A possible existence and its possible phenomenon may be irrelevant at a certain time, but time isn’t something to be ignored in general. Contingency in empirical knowledge mandates successions in time, so….. — Mww

Are irrelevant until (such time of) the manifestation. The proposition was emphasising the time factor.

But that isn’t the system as a whole. It is human nature so want to know, and for that the whole system…..whatever it may be…..is a prerequisite. — Mww

Of course not, but it was to make the point that the alternative is not always the case.

Nature is the totality of all that is possible independent of whatever intellect receives it. — Mww

How do you prove something is possible independent of whatever intellect received it?

Hi Russell - thank you very much for your reply. It is helpful in someways, and not in others.

As a pre-empt; shortly after making my comment, I was watching Lecture 2 in a series by Robert Paul Wolf on the CPR... Nearer the end another prof. from his department (Dr. Alan Nelson) asks a question which is somewhat answered there, and then further answered in the opening of Lecture 3.
The question he has is somewhat similar to mine, but posed in an infinitely more reasonable and i think clearer way: his question is Kant's use of hte word 'experience' with regard to delineating between 'understanding' and 'intuition'. He is asking why Kant thought he could get away with the premise that het two are necessarily distinct and why, with regard to Humean/Leibnizian alternatives, he thought it could not be argued against. Wolf's answer was basically that he thought he had already established the delineation in his inaugural dissertation (i've not read) and so didn't bother elucidating in the way Dr. Nelson was looking for. Ultimately, he concludes that it's not all that convincing (as best I can tell). I suppose that's where i am now.

I would suggest that concepts such as rough and smooth are innate and pre-exist any phenomena subsequently experienced. — RussellA

I guess this is what I have trouble with (noting for anyone else reading; I haven't attended the other replies to my recent comment re: concepts. Am working backward through notifications).

"apple" doesn't appear to me to be the same as "rough" - which, from what i understand of the world, is heuristic rather than a definite descriptor (but as usual, I could very well just be wrong). Apple can collapse into many other categories and concepts, but 'rough' is a sensation regardless of that which it inheres. I understand 'apple' to still be a concept - I'm not skirting that - But, 'apple' describes an arrangement of things in the world via their impression on the sum total of our sensible "inputs" ideally. 'roughness' only applies to one, in the context you've outlined and so appears far more apt to the distinction, where I can't get over into putting 'apple' there too. The 'concept' of apple is surely derived from an amalgamation of the totality of instances of 'apple' one has experienced brought under another concept - say, 'hand fruit', which itself has the same collapse pending into lesser-distinct concepts (food, flesh, juice etc..). But those sensations one could ascribe to an apple (colour, texture, smell, taste etc...) can be thought of in that a priori sense. One can cross-reference those aspects of an experience with other, disparate experiences, to form a working system of sensational categories.

Good lord I hope that's not just intensely confused muck :snicker:

you hear the sound, but don’t know whether it’s a firecracker or the tailgate on a dump truck. — Mww

On this account, are you illustrating the 'concept' of that (I guess, specific..) sound, without needing to invoke an object to understand the sensation? If so, yes, that's helpful. My response to Russell will be illustrative of why It's only helpful to understand the intent there, rather than my understanding of why that's the case..

For practical experience, true enough. Phenomena always antecede the conception, but they certainly do inform the concept. — Mww

Ah, this is clarifying, in terms of what i intuited(in the colloquial sense) was inarguable in the hypothesis. Thank you.

pure logic, antecedes the phenomenon. — Mww

Is the suggestion here that without the concepts that allow phenomena to cohere in the understanding, we wouldn't actually intuit (in the Kantian sense) anything of any comprehendable nature?

Would you accept that even in that case, the objects exist, we just have no access to even their indication? (i realise this might be pedestrian to you and somewhat obvious - I'm new to this work).

Is the suggestion here that without the concepts that allow phenomena to cohere in the understanding, we wouldn't actually intuit (in the Kantian sense) anything of any comprehendable nature? — AmadeusD

In a Kantian sense, it is already the case we don’t intuit anything in any comprehendable nature. Intuition is that faculty of representation by which the matter of objects given a posteriori, is synthesized with certain forms, given a priori “in the mind”, the arrangement of that synthesis being termed phenomena. We are not aware of this arrangement, which is the purview of the productive imagination.

It is the case as well, that concepts belong to understanding, as you say, so what you said actually becomes….without concepts that allow phenomena to cohere in the understanding, we wouldn’t actually cognize anything at all, as made clear here:

“….Thoughts without content are void (empty); intuitions without conceptions, blind…”
—————

Would you accept that even in that case, the objects exist, we just have no access to even their indication? — AmadeusD

Almost. In the case without concepts that allow phenomena to cohere in the understanding, we may still be quite aware of a existent object, merely from its sensation, but what we don’t have, is even the possibility of a representation of what that existent object actually is. What it is meaning nothing more than how it is to be judged, what judgement regarding that thing is permissible, such that object is or is not comprehensible. The arbiter here being simply the LNC, the domain of which is….pure reason her-very-own-damn-self.

Think of it as a tripartite system, in the form of a syllogism, in which the major is the understanding of the manifold of conceptions related to an object, the minor is the judgement regarding the compatibility of the synthesis of those conceptions to each other, and reason concludes the validity of that synthesis with respect to those already given, better known as the principle of non-contradiction. You know….like….square circles as an extreme example, but even such everyday cognitions such as driving on the wrong side of the road, going through a door without opening it. And my all-time favorite….swearing on a stack of bibles the stupid cup is still in the stupid cupboard, with the same certainty you had when you actually put it there. (Mumblesputtercuss-choke)

But I digress. So yes….the object does exist. If there is a phenomenon, there must have been a sensation. If a sensation, there must have been a perception. If a perception, there must have been an appearance. If an appearance, there must be that which appears. There must be a thing, an object, that appears.

How do you prove something is possible independent of whatever intellect received it? — Corvus

You don’t. You reason to a justifiable conclusion on sufficient grounds.

without concepts that allow phenomena to cohere in the understanding, we wouldn’t actually cognize anything at all, as made clear here: — Mww

Ok, nice. That feels like a slightly more adequate key to the lock im trying to pick, compared with my question. Thanks! Feeling a little less lost now.

in which the major is (1.)the understanding of the manifold of conceptions related to an object, the minor is (2.)the judgement regarding the compatibility of the synthesis of those conceptions to each other, and reason (3.)concludes the validity of that synthesis with respect to those already given — Mww

Something i've wanted, for some time, is a plain-language expression of the passages that express this in the CPR. So, if you wouldn't mind commenting on, or correcting hte below, I would sincerely appreciate that(these numbers being the three parts I've inserted into your description above):

1. In which your mind retrieves a priori concepts under which the sensation can be brought in order to cognise the object;
2. In which your mind determines which concepts are 'correct' to apply to the object, with regard to their inter-conceptual coherence (i.e avoiding contradiction); and
3. In which your mind determines whether that coherent set of concepts, in fact, applies to the sensations you're 'judging'.

is that, or how far is that, a reasonable unadornment ?

How do you prove something is possible independent of whatever intellect received it?
— Corvus

You don’t. You reason to a justifiable conclusion on sufficient grounds. — Mww

It sounds absurd that you can reason on something which is independent of whatever your intellect received.

It sounds absurd that you can reason on something which is independent of whatever your intellect received. — Corvus

The difference between he intellect receiving from without, and creating from within. Logic, and by association, pure reason, still needs the guidance of experience for its empirical certainty.

is that, or how far is that, a reasonable unadornment ? — AmadeusD

Close enough. To reduce it all to the subtleties of transcendental philosophy might be a little different, but the gist is good enough for a general idea.

Close enough. To reduce it all to the subtleties of transcendental philosophy might be a little different, but the gist is good enough for a general idea. — Mww

Ok, wonderful. Very much appreciate that. I'm getting somewhere heh.

Thanks for this exchange :)

The difference between he intellect receiving from without, and creating from within. — Mww

Not quite sure what this means. Could you please elaborate?

Thanks for this exchange — AmadeusD

No prob, but it goes without saying…..any comment on Kant is only an opinion at least, and a best guess at most. I mean, when you come across sentences half a page long, you’re bound to miss the mark sooner or later.

when you come across sentences half a page long, you’re bound to miss the mark sooner or later. — Mww

Hahaha, very true!

Could you please elaborate? — Corvus

We should both step back, maybe. Your…

How do you prove something is possible independent of whatever intellect received it? — Corvus

….makes no sense to me, and my….

Nature is the totality of all that is possible independent of whatever intellect receives it. — Mww

…..seems to have made no sense to you. I meant by the proposition that just because we are not receptive of a thing is not sufficient warrant for us to den its existence. Whereas, if we were to deny the existence of that which is a cause of our sensations, we contradict ourselves.

How do you prove something is possible independent of whatever intellect received it?
— Corvus

….makes no sense to me, and my…. — Mww

If something was independent of experience, then it would be A priori. But if something was independent of intelligence, then would it be also A priori? Well, then we wouldn't know what it would be. I wasn't sure on that. And your claim, that we don't prove, but reason on it sounded not making sense, because we don't know whether it were A priori or Thing-in-Itself, or some unknown empirical object.

…..seems to have made no sense to you. I meant by the proposition that just because we are not receptive of a thing is not sufficient warrant for us to den its existence. Whereas, if we were to deny the existence of that which is a cause of our sensations, we contradict ourselves. — Mww

I wasn't meaning to deny existence because we are not receptive of a thing, but rather was saying that having a concept of something doesn't warrant its existence of it.

I wasn't meaning to deny existence because we are not receptive of a thing, but rather was saying that having a concept of something doesn't warrant its existence of it. — Corvus

Oh. That’s fine. I hope I didn’t give any indication I thought otherwise. Correlation not causation and all that.

Delete duplicate

Oh. That’s fine. I hope I didn’t give any indication I thought otherwise. Correlation not causation and all that. — Mww

:cool: :ok:

No prob, but it goes without saying…..any comment on Kant is only an opinion at least, and a best guess at most. I mean, when you come across sentences half a page long, you’re bound to miss the mark sooner or later. — Mww

Nicely put. Which has non-philosophers like me wary of even trying to make sense of him (or any of the significantly complex thinkers, Heidegger, for instance). The chances of developing a useful reading without more formal instruction would seem negligible. And even then...

Are there readings of Kant by academics you consider to be wrong or misconceived? Are there schools of Kant?

Which has non-philosophers like me wary of even trying to make sense of him….. — Tom Storm

A common lament to be sure, but, believe it or not, there are passages that make so much sense, it helps in drawing sense out of the rest, like this:

Forget everything you learned in school, and consider the ramifications: it is absolutely impossible to get to 12, when all you have is a 7 here and a 5 there. Upon grasping that in all its magnificent glory, it might occur, that there’s a whole boatload of stuff happening between the ears that has not a damn thing to do with your senses. Can I get an a-MEN, brutha????

Know what else? It is impossible to think a triangle in general, for every thought of one, is a certain triangle. But it is impossible from the conception of three straight lines alone, to form a certain triangle, but can only give the thought of a triangle in general. ARRRRGGGG!!!!

Hey…I embellish. But I’m old, retired and therefore entitled. (Grin)
————-

Are there readings of Kant by academics you consider to be wrong or misconceived? Are there schools of Kant? — Tom Storm

Yikes. That presupposes I’m qualified to critique academics. I’d never be so presumptuous, but I’ve read a lot of a few, and some of a lot, so to answer your question, it would be Schopenhauer, without doubt. He’s hypocritical on the one hand, praising Kant to the high heavens as philosophy’s golden child, then rips him a new one on the other, by denying the validity of his version of the ultimate ground of transcendental philosophy.

In short, by claiming the will, as something the knowledge of which is not impossible, and making that the thing-in-itself, then the fact it is to not impossible to know this version of the thing-in-itself, absolutely destroys the version wherein the thing-in-itsef is impossible to know.

As for schools of Kant, there’s neo-Kantianism, proto-Kantianism, same as with any theory, where peer group successors modify or rearrange the original. Then there’s the analytic philosophers who are somewhat anti-Kantians, insofar they don’t do speculative metaphysics or theoretical methodologies, seemingly because how we talk is more relevant than how we think.

Hope that’s helpful.

Yes it is. Thanks. I was wondering about Schop's reading.

Schop's reading. — Tom Storm

He’s very harsh on Young Hegelians, calls them mushheads following a philosophical numbskull. Kant just says he disagrees with a guy without demeaning him.

Descartes refers to Everydayman as philosophically unsophisticated, Hume refers to him as vulgar, Kant just calls him common.

Descartes refers to Everydayman as philosophically unsophisticated, Hume refers to him as vulgar, Kant just calls him common. — Mww

Guilty as charged. I tend to prefer the appellation ‘unremarkable’.

The question he has is somewhat similar to mine.................his question is Kant's use of the word 'experience' with regard to delineating between 'understanding' and 'intuition'. He is asking why Kant thought he could get away with the premise that het two are necessarily distinct and why, with regard to Humean/Leibnizian alternatives, he thought it could not be argued against. — AmadeusD

Robert Paul Wolff

Wolff said "the foundation of the distinction is that Kant thinks that through sensibility we are placed in direct relation with individual things, and through conception and understanding we are placed in indirect relation through general concepts to individual things. IE, we can look at a particular horse, but we need to bring it under the general concept of horse, the particular falls under the general. He doesn't think this can be reduced to the same thing but they are different things"

The difference between the particular and the general

There is a difference between a particular and the general. For example, we look at a field and see at one moment in time and one particular position in space a particular set of shapes and colours. We can then generalise, ie, conceptualise, a horse .

We can only come up with the general concept of a horse after seeing several particular example of a horse.

For Kant, an Intuition can be i) Sensible Intuition, ie, phenomena - ii) Non-sensible Intuition, ie, noumena - iii) Pure Intuition, ie space and time. What all these have in common that it is intuition of one particular thing, ie, a set of shapes and colours we see in the field at one moment in space and time

For Kant, our Principles of Understanding can be discovered from our Concepts of Understanding, ie the Categories, For example, such Principles of Understanding would include: i) the conservation of energy ii) qualities inhere in substances iii) things don't happen randomly. What all these have in common is that the concept is not about one particular thing, but is about a set of particular things under the umbrella of a single idea.

The question is, after seeing several particular sets of shapes and colours in a field through space and time, how do we understand that they are connected in some way under the single idea of a "horse".

The Empiricists Hume and Locke thought that we discover the concept of horse just from the experience of seeing several instantiations of a horse. Kant thought that we can only discover the concept of horse from a combination of a priori knowledge independent of experience together with empirical experience.

For Hume, we would infer the concept of horse from the constant conjunction of states of affairs in the world. For Kant, we would know the concept of horse because our experiences fulfilled an a priori understanding.

Does the colour red exist in the world or the mind

The question is how we establish general concepts from several particular example. For example, we see the colour red when looking at wavelengths between 620nm and 750nm.

Are the Empiricists correct when they propose that we have learnt the concept of red from looking at all the wavelengths from 620nm to 750nm and finding a similarity in them. Are the Innatists correct when they propose that we know the concept of red a priori, before even looking at wavelengths, and only need to look at a single wavelength, say 700nm, in order to recognize it as the colour red. (Accepting that it is disputed whether or not Kant endorsed concept innatism)

If the Empiricist are correct, the colour red exists in the world and we discover it. If the Innatists are correct the ability to perceive the colour red exists in the mind which we then recognize in the world.

Objects are sets of properties

An object such as a horse is a set of properties, such as colour, texture, smell, taste, etc. In fact, an object is only its set of properties, in that if all the object's properties were removed, then no object would remain.

If the Innatists are correct in that the ability to perceive the colour red exists in the mind prior to experiencing the world, a similar argument can be made for all the other properties. Butt as an object is no more than its set set of properties, then our understanding of what an object is, as illustrated by the CPR, is dependent not only what we experience but also on an a prior ability in being able to recognize what we experience.

(Kant's Categories - Daniel Bonevac)
(Leibniz on Innate Ideas and Kant on the Origin of the Categories)

I'm late to the party but ordering it today! I'll be sure to check the version :)

In fact, an object is only its set of properties, in that if all the object's properties were removed, then no object would remain. — RussellA

Are things more than their parts?

I'm late to the party but ordering it today! I'll be sure to check the version :) — Daniel Duffy

Good. I think i F'd up on this one - I got F. Max Müller's translation, which I take to be neither well-renowned or particularly good, because it was available and cheapish.

I take it that the Cambridge translation by Guyer and Wood is considered the best when considering a ratio between readability and accuracy to the original.

take it that the Cambridge translation by Guyer and Wood is considered the best when considering a ratio between readability and accuracy to the original. — AmadeusD

I had looked at that, but this close to Christmas I didn’t justify the spend.

I also bought a guidebook relating to it. From what I understand, grad students in America use those kinds of books to introduce the actual text and build some basic understanding…and I will certainly need all the help I can get!

https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/u.osu.edu/dist/5/25851/files/2017/09/kant-first-critique-cambridge-1m89prv.pdf

Just a click away……

Thank you Mww. What a legend!

Are things more than their parts? — AmadeusD

If all the metal was removed from the Eiffel Tower, what would be left. An idea of the Eiffel Tower would be left.

If by "thing" one means an idea in the mind as well as physical parts in the world, then, yes, things are more than their physical parts.