Yes, that would be moral subjectivism.

Although I would argue against moral subjectivism on the grounds that when we make moral claims we don't usually think of ourselves to be just expressing a subjective opinion. This is why there is such a strong disagreement. — Michael

There is a difference. Suppose that Kant was ultimately successful and the categorical imperative was the moral lodestone of the world. Everyday moral claims would seem to be truth-apt, and indeed they would be, as they would either follow from the categorical imperative, or not. And yet, it still may be the categorical imperative itself is false, or not truth apt. And indeed any such "brute moral fact" might necessarily be false, or not truth apt.

And indeed any such "brute moral fact" might necessarily be false, or not truth apt. — hypericin

If it’s false then it’s not a brute fact. If it’s a brute fact then it’s true.

If it’s false then it’s not a brute fact. If it’s a brute fact then it’s true. — Michael

Call it a "brute proposition", then.

The point is that everyday moral propositions seeming to be truth apt carries no evidentiary weight whatsoever. They may be perfectly truth apt, and even true, in that they perfectly follow from say the categorical imperatives.

I made the earlier comparison to Catholic doctrine. Statements about Catholic doctrine seem to be truth apt, and they certainly are, in that they are doctrinally correct, or not. At the same time, you might believe that Catholic doctrine itself is false, necessarily false, or just not truth apt.

I think possibly one issue in this whole discussion is that both you and Banno want to argue for being able to say "x is true" or "x is false", yet neither of you are willing or able to give arguments that refute the kinds of indeterminacy as in these examples with chess pieces.

Moral statements being truth apt doesn't entail moral realism. If I hold that the truth predicate merely serves a social function, I can accept the truth aptness of moral oughts without any metaphysical implications. I may also reject scrutability of reference, so I don't think "ought" refers any more than any other word. This doesn't interfere with truth aptness. — frank

:up: :ok: :cheer: :up:

Rightly or wrongly we mean to assert an objective moral fact, and as such it must be that either moral realism or error theory is correct. — Michael

I think I personally lean towards views where there is skepticism about this. It may at least be indeterminate or context dependent.

Moral claims may indeed be true, but only in that they are true representations of the moral system within which they operate. — hypericin

H If moral claims aren't true by virtue of moral rules/systems/etc, what are they true by virtue of? — hypericin

Hypericin, I hope to respond to your posts tomorrow, but let me ask a preliminary question. You have given an argument against the truth of moral claims, such that, <Moral claims can only be true in virtue of moral systems, and moral systems cannot be true. Therefore, moral claims cannot be true in a supra-systematic way>. (In my post, "in the strong sense" = supra-systematic)

Do you have examples of non-moral truth claims that are true in a supra-systematic way? Is any system true or false? Does your argument prove too much? Namely, that truth itself is always system-constrained? (This is the question that my initial responses have addressed.)

Generally not. "I ought to get out of bed because otherwise I will be late for work" is not a moral judgement, it is purely pragmatic. — hypericin

See:

You distinguish the pragmatic from the moral (in law). Ross distinguishes the psychological from the moral. I think this sort of separation is part of the problem, and it comes from being in the shadow of deontologists like Kant.

Earlier I gave you an account of moral judgment, "To judge an action is to hold that it should have occurred or should not have occurred, with reference to the person acting." This can be pragmatic or psychological, but it is still moral. The whole purpose of law is moral, because it is meant to influence behavior. — Leontiskos

Propositions about the rules of chess may be true or false. The rules of chess may not be. Try harder. — hypericin

1.1 The game of chess is played between two opponents who move their pieces alternately
on a square board called a ‘chessboard’. The player with the white pieces commences the game. A player is said to ‘have the move’, when his opponent’s move has been ‘made’. — FIDE Laws of Chess

Is "The player with the white pieces commences the game" true, false, or not truth apt? Or are you going to claim that "The player with the white pieces commences the game" is a proposition about the rules of chess, not a rule of chess?

It's true, because if it were not, we could not form an argument such as

• The player with the white pieces commences the game.
• Fred has the white pieces.
• therefore Fred commences the game.

This thread has degenerated to imbecility. Have fun. :roll:

Is "The player with the white pieces commences the game" true, false, or not truth apt? — Banno

It is true of chess. It is part of the definition of chess. But there is no sense that it is true beyond chess. Outside of chess it is false, or nonsensical/ not truth apt .

The rules of chess are not inherently propositional, though you can communicate them propositionally. You can also learn them by watching people play. Computers play perfect , rule abiding chess, knowing nothing of propositions. There the logic of the rules is encoded non-propositionally.

Are you pretending that propositions about X are the same as X?

"Moby Dick is an American novel consisting of the text 'Call me Ishmael. Some years ago...' "

Is a true proposition about Moby Dick. Moby Dick itself is neither true nor false, it is not truth apt.

This thread has degenerated to imbecility. Have fun. :roll: — Banno

Ok dude see ya

Do you have examples of non-moral truth claims that are true in a supra-systematic way? Is any system true or false? Does your argument prove too much? Namely, that truth itself is always system-constrained? (This is the question that my initial responses have addressed.) — Leontiskos

Fair enough.

Mundane claims: It would be too much of a stretch to claim that "I have an apple in my pocket" depends on this or that system. For our purpose lets say these are system-free claims.

Scientific claims: While this is apparently controversial, I think scientific claims offer a reasonable model of what systematic claims, where the system itself is true or truth-apt, can look like. Suppose I make a claim, say a calculation, that falls under the province of special relativity. That calculation may be true or false according to the systematic rules of special relativity. These systematic rules themselves may be true or false, to the degree that they accurately predict all the parts of empirical reality that they ought to.

Earlier I gave you an account of moral judgment, "To judge an action is to hold that it should have occurred or should not have occurred, with reference to the person acting." This can be pragmatic or psychological, but it is still moral. — Leontiskos

So a surgeon learning how she ought and ought not to wield a knife, is learning "morality"? This is not the "morality" I am familiar with.

After thinking some more, here is a formulation of the problem I have with "ultimate" moral propositions:

Every "should", "ought", and value proposition, may be perfectly truth-apt, but it must explicitly or implicitly include an "according to" clause, just to be structurally correct. Because "according to" is a part of the notion of ought or values. There is just no such thing as an imperative or value according to nothing.

But an "ultimate" should, ought, or value proposition necessarily lacks an "according to", because it is ultimate. Therefore, it is necessarily ill-formed, and so is not truth-apt.

"According to Sam, ham tastes better than chicken": truth apt.
"(According to me) Ham tastes better than chicken": implicit according to, perfectly truth apt.
"Ham objectively and absolutely tastes better than chicken": taste is subjective and provisional by nature, the statement is internally contradictory and therefore not truth-apt. Or, self-falsifying.

@Leontiskos
@Michael

Every "should", "ought", and value proposition, may be perfectly truth-apt, but it must explicitly or implicitly include an "according to" clause, just to be structurally correct. — hypericin

Well that’s just where moral realists disagree.

"Ham objectively and absolutely tastes better than chicken": taste is subjective and provisional by nature, the statement is internally contradictory and therefore not truth-apt. Or, self-falsifying. — hypericin

I wouldn’t say that it’s internally contradictory, just that it’s factually incorrect.

A good example is that of colour. It’s not internally contradictory to claim that grass is objectively and absolutely green, but given that I’m not a colour realist I would argue that this is factually incorrect. Colour is “in the head” (like taste). Obviously colour realists argue otherwise.

The same disagreement applies in meta ethics. Moral realism may be factually incorrect, but I don’t think it’s internally contradictory.

I wouldn’t say that it’s internally contradictory, just that it’s factually incorrect. — Michael

:chin:
Yeah, I think you're right.

Mundane claims: It would be too much of a stretch to claim that "I have an apple in my pocket" depends on this or that system. For our purpose lets say these are system-free claims. — hypericin

Okay. Well the first thing I want to say is that your system/claim distinction is somewhat arbitrary. For example, you say that Kant's categorical imperative explains why something is the case, and therefore the categorical imperative is the brute fact, not the prescription. This is fine as far as it goes, but I think it is wrong to go a step further and claim that explanation implies a system. All claims, including moral claims, depend on a categorical premise, but it does not follow that all claims are system-based. Your claim here is similar: <All apples are such-and-such; the thing in my pocket is such-and-such; therefore I have an apple in my pocket>. Earlier I noted that some moral claims are presumably system-based, such as utilitarian claims (). But not all are. "Do not execute that innocent man," is much like, "I have an apple in my pocket."

More generally, arguments for moral antirealism in our scientific age usually take the following form:

• All truths must be accessible via the methods of natural science.
• Moral claims are not accessible via the methods of natural science.
• Therefore, moral claims are not truths.

More precisely, it is the idea that there is not parity between moral epistemology and the epistemology of natural science, and that only the latter is legitimate. I usually point out that the non-parity claim is false, or at least it is not supportable on my interlocutor's framework. This theme recurs in our conversation. Presumably you would say that the claim about the apple is system-free but the claim about the innocent man is not system-free. @Michael has done a good job laying the groundwork in this thread and the other thread regarding things like brute facts and @Bob Ross's "(moral) facts."

That calculation may be true or false according to the systematic rules of special relativity. These systematic rules themselves may be true or false, to the degree that they accurately predict all the parts of empirical reality that they ought to. — hypericin

Okay, but I think it is somewhat confusing to call that which follows from a system "true." It is simply not the case that things are true insofar as they follow from any arbitrary system. In effect you are offering a false concession to moral realism with this sense of "true."

So a surgeon learning how she ought and ought not to wield a knife, is learning "morality"? This is not the "morality" I am familiar with. — hypericin

Yes, exactly. You are familiar with a Kantian morality, of (exceptionless) categorical imperatives, no?

---

Every "should", "ought", and value proposition, may be perfectly truth-apt, but it must explicitly or implicitly include an "according to" clause, just to be structurally correct. — hypericin

I agree with .

---

I don't follow your point. Making moral claims seems voluntary, one is under no obligation to make them. And I don't see why voluntary/necessary is an important distinction in this discussion. — hypericin

The simpler point is that everyone on this forum did get out of bed this morning, therefore everyone on this forum does make moral claims or judgments. The same is not true of chess. Presumably we do not all play chess. So I reject the notion that anyone, practically, does not engage in moral judgment.

---

You are just playing with words. This is not the same meaning as the "true" we are discussing. — hypericin

Well, what is the notion of "true" that we are discussing? You have never defined it.

If moral claims aren't true by virtue of moral rules/systems/etc, what are they true by virtue of? Is "one mustn't hurt cats" a brute fact, just as "one mustn't hurt dogs"? Or is there some rule they flow from? — hypericin

If "One musn't hurt cats," is a system-based claim, then so is, "There is an apple in my pocket."

My point is to challenge the idea that

* people make moral propositional claims
- therefore
*moral propositional claims are truth-apt
- or
*everyone is running around making mistakes.

My argument is that there is a third way: people make propositional moral claims, but they are claims within systems of ideas, not claims about the world. And that you can make true or false, therefore truth-apt claims within systems of ideas which themselves may be true, false, not truth apt at all, or nonsensical. — hypericin

I think anyone who claims that those who intend to make a truth claim are not doing so has a very odd notion of truth, propositionality, and intention. The claim that most everyone, including some of the most competent philosophers who have ever lived, have been plagued by first-order deception at the level of their very intention, is just a weak theory. It reads like a conspiracy theory. I'm not even sure it is coherent to claim that one can be deceived about their intention. (@Michael has also covered this topic in various ways.)

Indeed, I believe this. But, how do I know it? What tells me it is true? If it were false, how would I know it? How do I reality test it? How did I or anyone discover this fact? These are the questions that seem to bedevil any moral proposition, and it is in this sense that they aren't truth-apt: not only do we not know they are true, we don't even know what knowing they are true, or knowing they are false, looks like. — hypericin

As @Michael pointed out, I think this is a separate consideration. I claimed that it deserves its own thread (). But as I pointed out to you early on, discursive reason/justification must end at some point. The same holds of the epistemology of natural science.

The moral rules/systems I have in mind aren't necessarily prescriptions. They may be something like, "all sentient life has value". Indeed, I believe this. — hypericin

What does it mean to say, "I believe this," other than, "I believe this to be true"?

I don't agree. "I ought to get out of bed" is not independent of the context. Sure, you can incorporate the context and say "I ought to get out of bed in x context" but then that leads me to ask why I ought to get out of bed in x context. I don't see how such a reason cannot depend on my personal desires and personal goals.

I will then end up asking the question: "why ought I perform behaviors that fulfil my goals?". I see no putatively objective statement about the world that makes it true that "I ought to fulfil my goals". — Apustimelogist

Well, that's because nobody gets out of bed "because I ought to fulfill my goals." You are floundering in abstractions. People get out of bed because "otherwise I will be late for work" (). People don't want to be late for work because they don't want to lose their job. They don't want to lose their job because they have children to feed, and here we arrive at a more basic moral judgment: "I ought to feed my children." This is one example of a personal goal that is widely accepted to be "moral," and so your "personal goal" distinction turns out to be no more relevant than the pragmatic or psychological distinctions that others have given. There is no mutual exclusion, here.

So if, "I ought to get out of bed," is grounded in the belief that one ought to feed their children, and the actor takes this belief to be objectively true (and moral), then, "I ought to get out of bed," is also objectively true and moral.

So again:

Is the reasoning that grounds that moral judgment purely hypothetical, with no reference to, or support from, objective values or 'oughts'? I really, really doubt it. When people make decisions they do so on the basis of the belief that some choices are truly better than others, in a way that goes beyond hypothetical imperatives. — Leontiskos

The basis belief is, "I ought to feed my children," or, "It is better that I feed my children than that I not feed my children." I take it that this is an objective moral truth, but more importantly, it is affirmed to be an objective moral truth by the hundreds of millions of parents who got out of bed this morning.

I answered this in detail in my response, and you can even find it in the quotes you have of me in your response. I said that the difference is that I care about it enough to impose it on other people... — Bob Ross

How does caring about a taste make it imposable? This makes zero sense. There are people in this thread making real arguments, so this conversation is liable to get short shrift. If your only argument is, "My tastes are imposable because I care about them a lot!," then I am going to end this conversation. I am not going to argue with someone who thinks the burden is on me to show that de gustibus non est disputandum. As far as I am concerned such a move is a forfeiture of your position. I have never heard anyone, on this forum or elsewhere, argue for this stupid position. :groan:

(It's actually sort of fascinating because you have basically provided a per se description of irrationality or <"stupidity">. "I care, therefore I am justified. My passions justify me." It is truth or imposition by sheer willpower. This is precisely what irrationality is on a classical Platonic account. It is caring more about your passions than about what is true, and letting your passions override reason. The fellow I described <here> is at least rational.)

I gave the analogy in axiology that commits you to the same line of thinking — Bob Ross

I answered your tu quoque:

Nope. I say, "This is a moral truth [a "fact" if you prefer], and therefore I treat it as a moral truth." You say, "This is a taste, but I do not treat it as a taste." My action matches my perception, whereas yours does not. Even if someone wants to say that I am irrational (because they believe my perception is mistaken), they would have to admit that you are significantly more irrational, because you do not even act according to your perceptions. You have a sort of first-order irrationality going on. — Leontiskos

Well that’s just where moral realists disagree. — Michael

So in a world without minds, would a complete taxonomy of this world included oughts and values?

So in a world without minds, would a complete taxonomy of this world included oughts and values? — hypericin

No, because moral claims are about the behavior of "minds" (to use your word). Similarly, a world without traffic would have no traffic laws.

Okay, but I think it is somewhat confusing to call that which follows from a system "true." It is simply not the case that things are true insofar as they follow from any arbitrary system. — Leontiskos

Oh? I thought you just clarified a few days ago that claims about chess, the most arbitrary sort of system, were true?

"Do not execute that innocent man," is much like, "I have an apple in my pocket." — Leontiskos

They are not alike. The truth of the apple claim depends on knowing what the words mean, and access to my pocket. Sure, language is a system, but not the sort we are discussing here. Every proposition depends on language, so considering it as a "system" akin to a moral system just confuses the discussion.

"Do not execute that innocent man" is a command, and has no truth value. Consider rather "Innocent men ought not be executed". I know what the words mean. But to know whether it is true, I have to know: According to whom, or what? Without the implicit moral system which makes the sentence seem obvious to us, it is no more comprehensible than "Innocent eggplants ought not to be eaten." Why not? I'm hungry.

The simpler point is that everyone on this forum did get out of bed this morning, therefore everyone on this forum does make moral claims or judgments. — Leontiskos

Stop right there. We cannot expect a productive discussion if you abuse language that way. You cannot presume your own eccentric usage will be adopted by anyone else, offhand reference to the categorical imperative, or no. Moral claims, commonly understood, are about moral right and wrong. Not about surgical technique. Not generally about getting out of bed. The word "ought" is not sufficient to make a claim moral. We're not discussing claims such as "I ought to get two cheeseburgers today".

I think anyone who claims that those who intend to make a truth claim are not doing so has a very odd notion of truth, propositionality, and intention. The claim that most everyone, including some of the most competent philosophers who have ever lived, have been plagued by first-order deception at the level of their very intention, is just a weak theory. It reads like a conspiracy theory. I'm not even sure it is coherent to claim that one can be deceived about their intention. — Leontiskos

When people make moral claims, these are truth claims about actions or characters, whose truthmakers are the systems of moral values they grew up immersed in, or adoped, systems likely shared by their moral community. For most people, this is enough. Values are real, but they are mind dependent, and they cannot be true independently of those who hold them.

It is no conspiracy to point out people mistake their values for reality. It is the same error, the same parochialism that regards one's own culture as "true" and absolutely "real". Cultures are real, their artifacts are physically real, but cultures, like values (which are culturally bound) are not mind independent, and are not "true" in an absolute sense.

But as I pointed out to you early on, discursive reason/justification must end at some point. The same holds of the epistemology of natural science. — Leontiskos

There is no limit in principle where scientific explanation ends. Researchers push it as far as they can take it. By contrast, it's frankly quite pathetic to throw up one's hands at "mustn't hurt kitties".

Well, what is the notion of "true" that we are discussing? — Leontiskos

"True" as in factual. Not likeness. Not the alignment of wheels.

No, because moral claims are about the behavior of "minds" (to use your word). Similarly, a world without traffic would have no traffic laws. — Leontiskos

Presumably if traffic laws were "brute facts" they would exist with or without traffic.

So in a world without minds, would a complete taxonomy of this world included oughts and values? — hypericin

In the counterfactual sense that "if there were minds then those minds ought not..." would be true.

Much like the counterfactual sentence "if the Tyrannosaurus rex still lived then it would be the largest living land animal on Earth" is true.

There can be objective truths about things that don't exist.

Well, that's because nobody gets out of bed "because I ought to fulfill my goals." — Leontiskos

Well they evidently do because you go on to list all the sorts of goals or reasons why people get out of bed, and the other goals and reasons these are related to. Whether explicitly or implicitly, people seem to do things in order to avoid or attain future states of the world. Its very difficult to give a reason why people shpuld get out of bed that does not satisfy something like that, and ultimately it will be trivially related to the person's unique life situation.

and here we arrive at a more basic moral judgment: "I ought to feed my children." This is one example of a personal goal that is widely accepted to be "moral," and so your "personal goal" distinction turns out to be no more relevant than the pragmatic or psychological distinctions that others have given. There is no mutual exclusion, here. — Leontiskos

I am not making a mutually exclusive distinction. Feeding your children is yet another goal or desire or want or [equivalent pragmatic phrase] that people may have. It may happen to be widely agreed moral statement but that is irrelevant. On one hand, there is no requirement that the reasons for getting out of bed need to be moral. On the other, moral statements fall to the exact same line of reasoning I gave in that post: I cannot find objective reasons why I ought to feed my children. I may come upon a very good reason about not inflicting suffering on people but then you can ask if that is an objective reason. Is there an objective reason to not inflict suffering? What in the world would make it so?

So if, "I ought to get out of bed," is grounded in the belief that one ought to feed their children, and the actor takes this belief to be objectively true (and moral), then, "I ought to get out of bed," is also objectively true and moral. — Leontiskos

That someone takes a belief to be objectively true is not an argument that it is objectively true. Unless you can provide an objective argument why they are correct, then the only argument being given is someone's subjective inclination that they think something is true. Is there a reason to think those inclinations are accurate? How do you refute other people who just happen to have different inclinations? It is not a sound argument for something being objectively true. And this comes back to a point I made before: you and Banno seem to be primarily arguing for being able to use the world "true". But this is almost trivial and not the real meat of issues in regard to moral realism. As some other posters have said, moral realism doesn't follow from truth aptness. What you need to do is resolve the indeterminacy problem and show why some moral statements are objectively true, as opposed to just saying that is reasonable to use the word "true".

The basis belief is, "I ought to feed my children," or, "It is better that I feed my children than that I not feed my children." I take it that this is an objective moral truth, but more importantly, it is affirmed to be an objective moral truth by the hundreds of millions of parents who got out of bed this morning. — Leontiskos

Well, I don't think we can necessarily make the claim that it is affirmed as an objective moral truth by millions of people without some kind of rigorous empirical survey.

More importantly, I don't think the fact that people agree on things make them true. Often people agree on things by consensus which we later change our agreement to be false or which another completely different community think are false. It is plausible there are other reasons people agree which are not to do with objective truth.

As an example, it is trivial that the reasons people get out of bed are related to their unique personal situations, not some context-invariant reason. It just so happens that many people have similar reasons for getting out of the bed because we live in similar worlds culturally and we have similar desires, partly due to culture, partly due to biology (e.g. the only reason I want to eat is because I am biologically wired and structured to so so).

Whilst many people share similarities in why they get out of bed, many people have completely different reasons (e.g. not all have children to feed) and changing the proportions of people that have particular reasons is something that can conceivably occur by changing the social or even biological context. At the same timev someone having a goal that they may want to attain by getting out of bed doesn't seem to connect to some objective reason that they ought to get out of bed.

I can reiterate this line of thought in a similar way but concerning morality and agreement. People may agree on different moral things depending on the social context. Perhaps societies which are more harsh may have more permissive moral norms, societies which are more co-operative may have more stringent ones. Changing the context may lead to changes in moral norms due to the changes in the practicalities of living and changes in the way people interact or communicates with each other.

Our biological similarities obviously also have a big factor in morality - we are essentially wired to be averse to pain and we have sophisticated abilitied to empathize and read people's intentions. I don't need to refer to objective moral facts to explain that those kinds of things may lead to certain agreements on moral statements. In fact, if moral statements are about how people should behave and society relies on co-ordinated behavior to function, then it is almost impossible for society to function without wide ranging agreements on many things, whether legally or morally or otherwise.

Furthermore, I think that appealing to agreement among people suggests that they have some kind of inherent ability to sense moral truths. I just cannot envision this as some kind of likely ability for people to have, based on what we know about neuroscience and things like that. The way I conceive of neuroscience just doesn't look like we have some access to moral truths in some fashion. I cannot envision how that would look scientifically. We don't have some kind of sensory apparatus for moral truth and the idea of physically sensing an ought makes no sense to me.

To me, from a neuroscientific perspective, *I would say that* morals arise as abstractions which are related to things like desires and the kinds of affective and interoceptive states that underlie emotion. It doesn't seem to me that these have anything to do with some kind of moral objective state of affairs as opposed to our inherent biological tendencies and how they interact and manifest within a social context that can vary. Neither do I see any inherent reason why acting in accordance to those kinds of things is something we objectively ought to do, and I think that trying to charactetize moral truth that way is ultimately intractable, indeterminate and trivial.

Much like the counterfactual sentence "if the Tyrannosaurus rex still lived then it would be the largest living land animal on Earth" is true.

There can be objective truths about things that don't exist. — Michael

But this is merely a logical relationship.

Tyrannosaurus rex were the largest living land animals to ever exist.
Therefore, if the Tyrannosaurus rex still lived then it would be the largest living land animal on Earth.

But moral facts, to you, are special "brute facts" which cannot be derived logically. Can you name any other such brute fact about something that doesn't exist?

Can you name any other such brute fact about something that doesn't exist? — hypericin

1 + 1 = 2.

As far as I am concerned such a move is a forfeiture of your position. I have never heard anyone, on this forum or elsewhere, argue for this stupid position.

I don’t think you are being charitable to my position nor are you genuinely trying to understand it. You keep making hateful comments which are either ungrounded or presuppose your moral realist framework.

If you are unwilling to have a serious and respectful conversation about moral subjectivism, then I think it is best that we just agree to disagree. I am more than willing to continue the conversation, but, as of now, it seems clear to me you are more interesting with throwing around insults than actually contending with my elaborate responses. I responded to a lot of your objections and you simply ignored them in this response.

With that being said, I will address only the parts of your response that I think I wouldn’t be re-iterating what you have ignored from my other responses.

I am not going to argue with someone who thinks the burden is on me to show that de gustibus non est disputandum

I do not disagree that tastes, at the end of the day, are indisputable. I never said otherwise or to the contrary.

As far as I am concerned such a move is a forfeiture of your position.

You not liking my position is not a forfeiture of my position. If you can provide a contradiction or incoherence with the view, which you have not done as of yet, then I am more than happy to concede my position (or amend as necessary). I am not looking to stay ten toes down for the sake of dignity or pride: I seek the truth.

(It's actually sort of fascinating because you have basically provided a per se description of irrationality

I am not really that interested in the definition of stupidity, since it hinges on the definition of rationality; so let’s dive in: what is your definition of rationality? I don’t see how enforcing a preference is irrational there is something incoherent or contradictory about doing so. This is why I keep asking you to provide two propositions that I accept which you think are incoherent or contradictory. I can only assume, with all due respect, that you are unable to do so, and implicitly concede that there isn’t any.

It is truth or imposition by sheer willpower. This is precisely what irrationality is on a classical Platonic account. It is caring more about your passions than about what is true, and letting your passions override reason.

You would be right if moral facts existed. Again, you just continue to, with all due respect, blatantly presuppose your position and act like I am irrational for not accepting it. If there are no moral facts, then to impose a moral non-fact is not going against what is true. Likewise, in my scenario I gave you, not caring about the moral fact isn’t the same as claiming the moral fact is false or doesn’t exist.

I answered your tu quoque:
Nope. I say, "This is a moral truth [a "fact" if you prefer], and therefore I treat it as a moral truth." You say, "This is a taste, but I do not treat it as a taste." My action matches my perception, whereas yours does not. Even if someone wants to say that I am irrational (because they believe my perception is mistaken), they would have to admit that you are significantly more irrational, because you do not even act according to your perceptions. You have a sort of first-order irrationality going on.

You seem to smuggling here: treating a moral truth ‘like it is a moral truth’ seems to be smuggling in the notion that it intrinsically axiologically matters, which is false. Is that what you are arguing? That in virtue of something being a moral truth is should be valued?

If so, then how is that not stemming from a preference that you have? You can’t appeal to another moral fact because that is circular logic. Something being morally true doesn’t mean you have to value moral facts in general: what fact are they getting wrong? Or are you saying morals and axiology are the same thing under your view?

1 + 1 = 2. — Michael

In a universe consisting of nothing, would 1 + 1 = 2? It would not be empirically verifiable. It would not be intuitively obvious, since the notion of any one thing would be incomprehensible, assuming there was anything around to have notions.

I am not looking to stay ten toes down for the sake of dignity or pride: I seek the truth. — Bob Ross

I got the feeling this wasn't on the menu, for this interlocutor. I have a feeling moral realists are necessarily unable to bridge the gap we're genuinely looking to traverse.

Oh? I thought you just clarified a few days ago that claims about chess, the most arbitrary sort of system, were true? — hypericin

You're not following. A chess claim is true, but not because it follows from an arbitrary system.

They are not alike. The truth of the apple claim depends on knowing what the words mean, and access to my pocket. Sure, language is a system, but not the sort we are discussing here. Every proposition depends on language, so considering it as a "system" akin to a moral system just confuses the discussion.

"Do not execute that innocent man" is a command, and has no truth value. Consider rather "Innocent men ought not be executed". I know what the words mean. But to know whether it is true, I have to know: According to whom, or what? Without the implicit moral system which makes the sentence seem obvious to us, it is no more comprehensible than "Innocent eggplants ought not to be eaten." Why not? I'm hungry. — hypericin

And without the taxonomical system that makes the apple sentence seem obvious to us, it is no more comprehensible than, "Bloofas are common in ariondus." Your notion of a "system" is arbitrary, and it is supporting your question-begging.

Stop right there. We cannot expect a productive discussion if you abuse language that way. You cannot presume your own eccentric usage will be adopted by anyone else, offhand reference to the categorical imperative, or no. Moral claims, commonly understood, are about moral right and wrong. Not about surgical technique. Not generally about getting out of bed. The word "ought" is not sufficient to make a claim moral. We're not discussing claims such as "I ought to get two cheeseburgers today". — hypericin

Oh, I gave my definition of a moral judgment (). I noted that I hold to a correspondence theory of truth. You are the one running around making wild assertions without defining your terms. You say that I am not talking about truth, but you won't define what you mean by truth. You say that I am not talking about morality, but you won't define what you mean by morality. "Moral claims... are about moral right and wrong," is about as helpful and substantial as, "'True' as in factual."

It is no conspiracy to point out people mistake their values for reality. It is the same error, the same parochialism that regards one's own culture as "true" and absolutely "real". — hypericin

It is a conspiracy to hold that moral philosophers who understand the various positions are doing such a thing. But hey, you're probably just laboring under your parochialism, right? You've grown up in a culture of moral anti-realism, and you aren't able to understand that your moral claims are supra-systematic. You intend to assert that your moral claims are system-bound, but you are unable to understand that your intention is actually supra-systematic. How's that sound?

There is no limit in principle where scientific explanation ends. — hypericin

Arguendo, why can't the same hold of morality? Again, your non-parity continues to struggle. One could attempt to answer the question, "Why are electrons negatively charged?," but the attempt is only worthwhile if the interlocutor accepts that, in practice, there is a limit to explanation. Once it is recognized that the interlocutor will not admit this (and is not therefore not being serious), one will not attempt an answer.

"True" as in factual. Not likeness. Not the alignment of wheels. — hypericin

"Factual"! :groan: Heaven help us! If you had read either of the current threads on this topic, you would know how question-begging this response is. In any case, it's nowhere near a philosophical account of truth.

Presumably if traffic laws were "brute facts" they would exist with or without traffic. — hypericin

It depends on how one conceives of a brute fact. Michael's counterfactual point of course holds, but the problem is that, like Bob Ross, you are just begging the question. "Truth" is "factual," and "factual," among other things, means, "Non-moral." "Brute facts" can only be supported by the physical or natural world, and are therefore non-moral (i.e. they cannot be supported by truthmakers or states of affairs that are non-physical).

The difficulty for me is that you guys don't even understand that you are begging the question. You're blinkered in your own worldview, unable to see a different view. You also aren't able to see how inconsistent your arguments are. I haven't published a thread on morality because there are so many naive moral anti-realists here. I don't want to wade through all of those responses, especially if there is no one who is able to provide a response from the perspective of critical moral anti-realism.

You not liking my position is not a forfeiture of my position. If you can provide a contradiction or incoherence with the view, which you have not done as of yet, then I am more than happy to concede my position (or amend as necessary). I am not looking to stay ten toes down for the sake of dignity or pride: I seek the truth. — Bob Ross

I think your toes are much stickier than you realize. If someone thinks imposing tastes is justifiable, then in my estimation the conversation is at an end, and they have reduced their own position to absurdity. You think imposing tastes is justifiable (when "[You] care about it enough to impose it on other people"). Hence, the conversation is at an end.

Also, I am going to go ahead and report you to the logic police!

In a universe consisting of nothing, would 1 + 1 = 2? — hypericin

Yes.

It would not be empirically verifiable. — hypericin

Does that matter? Does something need to be empirically verifiable for it to be true? Are you an antirealist about truth in general?

You think imposing tastes is justifiable (when "[You] care about it enough to impose it on other people"). Hence, the conversation is at an end. — Leontiskos

The philosophical one is. Having not resolved anything hehe.

But there's much to be said about that assertion.

Does that matter? Does something need to be empirically verifiable for it to be true? Are you an antirealist about truth in general? — Michael

No, I don't think I am. But it is an awfully weak "axiom" that is neither empirically testable nor intuitively clear. I suppose something can be true in spite of these lacks, though one would never learn of it. But in this case, the question is "true of what"?