↪Joshs Oh please. A confused little boy like Leontiskos doesn't have the balls to be an authoritarian — hypericin

I dunno. Seems like he’s developing a cult following.

The problem with @Michael’s approach is that it disregards one’s responsibility to argue for a coherent moral theory and not contradict oneself. Michael has admitted that his own holdings are self-contradictory, but he ignores this fact and instead just argues with everyone. That is, he argues with noncognitivists, error theorists, subjectivists, and moral realists alike. Since his own position is self-contradictory he feels himself at his rights to argue against all possible positions simultaneously. It turns into argument for the sake of argument, a form of eristic. It is the act of arguing against everything without simultaneously arguing for anything, all while ignoring or continually dismissing the fact that his holdings and his approach are incoherent in themselves. I say this is not philosophy, and that is why I do not wish to engage it.

The problem with Michael’s approach is that it disregards one’s responsibility to argue for a coherent moral theory and not contradict oneself. — Leontiskos

I don’t need to argue for any theory. You’re shifting the burden of proof. You made much the same comment to another poster earlier in the discussion from what I recall.

Michael has admitted that his own holdings are self-contradictory, but he ignores this fact and instead just argues with everyone. That is, he argues with noncognitivists, error theorists, subjectivists, and moral realists alike. Since his own position is self-contradictory he feels himself at his rights to argue against all possible positions simultaneously. It turns into argument for the sake of argument — Leontiskos

I’m interested in testing the strengths of each theory whether I agree with their conclusions or not. If these arguments cannot stand up to scrutiny then they fail in their task.

I don’t know why you think my personal beliefs matter at all.

Justification is for suckers, and if someone hassles you over it just give them my name. — Ludwig Wittgenstein

What does it mean for an obligation to be moral? Are moral obligations discovered or socially constructed (or other)? How does one verify or falsify a supposed moral obligation? — Michael

I'm not avoiding these questions. I am avoiding glib answers. I've offered, here and in other threads, ways of thinking about them that I think are productive: direction of fit, status functions, existential autonomy, the capabilities approach. I''m not pretending to have an answer, indeed I don't think this is the sort of issue that that an answer, but instead consists in a process of self-development. I've little patience with poor thinking, and doubtless get more pleasure from kicking the occasional pup that I should. But I've avoided kicking hyperchin for a few days.

Nice list. Yes, that's the way to proceed, looking at how the words around "obligation" are used rather than just making up a definition.

"That's not moral and I refuse to say what I mean by 'moral'" — Leontiskos

This captures neatly the problem with @Michael's writing.

Nice summation of On Certainty.

When person A says to person B "I promise, I'll make sure you have a rose garden on Sunday", then come Monday person B ought have a rose garden. That is true because it corresponds to what A was doing when making the promise. That's what promising means.

It doesn't resolve it because I don't know which side to take. Do I accept that, as a categorical imperative, I ought not kick puppies, or do I accept that categorical imperatives make no sense? — Michael

Divorce the utterance from the label and walk away a free man. "One ought not kick puppies" is both sensible and true. It's definitely sensible, and that's enough, if you'd like to set the truth issue aside. If categorical imperatives make no sense, and "one ought not kick puppies" makes perfect sense, then "one ought not kick puppies" cannot count as a "categorical imperative", for the claim cannot do both, make perfect sense and make no sense..

Time to choose between the archaic taxonomy(categorical imperatives) and what you know is true despite not fully understanding how and/or why it is.

The end.

"One ought not kick puppies" is both sensible and true. — creativesoul

It's not true. Thank you for your time :)

One ought not kick puppies

It's very easy to pick our young, or the young of our pet species, and say "Its just true! We shouldn't harm them! Like, obviously!" But why a puppy? Why not all dogs? Until recently kicking dogs was a pretty normal, accepted thing to do. Only lately did it acquire a stink. Or, why dogs at all? Why not, pigs? Cows? Chickens? These are, after all, intelligent, feeling creatures. Is there some fine moral distinction I'm missing whereby "Thou shalt not kick puppies" is a commandment from God, whereas we collectively exploit and abuse the others with total indifference to the "obvious" moral facts concerning their well being? Or, maybe, just maybe, we like dogs more?

Pseudo-philosophers do seem to love inflating their biases and inclinations into universal truths.

Why not, pigs? — hypericin

I worked as a debt collector for a time in finance and I no kidding once had to put through an application for hardship for a fellow who had been suspended from his rural job for kicking the pigs out of frustration at the COVID lockdowns .. yikes.

Denied. Naturally.

Normativity in Metaethics

Our decision to focus initially on metaphysical issues doesn’t get us any closer to what normativity is; it only tells us where to locate the initial important questions about normativity. But what would make a fact be a normative one? We started with some hand-wavy platitudes about normative claims being “action-guiding”, and “attitude-guiding”, and about their giving us reasons for action, or reasons for attitudes. We could also give lots of examples of normative claims, adding that, if they are true, they are true in virtue of the normative facts:

...

But while platitudes and examples can give one a general sense of the extension of the normative, they don’t tell us what normativity is.

...

This worry becomes deeper when we consider the possibility of reasons that are not “robustly” normative in the philosophically most interesting and important sense. In chess, there is a reason to castle early. In etiquette, there is a reason, when in Rome, to do what the Romans do. But it might seem that these reasons have no genuine claim on our attention in the way that the moral reason to be loyal to friends does. So it would seem that the normatively fundamental facts about reasons, if reasons fundamentalism is indeed on the right track, would be facts about robustly normative reasons. Perhaps, then, only some reasons are normatively fundamental – the robustly normative ones. If so, presumably the reasons fundamentalist would want to amend their view: what makes a fact normative is that it is, or depends on, a fact or facts about robustly normative reasons. But then it seems important for them to be able to say what makes a reason robustly normative – and it would be unsatisfying for them to answer that a robustly normative reason is one that makes its dependents robustly normative!

There is more to the issue than you and some others seem willing to admit. Robust moral realists, non-realist cognitivists, and moral non-objectivists all believe that we have moral obligations, but they disagree on what this means and how such obligations can be verified or falsified.

Pretty close.

Back in the days when I edited Wikipedia, I was at pains to keep the distinction between substantive and minimalist theories of truth. That distinction has persisted, so I'll continue to think it useful For my part I prefer minimalist theories. Perhaps those who like substantive theories will be less amenable to ought statements having a truth value because of the execs baggage they attach to truth.

I'm not sure where stands in this regard, but @Bob Ross is surely thinking in terms of correspondence, along with many others hereabouts. A correspondence theorist might well be rightly puzzled as to what it is to which an ought statements corresponds. But to my eye this is not a reason to think there are no true ought statements, but instead to question if truth is always correspondence.

Anyway, the kicking puppies example was chosen because it is hard to come onto a page such as this and admit to engaging in puppy kicking as a pastime without losing some credibility. Even those who for whatever reason think "One ought not kick puppies for fun" is not true do not kick puppies for fun. @Michael elevated the preference to the status of a categorical imperative, while trying to leave the baggage associated with that term at the door. Others here, despite their agreeing with it, have insisted on its being justified or evidenced. Odd, that. To insist on a warrant despite agreeing; to insist on something incorrigible rather than what is already apparent.

Since we can build on the simple fact of our agreement. We can discourage puppy kicking, try to avoid the temptation provided by puppies, or introduce sanctions against puppy kickers. All the bits we need for a moral practice still follow, without a grounding in deontology or consequentialism, and with precious little metaethics.

Perhaps those who like substantive theories will be less amenable to ought statements having a truth value because of the execs baggage they attach to truth.

I'm not sure where Michael stands in this regard — Banno

Parfit’s non-realist cognitivism seems like it addresses this distinction.

Going further, the metaphysical non-naturalists believe that, when we make irreducibly normative claims, these claims imply that there exist some ontologically weighty non-natural entities or properties.

Non-metaphysical non-naturalists make no such claims, since they deny that irreducibly normative truths have any such ontologically weighty implications.

One such view in this light is non-realist cognitivism, in which there are some true claims which are not made to be true by the way in which they correctly describe, or correspond to, how things are in some part of reality.

The best analogy I think there is to this is the distinction between mathematical realists and mathematical nominalists. Both believe that there are mathematical truths but the former believe that these mathematical truths depend on the existence of non-natural (abstract) mathematical objects whereas the latter don’t.

So assuming that there are moral truths, do these moral truths depend on the existence of non-natural “moral” properties? This is the kind of substantive (“robust”) realism that many moral antirealists reject, and if one subscribes to physicalism then it certainly seems that one must reject this kind of realism.

But what of Parfit’s “non-realist cognitivism”? It’s difficult to make sense of what it means for a moral proposition to be true if not by accurately describing some non-natural moral property of the world.

This is the kind of substantive (“robust”) realism that many moral antirealists reject, — Michael

Would that this were so. They throw out the babe with the bathwater, adopting convolute notions in order to avoid the simple fact that ought statements can be true.

They throw out the babe with the bathwater, adopting convolute notions in order to avoid the simple fact that ought statements can be true. — Banno

So can mathematical statements, but surely you understand the distinction between mathematical realism and mathematical nominalism?

Which of the metaethical equivalents of mathematical realism and mathematical nominalism is correct?

I certainly don’t think that non-natural or abstract properties or objects exist, and Moore’s open question argument strongly suggests that any naturalist account of morality fails, so something equivalent to mathematical nominalism is most likely.

But with mathematical nominalism we can make sense of it as a kind of coherence theory. I’m not sure how we can make sense of something like “moral nominalism”?

There is more to the issue than you and some others seem willing to admit. — Michael

Well, in my own defense, I was simply working from exactly what you boiled the dissonance down to.

It doesn't resolve it because I don't know which side to take. Do I accept that, as a categorical imperative, I ought not kick puppies, or do I accept that categorical imperatives make no sense? You might be able to pick a side without justification but I can't.

Hence why I remain a skeptic. — Michael

Hence, from that I offered...

Divorce the utterance from the label and walk away a free man. "One ought not kick puppies" is both sensible and true. It's definitely sensible, and that's enough, if you'd like to set the truth issue aside. If categorical imperatives make no sense, and "one ought not kick puppies" makes perfect sense, then "one ought not kick puppies" cannot count as a "categorical imperative", for the claim cannot do both, make perfect sense and make no sense..

Time to choose between the archaic taxonomy(categorical imperatives) and what you know is true despite not fully understanding how and/or why it is.

I find the focus on what counts as normativity as irrelevant to whether or not some utterances of ought are true. I'm open to be persuaded otherwise.

Time to choose between the archaic taxonomy(categorical imperatives) and what you know is true despite not fully understanding how and/or why it is. — creativesoul

It’s not about taxonomy. It’s about not understanding what it means for a moral sentence to be true and not understanding how to verify or falsify a moral sentence.

This makes them very unlike empirical and mathematical sentences.

If I can’t make sense of this then perhaps I ought abandon my dogma and either accept that all moral sentences are false or that no moral sentence is truth apt.

I find the focus on what counts as normativity as irrelevant to whether or not some utterances of ought are true. I'm open to be persuaded otherwise — creativesoul

See the distinction between meta ethics and normative ethics. The former addresses the meaning of moral sentences and what sort of things must obtain for them to be true (if they are indeed truth apt). The latter addresses which of them are true.

If you’re only interested in normative ethics then by all means ignore meta ethics. But I’m interested in meta ethics and so that is what my questions are trying to uncover.

And I think an answer to the questions of meta ethics is necessary to answer the questions of normative ethics, hence why I have repeatedly asked for how to verify or falsify a moral sentence. If you don’t know how to verify or falsify a moral sentence then how do you expect to determine whether or not some moral sentence is true? Is it simply a matter of faith?

It’s about not understanding what it means for a moral sentence to be true and not understanding how to verify or falsify a moral sentence. — Michael

Those could be perplexing considerations if we work from the conventional notions of truth as in using one and one only. Perhaps different sorts of claims are true by virtue of different means, or by virtue of corresponding to different sorts of things.

Perhaps different sorts of claims are true by virtue of different means, or by virtue of corresponding to different sorts of things. — creativesoul

So by what means are moral claims made true? What sort of things (if any) do they “correspond” to? Does the world contain non-natural “moral” properties that can be detected by some non-natural moral “intuition” that supervenes on our physical brain?

I find it a bit amusing that you're insisting that I'm not doing metaethics while I'm doing nothing but thinking about morality and ethics as a subject matter in its own right. As if the only thing that counts as "metaethics" is discourse about what it means for a moral judgment/statement to be true.

I'm attempting to openly consider many different takes/positions on the matter at hand.

So, I do not care what label/name you give it... I'm interested in discussing what it takes for some utterances of ought to be true.

So by what means are moral claims made true? What sort of things (if any) do they “correspond” to? — Michael

Those are good questions.

If I can’t make sense of this then perhaps I ought abandon my dogma and either accept that all moral sentences are false or that no moral sentence is truth apt. — Michael

You seem to be burning some of your Analytic philosophy bridges. Keep this up and you’ll have to join us Continental relativists. Wouldn’t that be a revolting development.

Correspondence is an emergent relation between what is thought and/or believed about what is going on and what is going on. When what is thought about what's going on is 'equivalent' enough, or close enough to what is going on, then truth emerges. That is how meaningful true belief become real/actual/manifest/formed. That's what it takes. That's how correspondence 'between' belief about reality and reality(hence, meaningful true belief) emerges onto the world stage.

If it is the case that we ought not kick puppies, then "we ought not kick puppies" is true.

Are you questioning whether or not it is the case that we ought not kick puppies?

Are you questioning whether or not it is the case that we ought not kick puppies? — creativesoul

Realise you didn't ask me, but it's apt to my considerations of the discussion - I don't think it could be the case, as it's a judgement, not a state of affairs with with one's opinion could correspond.

Banno will disagree, but i've not seen a way to conclude that it is inaccurate.

A correspondence theorist might well be rightly puzzled as to what it is to which an ought statements corresponds. But to my eye this is not a reason to think there are no true ought statements, but instead to question if truth is always correspondence. — Banno

Hey my friend. I think perhaps correspondence and coherence combined.

I've been mulling over promises...

When the direction of fit is such that keeping one's word confirms one's sincerity, it is certainly the case that if one is sincere, then one will keep one's word. Hence, when a promise is made to do something, it is always the case that one ought do it. If it is not the case, then it is not a promise.

Are you questioning whether or not it is the case that we ought not kick puppies?
— creativesoul

Realise you didn't ask me, but it's apt to my considerations of the discussion - I don't think it could be the case, as it's a judgement, not a state of affairs with with one's opinion could correspond. — AmadeusD

As if codes of conduct cannot be considered as an elemental constituent within a state of affairs? As if it is never the case that kicking puppies is forbidden?

:brow:

As if codes of conduct cannot be considered as a state of affairs? As if it is never the case that kicking puppies is forbidden? — creativesoul

I don't think so no. It can be the case that a code of conduct exists, and that a group or society accept, and live by, a code of conduct. So you could say, "In this quite particular scenario, it is the case that one ought not kick puppies" but that's just an appeal to authority... so, I suppose in some sense i have to concede here but it's not a concession on my position, just on the way it applies.

That one ought not kick puppies isn't the state of affairs in the above. It's the existence of, and assent to, a code of conduct which includes that proscription. It may well not have that proscription and the state of affairs still obtains, but without that obligation.

Correspondence is an emergent relation between what is thought and/or believed about what is going on and what is going on. — creativesoul

What is the what is going on with respect to the obligation to not kick puppies?

Are obligations physical objects? Are obligations physical events? Are obligations mathematical conclusions from some set of formal axioms and rules of inference? Are obligations Platonic entities that exist in some abstract realm of Ideas?