As a thing-in-itself it cannot be talked about (like the Fight Club) — RussellA

A resolute agreement :up:

pointed out that in the CPR bodies exist in space and that we have immediate, non-inferential knowledge of them. — RussellA

“…. In whatsoever mode, or by whatsoever means, our knowledge may relate to objects, it is at least quite clear that the only manner in which it immediately relates to them is by means of an intuition…..”

This just says knowledge of objects is mediated by intuition. Objects are given immediately, but not known immediately; to be known or experienced, an object must run the procedural gauntlet of human cognition, the representation of which begins with intuition.

the matter we experience depends on a source outside of the mind. — RussellA

We don’t experience matter. We experience representations of real things, consisting of the synthesis of its matter, given a posteriori by the senses, with a form, given a priori by “the mind”. Nevertheless, it is true matter depends on a source outside the mind, an external thing appearing to the senses.

thinking about the analogy of colour — RussellA

Irrelevant. Color is just another sensation, given from an undetermined appearance.

there has to be something in the world for us to be able to perceive something, but the something we perceive doesn't of necessity have to be the same thing as the something that caused our perception in the first place. — RussellA

So you’re saying the something we perceive might not be the something that caused our perception. So what? The system as a whole only operates in accordance with that which is given to it. In what other way is it possible to get from red to 700nm, then to begin with the former and reason to the latter?
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If space wasn't real, then the garden bucket would be the same size as the Milky Way Galaxy. — RussellA

Ok. How do you get from the fact they are different sizes, that space is real? Couldn’t it as well be that one is bigger than the other simply because it takes longer to perceive the galaxy than it takes to perceive the bucket? That only tells you there is more of the one than the other, a measure of relative quantity, which is…..yep, a category, which space…..yep, is not.

Space allows me to compare sizes — RussellA

Yes, it does. Allows YOU to compare, which asks…..where is the comparison taking place, if not in the constitution of the subject, in this case…YOU.

“…. when I say, “All bodies are extended,” this is an analytical judgement. For I need not go beyond the conception of body in order to find extension connected with it, but merely analyse the conception, that is, become conscious of the manifold properties which I think in that conception, in order to discover this predicate in it….”

If I think object, the extension of it is given. If I need not go beyond the conception of a body, I need not consider space. And because it’s an analytic judgement, true because of itself, there’s no need for the synthetic a priori judgment the pure intuition of space provides.

“….. if I take away from our representation of a body all that the understanding thinks as belonging to it, as substance, force, divisibility, etc., and also whatever belongs to sensation, as impenetrability, hardness, colour, etc.; yet there is still something left us from this empirical intuition, namely, extension and shape. These belong to pure intuition, which exists à priori in the mind, as a mere form of sensibility, and without any real object of the senses or any sensation….”

Why can’t the extension of an object be predicated entirely on what that object actually is? Why can’t it simply be, that this object I know as an ant cannot be a basketball just because its size alone contradicts what I know?

Nevertheless, it is true matter depends on a source outside the mind, an external thing appearing to the senses. — Mww

I agree, otherwise Kant's Transcendental Idealism would just be a Berkeleyan or Phenomenalist idealism.
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Irrelevant. Color is just another sensation, given from an undetermined appearance..................................So you’re saying the something we perceive might not be the something that caused our perception. So what? — Mww

Yes the colour red is a phenomena, but there are different opinions as to the relationship between a phenomena in the mind and its cause, a noumena in the world.

I would guess that half of the Forum are Direct Realists and as such have no regard for the CPR, whilst the other half are Indirect Realists, for whom the CPR might be relevant.

The Direct Realist, such as Austin and Searle, holds the position that if they perceive a red postbox there is a red postbox in the world, ie, in perceiving a phenomena in the mind they are also perceiving the noumena in the world.

The Indirect Realist such as Kant, holds the position that what we perceive might not be the same thing that caused our perception, in that although we perceive the colour red we might be looking at a wavelength of 700nm. IE, the phenomena perceived in the mind is not of necessity the same as what caused this perception.

Colour is a phenomena in the mind, but colour can also be used to enable a metaphorical understanding of the relationship between phenomena and noumena. George Lakoff makes the point that the metaphor is fundamental in how humans understand complex abstract ideas.
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How do you get from the fact they are different sizes, that space is real? — Mww

If space wasn't real, how could things be of different sizes?
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If I think object, the extension of it is given. If I need not go beyond the conception of a body, I need not consider space. And because it’s an analytic judgement, true because of itself, there’s no need for the synthetic a priori judgment the pure intuition of space provides. — Mww

A proposition may be analytic or synthetic

A7/B11 - “…. when I say, “All bodies are extended,” this is an analytical judgement. For I need not go beyond the conception of body in order to find extension connected with it, but merely analyse the conception, that is, become conscious of the manifold properties which I think in that conception, in order to discover this predicate in it….”

A7/B11 - On the contrary, if I say: "All bodies are heavy," then the predicate is something entirely different from that which I think in the mere concept of a body in general. The addition of such a predicate thus yields a synthetic judgment.

It is true that a body by its very nature is extended in space, in that the word "body" means being extended in space. This is analytic, regardless of the nature of the world.

Similarly the word "unicorn" means a mythical animal typically represented as a horse with a single straight horn projecting from its forehead. This is also analytic, regardless of the nature of the world.

The fact that I can say "all bodies are extended" and "unicorns have a a single straight horn projecting from its forehead" does not presuppose that either bodies or unicorns exist in the world.

If I want to know whether "bodies" or "unicorns" exist in the world, this requires a synthetic judgement.

In Kant's Realism, he does believe that objects exist in the world

From the SEP article section 2.3 on Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, in his Prolegomena he was apoplectic that Feder and Garve had claimed that his Transcendental Idealism was just a Berkeleyan or Phenomenalist idealism, and pointed out that in the CPR bodies exist in space and that we have immediate, non-inferential knowledge of them.

For Kant, bodies exist in the world, even if we only have transcendental knowledge of them. As by definition of the word "body", such bodies are extended in space, this means that if the body is real then the space the body extends into must also be real.

How do you get from the fact they are different sizes, that space is real?
— Mww

If space wasn't real, how could things be of different sizes? — RussellA

What is size, but a relation to a subject? Only an intelligence thinks about or compares sizes. Why not, then, limit the conditions by which relative size is cognizable, to that intelligence wanting to know of it?

That he thinks this object is bigger than that object, merely from its greater degree of extension in space, all he’s done is manufacture a means by which the relation he perceives accords with the relation he thinks.

By both the metaphysical exposition and the transcendental exposition of space, is that means by which the subject comprehends relative extensions of objects given. As an added bonus, that same means is that by which all objects relate, not only to each other, but also and equally, to him, as being closer or further from him, beside or behind him, above or below him, and so on.

As you say, on the other hand, the pure physicalist may insist the extension of objects, and the relation of objects to each other, is impossible without the necessary condition of empirical space. But in CPR no pure physicalist excuses are to be found, except the natural existence or possible existence of real things.
————

A proposition may be analytic or synthetic — RussellA

I agree with what you’re saying, but this part should read, propositions may be analytic or synthetic. The way you’ve written it, it indicates a proposition can be both at the same time, which is not the case.
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….he was apoplectic that Feder and Garve….. — RussellA

Please refrain from repeating yourself; it’s boring as hell, and carries the implication you doubt the thoroughness of people’s dialectical participation. Like….I didn’t see it the first time.

Boring as hell, in that this is a thread grounded in the reading of CPR, which presupposes it’s been read, and the ensuing dialectic is derived from it alone. By second-handing the content of the original, the poster is merely holding with the opinion of the secondary author, rather than presenting his own in accordance with the actual reading of the text. Even when the secondary author directly quotes the original, he is still of the opinion the quote is pertinent, at the expense of the reader who is supposed to be familiar enough to recognize it either may not be, or may not be enough.

Besides, the Prolegomena is what nowadays would be labeled CPR for Dummies, and Kant himself states it is less comprehensive and thereby less precise than CPR. Doesn’t make much sense, in the examination of what he thinks, for it to be taken from an abridged version. Same with any SEP or IEP or (gaspgagchoke) wiki reference.

Sapere aude, dammit!!!!!
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if the body is real then the space the body extends into must also be real. — RussellA

You can see the body, but can you see the space? Say a balloon, before adding air, it’s small. Add air, it gets bigger, extending into space. What happened to the space of each increment of its growing? Is space displaced, and if so, where did it go? Did it just move adjacent space aside, expanding the totality of space? If the totality of space expands, what does it expand into?

So it isn’t that space gets moved aside or expands, but that objects have a space of their own, such that it can be said each object occupies a space. Small objects occupy a small space, bigger objects a bigger space. This object in this space, that object in that space. So space can be treated as a property of each object. Other properties like shape, composition, texture, weight, mass….all determinable quantities. What is the measure of the property of space?

If we say a box measures 3 x 4 x 5 feet, we are describing the dimensions of the box, but are we in fact determining the property of space? Even if we say we’ve measured the property of the space the box occupied, we still only actually measured the box.

By the same token, go out and take three measurements all orthogonal to each other, that is, on three axial dimensions, and say you’ve measure a space. But in this case, without an object, space is not a property of anything, which reduces to the fact you’ve measured nothing which could be an experience. So you can say you measured space, but in fact all you did was move a measuring device from one place to another, which is nothing but the relation of one thing to itself in different times. No matter how you look at it, the relative positioning of the measuring device doesn’t enclose anything. And to use three devices, one for each dimension, you still haven’t enclosed anything, enclosure being the only true representation to which the conception of space can be attributed.

Even to measure a space for a potential object, say a bookshelf, the spatial measurement is merely in relation to that object, but still not a property insofar as there is no bookshelf to which the property may belong.

So….you can’t get from objects are real therefore the space of them must be real. You can’t get there legitimately, that is. Sure, you can say it, you can think it, but what have you actually done? Imma gonna tell ya whachu done: you committed a transcendental illusory faux pas, affectionately known as a syllogism of catastrophic delinquency:

“…. transcendental paralogism has a transcendental foundation, and concludes falsely, while the form is correct and unexceptionable. In this manner the paralogism has its foundation in the nature of human reason, and is the parent of an unavoidable, though not insoluble, mental illusion….”

What about them apples, huh?

You can see the body, but can you see the space? — Mww

Seeing is not a property for space. Space has a few properties based on physics, but visibility is not one of them.

Space has a few properties in physics — Corvus

Maybe, dunno, but we’re not doing physics. We’re doing transcendental philosophy.

I don’t recall saying or implying that seeing was a property of space. Or anything, for that matter.

Maybe, dunno, but we’re not doing physics. We’re doing transcendental philosophy.

I don’t recall saying or implying that seeing was a property of space. Or anything, for that matter. — Mww

Then, the question,

You can see the body, but can you see the space? — Mww

is irrelevant in Transcendental philosophy?

More than irrelevant; incomprehensible. Vision needs that which appears, space does not appear, space cannot be a sensation, space cannot be real.

It can be said, however, space can be real in a different way than that which appears. Which is an entirely different philosophy on the one hand, and a separate science on the other.

Nevertheless, whichever it is, reason is absolutely necessary for whatever the conclusions might be.

That he thinks this object is bigger than that object, merely from its greater degree of extension in space, all he’s done is manufacture a means by which the relation he perceives accords with the relation he thinks. — Mww

mmm. Good. I needed this.

I needed this. — AmadeusD

Presupposing something you didn’t need. What might that be?

Presupposing something you didn’t need. What might that be? — Mww

No idea what you think you're asking, soz.

Ok. Never mind.

Happy to be of service, nonetheless.

More than irrelevant; incomprehensible. Vision needs that which appears, space does not appear, space cannot be a sensation, space cannot be real. — Mww

If you accept, space is invisible emptiness which contains all the objects in universe, then you are seeing it, when you don't. Sense perceives invisible objects.

It can be said, however, space can be real in a different way than that which appears. Which is an entirely different philosophy on the one hand, and a separate science on the other. — Mww

Kant is not talking about the space in empirical reality in CPR, but he seems mentioning its legitimacy in various places from presupposition. He is talking about space as intuited concept in TI to explain how Geometry and visualisation works. And whatever you are perceiving, they originate from the external objects.

Nevertheless, whichever it is, reason is absolutely necessary for whatever the conclusions might be. — Mww

Yes, hence his CPR.

By second-handing the content of the original, the poster is merely holding with the opinion of the secondary author, rather than presenting his own in accordance with the actual reading of the text. — Mww

The poster presents their own opinions as to both the primary and secondary sources

The OP of this Thread suggests a reading group of the CPR, reading the book and sharing thoughts about it. There is no restriction within the OP that only the primary source must be used.

To ignore secondary sources about such a complex book would be foolhardy, in that very few of us have had the time to read the almost 800 pages, analyse and study the almost 900 paragraphs, and compare and contrast the CPR within the body of his other works.

As long as these secondary sources are referenced, and on the assumption judged worthy of inclusion, reasons should given for sources that support one's position and reasons given against sources that don't support one's position.

The use of secondary sources shows that one is not trying to reinvent the wheel, but is constructively building on different debates and different perspectives of academics over a period of 200 years who have devoted their careers to this particular topic.
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Please refrain from repeating yourself — Mww

"Repetition is the mother of learning"

I try to make my posts complete, and if a particular quote or idea helps to make the post understandable then I will use it, regardless of how many times I have used it before.

As you say, on the other hand, the pure physicalist may insist the extension of objects, and the relation of objects to each other, is impossible without the necessary condition of empirical space. But in CPR no pure physicalist excuses are to be found, except the natural existence or possible existence of real things. — Mww

Kant in his Prolegomena made clear that he believed space is empirically real

In the Introduction to CPR by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood is the statement that, for Kant, space and time are empirically real.
Kant's thesis that space and time are pure forms of intuition leads him to the paradoxical conclusion that although space and time are empirically real, they are transcendentally ideal, and so are the objects given in them.

From the SEP article section 2.3 on Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, Kant in the Prolegomena was apoplectic that Feder and Garve had claimed that his Transcendental Idealism was just a Berkeleyan or Phenomenalist idealism, and pointed out that in the CPR bodies exist in space and that we have immediate, non-inferential knowledge of them.

In his Prolegomena, Kant wrote that space is real and exists outside of ourselves:
Here’s something else that can be proved ·as a requirement for the intellectual management· of experience, but can’t be shown to hold of things in themselves: Our outer experience not only does but must correspond to something real outside of ourselves. That tells us this much: there is something empirical—thus, some phenomenon in space outside us— ·the existence of· which can be satisfactorily proved. ·That’s all it tells us·, for we have no dealings with objects other than those belonging to possible experience; because objects that can’t be presented to us in any experience are nothing to us. What is empirically outside me is what appears in space.

It is true that in the CPR Kant writes that we have an a priori pure intuition of space

Kant argues that our perception of space is not a posteriori derived from experience, but must be a priori in order to underlie all experience.

A24/B38 - 2) Space is a necessary representation, a priori, which is the ground of all outer intuitions. One can never represent that there is no space, although one can very well think that there are no objects to be encountered in it. It is therefore to be regarded as the condition of the possibility of appearances, not as a determination dependent on them, and is an a priori representation that necessarily grounds outer appearances.

Understanding A24/B38 using the analogy of perceiving the colour red, we can only perceive the colour red because we have the innate ability to perceive the colour red when looking at a wavelength of 700nm. The fact that we perceive the colour red doesn't mean that the colour red exists in the world. In fact, it is the wavelength of 700nm that exists in the world, and this wavelength of 700nm is the cause of our perception of the colour red.

The fact that we do perceive the colour red suggests that there is in fact something in the world causing such perception, which may for convenience be called" red". There is a dualism in reference, in that red may refer either to what we perceive or the cause of what we perceive. It should be noted that what is referred to by the same term are of different kinds.

The fact that we do perceive space as an outer intuition suggests that there is in fact something in the world causing such perception, which may for convenience be called "space". There is a dualism in reference, in that space may refer either to what we perceive or the cause of what we perceive. It should be noted that what is referred to by the same term are of different kinds.

Where does Kant write in the CPR that space is not empirically real?

There is a dualism in reference of the word space, in that space may refer either to what we perceive or the cause of what we perceive. Whilst Kant does discuss space as referring to what we perceive, where does Kant in the CPR write that space as referring to the cause of what we perceive doesn't exist?

Sense perceives invisible objects. — Corvus

Or, understanding thinks invisible objects.

He is talking about space as intuited concept in TI to explain how Geometry and visualisation works — Corvus

Almost, yes. He is talking about space as an intuited a priori representation, in order to remove it from the necessity of being a phenomenon.

It is true that in the CPR Kant writes that we have an a priori pure intuition of space — RussellA

Yep. Now all you gotta do is figure out exactly what that means, and how it reflects on the human cognitive system overall.

Your modern mentality combined with fixation on a single phrase has made thinking like an Enlightenment-era Prussian impossible.

Almost, yes. He is talking about space as an intuited a priori representation, in order to remove it from the necessity of being a phenomenon. — Mww

Yes, that was my point all the way along. Glad to see some sort of agreement. Well almost.

very few of us have had the time to read the almost 800 pages, — RussellA

JMD Meiklejohn version CPR is only 500 pages long (the 2nd edition only). All the other versions are 700 - 800 pages because they combined the 1st and 2nd Editions into one book.

Devil’s in the details. What is a phenomenon; how did it get to be one; what makes it possible;

What does “pure” mean; what does “a priori” mean;

Virtually every term in CPR is re-defined from the status quo of the age, and when there wasn’t one suitable for what he wanted to say, he invented one and made it known what it was supposed to mean.

Empirical….nothing but a way to think about stuff, just like to think of stuff transcendentally, logically or hypothetically. To think space empirically is not to think it as being real, but merely to think of it as that which contains the real, in order for the relations of things becomes comprehensible.

If it were as real as that which it contains, it would have to be a phenomenon, which makes explicit it could never be pure a priori, and the entire system contradicts itself.

“…. It is therefore from the human point of view only that we can speak of space, extended objects, etc. If we depart from the subjective condition, under which alone we can obtain external intuition, or, in other words, by means of which we are affected by objects, the representation of space has no meaning whatsoever.…”

If the representation has no meaning whatsoever, to then talk of its empirical reality, is sheer nonsense. That Kant uses that wording, indicates he means something else by it.

Now all you gotta do is figure out exactly what that means, and how it reflects on the human cognitive system overall. — Mww

What does it mean that we have an a priori pure intuition of space

As with the colour red, where we have the innate ability to perceive the colour red when looking at a wavelength of 700nm, it means that we have the innate ability to perceive objects in space when looking at the world.

It means that neither the object nor the space that we perceive actually exist in the world, but there is definitely something in the world that we can name for convenience as object and space that has caused our perception of an object in space.

JMD Meiklejohn version CPR is only 500 pages long (the 2nd edition only). All the other versions are 700 - 800 pages because they combined the 1st and 2nd Editions into one book. — Corvus

I am using the Cambridge Edition, translated and edited by Guyer and Wood, which includes the first and second editions.

What does “pure” mean; what does “a priori” mean; — Mww

Pure in CPR means "a priori".

To think space empirically is not to think it as being real, but merely to think of it as that which contains the real, in order for the relations of things becomes comprehensible. — Mww

A tree is standing in the space and on the ground. For you to perceive the tree, the physical space must allow the particles of the light which reflected from the tree, to enter to your eyes. Without the physical space, the light won't be able to travel from the tree to your eyes making all visual perception impossible. So physical space in empirical reality has to be real existence.

If the representation has no meaning whatsoever, to then talk of its empirical reality, is sheer nonsense. That Kant uses that wording, indicates he means something else by it. — Mww

When empirical reality caused the representation to happen in the mind, but if the mind thinks it is sheer nonsense, then it is a problem of the mind.

It means….. — RussellA

Kindasorta, I suppose. We have the physiological capacity to perceive, in various modes, given from the type of biological being we are.

It means….. — RussellA

No it doesn’t. That objects don’t exist contradicts the human experience.
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Pure in CPR means "a priori". — Corvus

Yes, but a priori is not necessarily pure:

“…. “Every change has a cause,” is a proposition à priori, but impure, because change is a conception which can only be derived from experience….”

A priori carries the implication of universality and necessity; pure/impure carries the implication of the contingency of experience.

Kant wants it understood that by a priori, he means without regard to any experience or possible experience whatsoever. He just released himself from having to qualify the term with “pure” every time he used it, the word in the book’s title sufficing as the ground of the whole, the justification for the ground given early on in the text itself.

That objects don’t exist contradicts the human experience. — Mww

1) When we perceive the colour red, the colour red doesn't exist in the world, what exists in the world is a wavelength of 700nm.
2) When we perceive a bent-stick, there is no bent-stick in the world, it is a straight stick in water.
3) When we perceive an elliptical coin, there is no elliptical coin in the world, it is a circular coin on its side.
4) When we perceive a mountain to be the same height as a person, a person the same height as a mountain doesn't exist.
5) When we perceive the two sides of a road approaching each other in the distance, the two sides of the road in the world are in fact parallel.
6) Whe one perceives a pink elephant, there is no pink elephant in the world, only an hallucination caused by delirium tremens.
7) When we perceive an apple, apples don't exist in the world, what exists in the world are
fundamental particles and fundamental forces existing in space and time.

The object that we perceive in our mind is not of necessity the same as the object that exists in the world, meaning that the object we perceive in our minds does not of necessity exist in the world.

Only the Direct Realist would say that the phenomena we perceive in our minds is the same as a noumena that exists in the world.

Not sure what I’m supposed to do with all that.

Pink elephants and noumena are of no interest to me, and I’ve never seen 700nm.

Yes, but a priori is not necessarily pure: — Mww

Kant mainly uses a priori to mean pure in CPR.

“…. “Every change has a cause,” is a proposition à priori, but impure, because change is a conception which can only be derived from experience….” — Mww

It has nothing to do with pure or impure. It is a priori synthetic proposition.

A priori carries the implication of universality and necessity; pure/impure carries the implication of the contingency of experience. — Mww

Not sure if pure / impure has much to do with experience. If it does, it would be minor context.

Kant wants it understood that by a priori, he means without regard to any experience or possible experience whatsoever. He just released himself from having to qualify the term with “pure” every time he used it, the word in the book’s title sufficing as the ground of the whole, the justification for the ground given early on in the text itself. — Mww

But please bear in mind that Kant thought some knowledge is both a priori and also a posteriori e.g. Physics.

I’ve never seen 700nm. — Mww

Exactly, the object perceived in the mind is not of necessity the same object in the world causing the perception. Knowledge of the phenomena does not of necessity give us knowledge of the noumena, as the Direct Realist insists it does.

For over 300,000 years, humans did not know that the cause of their perception of the colour red was the wavelength of 700nm. Only in the last 200 years have humans discovered that the colour red they perceived in the mind doesn't actually exist in the world. Perhaps coincidentally, about 200 years ago, Kant wrote CPR.

It is nothing to do with pure or impure…. — Corvus

….yet he states, clear as the nose on your face…..impure. How can it have nothing to do with exactly what he’s saying?

Not sure if pure / impure has much to do with experience — Corvus

“…. By the term “knowledge à priori,” therefore, we shall in the sequel understand, not such as is independent of this or that kind of experience, but such as is absolutely so of all experience….”

“…. Necessity and strict universality, therefore, are infallible tests for distinguishing pure from empirical knowledge….”, and, empirical already distinguished as having to do with experience.

But please bear in mind that Kant thought some knowledge is both a priori and also a posteriori e.g. Physics. — Corvus

“…. the acquisition of real, substantive knowledge is to be sought only in the sciences, properly so called, that is, in the objective sciences….

Real, substantive knowledge, if it should be acquired, is a posteriori, that is, having sources in experience.

“….. Mathematics and physics are the two theoretical sciences which have to determine their objects à priori. The former is purely à priori, the latter is partially so, but is also dependent on other sources of cognition….”

Partially so means impure; other sources means from out in the world, or, experience.

Knowledge given from the objective sciences is empirical, it informs as to experiences of the world; it is the way in which the knowledge is acquired, the systemic methodology for the development of principles and judgements, better known as logic, the intellect uses to acquire it, that is pure a priori.

Math is purely a priori because it constructs its own objects; physics is a posteriori because its objects are or can be given to it from an external source, re: the world.
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the cause of their perception of the colour red was the wavelength of 700nm. — RussellA

(Sigh) Once again….red is not a thing. Wavelength is a thing, but is not an sensation.

This apples and oranges shit is wearing me out.

Once again….red is not a thing. Wavelength is a thing, but is not an sensation. — Mww

Of course, sensations in the mind are caused by things in the world. Au revoir.