Homo sapiens’ mind. It is a cognitive ability to be inoculated by a certain practice and only open to those members of a population who has been brought to a specific learning environment. Hence, deductive logic must be inherited by a tradition, and only those who have learned it will be able to reason by deductive rules.Footnote17 In this sense, it is like any other piece of mathematical notation. We are not “hard-wired” to use analytical algebra, but once this cultural artifact is there and part of our niche, we can put it to use for all kinds of things. The same goes for deductive logic, as I propose here.

Of course its a physical process. You are physically typing, the physical transfer of binary information across the internet to my TV hooked up to my computer. I will read it with my physical eyes, my physical brain will process the information, and I'll type a physical reply. If I'm wrong, where am I wrong? — Philosophim

It's physical in some respects, but the salient point, our understanding of what is being said, the expression of intentional meaning - that is not a physical process.

What is the non-physical part? A sub-space where my consciousness resides? — Philosophim

The interpretation of meaning. The constant, underlying, subliminal processes of 'this means that', 'this is that', 'this word has that meaning' - otherwise known as judgement. That is not a physical process. It can be instantiated in the computer, even more so now with AI (which I myself use constantly and refer to frequently) - but those are human artefacts, manufactured and programmed by humans to amplify human abilities.

I will acknowledge that I am positing a form of dualism, but it has to be spelled out very carefully. As I've said already a number of times in this thread, the Cartesian idea of there being a 'thinking thing' (res cogitans) or 'spiritual substance' is extremely misleading. There is no such thing, in any objective sense - there's nothing 'out there' which corresponds to that. The thinking subject is not an objective reality (which is another way of expressing the hard problem). But such judgements as 'is', 'is not', 'is the same as', and so on, are intrinsic to the operation of reason, which is internal to thought, and thus not objective in the sense implied in cartesian dualism. I'm more impressed with the approach of A-T (Aristotelian Thomist) dualism, generally described with that ugly word 'hylomorphism'. But what it means is that reason (nous) grasps meaning, which is the building block of rational thought. And that is not a physical process. That is why Thomist philosophy (and Christianity generally) sees the human as a compound of body and soul (or psyche). Not that the soul exists objectively, but as the animating intelligence which makes the grasp of meaning possible.

Even if we accept the impossibility of recognition of the value of the law of the excluded middle as a result of biological evolution, despite you simply asserting it, here is a paper suggesting it was a matter of cultural evolution. — wonderer1

And that is where Nagel's critique of evolutionary reductionism is salient. To seek to provide an account of reason, on some grounds other than the rational, is to call into question the sovereignty of reason.

Unless it is coupled with an independent basis for confidence in reason, the evolutionary hypothesis is threatening rather than reassuring. It is consistent with continued confidence only if it amounts to the hypothesis that evolution has led to the existence of creatures, namely us, with a capacity for reasoning in whose validity we can have much stronger confidence than would be warranted merely from its having come into existence in that way. I have to be able to believe that the evolutionary explanation is consistent with the proposition that I follow the rules of logic because they are correct--not merely because I am biologically programmed to do so. But to believe that, I have to be justified independently in believing that they are correct. And this cannot be merely on the basis of my contingent psychological disposition, together with the hypothesis that it is the product of natural selection. I can have no justification for trusting a reasoning capacity I have as a consequence of natural selection, unless I am justified in trusting it simply in itself -- that is, believing what it tells me, in virtue of the content of the arguments it delivers.

If reason is in this way self-justifying, then it is open to us also to speculate that natural selection played a role in the evolution and survival of a species that is capable of understanding and engaging in it. But the recognition of logical arguments as independently valid is a precondition of the acceptability of an evolutionary story about the source of that recognition. This means that the evolutionary hypothesis is acceptable only if reason does not need its support. At most it may show why the existence of reason need not be biologically mysterious.

The only form that genuine reasoning can take consists in seeing the validity of the arguments, in virtue of what they say. As soon as one tries to step outside of such thoughts, one loses contact with their true content. And one cannot be outside and inside them at the same time: If one thinks in logic, one cannot simultaneously regard those thoughts as mere psychological dispositions, however caused or however biologically grounded. — Thomas Nagel, op cit

And that is where Nagel's critique of evolutionary reductionism is salient. To seek to provide an account of reason, on some grounds other than the rational, is to call into question the sovereignty of reason. — Wayfarer

Nagel has failed to recognize the poor thinking in things like Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism and Intelligent Design. So your appeal to authority is particularly unpersuasive in this case.

FWIW, that article on cultural evolution of our ability to apply logic is just the kind of thing that Plantinga's EAAN grossly fails to address. To the best of my knowledge Plantinga never recognizes the significance of our evolutionary ancestors being members of a social species to the EAAN.

It's physical in some respects, but the salient point, our understanding of what is being said, the expression of intentional meaning - that is not a physical process. — Wayfarer

But where is the evidence that its not? I don't mind the declaration, but there has to be evidence. If my brain bleeds do I not have a stroke? If I'm the part of my brain that processes sight is damage, my eyes work, but I cannot see anymore. If I drink alcohol, won't my words start slurring and I start thinking that the jerk to my left is really "A schtand up guy?"

The interpretation of meaning. The constant, underlying, subliminal processes of 'this means that', 'this is that', 'this word has that meaning' - otherwise known as judgement. That is not a physical process. — Wayfarer

But we can take things that impair our judgement, and this is because these substances affect the brain. If judgement was not a physical process, then nothing physical should be able to affect the process correct? Now I could grant that perhaps there is a third non-physical component that could act with the physical brain. I can get behind the idea. But do we have any evidence of this third non-physical component? If it interacts with the physical, then we can get evidence of it.

That is why Thomist philosophy (and Christianity generally) sees the human as a compound of body and soul (or psyche). Not that the soul exists objectively, but as the animating intelligence which makes the grasp of meaning possible. — Wayfarer

Again, this is a wonderful idea. But it has no evidence. I don't mind someone stating, "Its possible this idea is true, and we may find evidence for it in the future." But until evidence is found, it can make no factual declarations of its own, only suppositions.

I can have no justification for trusting a reasoning capacity I have as a consequence of natural selection, unless I am justified in trusting it simply in itself -- that is, believing what it tells me, in virtue of the content of the arguments it delivers. — Thomas Nagel, op cit

Then Nagel misunderstands natural selection. Natural selection is merely a note that species which survive in the world to the point of procreation continue on their genes. Rationality is a capturing and understanding of the world that allows planning and use of that reality accurately. Those that are not rational do not accurately capture reality, and if this inaccuracy is too high they would not be able to handle the dangers reality throws at them.

But the recognition of logical arguments as independently valid is a precondition of the acceptability of an evolutionary story about the source of that recognition. This means that the evolutionary hypothesis is acceptable only if reason does not need its support. At most it may show why the existence of reason need not be biologically mysterious. — Thomas Nagel, op cit

Again, he's missing the point. If we evolved to survive in reality, then logic necessarily reflects reality in the most accurate way we know. It all starts with, "Assume A" Can A be not A at the same time? No. And reality matches that. Logic is not an innate thing floating around existence. Its a well proven tool to accurately evaluate our ideas in a way that intends to match reality.

But where is the evidence that its not? I don't mind the declaration, but there has to be evidence. If my brain bleeds do I not have a stroke? — Philosophim

It's not an empirical question, but a philosophical one. Although, there's the famous TED talk, My Stroke of Insight, Jill Bolte Taylor. She was a neuroscientist involved in brain-mapping who suffered a major stroke, which resulted in her attaining an insight into what she descibed as 'Nirvāṇa' (her 'stroke of insight') due to the left hemisphere of the brain shutting down. But note that this was a first-person experience - there would have been no way for her to tell, as a neuroscientist, what that experience might be in another subject, without having undergone it.

Rationality is a capturing and understanding of the world that allows planning and use of that reality accurately. — Philosophim

No, that is described in critical philosophy as the instrumentalisation of reason, although I'm guessing that won't of interest to those here.

Second, are computers not physical then? I can send a file from my computer to another. Does that mean the file isn't a set of physical 1's and zeros on my hard drive? Of course it is. Its obvious. — Philosophim

I'm questioning what you regard as obvious. What imparts that order? If you zero out the HD it is physically the same matter, it weighs the same, has all the same physical constituents, but it contains no information. The information is conveyed by the arrangement of matter. What arranges it? I mean, computers don't emerge spontaneously from the sky, they're the product of human intelligence.

It's physical in some respects, but the salient point, our understanding of what is being said, the expression of intentional meaning - that is not a physical process.
— Wayfarer

But where is the evidence that its not? I don't mind the declaration, but there has to be evidence. — Philosophim

Incidentally, what would constitute evidence of this claim? What would you be looking for?

Does that mean the file isn't a set of physical 1's and zeros on my hard drive? Of course it is. Its obvious. — Philosophim

And that is the key difference between a computer and a human. For a computer, there's nothing more the file could be. It isn't "like anything" to be a computer. But we have a different experience, which gives rise to all of the problems discussed on this thread.

This may be one of those fundamental philosophical problems that simply call up different basic intuitions. I certainly don't think that physicalists are less intelligent than I am, or wrong in some obvious, silly way. I hope they feel the same way about me! It just seems like a brute fact (to me) that what I do when I interpret a story about Sherlock Holmes is completely different from what a computer does when it realizes a program. And functionalism has had a very hard time since its heyday in the late 20th century.

So your appeal to authority is particularly unpersuasive in this case. — wonderer1

It's not an 'appeal to authority', but an appeal to a rational argument by a recognised philosopher. But, of course, philosophy itself is useless, right? Unless it can be put to use in some practical way. Makes you wonder why we're all wasting our time here.

But, of course, philosophy itself is useless, right? — Wayfarer

Of course philosophy isn't useless, but when someone's philosophy is dismissive of natural philosophy the results don't tend to be very good.

I'm not being dismissive of it, I'm challenging it on the basis of arguments and citations.

I'm not being dismissive of it, I'm challenging it on the basis of arguments and citations. — Wayfarer

I've seen more than enough evidence of your cherry-picking scientific views for their consistency with the beliefs you prefer to have. It's a common characteristic in humans. I've done it myself, and had my life gone differently, I might be as inclined to do so as you are.

However, aspects of the way my life has gone have resulted in my gaining expertise in a number of areas where reality will smack you upside the head if you aren't willing to put aside what you want to believe, in order to develop a better understanding of the way things are in reality. I don't think I deserve any more credit or blame for having my view, than you do for yours. It's just a matter of the way things have gone.

I do however, have a lot more confidence that my view will stand up to testing, than that your view will. For example, I expect that as you read this your are dealing with aspects of your social primate nature. Do you think I am wrong?