Does pain hurt? Does it feel bad? — RogueAI

Yes, but any p-zombie or human would say that. It's not a question that distinguishes the two cases. I've been taught that 'hurt' and 'feel bad' are appropriate ways to express the state of my information processor when it detects signals originating from nociceptors. Most self-driving cars don't have these, so in that sense, the car is a poor example.

Not sure what having children has to do with being conscious. Things have been having children since eukaryotes, which arguably are not particularly conscious.

1. “I consider myself to be a p-zombie” is false because you are a p-zombie and so don’t believe anything. — Michael

OK, 'belief' is one of those things reserved. It is not appropriate to say that a self-driving car believes that steering onto the soft shoulder at speed would be a poor choice. Different language must be used.
All that said, the statement "I consider myself to be..." does not use the word 'believe'. If you equate them, then you really need to pony up a generic word that applies to cars and such which consider some judgement to be 'true'.
But a p-zombie making the same statement would be one of truth, even if the phrasing is designated to not be allowed by you.

The statement “I consider myself to be a p-zombie” is only true if you are not a p-zombie and so no rational person can believe themselves to be a p-zombie.

OK, so it's false, only because the actual p-zombie is not allowed to use the phrasing. The p-zombie differs on that ruling.

It is a thought experiment, it is an open question whether it is believable or not. — hypericin

Belief in it is critical to the argument. The p-zombie apparently isn't allowed to 'believe', so there's seemingly no position from which an actual p-zombie can argue his case.

Chalmers is full of descriptions of all this miraculous stuff that isn't physically possible. It's so obvious to the people actually conscious (his definition), leaving people like me wondering what the miracle is. There's nothing inexplicable. No hard problem, so the conclusion is that Chalmers experiences something I don't, something that cannot be conveyed to me, which is sort of like trying to convey the experience of seeing red to Mary. I can pick red out of a box of crayons by sight, as can a robot. Mary was never given a chance to, so I'm not sure if the analogy is apt.

I cannot think of anything I can do that a machine cannot. Chalmers has access to something that obviously is out of reach of the machine. The conclusion is that I'm missing what he experiences.

Yes, but any p-zombie or human would say that. — noAxioms

When humans say "pain hurts" it's true. When a p-zombie says it, it's not. And, I'm not so sure a p-zombie would say "pain hurts". Why would they lie? Wouldn't they just be confused about what "hurting" is and ask for clarification?

I assume you are telling the truth when you say "pain hurts" and it does indeed hurt so you are not a p-zombie.

Not sure what having children has to do with being conscious. Things have been having children since eukaryotes, which arguably are not particularly conscious. — noAxioms

Perhaps they have desires and urges we're not aware of.

When humans say "pain hurts" it's true. When a p-zombie says it, it's not. — RogueAI

No, it's true by definition, regardless of what says it. The p-zombie might not feel actual pain, but says he does anyway since he very much detects the undesirable sense of injury, and he has no actual reference to what true pain feels like, so he says he feels pain, not knowing that it isn't real pain, just an interpretation of sensory data.

And, I'm not so sure a p-zombie would say that. Why would they lie?[/quote]Lies are intentional. The p-zombies doesn't know. I only suspect because there's something missing, something many others find obvious, but not all.

Wouldn't they just be confused about what "hurting" is?

You're definitely confusing me when y'all say there's a whole vocabulary that I'm not allowed to use, and without giving me replacement words. So I use the words.

I assume you are telling the truth when you say "pain hurts"

It is truth, but 'hurts' to me is just detection of signals of injury. It's not like I lie and don't actually get this sensory input. But the extra bit, that which I would be totally unaware except for people talking about how obvious and inexplicable it is, only the talk of that makes me aware of something more that should be there.

Perhaps they have desires and urges we're not aware of. — RogueAI

I would hope so. They invented sex after all.

If you equate them, then you really need to pony up a generic word that applies to cars and such which consider some judgement to be 'true'. — noAxioms

You could just say “I am a p-zombie”.

That is, when he says "I consider myself to be a p-zombie", what he really means (to you) is "I p-consider myself to be a p-zombie". — hypericin

What does “p-consider” mean?

P-zombies have no consciousness. They just have an outward appearance (including observable behaviour). You’ll need to explain it in these terms.

(By outward appearances I don’t mean to exclude muscles and bones and internal organs)

No, it's true by definition, regardless of what says it. The p-zombie might not feel actual pain, but says he does anyway since he very much detects the undesirable sense of injury, and he has no actual reference to what true pain feels like, so he says he feels pain, not knowing that it isn't real pain, just an interpretation of sensory data. — noAxioms

I don't agree with this. "so he says he feels pain, not knowing that it isn't real pain". That's an epistemic issue, not a truth issue. For any x, if x is not feeling pain/hurting, and x says it is feeling pain/hurting, x is wrong. X is saying something false.

It is truth, but 'hurts' to me is just detection of signals of injury. — noAxioms

But this isn't true for you. Pain/hurting is more than just a detection of signals of injury. Pain/hurting hurts. It feels bad.

What does “p-consider” mean? — Michael

"p-consider", "p-belief" is all the informational operations of "consider", "belief" without the conscious part. Like how a computer-vision program might "believe" it is looking at a table, without any conscious awareness of it.

"p-consider", "p-belief" is all the informational operations of "consider", "belief" without the conscious part. Like how a computer-vision program might "believe" it is looking at a table, without any conscious awareness of it. — hypericin

But belief is a conscious mental activity. P-belief/p-consider is incoherent. It's missing a necessary condition for anything that remotely resembles believing and considering. P-belief is so far removed from actual belief, calling it p-belief is misleading.

I think we need to define some terms here. Do you agree that any definition of pain has to include the "feels bad" aspect of it? If we're talking about pain and it doesn't involve the sensation of hurting, we're talking about something other than pain. P-pain or Pain1 or something. Agreed?

They wouldn't be p-zombies if they acted differently. — Michael

Exactly. Zombies by definition behave as we do, but they cannot adopt attitudes towards propositions, and so do not have beliefs.

This thread is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of philosophical zombies.

One might suppose that the OP question could become "would a being without attitudes or intentions reproduce?". The answer is that it would behave as its physical circumstances dictate. If they dictated reproduction, then the zombies would reproduce.

, you are attributing the intent to expediency to zombies. They do not have intent.

The answer is that it would behave as its physical circumstances dictate. — Banno

We don't behave this way, so p-zombies would not behave this way. But without a mind, how could they behave in any other way? I think there may be a contradiction here.

What?

What do you think a philosophical zombie is?

Edit: no, forget that. I see others have tried to explain the error in the OP to you. I'll leave you to it.

"p-consider", "p-belief" is all the informational operations of "consider", "belief" without the conscious part. Like how a computer-vision program might "believe" it is looking at a table, without any conscious awareness of it. — hypericin

Something like "the computer algorithm inside my head has caused me to speak the phrase 'I am not a p-zombie'"?

Certainly that's possibly true, but anything that speaks like that isn't a very good facsimile of a real person, and so isn't a p-zombie.

If they're a convincing doppelganger, as p-zombies are, then they speak ordinary English, in which case the word "belief" that they use means what the word "belief" means in ordinary English. And so any self-proclaimed belief, as expressed by a p-zombie, is false. P-zombies, by definition, don't believe anything.

Exactly. Zombies by definition behave as we do, but they cannot adopt attitudes towards propositions, and so do not have beliefs.

This thread is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of philosophical zombies. — Banno

The misunderstanding is once again yours. If you ask a p-zombie, "will the sun rise tomorrow", they would say "yes, I believe so". By definition they behave as we do. This includes belief. They will report beliefs, and behave as if they believe. The only difference is that none of these behaviors is accompanied by experience.

I gave up kicking the puppy.

don't on my account. Continue kicking, and falling on your ass.

Something like "the computer algorithm inside my head has caused me to speak the phrase 'I am not a p-zombie'"? — Michael

They would of course never say that, and may be naïve to the notion of computer algorithm. Something inside their heads causes them to say things, just as it does for us. The only difference is the lights are out.

Meh. The error in your post is obvious. The supposition is that the zombie behaves just as we do - says things like "I believe..." - and yet has no "inner" life - no such belief.

Something inside their heads causes them to say things, just as it does for us. The only difference is the lights are out. — hypericin

Which is precisely why their claims, when made by them, are false.

"I am conscious" is false when said by a p-zombie.
"I believe that I am a p-zombie" is false when said by a p-zombie.

The words they use mean what they mean in ordinary English. They certainly don't have the intention to mean anything else.

This "obvious error" rests on the presumption that inner life is necessary to the notion "belief".

Yep.

The words they use mean what they mean in ordinary English. — Michael

I'm not convinced that "belief", unlike "conscious", entails inner life.

But the larger point is, your "cheating" here:

The statement “I consider myself to be a p-zombie” is only true if you are not a p-zombie and so no rational person can believe themselves to be a p-zombie. — Michael

You can disqualify the statement because by your definition belief must entail consciousness. But the fact remains that they might be a p-zombie, along with the informational p-zombie belief-analog that they are p-zombies.

Judging by your incessant posting, you have no life at all, let alone "inner", so I'm not sure on what authority you speak.

Love you too. Especially how you went straight to a personal insult.

along with the informational p-zombie belief-analog that they are p-zombies. — hypericin

Whatever "belief-analog" they have isn't belief.

If the p-zombies are speaking English then the words they use mean what they mean in English, and "belief" in English means something like "the subjective attitude that a proposition is true."

But the fact remains that they might be a p-zombie

Yes, which is why I said this.

"the subjective attitude that a proposition is true." — Michael

Wouldn't it be preferable to say intentional attitude? That's the usual term used by philosophers, with a quite substantial backing in the literature. It avoids the problematic notion of the subjective.

I find it very hard to believe. But I can believe that there are differences in neural architecture such that for some people this qualia talk makes no sense. — hypericin

There is someone who made a thread yesterday or the day before explaining how he has no inner monologue and also cannot form images mentally.

Whatever "belief-analog" they have isn't belief. — Michael

But wouldn't "belief", for a p-zombie, be precisely this "belief-analog"? It might be false on your notion of belief, but not theirs.