But true or false? I don't think so. I just can't see how they are the sort of things that might be true or false. — hypericin

I agree with this - and it seems to me that this exact thinking applies to moral statements. But I consider truth dependent on an object. If your object is “the world at large” I simply don’t understand what you think you’re saying wrt to a moral “fact” of the world.

But again; I may be (and this is active work(including this comment)) changing that conception as we exchange.

The question is not whether moral statements are truth-apt. They clearly are.

The problem is, are the moral systems against which moral statements are true or false themselves truth-apt? Here I think not. — hypericin

I think there are a number of problems with this post, but let me just focus on the most basic. As outlined by @Michael and others in the other thread (link), moral truth claims adhere to a basic sort of correspondence theory of truth. At least this is how I mean them. You are thinking in terms of a formal systems notion of truth. It’s an equivocation on what “truth” means. For example, we can call the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity a tautology (“truth” in the formal systems sense), but that is not how Catholics mean it. We do not mean, “If you accept our axioms then this follows tautologically.” We mean, “This is true, it correctly describes reality.” A moral claim works the same way. The claim is not, “If you accept my system then this follows,” but rather that the proposition itself is true (and if your system can’t handle it then you need an upgrade).

A system or context can condition the meaning of a proposition, but the proposition itself is ultimately true or false depending on how it comports with reality. The primary bearers of truth are therefore propositions, not systems.

Somewhere what I was trying to convey has passed over you, which is fine as I do that too sometimes, so I would like to clarify the points again.

My precise definition I am using of ‘moral realism’ is a thesis of the conjunction of three claims:

1. Moral judgments are propositional [moral cognitivism]; and
2. Moral judgments express something objective [moral objectivism]; and
3. There are some true moral judgments [moral non-nihilism].

This is reflected, upon doing a quick search (again), in every major definition I am seeing on google; but my favorite is https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-anti-realism/#CharMoraAntiReal:

Traditionally, to hold a realist position with respect to X is to hold that X exists objectively. On this view, moral anti-realism is the denial of the thesis that moral properties—or facts, objects, relations, events, etc. (whatever categories one is willing to countenance)—exist objectively. This could involve either (1) the denial that moral properties exist at all, or (2) the acceptance that they do exist but this existence is (in the relevant sense) non-objective. There are broadly two ways of endorsing (1): moral noncognitivism and moral error theory. Proponents of (2) may be variously thought of as moral non-objectivists, or idealists, or constructivists. So understood, moral anti-realism is the disjunction of three theses:

i. moral noncognitivism
ii. moral error theory
iii. moral non-objectivism

Those three prongs are the exact same as mine, except stanford is defining it in terms of the converse position (viz., in terms of what counts as moral anti-realism instead of what counts as moral realism, if you negate each and swap the disjunction for conjunction then you end up with the definition of moral realism).

In terms of your summary of my definition:

I am thinking of moral anti-realism as the idea that, to use your own words, <There are no "subject-referencing prescriptive statements" that are objectively binding on all>.

I think that is a perfectly adequate, less precise, short-hand for it. By ‘moral’ language I do mean ‘subject-referencing normativity’ and by fact I am refering to a statement which agrees with reality with respect to what it purports about reality. Unless I am missing something about your definition here, then I don’t see any incoherence with me accepting this as a useful short-hand definition.

Likewise, saying, in short-hand, “that are objectively binding on all” is just to say that moral anti-realism denies #2. “binding on all” isn’t really necessary aspect of moral anti-realism, but it a meaningful distinction. Technically some prescriptive judgment could be subject-referencing in the sense that it binds to me but not you (theoretically) and that would be a moral fact; however, when talking generally, I would say the most meaningful convo is about ones which apply to all subjects/persons.

No, I don't think so. According to the standard view, someone who accepts objective moral values is a moral realist. What source are you using?

Again, my definition pertains to the bindingness of a moral prescription, and you agreed to that definition. Are you withdrawing your agreement?

Your short-hand definition above that I agreed to was that a moral anti-realist rejects that they are objective. Likewise, I accepted that if by moral realism you mean a person who accepts #1 and #3, which precludes #2 which is required for it to be an objective moral value, then I am a moral realist. I am failing to see the confusion here.

I assume this is a typo and you meant to say "moral realism."

Correct. I apologize.

"I believe the proposition, but that doesn't mean I think it's true."

No. Like I said, moral judgments are expression of subject beliefs and not beliefs about facts under moral subjectivism. You seem to be either misunderstanding or completely ignoring this point I keep making. There is nothing incoherent with saying “I believe you shouldn’t do X” and this is a belief which is an expression of what my psyche approves/disapproves of—not an expression of a belief about a fact-of-the-matter.

I doubt you even completely reject this idea either. Imagine I said “I believe that ice cream tastes absolutely delicious!”. Would you really be confused and say “Oh so you are affirming the fact that ice cream tastes absolutely delicious?”. That believe is the upshot of an approval by their psyche of the taste of ice cream: it is not fact that ice cream tastes really good.


The second thing I wanted to clarify is that you seem to think, as I noted before, that either (1) a taste which expresses a desire for other to have the same desire is impossible or/and (2) that a subjectively universalized goal is equivalent to an objectively universalized goal.

With respect to #1, I just find these to demonstrably exist. With respect to #2, I can subjectively want for everyone to abide by “one ought not do X”, and with it a sense of universalization, while not conceding that it is a fact that “one ought not do X”. I am not sure what the hiccup is here, but you seem to think that it is actually impossible to have a taste that others should have the taste to not do X without it being converted into an objective fact: I think this is just a misunderstanding.

For example, you think that we should not torture babies, and that this moral norm applies universally and unchangeably.

Firstly, it isn’t immutable. I have the taste that everyone should not torture babies, and that could very well change (although I doubt it) in the future.

Secondly, it is not ‘universal’ in any objective sense. I subjectively commit myself to trying to universalize my goal.

Think of it this way. Imagine that we programmed an AI such that they had the sole goal all the time of trying to convince and ultimately stopping people from torturing babies. All else being equal, that people shouldn’t torture babies is not a fact, the AI just has this ingrained taste. Now, does this change the fact that this AI is trying to universalize their taste? Not at all. You seem to omit this option in your analysis.

So if there were an intersubjective agreement that it is permissible to torture babies, then it would be permissible to torture babies?

Ultimately, if one believes that torturing babies is permissible then, relative to them, it is permissible. For me, it is impermissible.

Does the wrongness of torturing babies change with the opinions of the day?

Ultimately, I would say it changes with the individual, and inter-subjectivity flows from that; although they may impact each other (e.g., I may change my mind about torturing babies depending no the society I am in).

As outlined by Michael and others in the other thread (link), moral truth claims adhere to a basic sort of correspondence theory of truth. At least this is how I mean them. You are thinking in terms of a formal systems notion of truth. It’s an equivocation on what “truth” means. For example, we can call the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity a tautology (“truth” in the formal systems sense), but that is not how Catholics mean it. — Leontiskos

Hi Leontiskos, thanks for making this point, it is crucial. It is precisely here that I am an error theorist. People go around all the time making doctrinal claims as if they were correspondence to reality claims. Pick any ideology, religion, political system, etc., you want, and you will find people talking about it as if they were claiming things about reality. When in fact, they are making doctrinal claims about and within a certain framework of beliefs. This is in fact a basic cognitive error, and it is for the clarification of errors of this sort that philosophy exists in the first place.

Moral claims absolutely do not escape this, as much as it might hurt the feelings of those making them. Moral claims are simply impossible without a moral doctrine within which they exist. And this moral doctrine itself, unlike the claims made within it, is not truth apt.

The larger philosophical question is, what claims do escape this?

Now, there may be people who earnestly profess to fail to comprehend morality. But I would say that if it is observable in their actions then they understand it just fine, it's just that their theory is at odds with their actions. — Leontiskos

I wouldn't say I fail to comprehend morality. I see morality as a function of evolved cognitive biases which tend to make individuals function successfully in a social group, as the following video illustrates:



Like the angry monkey, we are biased towards judging things to be wrong and acting on such judgements. There is no need for a 'moral law' to explain such behavioral tendencies - just a history of evolution as social primates.

There is no inconsistency in social primates like us intellectually recognizing an emotivist basis for morality, and yet continuing to be social primates who form and act on moral judgements. Humans can't turn themselves into Vulcans just by adopting a particular moral theory.

I know your intuitions about morality have been strongly influenced by religious arguments. So it is understandable that it would be quite a paradigm shift for you to grasp such a different way of understanding morality, but I happen to think this is vastly more realistic than your belief in a moral law and lawgiver.

Moral claims absolutely do not escape this.... The larger philosophical question is, what claims do escape this? — hypericin

:up: Yessir.

Firstly, it isn’t immutable. I have the taste that everyone should not torture babies, and that could very well change (although I doubt it) in the future.

Secondly, it is not ‘universal’ in any objective sense. I subjectively commit myself to trying to universalize my goal.

Think of it this way. Imagine that we programmed an AI such that they had the sole goal all the time of trying to convince and ultimately stopping people from torturing babies. All else being equal, that people shouldn’t torture babies is not a fact, the AI just has this ingrained taste. Now, does this change the fact that this AI is trying to universalize their taste? Not at all. You seem to omit this option in your analysis. — Bob Ross

Okay, that was a useful clarification. The thrust of my point is this: Why are you trying to universalize a taste that is not universal in any objective sense? If moral subjectivism is the claim that moral judgments are idiosyncratic (flowing from subjectivity), then the evangelistic moral subjectivist is attempting to impose idiosyncrasies.

Again, I think there is a relevant difference between ice cream preference and the belief that no one should torture babies. Imagine there were someone who went around, everywhere, trying to convince everyone that chocolate was the best ice cream, and if they saw anyone eating any other flavor they would violently prevent them from doing so. I ask them, "Do you think there is some objective reason everyone should only eat chocolate ice cream?" They respond, "No, it's my personal and subjective taste, but I just go around trying to persuade and even force everyone to eat only chocolate ice cream." And they take this to be a reasonable answer to my question. What would you say? Is that anywhere near reasonable? I think the proper word for such a person is "vain." They want everyone to have the same tastes that they do.

To be clear, I grant that your 'moral subjectivism' is probably not a form of moral realism, but I do not grant that it is coherent. It requires one to do things like impose idiosyncratic beliefs, or speak of judgments that are true and yet not objective.

Hi Leontiskos, thanks for making this point, it is crucial. It is precisely here that I am an error theorist. People go around all the time making doctrinal claims as if they were correspondence to reality claims. Pick any ideology, religion, political system, etc., you want, and you will find people talking about it as if they were claiming things about reality. When in fact, they are making doctrinal claims about and within a certain framework of beliefs. This is in fact a basic cognitive error, and it is for the clarification of errors of this sort that philosophy exists in the first place.

Moral claims absolutely do not escape this, as much as it might hurt the feelings of those making them. Moral claims are simply impossible without a moral doctrine within which they exist. And this moral doctrine itself, unlike the claims made within it, is not truth apt.

The larger philosophical question is, what claims do escape this? — hypericin

I think you missed my entire point, because I agreed that doctrinal claims are "correspondence to reality" (truth) claims. I think you are putting the cart before the horse. Truth in the primary sense is not tautological, and systems are secondary realities. Propositions are primary. Everyday language is not a logical system. Analytic philosophers have basically built a pretty house and then pretended that there is no reality outside of it. Systems are contrived, not basic. Truth is a great deal more wild and unwieldy than the analytic philosopher's domesticated schema can account for.

So the category error is yours, for the truth-claim is not a system-claim. It is not a framework-claim. It is a metaphysical claim, and there is no contextualizing framework or system for truly metaphysical claims. Modern philosophy has dug itself into a rabbit hole by claiming that metaphysics and metaphysical claims are impossible.

Here is something I wrote elsewhere:

It is such a strange and deep-seated malady of analytic philosophy whereby intelligence is reduced to computation and truth is reduced to tautology! Some philosophers have become so preoccupied with their systems that they seem to have forgotten that reality exists at all. Their Tower of Babel always ends up crashing down, and this occurs at approximately the same moment that the average person understands truth better and more clearly than they do. Truth is arrived at by judgment, not primarily by computation or syllogism or system. Judgment always comes first and precedes the others. The terms, the premises, the first principles, the inferences, the realities at stake—all of it is first subjected to judgment. There is no magic way to circumvent judgment and truth in the realest, most primary sense. In real life there are no axioms, only first principles that are either true or false. The suspension of judgment that putatively applies to axioms is but a useful fiction.

The same problem that occurs in moral epistemology also occurs in natural epistemology. The initial judgments that connect reason to the real world tend to elude analytic philosophers and “empiricists.” Hume ends up undermining not only morality, but also natural science. A truncated understanding of intelligence leads to a truncated understanding of reality. If intelligence were only computational, a matter of combining and separating, synthesis and analysis, then empiricists like Hume would be justified in their strange conclusions. But it is not. It is also comparison; comparison of things to one another and also comparison of ideas to things and to reality, whence the ideas are true or false. The most basic act is not even comparison per se, but rather affirmation and denial (the recognition and assertion that something is or that something is not). The simplicity of affirmation and denial precedes discursive computation and also grounds it, giving it meaning and purpose. If there is no truth in non-discursive reason, then there can be no truth in discursive reason (unless we substitute truth for a formalism, but this is not truth).

Else, take my post <here> and replace "theory" with "system" and "fact" with "proposition." The same point holds. There is no automatic rule that systems must be met with systems, or that systems are more fundamental than truths. I think it is quite the opposite.

(Of course there are exceptions, moral approaches which are system-fundamental. Utilitarianism comes to mind, where a systematic abstraction grounds the moral conclusions.)

Fair enough. I don't really know enough about your position to say much, and I may not have enough time for that anyway, but I suppose there is one thing that could be said. You distinguish the pragmatic from the moral (in law). Ross distinguishes the psychological from the moral. I think this sort of separation is part of the problem, and it comes from being in the shadow of deontologists like Kant.

Earlier I gave you an account of moral judgment, "To judge an action is to hold that it should have occurred or should not have occurred, with reference to the person acting." This can be pragmatic or psychological, but it is still moral. The whole purpose of law is moral, because it is meant to influence behavior.

Or in the other thread I spoke of the claim that "we should not torture babies." You replied:

In my case, I do think this, but i dont think it's a norm — AmadeusD

First, note that it is a principle of action. Now when a principle of action is applied, it becomes a norm. That is, the one applying it is utilizing it as a norm or standard, which is being applied to persons and their actions. So to say, "I think we should not torture babies, but I don't think it's a norm," is a contradiction (or else the English language is being used in a highly abnormal and unconventional manner). Else it is the claim that it is only a tentative norm or a watery norm. But just as tentative judgments are still judgments, so too are tentative norms still norms.

To be honest, then, I think the "moral subjectivist" lacks self-knowledge. They are trying to have their cake and eat it too, and this comes out in various ways. One such way is by applying or maintaining a principle of action and refusing to call it a norm. Another is vacillating on the question of whether they are within their rights to project their subjectivity onto others. The more precise problem, in my opinion, is that "subjective" and "objective" are much less precise words than the so-called "subjectivist" recognizes, and this leads to odd claims and presumptions.

Why are you trying to universalize a taste that is not universal in any objective sense?

Because it is a taste that I find is important enough to me to enforce. I totally agree with:

Again, I think there is a relevant difference between ice cream preference and the belief that no one should torture babies

But, I would say, within my metaethical framework, the reason I agree with you is not because there is a fact of the matter: it is because what we both consider “worthy” of imposement is similar to one another. They are both tastes (to me), but one hits towards my core morals and the other seems negligible. Why? I can’t give you a full account of my psychology, but I would guess it is a bit of biology, sociology, nurture, and psychology that motivate me towards finding that a reasonable assessment.

Of course, you are going to disagree because all that matters to you, from your metaethical framework, is that they are both tastes; so why do I think you should somewhat agree with me here? Let’s go back to my example (that I still think you have avoided addressing): if you catch me in the act of torturing a baby (for fun) and tell me “you shouldn’t be doing that because it is a fact” and I say “I don’t care”...what is left for you to do other than shove your values down my throat (viz., other than for you to impose your taste that I should care about the moral facts because you care about the moral facts)?

This scenario explicates two things:

1. That moral realists cannot be coherent (internally) with the principle that a taste cannot be imposed on another because they equally do it all the time.

2. It is impossible not to impose one’s tastes, to some extent, on other people. It is not enough to note there is a moral fact-of-the-matter: you also have to impose your taste that anyone should care about them.

So I don’t think you should find it that controversial when I say I would impose my belief that one should not torture babies but no the vanilla ice cream because I value the former simply so much; just like how you value moral facts so much that you will impose that taste on other people.

You have yet to address this issue.

They respond, "No, it's my personal and subjective taste, but I just go around trying to persuade and even force everyone to eat only chocolate ice cream." And they take this to be a reasonable answer to my question. What would you say?

I would find them “unreasonable”, but not objectively wrong. ‘Unreasonablness’ is subjective (ultimately).

If moral subjectivism is the claim that moral judgments are idiosyncratic (flowing from subjectivity), then the evangelistic moral subjectivist is attempting to impose idiosyncrasies.

Not necessarily, but certainly a possibility. Most of the time moral judgments that are not peculiar to one individual makes it into society’s norms. The more peculiar, the less likely it is to have any power over the populace. Society’s functions on explicit and implicit agreement.

To be clear, I grant that your 'moral subjectivism' is probably not a form of moral realism, but I do not grant that it is coherent. It requires one to do things like impose idiosyncratic beliefs, or speak of judgments that are true and yet not objective.

What is incoherent about any of that? Please explicate two propositions which I affirm that you find to be incoherent.

For example, I think you accept “one should not impose tastes on one another” and “one is permitted to impose tastes on each other if it matters deeply to them” which contradict each other; I would say you affirm this because you would implicitly shove your values about morals down my throat in the scenario I gave, which violates the first proposition. What similarly do you find incoherent with my view?

There being true moral judgments, in the sense of being true relative to whether it is a belief or conative disposition a subject has to an action, is perfectly coherent with them not being objective—if they are an upshot of our psychology, then why would anyone even think they are objective?

I don't think there's a meaningful answer to the question. Some things are simply fundamental, brute facts about the world. Explanations have to come to an end somewhere. — Michael

I half agree with you. A person's values might ultimately be a brute fact (as Hume attempted to demonstrate), and that determines what is good for them.

But the fact that different people have different values means that there is no point-of-view invariant value, as value depends on the point of view. Even if everyone has the same base set of values (if we go with Hume, avoidance of pain (broadly conceived) and pursuit of pleasure (again broadly conceived), the fact that one person's pleasures (bathing in asses milk) entailing another one's pain (slavery) renders an objective account inaccurate. Values can be real (in the sense of not fictions or illusions) and brute, while also being subjective, it seems to me. Unless 'real' is construed to mean 'point of view invariant' or even a view from nowhere. I haven't read the whole thread, sorry if this has been dealt with already.

But the fact that different people have different values means that there is no point-of-view invariant value, as value depends on the point of view. — bert1

I'm not sure what you mean here by "value". I am simply saying that moral realists believe that there is some X such that "one ought not X" is a brute fact.

Asking them to explain why it's the case that one ought not X is like asking the physicist why electrons are negatively charged particles. There's just no answer to this question.

~~ Your posts would improve if you were to use "preference" in preference to "taste".

First, note that it is a principle of action. Now when a principle of action is applied, it becomes a norm. — Leontiskos

I'm very sorry about how dismissive this might sound, but I can't think of anything but 'What, no".
That makes no sense to me. This requires that you apply that judgement to other people. I make no such step. I think it's probably better that other people don't routinely do that, but that's only a comment on my own discomfort. I say literally nothing, and claim literally nothing, about how others should behave. I have thoughts, sure, but I refuse to(tbh, am not motivated to either) conclude anything. I inform my own actions. No one else's. And i don't, unless by incident. I suppose one could say 'norm' OR 'norm for me'. And yeah, it's normal for me not to want to torture babies. That doesn't extend to anyone else (again, other than the fact that it actually is normal, rather than normative, to not do that).

One such way is by applying or maintaining a principle of action and refusing to call it a norm. — Leontiskos

I just can't see an issue with this. If your principles are applied only to yourself, you are making no attempt whatsoever to enforce them. You are not making judgements or proclamations on actions per se, but on your actions. I think this is best encapsulated by an explanation i gave of why I'm not longer depressed to my wife (Lmao)

I just do not have time to second-guess everything i do. I accept i can't possibly know if an action is correct, right, or best. I can approximate, and forge on knowing full-well I could be incredibly wrong consequentially and will need to adjust my actions in future based on the results of actions in present. I do not judge the action as moral or immoral because i reject deontology almost entirely.

Asking them to explain why it's the case that one ought not X is like asking the physicist why electrons are negatively charged particles. — Michael

Physicists can empirically verify is (with reference to definition, sure). Moral facts are not amendable to the same verification. I think this is the trouble, though i agree that's how realists see their position.

Physicists can empirically verify is (with reference to definition, sure). Moral facts are not amendable to the same verification. I think this is the trouble, though i agree that's how realists see their position. — AmadeusD

Proving that something is the case isn't the same as proving why something is the case.

I'm saying that there is no explanation for why electrons are negatively charged, and that there is no explanation for why one ought not do something.

If all you want to say is that moral realists haven't proven that there is something that one ought not do then I won't object.

If all you want to say is that moral realists haven't proven that there is something that one ought not do then I won't object — Michael

yeah, perhaps we've just misused terms (one or other of us) but i think this is what my issue boils down to. I can accept the 'brute fact' position because it requires no justification to take, but I see no reason to accept the claim (wrt morality, anyhow) I suppose. A further objection, but not relevant is that I just cannot see how a moral statement could be brute. Morality isn't inherent in anything but those statements.

Why?

For example, we can call the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity a tautology (“truth” in the formal systems sense), but that is not how Catholics mean it. We do not mean, “If you accept our axioms then this follows tautologically.” We mean, “This is true, it correctly describes reality.” — Leontiskos

I agree. People don't go around thinking they are making tautological claims. They generally think they are making claims about reality.

Which of these don't you agree with:
(By "Doctrine", I mean any doctrine, system of thought or belief, ideology, etc. )

Claims can be about doctrine, or about reality, or both.
Doctrinal truth is independent of truth in reality.
Claims can therefore be:
Doctrinally true, but false in reality.
Doctrinally false, but true in reality.
Doctrinally true or false, but have no truth value at all in reality.
Doctrinally empty, and true or false in reality.

The form in English of doctrinal and reality claims is identical.
Therefore, people are apt to get all this wrong. They may confuse doctrinal claims with claims about reality, or mistake doctrinal truth with truth in reality.

I am simply saying that moral realists believe that there is some X such that "one ought not X" is a brute fact. — Michael

How does one discover and verify such brute facts?

(Sorry for butting in, feel free to quote if this has already been gone over, I certainly haven't read the whole thread)

If all you want to say is that moral realists haven't proven that there is something that one ought not do then I won't object. — Michael

Presumably you meant "...why there is something..."

But, I would say, within my metaethical framework, the reason I agree with you is not because there is a fact of the matter: it is because what we both consider “worthy” of imposement is similar to one another. They are both tastes (to me), but one hits towards my core morals and the other seems negligible. Why? I can’t give you a full account of my psychology, but I would guess it is a bit of biology, sociology, nurture, and psychology that motivate me towards finding that a reasonable assessment. — Bob Ross

If you agree that there is a relevant difference between ice cream preference and not wanting babies to be tortured, then what is the difference!? How does a taste become justifiably imposable? You claim they are exactly the same, and you treat them entirely different. You claim they are tastes, but you treat them as laws. This is irrationality at its finest.

So I don’t think you should find it that controversial when I say I would impose my belief that one should not torture babies but no the vanilla ice cream because I value the former simply so much; just like how you value moral facts so much that you will impose that taste on other people. — Bob Ross

Nope. I say, "This is a moral truth [a "fact" if you prefer], and therefore I treat it as a moral truth." You say, "This is a taste, but I do not treat it as a taste." My action matches my perception, whereas yours does not. Even if someone wants to say that I am irrational (because they believe my perception is mistaken), they would have to admit that you are significantly more irrational, because you do not even act according to your perceptions. You have a sort of first-order irrationality going on.

I would find them “unreasonable”... — Bob Ross

Good, and why are they unreasonable?

What is incoherent about any of that? Please explicate two propositions which I affirm that you find to be incoherent. — Bob Ross

It is irrational to impose tastes; it is irrational to hold that there are non-objective truths; it is irrational to treat two alike tastes entirely differently; it is irrational to claim that rationality is a subjective matter. Your thread is overflowing with irrationality. When faced with a contradiction in your thinking you try to defend it, and seven more pop up.

I make no such step. I think it's probably better that other people don't routinely do that, but that's only a comment on my own discomfort. I say literally nothing, and claim literally nothing, about how others should behave. I have thoughts, sure, but I refuse to(tbh, am not motivated to either) conclude anything. I inform my own actions. No one else's. And i don't, unless by incident. I suppose one could say 'norm' OR 'norm for me'. And yeah, it's normal for me not to want to torture babies. That doesn't extend to anyone else (again, other than the fact that it actually is normal, rather than normative, to not do that). — AmadeusD

I addressed this in my post to you <here>. Judgments need not be enacted to occur. To judge that, "we should not torture babies," is to apply a norm to people. Even if it is not applied externally, you are still applying a norm in your judgment. If you do not apply norms to others, then you cannot agree with that claim. Instead you might say, "I should not torture babies, but this 'should' does not apply to others."

I just can't see an issue with this. If your principles are applied only to yourself, you are making no attempt whatsoever to enforce them. You are not making judgements or proclamations on actions per se, but on your actions. — AmadeusD

Sure, but the claim involves the word 'we'. It's a rather important word within the proposition.

To judge that, "we should not torture babies," — Leontiskos

I don't make that claim. You seem to be replacing some of my terms to support your response.

i shouldn't torture babies.

"I should not torture babies, but this 'should' does not apply to others." — Leontiskos

Yes, that is exactly the case. I cannot see how this isn't clear in the post you've responded to. In any case, yes. That's right.

I don't make that claim. — AmadeusD

I already provided the quote where you agreed to the claim. Here it is again:

In my case, I do think this — AmadeusD

In my case, I do think this — AmadeusD

@Leontiskos (sorry, only realised after the fact that this isn't going to include you otherwise)

I have clarified this multiple times, at much pain (linguistically). i think this. I don't think it about anyone else. The claim is only that it's not good to torture babies - not to whom that applies. Perhaps you're weighting your own wording heavier than I am.

In any case, I have clarified this enough for a lifetime. I do not make that claim. That was also a tongue-in-cheek response.

I make that claim one should not torture babies. But i am the only one. Can i be a moral anti-realist NOW?

I have clarified this multiple times, at much pain (linguistically). i think this. I don't think it about anyone else. — AmadeusD

Then you would not agree to the claim that "we should not..." 'We' = 'Myself and other people.' Like I've said all along, your claim contradicts your position.

But by all means retract the claim. I assume this is what you are now doing?

But by all means retract the claim. I assume this is what you are now doing? — Leontiskos

Not at all, no. But i am outlining that the claim was misconstrued, and that was likely my fault. I really don't care how we got here.

I am telling you I don't make that claim. Accept it or do not. I never made that claim. I may have misspoke.

I really don't care how we got here. — AmadeusD

We got here when you tried to agree to a commonsensical claim that we should not torture babies, and then I pointed out that the claim is inconsistent with your position, and now you've slowly and painfully walked it back. So now you agree with me: you do not hold that we should not torture babies, because your presuppositions do not allow it.

We got here when you tried to agree to a commonsensical claim that we should not torture babies, and then I pointed out that the claim is inconsistent with your position, and now you've slowly and painfully walked it back. So now you agree with me: you do not hold that we should not torture babies, because your presuppositions do not allow it. — Leontiskos

1. No. You took a tongue-in-cheek response a bit too seriously, because that response contained a total mis-step on my part. The claim was never made. I misspoke, tongue in cheek. And again, I don't care. That was my fault; sloppy interaction for sure and to a major fault. But hte fact is, that is not my claim, and wasn't my claim. This is why it's been painful. Not because i've had to slowly walk anything back. I entirely missed the part where i fucked up in my response - which does not reflect my claim.

2. I never did.

3. I'm feeling as if this has gone circle from being a bit adversarial, to pretty amicable, to now somewhat adversarial.

I fucked up. I apologise. That is not my claim. We good? hehe

I fucked up. I apologise. That is not my claim. We good? hehe — AmadeusD

Sure, fair enough. :up: