Would P-Zombies have Children?

RogueAI

Kids slow you down. They're resource-intensive. They take up vast amounts of time. It seems the only reasons to mate and have them are emotional reasons: the urge to procreate, the feeling your life won't be complete without them, the anticipation of the joy they'll bring, etc. P-zombies don't have urges or emotions, so why would they reproduce?

I suppose it's possible p-zombies could come up with a belief system about the importance of preservation of the species (although I think p-zombies would be entirely self-interested) and have kids based on that. But long before p-zombies got to the stage in their evolutionary development where they can form complex philosophical belief systems about the importance of preservation of the species, they would have been p-zombie primates or p-zombie hamster like creatures with no belief systems. With no urge to reproduce and no way to think of rational reasons to do so, they would have died out very early in their evolutionary development. Is it possible p-zombies are metaphysically impossible?

Daniel Duffy

With no urge to reproduce and no way to think of rational reasons to do so, they would have died out very early in their evolutionary development. Is it possible p-zombies are metaphysically impossible? — RogueAI

Would this assume that the standard model of evolution is the only route to conscious existence? It is entirely possible that an entire world of p-zombies is created completely by the random chance of atom arrangement (possible, but ridiculously improbably haha). I am by no means an expert, just the word 'impossible' always piques my curiosity :)

RogueAI

Would this assume that the standard model of evolution is the only route to conscious existence? It is entirely possible that an entire world of p-zombies is created completely by the random chance of atom arrangement (possible, but ridiculously improbably haha). I am by no means an expert, just word word 'impossible' always piques my curiosity :) — Daniel Duffy

It's true, a world of completely evolved p-zombies could pop into existence like a Boltzmann Brain. Would the p-zombies then decide to continue their species and reproduce? Is it still metaphysically impossible that p-zombies could evolve into beings like us in the non-Boltzmann way (the "normal" way)?

Daniel Duffy

↪RogueAI

For a moment there I thought 'lol imagine just popping into existence and how that would feel' but then realised they probably wouldn't feel anything.

I wonder if the act of procreation could be considered self-centred - the continuation of your lineage - and so if they are entirely self-interested it might be in their best interest. Or it could be they are too self-interested to even considered another being. I don't know a great deal about them, but I assume they have no biological drive to procreate (though I did read some are behaviourally identical to humans, so if we say behaviour can be a reaction to biology, they may have the 'continuation of the species' built-in). If their physiology is indistinguishable from a human physiology, would their brain still have that drive?

And then, it's altogether possible p-zombies just randomly start popping into existence in a measured and sustainable volume over time in that particular part of the universe. Could be quite comical.

bert1

Kids slow you down. They're resource-intensive. They take up vast amounts of time. It seems the only reasons to mate and have them are emotional reasons: the urge to procreate, the feeling your life won't be complete without them, the anticipation of the joy they'll bring, etc. P-zombies don't have urges or emotions, so why would they reproduce? — RogueAI

This gets to the nub of the debate really well I think. The answer to this question depends brings out the different views.

Someone who thinks the physical is causally closed would presumably say the p-zombies would reproduce. Because the reason we reproduce is just because that's what DNA does - it creates reproduction machines. Feelings, emotions and so on are causal illusions, it seems like we do things because of how we feel, but we don't.

There is also a definition problem. p-zombies must reproduce by definition. They are indistinguishable from humans in terms of their behaviour, their response to stimuli etc. But if we think that p-zombies just wouldn't reproduce, then we have a conceptual incoherence - the p-zombie is in principle impossible in some sense.

Do feelings cause action? It certainly seems like they do. I guess I think that p-zombies are conceivable but metaphysically impossible. They are conceivable, because consciousness is not a function. They are metaphysically impossible because panpsychism is true.

Michael

↪RogueAI

P-zombies that procreate are self-replicating machines that look and behave human.

RogueAI

Procreating p-zombies are self-replicating machines that look and behave human. — Michael

Then we are self-replicating machines, since they are the same as us, except dead inside. But as Bert points out:

Do feelings cause action? It certainly seems like they do. — bert1

I think this goes to the heart of it. I don't think we're just self-replicating machines because I think it's obvious we are motivated by desires and feelings. Would a materialist grant that a p-zombie might act completely different than a human because it can't have desires or feelings? But if the materialist grants that, wouldn't that imply a p-zombie human and a normal human really aren't that much alike after all?

Michael

↪RogueAI

Do feelings cause action? It certainly seems like they do. — bert1

They happen to cause action in our case, but it is possible that in some other world those same actions are caused by something other than feelings.

Would a materialist grant that a p-zombie might act completely different than a human because it can't have desires or feelings? — RogueAI

They wouldn't be p-zombies if they acted differently. A p-zombie is defined as an entity that looks and behaves human but that does not have conscious experience.

RogueAI

t doesn't follow that are feelings are necessary for action. — Michael

True, but if feelings are sufficient for action (and I think it's obvious feelings are sufficient motivators to do certain things), and x has feelings and y doesn't, x may behave differently than y.

Michael

True, but if feelings are sufficient for action (and I think it's obvious feelings are), and x has feelings and y doesn't, x may behave differently than y. — RogueAI

They may also behave the same. Or it may be that both x and y have feelings but still behave differently.

RogueAI

True, but if feelings are sufficient for action (and I think it's obvious feelings are), and x has feelings and y doesn't, x may behave differently than y.
— RogueAI

They may also behave the same. Or it may be that both x and y have feelings but still behave differently. — Michael

Would a p-zombie ever murder someone after having a bunch of drinks at a bar and getting in an argument, and then a fight? Or is that uniquely a human thing?

Could a p-zombie commit a crime of passion?

Lionino

↪RogueAI

That is a good point. However, would a P-zombie have free will? I think not; in which case, a p-zombie could simply be programmed to reproduce, as those that did not reproduce did not pass their genes on.

Michael

Would a p-zombie ever murder someone after having a bunch of drinks and getting in an argument, and then a fight at a bar? Or is that uniquely a human thing? — RogueAI

A p-zombie, by definition, will look and behave exactly like us. Anything we can do they can do. They're just not conscious.

Lionino

↪Michael

What OP is calling into question is whether the definition of p-zombies is even metaphysically possible, I believe. Most philosophers in fact believe they are mp impossible, philosophers of mind evenmoreso.

RogueAI

A p-zombie, by definition, will look and behave exactly like us. Anything we can do they can do (except have conscious experience). — Michael

How could a zombie commit a crime of passion??? By definition they have no passions.

RogueAI

What OP is calling into question is whether the definition of p-zombies is even metaphysically possible, I believe. — Lionino

Yes.

Michael

How could a zombie commit a crime of passion??? By definition they have no passions. — RogueAI

Them killing someone after an argument after drinking alcohol wouldn't be a crime of passion then.

RogueAI

Them killing someone after an argument after drinking alcohol wouldn't be a crime of passion then. — Michael

Isn't it a little far-fetched to imagine a p-zombie getting in a drunken argument and murdering someone? Doesn't something like that require a lot of anger, which they don't have? For that matter, why would they drink alcohol or do any kind of drugs? There's no mind for them to alter.

The more we discuss them the more incoherent they seem.

Michael

Isn't it a little far-fetched to imagine a p-zombie getting in a drunken argument and murdering someone? Doesn't something like that require a lot of anger, which they don't have? For that matter, why would they drink alcohol or do any kind of drugs? There's no mind for them to alter. — RogueAI

Drugs, Brains, and Behavior: The Science of Addiction

Drugs interfere with the way neurons send, receive, and process signals via neurotransmitters. Some drugs, such as marijuana and heroin, can activate neurons because their chemical structure mimics that of a natural neurotransmitter in the body. This allows the drugs to attach onto and activate the neurons. Although these drugs mimic the brain’s own chemicals, they don’t activate neurons in the same way as a natural neurotransmitter, and they lead to abnormal messages being sent through the network.

The brain controls the body. Drugs (and other normal stimuli like light and sound) affect the functioning of the brain.

noAxioms

P-zombies don't have urges or emotions, so why would they reproduce? — RogueAI

They're supposed to be indistinguishable, so yes, they would display urges, emotions, and children. I consider myself to be a p-zombie. OK, my kids are a bit off the curve, but I display emotions and talk about qualia, mostly because I learned the language from you non-zombies, not because there's that inexplicable extra bit that seemingly defies 'physical explanation'.

RogueAI

I consider myself to be a p-zombie. — noAxioms

Are you conscious?

hypericin

I consider myself to be a p-zombie. — noAxioms

I find it very hard to believe. But I can believe that there are differences in neural architecture such that for some people this qualia talk makes no sense. What this implies for your subjective state, if indeed there is on, is hard to say.

RogueAI

I find it very hard to believe. — hypericin

I used to come across "I'm a p-zombie" in the international skeptics forum many years ago.

RogueAI

Another difference between P-zombie world and normal world is, Would P-Zombie language have any referents to mental states? Words like "ecstatic" or "agony" or "depressed"? If so, how would those words have come about? Do p-zombies ever look like they're in pain, or sad, or happy? What would cause them to exhibit such behaviors? If they burn their hand, would they then decide to act like they're in pain or would displaying "Ow, that hurts" behavior just happen naturally to them when they're hurt? Would torture work on them?

noAxioms

Are you conscious?. — hypericin

I react to data from my senses. So yes, I am conscious in the same way that a self-driving car is conscious of the traffic around it.
No, not conscious in the Chalmers sense, something more, something that machines cannot have. I've looked for the 'more' part, the part that is inexplicable, and find only the automaton.

I find it very hard to believe. — hypericin

Then the P-zombie argument falls flat because it is unbelievable that something could behave identically externally without that extra thing on the inside. The argument hinges on not being able to tell. So you must believe.

Do p-zombies ever look like they're in pain, or sad, or happy? — RogueAI

They'd act very different if they didn't look like that. As said in terminator, I sense injuries. The data could be called "pain.". I react in a way that attempts to minimize that pain, sometimes quite irrationally. The face expressions? Those seem to come from subconscious places to which I have no direct access. A sleeping (unconscious) person will still wince in pain given certain stimuli.

RogueAI

↪noAxioms

Does pain hurt? Does it feel bad?

Michael

I consider myself to be a p-zombie. — noAxioms

One of these must be true:

1. “I consider myself to be a p-zombie” is false because you are a p-zombie and so don’t believe anything.

2. “I consider myself to be a p-zombie” is false because you are not a p-zombie and believe that you are not a p-zombie.

3. “I consider myself to be a p-zombie” is true because you are not a p-zombie and believe that you are a p-zombie.

The statement “I consider myself to be a p-zombie” is only true if you are not a p-zombie and so no rational person can believe themselves to be a p-zombie.

hypericin

1. “I consider myself to be a p-zombie” is false because you are a p-zombie and so don’t believe anything. — Michael

I think p-zombies may believe things. They have the capacity to record and analyze information the same way we do. There is just no concomitant phenomenal experience of believing.

hypericin

Then the P-zombie argument falls flat because it is unbelievable that something could behave identically externally without that extra thing on the inside. The argument hinges on not being able to tell. — noAxioms

It is a thought experiment, it is an open question whether it is believable or not. But this is a different matter than having a real life p-zombie talking to you on a forum.

It may or may not be logically possible. But it seems much more likely that it is a matter of neural differences which make the concept of qualia obscure. Or simple confusion.

Michael

I think p-zombies may believe things. They have the capacity to record and analyze information the same way we do. There is just no concomitant phenomenal experience of believing. — hypericin

I’m not sure that counts as belief. Belief seems to me to be a conscious activity. Machines can record and analyze information but they don’t believe anything.

hypericin

I’m not sure that counts as belief. Belief seems to me to be a conscious activity. Machines can record and analyze information but they don’t believe anything. — Michael

You are free to not count that as belief. But you cannot use that to then logically conclude that "I consider myself to be a p-zombie" is only true when he is not a p-zombie. By definition, you have excluded the possibility that he p-believes it.

That is, when he says "I consider myself to be a p-zombie", what he really means (to you) is "I p-consider myself to be a p-zombie".

Would P-Zombies have Children?

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