Bob's Normative Ethical Theory

Bob Ross

This is an essay on my normative ethical theory: I apologize for the formatting ): I originally wrote it in an editor and it did not paste well: I tried to spruce it up as best I can here. Any thoughts or contentions are welcome!

Introduction

There is nothing higher than reason, and nothing more virtuous than rationality. A rational agent cannot do whatever they please but, rather, must abide by the laws of logic, be impartial, and be coherent in their beliefs—e.g., if there be any actions that concedes (whether that be implicitly or explicitly) a contradiction, then the rational agent has a duty to not do it (since they must obey the law of non-contradiction). As it turns out, this results in a fruitful and robust (normative) ethical theory.
The nature of minds is such that they are ends in themselves and, as a consequence, any agent which treats them solely as a means towards an end is thereby contradicting their nature. From this (at least) implicit concession of a contradiction arises the prohibition of treating minds as solely means towards an end, but must always also be simultaneously treated as an end in themselves—i.e., a slightly modified version of Kant’s categorical imperative as expressed as the Formula of Ends in Themselves (or FET for short).
It is clear that, for the rational agent, moral judgments are assessed in relation to this standard (i.e., FET). We thus, as a community of rational agents, prescribe rights to beings with minds, and center our character around the sanctity of minds. However, the actual world affords us many the case of moral antinomies—i.e., moral dilemmas which have no ideally suitable answer—and, consequently, a pragmatic formula is required to resolve them. When one has absolutely no choice but to use a mind as solely a means towards an end, then one must ask themselves: what action, out of all foreseeable actions I could take, would best progress towards a world with maximal sovereignty of minds? Whatever the answer may be, it will be the most (pragmatically) aligned with FET (out of the other options).

Terminology

Ends vs. Means
An ‘end’ is the final goal, irregardless of whether it being merely final relative to another, of which a ‘means’ is utilized to achieve. In other words, an ‘end’ is the desired goal, and a ‘means’ is a particular method of achieving that goal—e.g., in “if I want to be good at soccer, then I must practice”, the desire to be good at soccer is the end and practicing is the means to that end.

Categorical vs. Hypothetical Imperatives
There are general categories of ends: those which are for their own sake, which are called absolute or in themselves, and those which are for the sake of another end, which are called relative or for something else—e.g., in “if I want to be good at soccer, then I must practice”, the end (of desiring to be good at soccer) is relative to another end, let’s say, of being happy whereas, let’s say, being happy is an end for itself and thusly done for its own sake.
An ‘imperative’ is simply an obligation, and imperatives which are anchored in a relative end are called ‘hypothetical imperatives’; whereas imperatives which are grounded in an absolute end are called ‘categorical imperatives’.

Mind vs. Organism
A ‘mind’ can be, for the sake of this essay, interpreted two ways: an immaterial soul or an emergent process of the brain—I leave it up to the reader to take their pick, as it is of no consequence to my position hereon—that is/has an inner (subjective) life, no matter how small of a degree or rudimentary, such that there is something it is like to be it in and of itself. By ‘organism’, I mean a biological member of a species. An organism does not necessarily have a mind (e.g., a dead bird), and a mind doesn’t necessarily have to be in or of an organism (e.g., an AI [potentially]); and, likewise, an organism could have multiple minds (e.g., siamese twins). An organism, then, is just a vessel, potentially of many, which can house, so to speak, a mind—whether that be in the sense of a soul or an emergent process of biological functions.

The Formula of Ends in Themselves

One qua rational intelligence cannot treat a mind, whether that be human or non-human, as solely a means towards an end because their very nature points them out as an end in themselves—i.e., a modified version of Kant’s FET: “Act in such a way that you treat humanity [minds], whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end.” – (Kant, p. ).The argument for FET is as follows:

P1: If something is solely a means towards an end, then it is not an end in itself.

P2: Minds are ends in themselves.

P3: One should abide by the law of non-contradiction.

P4: To treat a mind as solely a means towards an end is to contradict their nature (i.e., to contradict P2).

C: One should not treat a mind as solely a means towards an end, but always as (at least) simultaneously an end in themselves.

P1 merely highlights that if something is just a means towards some end (and just a means) then it cannot be an end itself—e.g., if mowing my lawn is a means towards making my house look presentable (and that being the only consideration), then mowing my lawn is solely means to an end and that end is making my house look presentable. P2 notes that minds are ends in themselves, and this is because minds are the only beings with the nature such that they are their own end—i.e., they are an absolute end; e.g., although making my house look good may have been the end within the previous example’s context, it is likewise only a means toward another end (like making myself look respectable to my guests) but it will, without any consideration of other people as ends, ultimately bottom out at the final end of myself: I ultimately mow my lawn, in the case that I am not considering other people as ends, for myself—it is for my benefit being that my manifesting my desires is my absolute end. Minds are the only beings capable of setting out contextual ends for the sake of themselves (as the final, absolute end) and are thusly ends in themselves. P3 simply notes that the stipulation of this ethical theory is that one ought to be rational which implies being logically consistent; and P4 demonstrates that treating a person as solely a means towards an end entails (at least implicitly) a contradiction and thusly should not be done (if one is rational): when one uses another person for solely their own end, they concede in action that the other person is not an end in themselves (because they are treating them as solely a means) but are equally conceding that they are an end in themselves (due to understanding their nature as a mind)—hence the contradiction.
Then, the categorical imperative—i.e., the obligation to an absolute end—is to treat ends in themselves—i.e., anything which is an absolute end—as never a mere and sole means but, rather, also simultaneously an end in themselves because that is to be consistent with their nature. Any particular absolute ends each mind may have becomes relative in light of this categorical imperative, insofar as one must restrict their actions, their absolute ends, to conform to it.

Moral Antinomies

Practical life is just a series of moral antinomies, and, as such, although FET provides the underlying basis for any moral consideration at all, FET alone cannot be utilized to determine what one should do. If me and another have conflicting interests, then who should prevail? If it be I, then I am using the other person as solely a means towards my end by preventing them from enacting their (conflicting) interest; but if it be them, then vice-versa. May I eat other animals? If yes, then I use that animal as solely a means towards my own end; and if I don’t, then I use myself as a mere means towards an end. One can see, that any conflict of interest between two or more minds is immediately a moral antinomy—as one, according to FET, cannot use anyone as a means towards their own interest, but it will inevitable do so in the event of conflicting ones.
Even doing nothing, in the event of conflicting interests (of minds), violates FET: if I force myself to suppress my interest for the sake of another mind (when it be against my will), then I am being used, by myself, as a sole means towards the end of upholding that other mind, and if I do not suppress it, then I use that other mind as a sole means towards my own interest (i.e., my end).
Moreover, the deontological principle of ‘letting’ vs. ‘actively’ violating a mind (or sometimes solely a human mind or person) is of no use: allowing something to happen to someone entails that the person allowing it used that other person as a means towards their own end, even their ends is something as simple as avoiding an inconvenience or as serious as avoiding danger to their own health. If there are 5 people about to get run over by a train and I could flip a switch to redirect the train to run over 1 person instead, ‘letting’ the 5 people get run over as opposed to ‘actively’ violating the 1 person does not afford any help with respect to FET: if I let the 5 people die, then I have used them as a means towards my own interest—which could be anything, such as cowardice, wanting to not be allegedly ‘morally blameworthy’ for actively sacrificing another, or what not—and if I flip the switch, thusly sacrificing the other, then I have used that person as a solely a means towards saving the other 5. Both violate FET.
So, then, it must be asked: may we pragmatically resolve moral antinomies? If one has no choice but to use a mind as solely a means toward an end no matter which action or lack of action they commit (which is the nature of a moral antinomy), then, as a mere tautology, they have no choice but to do it: the aforesaid question is answered by simply unpacking the nature of moral antinomies. So, if one must do it, then it becomes a question of: is there a pragmatically best action to take in the event of a moral antinomy? Prima facie, it may seem as though each action is equally probable to take (pragmatically), because each equally violates FET; however, if the goal is FET—i.e., to never treat minds as solely means towards an end but simultaneously an end in themselves—then it follows that, pragmatically, the best action to take will be the one which progresses best towards a world with maximal sovereignty—i.e., maximal respect—for minds. Thusly, even if one has to choose between two (or more) options which equally violate FET, it does not follow that each option progresses with the same weight towards a world with maximal sovereignty of minds. This pragmatic formula, which I call the Formula of Ideal Sovereignty (or FIS for short), can be expressed most simply in the form of a question: what action out of all foreseeable actions, that I could take would progress best towards a world with maximal sovereignty of minds?
There are a couple things worth noting about FIS. Firstly, it is not a consequentialist principle of maximizing sovereignty: to seek to maximize sovereignty is not equivalent to trying to progress towards a world with maximal sovereignty. A clear example of this distinction is the classical Utilitarian problem of enslavement: is it good to enslave 1% of the population if that total net increased the well-being of the other 99%? With a minor variant of this, one can see how the principle of maximizing sovereignty would regress from a world with maximal sovereignty of minds: is it good to enslave 1% of the (human) population if that total net increased the sovereignty of the other 99%? If one is considering this question with respect to merely maximizing sovereignty, then the answer is clearly yes; but, if they are considering what would progress us to a world with maximal sovereignty of each mind, then it is not clear at all that counter-acting the long-struggled fight for equality amongst humans (such as rights) would be a progression. On the contrary, revoking a human person’s rights for the sake of other people seems to muddy the waters on rights in general (for humans), and thusly regresses us from a world with maximal sovereignty of minds. Secondly, it is worth noting that FIS is anchored in maximal as opposed to absolute sovereignty of minds because absolute sovereignty is a contradiction: if minds exist in the same reality, then they cannot have absolute freedom without it violating the others’ absolute freedom and vice-versa. Instead, this formula guides us towards a world with approaching the limit of such a contradiction instead of ever getting there (per se).
Now, with FIS, one can see exactly what underpins their practical moral decisions: sanctity of minds. However, FIS is a generic formula and does not afford a complete sense of what exactly is right or wrong in any given situation; instead, it offers up a simple question which would should be using to intuit their moral decisions—beyond that, there is no such thing as an equation which provides an exact determination of what actually will progress best towards such an ideal world. This is exactly why it is vital that one cultivates a character centered around the principle virtue of sanctity of minds; so that they are in the most optimal of characters to intuit (hopefully) the most moral conclusion in any given situation.

Considerations of Non-Minds

Simply because minds cannot be valued in any way which would set them out as solely a means, and thusly are effectively invaluable, it does not follow that non-minds are worthless. The valuing of non-minds, which surely can be done without contradiction (unlike minds), by rational agents geared towards the sanctity of minds, will be, in its most abstract sense, in correspondence with its relation to ‘mindhood’ even though it doesn’t have it—e.g., if minds are sacred and this non-mind once had a mind, then it will have more value than something which never had a mind. Thusly, there is, in its most abstract sense, a hierarchy of values of non-minds such that it corresponds to the following general categories (ordered by value): non-minds which (1) have the immanent potential to acquire a mind, (2) were once a being with a mind, and (3) were never nor will never be a being with a mind. Each is valued higher than the next because they relate more closely (than the next) to ‘mindhood’; and this is the chief consideration of FET.
However, it is worth noting that the valuing of non-minds, in accordance with the above categories, is not imperative—as one is not violating FET by valuing it otherwise—but, rather, is the consequence of one cultivating a respect for minds, a virtuous character towards sanctity of minds, due to FET.

Application

It is equally important to give examples of the practical application of a theory as opposed to just its abstract content; so, in this section, we will be reviewing some of the implications of this theory on key issues.
The pattern one will find in this section, and in all of applied ethics with respect to this (normative) theory, is that the world is riddled with vast amounts of moral antinomies—more than the average person may think. If one is really obligated to never use a mind as a means towards an end, then this current state of the world is so far from it; and, consequently, FIS is going to be of much importance to reaching exact conclusions socially, politically, etc.

Treatment of Other Animals
From FET, it does not merely follow that human beings with minds cannot be used solely as a means towards an end, but also most of the rest of the animal kingdom—for most animals have minds, no matter to what degree—which surfaces some questions worthy of answering.
May I eat non-humans? May I kill them for fun? May I sacrifice them to save humans? All of these sorts of question can be answered in the following manner: if the situation is a moral antinomy, then the human will take precedence over the non-human with respect to non-trivial matters because, as in accordance with FIS, that action will best progress towards a world with maximal sovereignty of minds—given that human minds are far richer, complex, and more rational than non-human minds; but, if it is not a moral antinomy, then the answer is an adamant NO—as per FET. For example: may I eat a non-human to nourish myself? Yes: to force myself, against my will, to malnourish myself entails that I am using myself as solely a means towards an end (and, in this case, to not kill a non-human mind) which violates FET, and to kill that non-human is to use it as solely a means towards an end (thusly, likewise, violating FET) which entails a moral antinomy—and thus the, per an evaluation of this situation in light of FIS, it is permissible for me, as a human that needs to nourish themselves (which is no trivial matter), to eat the non-human. However, may I eat the non-human for purely taste? No: to force myself (against my will) to not eat the non-human for purely taste uses myself as solely a means towards the end (of preserving that non-human), and killing/eating the non-human uses them as solely a means towards the end (of satisfying my taste)—thusly a moral antinomy: the reason for eating animal is so trivial that, as per an evaluation of the situation in light of FIS, it seems to regress from a world with maximal sovereignty of minds. Lastly, may I sacrifice a non-human (e.g., a dog) to save a human (e.g., a child)? Yes: if I do nothing, then I am treating the child as a means solely towards my own end (whether that be merely my desire to not be inconvenienced, cowardice to act, selfishness to take on the expense, or what not) and if it is stipulated that the only way to save the child is to throw a dog in the way (to obstruct whatever may be about to kill the child) then I will have used that dog as merely a means towards my end (of saving the child)—thusly a moral antinomy, and the child will take precedence because, as per an evaluation of the situation in light of FIS, this is no trivial matter.
Unlike traditional Kantian ethics, and most deontological ethical theories, this theory does add moral consideration to other animals because it is very clear that, since this theory acknowledges the need to pragmatically resolve moral antinomies (which is not the case in such traditional theories), allowing humans to do whatever they want to them (e.g., torturing them, hunting them purely for sport, etc.), does regress us from a world with maximal sovereignty; whereas, with equal moral intuitiveness, eating them, whereof they are killed with respect and reverence, are permitted as its prohibition would regress us from such an ideal world.

Treatment of Humans
Out of the attempt to use FIS to resolve moral antinomies (i.e., conflicts of interests, which is the essence of life) arises the pragmatically useful idea of ‘rights’ for rational kinds; which carry with them an absolute, immutable sort of essence—e.g., one cannot sacrifice one human for the sake of saving another (or X amount of others), one cannot kidnap and involuntarily donate a human’s organs to save five sick patients, etc. This is perfectly sensible in light of FIS, as rational agents, and most of rational kinds, (1) are capable of engaging in societies where they can reap the benefits of their labor, (2) have the capacity to uphold their own representational laws with high precision which thusly gives them a high degree of moral responsibility, and (3) have very rich and complex subjective experience and inner lives—all of which would seem to be worthy, if we consider it in light of FIS, of protection in the sense of a ‘right’ and not a mere ‘privilege’.
Although I refrain from going into detailed examples (for the sake of brevity), one controversial example worth mentioning is abortion: if we are to take seriously the notion that humans have rights, as opposed to mere privileges, to exist and to bodily autonomy, then we are in yet another moral antinomy (and this time with respect to rights). Holistically, given that pregnancy lasts 9 months, normally goes relatively smoothly, and that the other option gives people the whimsical right to kill organisms with minds in the womb, it seems that we progress towards a world with maximal sovereignty of minds by banning abortion except in abnormal circumstances (such as serious health complications for the mother, etc.). However, in the case that the human organism does not have a mind, then any conflict of interest with a mind will result in the latter taking precedence over the former: consequently, any period of development in the womb where the human organism (which is developing therein) does not have a mind is perfectly compatible with pro-choice.

Leontiskos

P3: To value something entails it is not an end in itself. — Bob Ross

Eh? If we cannot value ends, then how can we value means?

The other problem here is that you do not actually arrive at Kant's maxim. For example:

The formula is thus: one should never treat a person as solely a means towards an end, but always (at least) simultaneously an end in themselves—i.e., FET. — Bob Ross

Presumably you also hold to: <To value something entails it is ~~solely~~ a means towards an end>. Thus, on your view, no end in itself can simultaneously be used as a means to an end.

180 Proof

P1: If something is solely a means towards an end, then it is not an end in itself. — Bob Ross

This is a vacuous definition, not an ostensible claim.

P2: To value something entails it is solely a means towards an end.

Demonstrate this entailment.

C1: To value something entails it is not an end in itself.

Invalid inference from underdetermined "propositions". Ergo, "FET proof" (C6) fails.

Philosophim

Ah, here it is Bob! I almost missed it. We've already discussed at length on the meta-ethical considerations, but I will dismiss them here.

I ground the entire (normative and applied) ethical theory in one moral judgment: “one ought to be rational”. — Bob Ross

No disagreement with you there. I'll take it as an assumption going forward. The issue comes from the following statement:

There is no moral fact which dictates that one ought to be rational, but any sane person will agree to this moral judgment (subjectively) — Bob Ross

Let me type in a similar sentence and I think you'll see the problem:

"There is no fact that dictates God exists, but any sane person will agree to this judgement."

Claims like this beg challenges and can cause people to dismiss your claims outright. I'm not going to do that of course. I'm just noting that if you want to get to your point, you don't have to make claims like this. A simple "I'm not here to debate why one should choose the subjective start of, 'one ought to do what is rational.' I'm simply going to start with this and show a morality based on rationality." will work fine. So that's what I'm going to do. I'll assume that we take the prime assumption that we ought to act rationally and go from there.

t is important to explicate what exactly is meant by ‘rationality’. By this term I mean ‘the quality of being based in reason and logic’. — Bob Ross

Sounds good.

P1: If something is solely a means towards an end, then it is not an end in itself.
P2: To value something entails it is solely a means towards an end.
C1: To value something entails it is not an end in itself. — Bob Ross

P1 is fine, but how do we get P2? Can I not value an end itself? If I valued world peace, would that not be the end of my means? Can you explain further what you mean by P2?

But ok, lets assume C1 is true regardless for now.

P3: To value something entails it is not an end in itself.
P4: Minds are something.
C2: To value a mind entails that they are not an end in themselves. — Bob Ross

That is fine, but what if I don't value a mind? I'm assuming with the initial premise of "we ought to be rational" that "minds are rational, therefore they should be valued for they ought to be." The problem is you're trying to separate this from Kant, noting that one can have a mind but it not be rational. This leads into the question "Why should minds, even irrational ones, be valued?" If I recall you've given an answer to this long ago, but I don't remember it and I'm not seeing it here. I think it was something along the lines that you considered rational beings beings that had the capacity for rationality, not that they were necessarily rational. Can you clarify that? Onto the next set.

P5: Persons (i.e., beings with personhood) are ends in themselves.
P6: Minds are persons.
C3: Minds are ends in themselves. — Bob Ross

I'm a little confused by P5. Why are persons ends in themselves? Can't I use persons as means to my goals, even benevolently? If I send soldiers out to stop a terrorist, am I not using those soldiers, those people, as means to an end?

For P6, your intended goal was to separate minds from persons so that it can apply to rational agents, not merely persons. If you want to keep with that intention I would reorder P6 to "Persons are minds" or "Persons have minds". With this C3 follows.

P6: One should not accept contradictions as true.
P7: If one values a mind, then they are contradicting themselves (because it concedes that a mind is and is not an end in itself). [ !(C2 ^ C3) ]
C4: One should not value minds. — Bob Ross

I see you're trying a proof by contradiction but you've left out an equally probable conclusion: That persons, and thus minds are means and not ends in themselves. This is because you haven't proven either of the statements, only asserted them. Still, lets continue and assume you can demonstrate C4 as true.

P7: One should not value minds.
P8: To consider a mind valueless is to value them at 0.
C5: One should not consider minds valueless. — Bob Ross

Again I'm going to assume minds have value because they are rational and therefore have innate value. So since we should not consider minds valueless, they have value. And since minds have value, people have value. But then doesn't this prove that people are not ends in themselves?

P9: If one should not value a mind (including a value of 0), then minds should be considered invaluable.
P10: One should not value a mind (including a value of 0).
C6: Minds should be considered invaluable. — Bob Ross

I'm a bit confused again, but are you saying that your conclusion C5 is now being contradicted though P1? That we should consider that minds have value? Then why are we asserting that minds don't have value? Are you stating that not valuing a mind with the representation of 0, is in fact a value? Because that just doesn't work Bob. The number zero is a representation of there not being a quantity. The number zero is not a quantity in itself. The number zero for value is a representation of there being no value, a numeric assignment of zero for value does not mean there exists a value. It means there is no underlying represented value.

Finally, the term 'invaluable' means that it has so much value, it cannot be quantified into one number. It doesn't mean it has no value at all.

From the sheer impossibility (without conceding a contradiction) to value something which creates value, any rational agent is required treat creators of value (i.e., minds: persons) always as simultaneously ends in themselves: as invaluable. It follows from this the sanctity of persons (i.e., of minds) because they are invaluable — Bob Ross

It seems the overall conclusion you want to make out of this is it is impossible to value something that creates value. Since we cannot value an end in itself, we should treat people as so valuable they cannot be quantified into any comparative value? And because we cannot quantify this value, we cannot 'evaluate a value' of them, thus they are ends in themselves?

I think you're trying to say something here, but its just not coming across correctly. It seems to me that when you speak about valuing something, you're talking about a quantative value. For example, lets say we valued a person's worth at 10,000 dollars. If of course we could value people quantitively, then we could use them as means to an end. For example, I could use a person worth 10,000 dollars to make myself 1 million dollars. However, if human value is so valuable as to be beyond quantification, an infinite value so to speak, then we could never use a human as a means to an end. We don't use infinite money to make infinite money, that's silly. We simply enjoy infinite money.

Is that what you were trying to say? This seems to jive with your idea of your formula of ideal sovereignty. If all people are infinitely valuable, sacrificing one infinity for 99 infinities works in the moment of practical necessity, but one infinity is just as equivalent in value to 99 infinities, thus this sacrifice should be abated where possible.

I'm going to stop here for now and let you answer the questions I've posted.

Bob Ross

↪Leontiskos

That's fair: I just revised that section because (1) I don't think I need to get into a dispute about axiological theories to prove my point and (2) I didn't demonstrate the point clearly.

The new argument is:

P1: If something is solely a means towards an end, then it is not an end in itself.

P2: Persons are ends in themselves.

P3: One should abide by the law of non-contradiction.

P4: To treat a person as solely a means towards an end is to contradict their nature (i.e., to contradict P2).

C: One should not treat a person as solely a means towards an end, but always as (at least) simultaneously an end in themselves.

P1 merely highlights that if something is just a means towards some end (and just a means) then it cannot be an end itself—e.g., if mowing my lawn is a means towards making my house look presentable (and that being the only consideration), then mowing my lawn is solely means to an end and that end is making my house look presentable. P2 notes that persons (i.e., minds) are ends in themselves: persons are the only type of existence in reality which is capable of having ends and of being ultimately the final end for itself—e.g., although making my house look good may have been the end within the previous example’s context, it is likewise only a means toward another end (like making myself look respectable to my guests) but it will, without any consideration of other people as ends, ultimately bottom out at the final end of myself: I ultimately mow my lawn, in the case that I am not considering other people as ends, for myself—for my benefit. Persons are the only creators capable of setting out hypothetical imperatives (i.e., contextual ends) for the sake of themselves (as the final end) and are thusly ends in themselves. P3 simply notes that the stipulation of this ethical theory is that one ought to be rational which implies being logically consistent; and P4 demonstrates that treating a person as solely a means towards an end entails (at least implicitly) a contradiction and thusly should not be done (if one is rational): when one uses another person for solely their own end, they concede in action that the other person is not an end in themselves (because they are treating them as solely a means) but are equally conceding that they are an end in themselves (due to their nature as a person)—hence the contradiction.

I made it a pseudo-syllogism to be more concise, since I think people get the point.

Bob Ross

↪180 Proof

Hello 180 Proof,

Just to let you know, I updated the section with a clearer proof; but let me respond to your contentions.

P1: If something is solely a means towards an end, then it is not an end in itself. — Bob Ross
This is a vacuous definition, not an ostensible claim.

If something is solely a means to an end, then it can’t be an end itself because it is just a means towards some other end. If it is also an end then it is not just a means towards an end.

P2: To value something entails it is solely a means towards an end.
Demonstrate this entailment.
…
C1: To value something entails it is not an end in itself.
Invalid inference from underdetermined "propositions". Ergo, "FET proof" (C6) fails.

So I revised the proof, and I would like you to re-read it, because I don’t think it is beneficial for us to dive into axiological theories, which is the path I inadvertently put us down with this premise. I don’t think it matters what one thinks the nature of valuing something is to prove my point (I don’t think). So I, for the sake of the proof, recant this premise.

Bob Ross

↪Philosophim

"There is no fact that dictates God exists, but any sane person will agree to this judgement."

Claims like this beg challenges and can cause people to dismiss your claims outright. I'm not going to do that of course. I'm just noting that if you want to get to your point, you don't have to make claims like this. A simple "I'm not here to debate why one should choose the subjective start of, 'one ought to do what is rational.' I'm simply going to start with this and show a morality based on rationality." will work fine. So that's what I'm going to do. I'll assume that we take the prime assumption that we ought to act rationally and go from there.

That’s fair. It opens up the discussion back to metaethics; but I just wanted to make it clear that this theory was building off of the previous one, so one has to subjectively affirm ‘one ought to be rational’—there is not moral fact which makes it so.

Just to let you know, I updated and altered the proof for FET because I think some of the premises and syllogisms were off-point and incentivized derailments into unnecessary topics. So here is the new pseudo-syllogism:

P1: If something is solely a means towards an end, then it is not an end in itself.

P2: Persons are ends in themselves.

P3: One should abide by the law of non-contradiction.

P4: To treat a person as solely a means towards an end is to contradict their nature (i.e., to contradict P2).

C: One should not treat a person as solely a means towards an end, but always as (at least) simultaneously an end in themselves.

With that being said, let me respond to your points.

P1: If something is solely a means towards an end, then it is not an end in itself.
P2: To value something entails it is solely a means towards an end.
C1: To value something entails it is not an end in itself. — Bob Ross

P1 is fine, but how do we get P2? Can I not value an end itself? If I valued world peace, would that not be the end of my means? Can you explain further what you mean by P2?

Although I do affirm P2, I think, upon further reflection, it is irrelevant to the conclusion I actually meant to get to, which is FET. It doesn’t matter whether or not we hold the same axiological theories. So I recant this portion of the proof.

That is fine, but what if I don't value a mind? I'm assuming with the initial premise of "we ought to be rational" that "minds are rational, therefore they should be valued for they ought to be."

So I am arguing, unlike Kant, that ‘persons’ are ‘minds’ and not just rational agents. This is because I think that persons (minds) are ends in themselves because every mind has the capability, so some extent, to set out means towards their own ends of their own free will—which is, as a side note, unique to minds.

The claim that ‘one ought to be rational’ just ties into the argument with respect to not accepting a contradiction, and the idea is that treating a person as solely a means towards an end implicitly concedes they are not an end in themselves but once one understands the nature of a person as an end in themselves the contradiction arises: we contradict the nature of a person by treating them solely as a means towards our own ends.

I'm a little confused by P5. Why are persons ends in themselves? Can't I use persons as means to my goals, even benevolently? If I send soldiers out to stop a terrorist, am I not using those soldiers, those people, as means to an end?

Yes, we can use persons as means towards an end, but not solely as a means towards an end but, rather, must always also consider and uphold that they are themselves an end. Here’s the revised explanation of the revised proof of FET, as this may help clarify:

P1 merely highlights that if something is just a means towards some end (and just a means) then it cannot be an end itself—e.g., if mowing my lawn is a means towards making my house look presentable (and that being the only consideration), then mowing my lawn is solely means to an end and that end is making my house look presentable. P2 notes that persons (i.e., minds) are ends in themselves: persons are the only type of existence in reality which is capable of having ends and of being ultimately the final end for itself—e.g., although making my house look good may have been the end within the previous example’s context, it is likewise only a means toward another end (like making myself look respectable to my guests) but it will, without any consideration of other people as ends, ultimately bottom out at the final end of myself: I ultimately mow my lawn, in the case that I am not considering other people as ends, for myself—for my benefit. Persons are the only creators capable of setting out hypothetical imperatives (i.e., contextual ends) for the sake of themselves (as the final end) and are thusly ends in themselves. P3 simply notes that the stipulation of this ethical theory is that one ought to be rational which implies being logically consistent; and P4 demonstrates that treating a person as solely a means towards an end entails (at least implicitly) a contradiction and thusly should not be done (if one is rational): when one uses another person for solely their own end, they concede in action that the other person is not an end in themselves (because they are treating them as solely a means) but are equally conceding that they are an end in themselves (due to their nature as a person)—hence the contradiction.

Persons are ends in themselves because they have the capacity to set out means towards ultimately themselves as the end; thusly, they are ends in themselves. There is nothing like this outside of minds in reality: everything else lacks this capacity.

That persons, and thus minds are means and not ends in themselves. This is because you haven't proven either of the statements, only asserted them. Still, lets continue and assume you can demonstrate C4 as true.

So the proof itself is not meant to give every detail of proof for FET, because that would take pages upon pages upon pages (: but, rather, outline the basic argument. If you don’t believe that persons are ends in themselves, then, of course, the conclusion will not follow. We can discuss in more depth what is now P2 if you would like to contend with that one.

Again I'm going to assume minds have value because they are rational and therefore have innate value. So since we should not consider minds valueless, they have value. And since minds have value, people have value. But then doesn't this prove that people are not ends in themselves?

Firstly, I would just like to note again that I am not arguing that only rational agents have value, because I don not consider all minds to even have the capacity to be rational (in any meaningful sense); or, if they do, it is a stretch.

Secondly, yes, if you thought that minds have innate value, then they have value; and if they have value, then they are not invaluable. I happen to think that it is impossible to value a mind without contradicting its nature; so I can’t even value it at 0—so it must be invaluable. However, as I noted before, I don’t think diving into a theory of axiology is all that imperative to my argument, as my revised argument leaves out how value judgments work (purposely so to not derail on that point). I understand some people use ‘value’ in the sense of also minds, like intrinsic value and the like.

That we should consider that minds have value? Then why are we asserting that minds don't have value?

Something being invaluable is not the same thing as valueless. I am arguing that if we cannot value minds, then we cannot even count them as valueless because that is to value something at 0. So they must be invaluable, which is to say we can’t put a price on it; which usually entails it is “more valuable” than anything that can be valued.

Are you stating that not valuing a mind with the representation of 0, is in fact a value? Because that just doesn't work Bob. The number zero is a representation of there not being a quantity. The number zero is not a quantity in itself. The number zero for value is a representation of there being no value, a numeric assignment of zero for value does not mean there exists a value. It means there is no underlying represented value.

Being valueless is to be valued at 0 which is a number which expresses a quantified price—thusly putting a value on it. If there doesn’t exist a value, then it isn’t valueless in the sense that it is worth nothing. I see your point though, so perhaps the confusion between our views lies in the fact that I am talking about ‘valueless’ in the sense of having the absolute least worth, which if we cannot put a worth on minds then they are invaluable, which entails the exact opposite of being valueless. Something being valueless entails you can mistreat it, abuse it, etc.; whereas invaluable means you certainly will not do such things.

Finally, the term 'invaluable' means that it has so much value, it cannot be quantified into one number. It doesn't mean it has no value at all.

That’s fair. I just mean by “we can’t value it” that we cannot put a price on it.

I think you're trying to say something here, but its just not coming across correctly. It seems to me that when you speak about valuing something, you're talking about a quantative value. For example, lets say we valued a person's worth at 10,000 dollars. If of course we could value people quantitively, then we could use them as means to an end. For example, I could use a person worth 10,000 dollars to make myself 1 million dollars. However, if human value is so valuable as to be beyond quantification, an infinite value so to speak, then we could never use a human as a means to an end. We don't use infinite money to make infinite money, that's silly. We simply enjoy infinite money.

That’s fair, and this is why I revised the argument. Hopefully it is a bit clearer now what it is arguing.

Is that what you were trying to say?

I am trying to convey that persons are ends in themselves because their nature is such that they are the creators of values (they set out things as means towards their own ends, making them the end ultimately); and if we treat them solely as a means towards an end then we are implicitly conceding the contradiction that they are and are not an end in themselves. So if we are to be rational, then we cannot solely treat someone as means towards an end, but always simultaneously an end in themselves—hence FET.

This seems to jive with your idea of your formula of ideal sovereignty. If all people are infinitely valuable, sacrificing one infinity for 99 infinities works in the moment of practical necessity, but one infinity is just as equivalent in value to 99 infinities, thus this sacrifice should be abated where possible.

Exactly! FIS is just a pragmatic principle/formula to solve moral dilemmas/antinomies.

Hopefully that clarified a bit.

Philosophim

Thanks for the answers Bob! I think you tightened up the argument a bit, I'll point out the remaining issues I see.

That’s fair. It opens up the discussion back to metaethics; but I just wanted to make it clear that this theory was building off of the previous one, so one has to subjectively affirm ‘one ought to be rational’—there is not moral fact which makes it so. — Bob Ross

I understand from your point of view, but for the reader, its not relevant what your argument is here. I've found philosophical arguments can, and must, be treated as 'chunks'. Partly this helps keep focus on what is important to the current argument. The idea, "People ought to be rational" is really the only part we need to know to examine the argument you've presented here. Whether that conclusion is subjective or objective is irrelevant and can distract from the point you want to make.

You've probably seen me do this multiple times in our discussions. You'll be talking about something farther down the line of the argument I'm making, or questioning things that are not yet relevant to the argument at hand. When that happens, I try to bring you back to the chunk we're on first. First let people see the argument you want to discuss, not the one you don't want to discuss yet. If your argument works, then you can go back and address whether "We ought to be rational" is subjective or objective.

This lets us 'chunk' the discussions into manageable bits. When you bring in another pre-chunk, you'll find people will ignore the main point you're trying to make here and drag in, "Well why should we be rational?" That's not the point here. I only say this from the bruises I have from my own experience. =)

Persons are ends in themselves because they have the capacity to set out means towards ultimately themselves as the end; thusly, they are ends in themselves. — Bob Ross

I could agree with you if you stated minds, which would include insects, animals, and potentially plants. From animals at least we have clear evidence that animals such as crows and dogs for example, can have ends in mind that they set out towards. I think this is in line with what you want to say, but correct me if I'm wrong here.

If you don’t believe that persons are ends in themselves, then, of course, the conclusion will not follow. — Bob Ross

Ok, I am more than willing to state that minds are beings that can plan means for ends in themselves and see where this goes. After all, a rock has no plan for its own ends; it simply exists.

Firstly, I would just like to note again that I am not arguing that only rational agents have value, because I don not consider all minds to even have the capacity to be rational (in any meaningful sense); or, if they do, it is a stretch. — Bob Ross

I thought that was what you were going for, I just couldn't see how that fit at the time.

Finally, the term 'invaluable' means that it has so much value, it cannot be quantified into one number. It doesn't mean it has no value at all.

That’s fair. I just mean by “we can’t value it” that we cannot put a price on it. — Bob Ross

If that's your intent, all good. The only problem in the theory is proving why minds are invaluable. I happen to agree that minds are the highest values in existence, but for the theory to hold you'll need to prove why minds, even irrational ones, are priced right out of quantification.

That’s fair, and this is why I revised the argument. Hopefully it is a bit clearer now what it is arguing. — Bob Ross

I think it is now.

I am trying to convey that persons are ends in themselves because their nature is such that they are the creators of values (they set out things as means towards their own ends, making them the end ultimately); and if we treat them solely as a means towards an end then we are implicitly conceding the contradiction that they are and are not an end in themselves. So if we are to be rational, then we cannot solely treat someone as means towards an end, but always simultaneously an end in themselves—hence FET. — Bob Ross

Ok, I think this is more clear to me now. There are a few things to tackle to separate yourself from Kant.

1. Minds vs persons. If you want to apply it to all minds, you'll need to place the emphasis on minds instead of persons. As I mentioned earlier, this at the very least means animals. Can we justify killing an animal to eat it and survive if they are a means to us and an end to themself? If ends to themselves are invaluable, how do we justify killing and eating cows over killing and eating other humans?

2. The problem with removing value entirely is that questions of relative sacrifice no longer have any justification. Beyond the animal question, consider this. We have a room with 3 people. An unapologetic murderer, an unapologetic saint, and a regular person. They all must choose one of them to die for the other 2 to live. Currently, your theory has no means of stating that the murderer should be the one to die. Anytime we run into a case that conflicts with what most people would innately feel is a simple moral choice and conclusion, the theory needs to clearly and persuasively explain why we should logically dismiss that conclusion.

3. How do we treat minds that believe the best end to itself, is to end other ends in themselves? Or believes it is rational that the worth of other minds can be quantified as less than its own mind? What I'm noting is that your claim that minds are invaluable is not proven, only claimed. Anytime we claim something without proof, we must immediately realize that someone can claim the opposite to our claim and be just as justified as we are. That makes the argument an opinion, and not an airtight rationale.

Finally, after fully establishing how it minds and not persons that this theory applies to, I would study the general criticisms that people lobby against Kant and see if an how your theory answers or dodges those criticisms.

Bob Ross

↪Philosophim

I understand from your point of view, but for the reader, its not relevant what your argument is here.

That is fair enough. I will change that later.

I could agree with you if you stated minds, which would include insects, animals, and potentially plants.

I am talking about minds, as ‘persons’ to me is a ‘being with personhood’ which, in turns, just entails that the being ‘has a mind’. I did re-google of the term ‘person’ and it seems to exclusively tend to pertain to humans, so I will rewrite the argument with ‘mind’ instead of ‘person’ to more clearly convey the point.

The only problem in the theory is proving why minds are invaluable. I happen to agree that minds are the highest values in existence, but for the theory to hold you'll need to prove why minds, even irrational ones, are priced right out of quantification.

So, I got rid of that ‘value’ language in the argument because I don’t think it really matters. If you can’t treat an end as merely a means, then it doesn’t matter if you find it invaluable or not: you will treat it as though it is anyways.

So the argument is just FET, which is just that one cannot use a mind as solely a means towards an end but also must treat it simultaneously as an end in itself; and this is demonstrated in the (new) proof by teasing out a contradiction.

1. Minds vs persons.

I agree, and I noted this in the OP (I believe). I mean personhood, or ‘mindhood’, by persons and not rational agents; which is different than Kant.

Can we justify killing an animal to eat it and survive if they are a means to us and an end to themself? If ends to themselves are invaluable, how do we justify killing and eating cows over killing and eating other humans?

This is also addressed in the OP: my answer is yes if it is for the reason of nourishment, not things like taste. I can go through the argument if you would like for why that would be the case. This is another distinguishing factor between me and Kant.

The problem with removing value entirely is that questions of relative sacrifice no longer have any justification.

That is what FIS is for: if you have to violate FET, then it does not follow that you should just pick “eenie, meenie, miny, mo” (:

If one is really taking FET seriously, then even in situations where they must violate it they should still be considering FIS which is a pragmatic formula that is centered around sanctity of minds, and it is a simple question: what action can I perform that would progress best towards a world with maximal sovereignty of minds (persons)?

We have a room with 3 people. An unapologetic murderer, an unapologetic saint, and a regular person. They all must choose one of them to die for the other 2 to live. Currently, your theory has no means of stating that the murderer should be the one to die.

I would say that the murderer should die because they have a track record of violating FET outright (in a case where presumably it was nor a moral antinomy) whereas the other two do not and this is going to seem to progress better towards a world with maximal sovereignty of minds (persons) than killing one of the other two.

Anytime we run into a case that conflicts with what most people would innately feel is a simple moral choice and conclusion, the theory needs to clearly and persuasively explain why we should logically dismiss that conclusion.

I don’t think we should dismiss that conclusion at all. If you are stipulating that one has to get killed by the other two, then it is just a matter of deciding who goes. If you are stipulating that they could choose not to kill anyone and all three die, then I would say that is the best option because upholding a human being’s right to life as an absolute right, like we normally do, seems to be a progression best towards a world with maximal sovereignty of minds. If we just let me kill each other, even to survive themselves all else being equal, then we regress from the civil rights people have been working towards for so long. I don’t have the right to kill you so that I simply can keep living, because we have setup a system where human beings specifically have immutable, inalienable rights.

How do we treat minds that believe the best end to itself, is to end other ends in themselves? Or believes it is rational that the worth of other minds can be quantified as less than its own mind?

I don’t understand the first question, but my answer to the second is that they would be violating FET if they did all else being equal. If it is a moral antinomy, then they may be right depending on the facts in relation to FIS (in principle); but I would intuit that we would be regressing my removing human beings inalienable rights, so I would say in the case of humans we are best off (for the sake of getting to a maximal sovereignty state) to keep rights inalienable.

Finally, after fully establishing how it minds and not persons that this theory applies to, I would study the general criticisms that people lobby against Kant and see if an how your theory answers or dodges those criticisms

I have and am more than happy to answer any of them you may have!

Philosophim

I am talking about minds, as ‘persons’ to me is a ‘being with personhood’ which, in turns, just entails that the being ‘has a mind’. I did re-google of the term ‘person’ and it seems to exclusively tend to pertain to humans, so I will rewrite the argument with ‘mind’ instead of ‘person’ to more clearly convey the point. — Bob Ross

Seems fine to me. Since this is based off of Kant, it might help to contrast your reasoning with why Kant chose rational minds. I explored Kant years ago and do not remember much at this point.

So, I got rid of that ‘value’ language in the argument because I don’t think it really matters. If you can’t treat an end as merely a means, then it doesn’t matter if you find it invaluable or not: you will treat it as though it is anyways.

So the argument is just FET, which is just that one cannot use a mind as solely a means towards an end but also must treat it simultaneously as an end in itself; and this is demonstrated in the (new) proof by teasing out a contradiction. — Bob Ross

This is also fine. You're taking Kant's stance with a change in detail about minds. Its well documented enough you don't have to go into the justification of the FET unless someone has a problem with Kant.

Can we justify killing an animal to eat it and survive if they are a means to us and an end to themself? If ends to themselves are invaluable, how do we justify killing and eating cows over killing and eating other humans?

This is also addressed in the OP: my answer is yes if it is for the reason of nourishment, not things like taste. I can go through the argument if you would like for why that would be the case. This is another distinguishing factor between me and Kant. — Bob Ross

I think this fits in fine with the FIS. The FIS nicely follows if the FES holds up. Also, an animal is not a person. So no need to go into any more detail for me. :)

The problem with removing value entirely is that questions of relative sacrifice no longer have any justification.
— Bob Ross

If one is really taking FET seriously, then even in situations where they must violate it they should still be considering FIS which is a pragmatic formula that is centered around sanctity of minds, and it is a simple question: what action can I perform that would progress best towards a world with maximal sovereignty of minds (persons)? — Bob Ross

I think this solves the majority of the issues I mentioned. Any mind which took away sovereignty from other minds would be less valuable in a relative forced moral decision.

Anytime we run into a case that conflicts with what most people would innately feel is a simple moral choice and conclusion, the theory needs to clearly and persuasively explain why we should logically dismiss that conclusion.

I don’t think we should dismiss that conclusion at all. — Bob Ross

Sorry, I should have been more clear. Only if your moral decision contrasts with the general expected outcome, then one should explain why the theory necessitates the dismissal of the general expected outcome. I agree that if the proposed moral theory coincides with the expected outcome, its great to walk through it.

I don’t understand the first question, but my answer to the second is that they would be violating FET if they did all else being equal. If it is a moral antinomy, then they may be right depending on the facts in relation to FIS (in principle); but I would intuit that we would be regressing my removing human beings inalienable rights, so I would say in the case of humans we are best off (for the sake of getting to a maximal sovereignty state) to keep rights inalienable. — Bob Ross

Basically I was asking how do we tell a person who rationally justifies murdering another person that they're wrong? As to your second point, the problem really comes into play with justifying the FET's fundamental point that minds are ends in themselves. Why is this necessarily so? How do you demonstrate that a person who rationally justifies that they don't care about ends to themselves and thus don't care about how minds are treated?

So I think this is in a lot better place, I just noted two questions to consider.

1. Can you prove that any of us should care about people as ends in themselves?
2. Can you make a clear contrast with how Kant determines its rational beings to consider in the FET with your line of reasoning that it should be minds?

Other then that, I think its just Kant stuff, and I'm sure a Kantian will come along and be able to provide more feedback. Nicely done Bob!

Bob Ross

↪Philosophim

Seems fine to me. Since this is based off of Kant, it might help to contrast your reasoning with why Kant chose rational minds. I explored Kant years ago and do not remember much at this point.

It is because he considers only rational agents to have the sufficient freedom to obey their own representational laws as opposed to the laws of nature.

I say all minds have sufficient freedom to do it, we just don’t have the same amount each.

Also, an animal is not a person. So no need to go into any more detail for me.

Just a note: I am saying animals have minds; but aren’t a person in the sense of being a human being. They are, as minds, covered by FET.

So I think this is in a lot better place, I just noted two questions to consider.

1. Can you prove that any of us should care about people as ends in themselves?
2. Can you make a clear contrast with how Kant determines its rational beings to consider in the FET with your line of reasoning that it should be minds?

#1 is proven by the argument for FET: if one is rational, then they cannot treat a mind as solely a means towards an end without conceding a contradiction.

#2 yes, so Kant considers freedom to be something only rational agents have; and he defines it in terms of being able to obey one’s own representations of laws as opposed to the laws of nature. He thinks this because, quite frankly, he doesn’t think most animals have the capacity to set up for themselves a law and abide by: they just go from one biological motivation to another like a slave to biology. Hence, rational beings (i.e., those beings which can hang up a law to abide by with their capacity of freedom and presumably cognitive capabilities) are the only ends. Something which is does not have the freedom (in the sense of what I described above) cannot be an end because they are not setting out for themselves means towards their own ends because they are not freely choosing them—like a robot doing exactly what it was programmed to do. Kant believed in a libertarian form of free will, and in the sense that we have free will in virtue of a soul that we ultimately are (as opposed to merely have).

I take a much more naturalistic approach: I say nature, especially evolution, makes no leaps. It is clear to me that the vast majority of animals (although I don’t know about literally all of them) have sufficient freedom to set out a means towards their end, even if they lack the highly rational capacities we humans have. My dog clearly is not rational, but she has her moments: if the matt is wet outside, then she will wait farther back for me to let her in so that her feet don’t get wet. That’s a deliberate action sparked by her making a free choice to not get her feet wet and trying to actualize that prevention by setting out waiting farther back as a means towards that end. Anyways, I am a compatiblist when it comes to free will and don’t believe in souls.

Other then that, I think its just Kant stuff, and I'm sure a Kantian will come along and be able to provide more feedback. Nicely done Bob!

I'm sure @Mww will have a lot to say (:
Thank you!

Do you agree, Philosophim, with FET and FIS? Or are you just granting them as internally coherent?

Philosophim

It is because he considers only rational agents to have the sufficient freedom to obey their own representational laws as opposed to the laws of nature.

I say all minds have sufficient freedom to do it, we just don’t have the same amount each. — Bob Ross

That's fair. The only potential problem I see is how to justify eating or using animals for materials or labor. Beyond animals, there's now also the question of insects. Do they have minds? Where does a mind begin and end? If we can't treat them as solely means, then do we have a right to eat them?

Of course, this has been answered in other cultures. Jainism preaches that we should never kill animals. I suppose the FIS can note its a necessary evil, but that still leads to points of comparison. Why are animals and insects ends in themselves but clearly have less value compared to people? Its an assumption we all agree upon, but I don't know if there's a clear explanation from the FET and FIS alone.

#1 is proven by the argument for FET: if one is rational, then they cannot treat a mind as solely a means towards an end without conceding a contradiction. — Bob Ross

The only issue is that P2: Person's are ends in themselves isn't proven, its more of a given assumption. Which is fine when you're trying to prove a point. If minds are ends in themselves, then we can say x,y,z. But it all hinges on the reader accepting that a mind is an end in itself and that ends in themselves matter. For a person who already agrees or does not want to question this, it can work. This is more of an apologetics philosophy for morality then a paper of proof.

Apologetics in Christianity is an approach of the religion to the common moral person. Its target audience is a person who wants to believe in God, or has a few upper level hang ups about God. Generally apologetics make a lot of assumptions and don't worry about proving a lot of their premises, only drawing conclusions from these assumptions. I think apologetics serve a very good purpose. They get a person who doesn't need or want to think too deeply about the topic to more easily make better decisions in their lives. Same with the paper you've put here. For someone who already believes in morality and wants to be moral, its a rationale to continue to do so. Not all of us are crazy people who want to dive headlong into writing and questioning the nature of "what is" for days on end. :D

Do you agree, Philosophim, with FET and FIS? Or are you just granting them as internally coherent? — Bob Ross

I'm granting them as acceptably internally coherent. For me, its not enough to state that FET and FIS are 'the' moral theory. Its not that I don't think minds are the greatest things that can be, its the 'end in themselves' argument that isn't enough for me. Why is it important to be a end in itself? What does that even mean? (I know you've answered this, just showing my thought process) Why is it that we have value and morality at all? I'm the type of person that can accept a set of assumptions that lead to a conclusion, but then I have to question the assumptions after. I have to know Bob. And its not that I can't be moral in the meantime or hold a set of values until I find out more. It just has to go deeper.

We've been discussing the objective morality proposal in another thread, so you can see how deep this goes for me. That being said, I want to emphasize again that I find value in these topics. We have all levels of different people in life, and a theory like this could fit someone's personality to give a little justification and happiness in being moral. If it is this or being thrown into moral nihilism, its better to have this any day!

I take a much more naturalistic approach: I say nature, especially evolution, makes no leaps. It is clear to me that the vast majority of animals (although I don’t know about literally all of them) have sufficient freedom to set out a means towards their end, even if they lack the highly rational capacities we humans have. My dog clearly is not rational, but she has her moments: if the matt is wet outside, then she will wait farther back for me to let her in so that her feet don’t get wet. That’s a deliberate action sparked by her making a free choice to not get her feet wet and trying to actualize that prevention by setting out waiting farther back as a means towards that end. Anyways, I am a compatiblist when it comes to free will and don’t believe in souls. — Bob Ross

These are my thoughts as well. Kant came from an era where it was still too easy to dismiss animals as having any worth, and I believe he's a victim of that culture. I often wonder how the culture I've been raised to think in affects my own outlook, and if in a few generations from now they will look back on my thoughts as barbaric or hopelessly naive. :) Anyway, good discussion Bob! I hope Mww comes along and gives it a good read.

Mww

I'm sure Mww will have a lot to say — Bob Ross

Not a whole lot, truth be told. You’ve presented a worthy argument for a specific theory, blessed it with a Kantian foundation, but…..

….basing metaethics on F.P.M.M, 1785, isn’t what that treatise is about. For ethical systems, you’d probably want Metaphysics of Ethics,1797, especially considering your sections on rights and virtue, each having a book of their own in that work as a whole;
….the exchange of rational beings for minds either leaves out, or at least makes no account for the fundamental predicates of Kantian moral/ethical philosophy, re: will, autonomy and pure practical reason belonging necessarily to the former as a rational being, or person, but these need methodological justification in the latter as a simple mind;
….the conceptions means and ends, as they relate to moral/ethical philosophy, need to be determined before a FET with them as its ground, makes sense;
….you say, “FET, no matter how useful it is itself for ethics, cannot be enough for good moral discernment”, but I rather think the intent of it was precisely for moral discernment, of the pure subjectivist account.
….lastly, if one thinks ethics relates to a community of persons/minds, wouldn’t each mind need a moral disposition of his own? Otherwise, they become a hive rather than a community. And if that’s the case, shouldn’t there be some necessary condition similar to a categorical imperative somewhere in this current theory? Seems like a community must come to grips with a potentially universal law of some sort, by some method, else why consider themselves members of a community in the first place, such imperative for which there is no reason to suppose belongs to a mere hive or herd.

Anyway, I like the work that’s been done here, but it seems a little incomplete to me. I can’t help but think that upon more substance amended to the conditions, it may be found they don’t work as they are now.

Bob Ross

↪Philosophim

The only potential problem I see is how to justify eating or using animals for materials or labor

I just updated the OP so that it is clearer what is being argued: my answer is yes, it is justified because, long story short, it is a moral antinomy and I would intuit that, in accordance with FIS, that is permissible as long as it is done with reverence and respect for those animals.

A key feature I was not fully grasping of my (normative) theory is that practical life itself is essentially nothing but moral antinomies; and so FIS plays a much stronger role in practical life than I first envisioned.

Beyond animals, there's now also the question of insects. Do they have minds?

So, I would like to point out this is just an empirical question about what exactly has a mind, whereas my theory is simply proving that if it does have one, then what the implications (ethically) are of that. I am not sure how many insects have minds. I also added a terminology section to help define what I mean by a mind. I would say if the insect has some sort of inner life, such that there is something there is to be it in and of itself, then it has a mind.

Where does a mind begin and end?

I definitely can’t answer that, and, quite frankly, no one can. This isn’t necessary for the theory to work though, as I can prove that there is such a thing as a puddle and a lake without knowing the exact threshold where one becomes the other.

If we can't treat them as solely means, then do we have a right to eat them?

Yes, in the case that it is for nourishment. See the section on ‘treatment of other animals’ I added.

Why are animals and insects ends in themselves but clearly have less value compared to people?

They don’t have less value than humans: they are prioritized lower in the case of moral antinomies, which is most of practical life, than humans.

The only issue is that P2: Person's are ends in themselves isn't proven, its more of a given assumption.

I added more sections that pertain to ends vs. means; and there is an explanation below the argument of why P2 is true. They are ends in themselves because they are the only beings with a nature such that they are an absolute end.

But it all hinges on the reader accepting that a mind is an end in itself and that ends in themselves matter. For a person who already agrees or does not want to question this, it can work.

I gave an explanation of this, even in the previous version of the OP, so I don’t see how it is purely assumptive (in it).

I'm granting them as acceptably internally coherent.

I see!

Its not that I don't think minds are the greatest things that can be, its the 'end in themselves' argument that isn't enough for me. Why is it important to be a end in itself? What does that even mean? (I know you've answered this, just showing my thought process) Why is it that we have value and morality at all?

Which premise do you disagree with? The idea behind the premises and conclusion is that one has to disagree with at least one of them to deny FET which allows us to discuss the disagreement. I just don’t know which one exactly you are disagreeing with, but I am more than happy to discuss whichever one it is in more depth.

Also, I added a section on means vs. ends, so hopefully that clarifies that part a bit.

Bob Ross

↪Mww

Hello Mww!

Just FYI, I modified the OP, so it has changed quite a bit (;

….basing metaethics on F.P.M.M, 1785, isn’t what that treatise is about. For ethical systems, you’d probably want Metaphysics of Ethics,1797, especially considering your sections on rights and virtue, each having a book of their own in that work as a whole

Interesting, I will have to give it a read; but I would like to clarify that I am not basing my metaethics on Kant, just normative ethics. Kant would not like me being a moral anti-realist (:

….the exchange of rational beings for minds either leaves out, or at least makes no account for the fundamental predicates of Kantian moral/ethical philosophy, re: will, autonomy and pure practical reason belonging necessarily to the former as a rational being, or person, but these need methodological justification in the latter as a simple mind;

I honestly don’t see this as a problem: I think all minds, as outlined in my argument for FET, are subjected to his line of reasoning; and not just rational ones.

….the conceptions means and ends, as they relate to moral/ethical philosophy, need to be determined before a FET with them as its ground, makes sense;

Fair enough. I added a new section on that.

….you say, “FET, no matter how useful it is itself for ethics, cannot be enough for good moral discernment”, but I rather think the intent of it was precisely for moral discernment, of the pure subjectivist account.

Yes, the original intent by Kant was a strictly deontological account which made no room for pragmatically resolving moral antinomies—my does though.

….lastly, if one thinks ethics relates to a community of persons/minds, wouldn’t each mind need a moral disposition of his own? Otherwise, they become a hive rather than a community. And if that’s the case, shouldn’t there be some necessary condition similar to a categorical imperative somewhere in this current theory?

Yes, the categorical imperative is FET, but my FET is not targeting only rational beings nor does it bar pragmatic resolutions of moral antinomies.

I should note, as a moral anti-realist, I do not think categorical imperatives express something objective but, rather, are an absolute, ultimate end—and end for its own sake which is perfectly compatible with denying any objectivity to it. Does that make Kant roll over in his grave? You tell me…

Anyway, I like the work that’s been done here, but it seems a little incomplete to me. I can’t help but think that upon more substance amended to the conditions, it may be found they don’t work as they are now.

Since I revised it, please give it another read and let me know if you have changed your mind here.

Philosophim

So, I would like to point out this is just an empirical question about what exactly has a mind, whereas my theory is simply proving that if it does have one — Bob Ross

That's fair. So then if someone found an insect to be an end in itself, it would be needed to be treated as such.

Where does a mind begin and end?

I definitely can’t answer that, and, quite frankly, no one can. — Bob Ross

I see that as a problem considering that minds and their status are the fundamental lynch pin of your argument. Perhaps this could be answered if you define whether it is possible for something that is not a mind to be an end in itself.

Why are animals and insects ends in themselves but clearly have less value compared to people?

They don’t have less value than humans: they are prioritized lower in the case of moral antinomies, which is most of practical life, than humans. — Bob Ross

I understand you don't want to use the word value, but almost anyone using the theory will. In the case of choosing what must be sacrificed for another species to live, there must be a rationale behind it. In your case if you want to avoid value, you may just want to say, "Whatever is stronger." So if an insect ate a human being, it would be merely due to capability and not that one is more valuable than the other.

The only issue is that P2: Person's are ends in themselves isn't proven, its more of a given assumption.

I added more sections that pertain to ends vs. means; and there is an explanation below the argument of why P2 is true. They are ends in themselves because they are the only beings with a nature such that they are an absolute end. — Bob Ross

I'm not seeing why that matters though. All this seems to imply is that minds are beings that are ends in themselves. It doesn't prove why anyone should value this, its just a claim.

Which premise do you disagree with? — Bob Ross

Just why ends in themselves should matter beyond our desire or opinion that they should matter. I have a feeling reading Mww's response, that this is covered more thoroughly by Kant. He may be better to consult going forward. :)

Bob Ross

↪Philosophim

I see that as a problem considering that minds and their status are the fundamental lynch pin of your argument. Perhaps this could be answered if you define whether it is possible for something that is not a mind to be an end in itself.

I think this is just the fallacy of the heap.

I understand you don't want to use the word value, but almost anyone using the theory will. In the case of choosing what must be sacrificed for another species to live, there must be a rationale behind it. In your case if you want to avoid value, you may just want to say, "Whatever is stronger." So if an insect ate a human being, it would be merely due to capability and not that one is more valuable than the other.

I understand that most people’s knee-jerk reaction is to say “humans have more value!”; but this simply isn’t true under my theory. Instead, we are pragmatically permitted to use them, with stipulations, because it is in accordance with FIS.

Likewise, it is not “the stronger wins”. It is entirely possible that, according to FIS, a mind holds higher precedence over another mind and the former is physically weaker than the latter.

I'm not seeing why that matters though. All this seems to imply is that minds are beings that are ends in themselves. It doesn't prove why anyone should value this, its just a claim.
…
Just why ends in themselves should matter beyond our desire or opinion that they should matter.

So the idea is that ‘one ought to be rational’ and an implication of that is that ‘one ought not to concede contradictions as true’; and from that that ‘one ought not perform an action that concedes a contradiction as true’; and from that one should not treat a mind as a sole means towards an end because it concedes (implicitly in action) a contradiction as true: that they are and are not an end in themselves. So if you accept that ‘one ought to be rational’ and that ‘minds are ends in themselves’ and that ‘sole means are not ends’, then it logically follows that one should not treat them as a mere means. Not sure if that helps.

Philosophim

I see that as a problem considering that minds and their status are the fundamental lynch pin of your argument. Perhaps this could be answered if you define whether it is possible for something that is not a mind to be an end in itself.

I think this is just the fallacy of the heap. — Bob Ross

I'm wondering if the tie in of minds to things in themselves is this fallacy. My thinking was that if minds are the only things that are ends in themselves, you can just remove ends in themselves and just note that minds are simply the things on this planet which should be protected and encouraged. It just simplifies the argument.

Likewise, it is not “the stronger wins”. It is entirely possible that, according to FIS, a mind holds higher precedence over another mind and the former is physically weaker than the latter. — Bob Ross

Sure, but what's the way we measure the precedence? I think it works in easily defined scenarios like "People who follow the FET and FES versus those who defy it," but what about situations in which everyone is a rational agent who follows this morality to a T? As a simple solution its a nice thought, but I'm not seeing how we can develop any air tight means of measurement when tough moral choices come up. Its not anything you have to debate with me about, these are just musings to think about.

So if you accept that ‘one ought to be rational’ and that ‘minds are ends in themselves’ and that ‘sole means are not ends’, then it logically follows that one should not treat them as a mere means. — Bob Ross

I get that. The question is why anyone should care if a mind thinks its an end to itself. There's nothing requiring me in that argument to not solely treat them as an ends in themselves. All you've noted is that we cannot solely view them as a means. Vice versa it also means we cannot solely view them as an ends. Also, I'm not really sure there's an iron bound logic demonstrating why I should care if a mind views themselves as a means to an ends.

Is it possible that you could demonstrate why using a person for one's own end is a contradiction? I believe you need to include Kant's universizability principle for it work. Essentially Kant believed "act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.” With that you can make an argument that if a person does not treat themselves as a means to an end, they shouldn't expect anyone else to either.

Of course, we reach a similar question once more. What if I also treat myself as a means to an end? Further, why should I care if something becomes a universal law if it doesn't benefit me directly? What logically forces me to concede a universal law, and this law in particular? Just more things to think about.

Bob Ross

↪Philosophim

I'm wondering if the tie in of minds to things in themselves is this fallacy. My thinking was that if minds are the only things that are ends in themselves, you can just remove ends in themselves and just note that minds are simply the things on this planet which should be protected and encouraged. It just simplifies the argument.

Two things:

1. It is required to note that minds are ends in themselves because the identity of ‘an absolute end’ does not entail itself that those are only minds: minds are being predicated as the only absolute ends and not equivocal to them.

2. By end in themselves, I do not mean ‘things in themselves’. The Kantian idea of ‘thing-in-itself’ is that which exists independently of our sense-data of them—and independent of experience in general—whereas ‘end in themselves’ is the idea about beings with a nature such that they are absolute ends.

As a simple solution its a nice thought, but I'm not seeing how we can develop any air tight means of measurement when tough moral choices come up. Its not anything you have to debate with me about, these are just musings to think about.

FIS does not afford an equation that one can determine exactly what one should do in every given situation: it is a general formula, not an exact science. I have never heard a normative ethical theory that is able to afford such an equation without biting a lot of bullets.

So if you accept that ‘one ought to be rational’ and that ‘minds are ends in themselves’ and that ‘sole means are not ends’, then it logically follows that one should not treat them as a mere means. — Bob Ross

I get that. The question is why anyone should care if a mind thinks its an end to itself

If you agree, then you know that it doesn’t matter if anyone cares, despite the argument, about minds. If one accepts that accepting the premises entails the conclusion that one should treat minds as sacred, then if they either have deny a premise or accept that they should treat mind as sacred. Asking, on top of that, “but why should I care?” doesn’t get around this.

There's nothing requiring me in that argument to not solely treat them as an ends in themselves. All you've noted is that we cannot solely view them as a means.

Argument concludes that you cannot use a mind as solely a means, so this is false.

Vice versa it also means we cannot solely view them as an ends.

No, the conclusion is that they must at least simultaneously treat them as an end, and never solely as a means.

Is it possible that you could demonstrate why using a person for one's own end is a contradiction?

That’s the whole pseudo-syllogism I gave: you can’t do it without contradicting their nature and if you are being rational then you will not act in a way that implicitly concedes contradictions.

I believe you need to include Kant's universizability principle for it work.

I don’t agree with Kant’s universizability formulation of the categorical imperative, as it presupposes that we want a functioning society; which is not the real categorical imperative to me: it’s not treating minds as solely means towards an end.

What if I also treat myself as a means to an end?

You can’t: it violates FET. If it is a moral antinomy, then it boils down to FIS.

Philosophim

1. It is required to note that minds are ends in themselves because the identity of ‘an absolute end’ does not entail itself that those are only minds — Bob Ross

This is why I asked earlier if you could give an example of an end in itself that wasn't a mind.

FIS does not afford an equation that one can determine exactly what one should do in every given situation: it is a general formula, not an exact science. I have never heard a normative ethical theory that is able to afford such an equation without biting a lot of bullets. — Bob Ross

Yes, this is my general problem with ethical theories and why I feel we have a lot more work to do on the matter.

If one accepts that accepting the premises entails the conclusion that one should treat minds as sacred, then if they either have deny a premise or accept that they should treat mind as sacred. — Bob Ross

Right, but that's the answer to any valid syllogism. If we accept the premises, then the conclusion must necessarily be so. Yes, proving that first is essential. But after its proven, the question becomes, "Can you prove that I should accept your premises?" Its a different chunk of the argument. Its the trap many philosophies fall into, including my own. Its fun to make an argument with premises, but then the premises themselves must be worked back through to be justified as well. Its why so many philosophies fail. They become satisfied with asserting the assumptions as fact without proof, and people outside of the work just don't get why that should be.

Anyway, I think its a good start, but you have to address that new chunk if you want to convince people fully. And if you're not concerned about convincing people on those other points, all good as well. Sometimes philosophy is for us and people like us, not something that can be applied to everyone.

Lionino

Nice. Good job.

180 Proof

Apologies for this delayed response.

If something is solely a means to an end, then it can’t be an end itself because it is just a means towards some other end. If it is also an end then it is not just a means towards an end. — Bob Ross

Repeating your definition doesn't make it more substantive than just a definition.

.The argument for FET is as follows:

P1: If something is solely a means towards an end, then it is not an end in itself.

P2: Minds are ends in themselves.

[ ... ] — Bob Ross

Again, an arbitrary posit.

P2 notes that minds are ends in themselves, and this is because minds are the only beings with the nature such that they are their own end—i.e., they are an absolute end

Circular to the point of being tautological.

Minds are the only beings capable of setting out contextual ends for the sake of themselves (as the final, absolute end) and are thusly ends in themselves.

:roll:

C: One should not treat a mind as solely a means towards an end, but always as (at least) simultaneously an end in themselves.

Again, this conclusion does not follow validly from your mere 'definitions' (& otherwise 'hidden premises' e.g. what is conceptually meant by "minds").

Reason's Greetings & Happy New Year, Bob! :sparkle:

Bob Ross

↪Philosophim

1. It is required to note that minds are ends in themselves because the identity of ‘an absolute end’ does not entail itself that those are only minds — Bob Ross

This is why I asked earlier if you could give an example of an end in itself that wasn't a mind.

There aren’t any: my point is just that I am predicating that only minds are ends-in-themselves and not equivocating them.

Yes, this is my general problem with ethical theories and why I feel we have a lot more work to do on the matter.

Agreed. Ethics is a science, and as such we have to learn as we go: there’s not exact formula that tells us, to the T, what to do: we rely heavily on moral intuitions.

Right, but that's the answer to any valid syllogism. If we accept the premises, then the conclusion must necessarily be so. Yes, proving that first is essential. But after its proven, the question becomes, "Can you prove that I should accept your premises?"

So that’s what I was asking about before: which premise do you currently reject? We can discuss further whichever one that is.

Bob Ross

↪180 Proof

Reason's Greetings & Happy New Year, Bob! :sparkle:

You too!

If something is solely a means to an end, then it can’t be an end itself because it is just a means towards some other end. If it is also an end then it is not just a means towards an end. — Bob Ross
Repeating your definition doesn't make it more substantive than just a definition.

I am not sure how else to explain it. They are categorically different: are you asking why a means can’t ever be an end in a different context?

P2 notes that minds are ends in themselves, and this is because minds are the only beings with the nature such that they are their own end—i.e., they are an absolute end
Circular to the point of being tautological.

I don’t see how it is circular. I am saying that the nature of a mind is to set out means towards their own ends (which is what it means to have motives, desires, and a will) whereof the ultimate end is themselves. What is tautological about that?

C: One should not treat a mind as solely a means towards an end, but always as (at least) simultaneously an end in themselves.
Again, this conclusion does not follow validly from your mere 'definitions' (& otherwise 'hidden premises' e.g. what is conceptually meant by "minds").

Why?

Philosophim

There aren’t any: my point is just that I am predicating that only minds are ends-in-themselves and not equivocating them. — Bob Ross

Stating that something is self-evident doesn't demonstrate that its also not an equivocation though. If minds are not identical to ends-in-themselves, then we would need to see some difference between a mind and an end-in-itself. If you aren't seeing equivocation, could you note how they are not simply the same thing?

So that’s what I was asking about before: which premise do you currently reject? We can discuss further whichever one that is. — Bob Ross

Certainly! For me it is that I should value an end in itself beyond an opinion that I should do so. I see nothing concrete that binds me to it, or demonstrates a provable ethical decision. 180 proof is walking the same line I am, just in different details.

Bob Ross

↪Philosophim

Stating that something is self-evident doesn't demonstrate that its also not an equivocation though. If minds are not identical to ends-in-themselves, then we would need to see some difference between a mind and an end-in-itself. If you aren't seeing equivocation, could you note how they are not simply the same thing?

A mind is an emergent process of a brain or a soul (take our pic) which is capable of having desires, cognizing, and having a conscious experience or an awareness of its environment; whereas, an end-in-itself is just a shorthand for something capable of deploying absolute ends.

For me it is that I should value an end in itself beyond an opinion that I should do so. I see nothing concrete that binds me to it, or demonstrates a provable ethical decision

Ok, which premise then?

Philosophim

A mind is an emergent process of a brain or a soul (take our pic) which is capable of having desires, cognizing, and having a conscious experience or an awareness of its environment; whereas, an end-in-itself is just a shorthand for something capable of deploying absolute ends. — Bob Ross

Yes, but can you give an example of that 'something' that isn't a mind?

Ok, which premise then? — Bob Ross

P4: To treat a mind as solely a means towards an end is to contradict their nature — Bob Ross

Contradicting a person's nature is not the law of non-contradiction. For example, someone's nature could be to commit suicide, but I step in and stop them. No logical contradiction happened like 'True is false'. Its just going against someone's desires that we call, "Nature". I'm not seeing a reason why I shouldn't go against someone else's desires based on the points you've covered here. As I noted earlier, I think you'll need Kant's categorical imperative to have some type of justification that tells me I can't use someone for my own ends.

Bob Ross

↪Philosophim

Yes, but can you give an example of that 'something' that isn't a mind?

No, there aren’t any.

Contradicting a person's nature is not the law of non-contradiction.

So, the idea is that when one treats an end, E, as solely a means, they thereby implicitly concede the contradiction that “E is and is not solely a means” which is a logical contradiction (i.e., E → [ B && !B ] ). So the idea is that contradicting a person’s nature actually leads to a contradiction itself, which a rational agent should avoid.

Now, to be completely honest, I am rethinking this normative theory; because I don’t think it works anymore. I have this darn habit of writing something up, and quickly defeating my own position—back to the drawing board! ):

The reason I don’t think it works is because I think the contradiction doesn’t actually exist if one disambiguates the language: kind of like how B and C were really easy to conflate in your theory, being an being with the ability to set out absolute ends is different than being an absolute end. And the contradiction only arises if I set out for myself an absolute end and then treat it as solely a means.

I will have to think about it more...

180 Proof

Now, to be completely honest, I am rethinking this normative theory; because I don’t think it works anymore. — Bob Ross

:up:

Philosophim

Now, to be completely honest, I am rethinking this normative theory; because I don’t think it works anymore. I have this darn habit of writing something up, and quickly defeating my own position—back to the drawing board! ): — Bob Ross

No shame at all. The person who isn't making mistakes in trying to forge forward to new discoveries isn't doing anything meaningful. The fact you can admit flaws in you own arguments puts you years ahead of many people who have attempted serious philosophy.

The reason I don’t think it works is because I think the contradiction doesn’t actually exist if one disambiguates the language: kind of like how B and C were really easy to conflate in your theory, being an being with the ability to set out absolute ends is different than being an absolute end. — Bob Ross

Hey, I'm glad you learned something from my mistake then! I've made a lot of them over the years, let me know if you need any more. :D

Bob Ross

↪Philosophim

Here's a new argument I was thinking of:

P1: One should abide by the intended function(s) of their organism.

P2: It is an intended function of the human species to care about the well-being of minds.

C: TF, a human should care about the well-being of minds.

What do you think?

Bob's Normative Ethical Theory

Welcome to The Philosophy Forum!

Categories

More Discussions