I agree with the statement that “something is a state-of-affairs only if it exists” — Bob Ross

Consider two scenarios:

Scenario 1:
Only my mind exists

Scenario 2:
Only my mind and your mind exist

The sentence "only my mind exists" is true in scenario 1 but false in scenario 2. If a sentence is true only if it refers to something that exists then it must be that something exists in scenario 1 that doesn't exist in scenario 2. But this clearly isn't the case. The only thing that exists in scenario 1 – my mind – also exists in scenario 2.

That nothing else exists in scenario 1 is a state-of-affairs, but not something that "exists". Therefore it is false to say that something is a state-of-affairs only if it exists.

That nothing else exists in scenario 1 is a state-of-affairs, but not something that "exists". Therefore it is false to say that something is a state-of-affairs only if it exists. — Michael

that doesn't exist in scenario 2. — Michael

the absence of anything but that one mind exists in scenario 1.

In scenario two, this extends to "but those two minds".

While your example here is infinitely clearer than other attempts you've made, which i commend, I still end up with the answer "Not existing isn't a state of affairs". It's talking about a non-state-of-affairs. I would posit that in either case, it wouldn't even be possible to posit anything not existing or existing, beyond the items noted. That seems baked into the scenarios to me.

That may seem semantic to you, but doesn't to me, and that may be the difference.

Ok, but, like I said before, someone being in the event of making moral judgments (“considering what counts as acceptable or unacceptable behavior”) is not a moral fact in any meaningful sense. — Bob Ross

Where do I start? Sigh...



All practiced usage of a term, any term, counts as a 'meaningful' sense(scarequotes intentional) of that particular term. Oddly enough, the term "meaningful" is superfluous here. All senses of all terms are meaningful to the practitioners.

I'm not alone in holding that events are facts. You insist that in order for me to be arguing in the affirmative for moral realism I must use the subjective/objective dichotomy as well as the mind dependent/independent dichotomy. That's not true.

"Being in the event of making moral judgements" is not something I would condone writing. That just IS categorizing thought, belief and/or behaviour as acceptable/unacceptable in some set of specific circumstances. It just IS practicing the application of one's moral belief/code. Moral judgments are not equivalent to moral facts. All moral judgments are acts. Not all moral events/facts are acts of moral judgment.

Hence, in short summary, the quote directly above contains a non sequitur followed by a textbook demonstrable falsehood.



True to a strong methodological naturalist bent, on my view, the simplest moral facts existed in their entirety - they emerged onto the world stage - long before our picking them out to the exclusion of all else with our naming and descriptive practices. They do not consist of language use.

Some events count as moral because they share the same basic common denominator that all moral things include. Morality, after all, boils down to coded of conduct. Ethical considerations, after all, are always about what counts as acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. All things moral include that. There are no exceptions. There is no stronger justificatory ground. That all serves as more than adequate ground to discriminate between facts. Moral facts involve what I've been setting out. Non moral ones do not. That commonality makes all ethical considerations and all moral discourse count as moral.

What grounds your rejection of using the same common denominator to discriminate between kinds of events/facts/states of affairs/happenings?

Literally every moral anti-realist position agrees that there are people “considering what counts as acceptable or unacceptable behavior”--the disagreement is about whether those considerations are about mind(stance)-independently existing morals. Your view, I think, just completely sidesteps the actual metaethical discussion....

I get that you define ‘moral fact’ in a way such that a promise is one, being an event which has to do with “considering what counts as acceptable or unacceptable behavior”, but that, again, is just sidestepping the issue... is that promise, or that “considering what counts as acceptable or unacceptable behavior”, about something objective? It seems as though your use of ‘moral facticity’ just doesn’t find this question relevant...

It's irrelevant for different reasons. I've not used "moral fscticity". May I suggest you reread our exchange?

What you characterize as "sidesteps the actual metaethical discussion" I see as dissolving the issue by virtue of realizing that the problem is and always was the language use itself. The inherent inadequacy of the objective/subjective distinction seems like a novel consideration here.

You seem to find considerable difficulty accepting the facts for what they are when I'm saying stuff that you agree with. That's quite strange to me. What's the title of the thread again? What would a solution be like if not at least somewhat agreeable?

If moral facts are just events where someone is considering what is acceptable/unacceptable to do, then it isn’t necessarily the case that their judgment (conclusion they make) about what is acceptable/unacceptable corresponds to what mind(stance)-independently exists. Hence, it is not necessarily the case that ‘moral facts’ exist in any metaethically meaningful sense of the term.

The last statement is phrased as though it is a conclusion. It does not follow what preceded it. It does not follow from the fact that I'm not using your preferred terminological framework that what I'm arguing does not make sense.

It's not that simplistic. I have no "access" to your parents and yet I know that they're different. — Michael

Are you claiming my mom is to my dad as perception is to reality(as Kant's Noumena/phenomena distinction)?

Which one is the parent in itself?

:wink:

the absence of anything but that one mind exists in scenario 1. — AmadeusD

You're saying that non-existence exists. That makes no sense. At the very least you seem to be using the term "exists" in two different way which I suspect is leading you to equivocate.

I still end up with the answer "Not existing isn't a state of affairs". It's talking about a non-state-of-affairs. — AmadeusD

If you want to say that not existing isn't a state of affairs, and if it is objectively true that nothing else exists in scenario 1, then you must accept that objective truth does not always depend on there being some corresponding state of affairs.

So whether non-existence is a state of affairs or whether objective truth does not depend on some corresponding state of affairs, it is the case that objective truth does not always depend on the existence of something, and so it is fallacious to claim that moral realism is false because it doesn't correspond to something that exists.

f you want to say that not existing isn't a state of affairs, and if it is objectively true that nothing else exists in scenario 1, then you must accept that objective truth does not always depend on there being some corresponding state of affairs. — Michael

While I think probably “yes” I don’t think its a lack of correlation with a state of affairs. It’s a state of affairs which lacks some “thing”.

I see an appreciable difference there. You may not and I’m unsure how to sort that out

You're saying that non-existence exists. That makes no sense. — Michael

Not really no. What I’m saying is that in scenario 1. the entire scenario is caught by your mind. There is no sense of “doesn’t exist” outside that so perhaps I mis-spoke there and used exist incorrectly. The state of affairs is that your mind exists. Nothing else.
The absence of say a cat isn’t a state of affairs. But within the actual state of affairs the fact of “no cat” is evident. Unsure what precise wording I need there I’m sorry. So the state of affairs “there is only your mind” includes there being no cat - so, to me, it can be referred to as “existing” that there is no cat but I concede it isn’t objective because there is no cat to refer to.

"trees exist" is made true by the existence of something and "trees don't exist" is made true by the non-existence of something. As such, existence of something is not a prerequisite of truth.

In fact, "trees don't exist" is true even if nothing exists.

I may be needing to adjust my view here because there is no object. There is no objective reality to non-existence, brute fact maybe? Unsure. But there’s no object yo be referred to so maybe my formulation of “truth” needs to change

I may be needing to adjust my view here because there is no object. — AmadeusD

Objects don't need to exist for statements to be true. "Santa doesn't exist" is true. "1 + 1 = 2" is true. "The last ever human will die before the heat death of the Universe" is true. “Dinosaurs once walked the Earth” is true.

But there’s no object yo be referred to so maybe my formulation of “truth” needs to change — AmadeusD

Yes sir ^^ @Michael

Objects don't need to exist for statements to be true. — Michael

But they are not objectively true. I guess they must be relatively true in light of what does exist - exclusion. Hmm. Thanks for this,

I just don’t agree that it is objective. I would say it is inter-subjective. Something can be independent of me and still be subjective, and it can be independent of any randomly selected person and still be subjective. — Bob Ross

If you consider what actually makes up the criteria of "objective" (and not just the picture), then what I am describing can be reasoned and intelligible (not "arbitrary"--"real" in that it matters, has impact), and not emotional or self-interested or intuitive (what you term, "subjective"). Moral choices are not like an "Inter-subjective" contract, and, by their nature, unlike science or math, they do not always lead to agreement, but are nonetheless subject to judgment just as other rational acts.

Something can be independent of me and still be subjective, and it can be independent of any randomly selected person and still be subjective. — Bob Ross

Again, it is the fact that it is dependent on me (that I am defined and held to my acts) that makes moral choices not subjective (as I take you to mean "arbitrary" or, not based on a fact).

I don’t think morality is completely arbitrary. I think that morality is either objective (exists mind[stance]-independently) or it does not (e.g., subjective, inter-subjective, etc.). — Bob Ross

If you force a dichotomy it makes it impossible to take into consideration how things actually are (as does requiring a specific standard), as Hegel, Nietzsche, and Austin discuss. Again, the meat of what “objective” is would be the actual mechanics of how we judge based on what criteria.

The sentence "only my mind exists" is true in scenario 1 but false in scenario 2. If a sentence is true only if it refers to something that exists then it must be that something exists in scenario 1 that doesn't exist in scenario 2. But this clearly isn't the case. The only thing that exists in scenario 1 – my mind – also exists in scenario 2.

The statement “only my mind exists” claims that reality is such that my mind only exists. This is true iff reality is such that there are no other minds.

The statement “only my mind and your mind exists” claims that reality is such that my mind and your mind exists. This is true iff reality is such that my mind and your mind are the only minds.

There clearly is something which doesn’t exist in scenario one that exists in scenario two: your mind. That’s the differentiating factor.

I think you might be inferring your conclusion from that because your mind exists in both scenarios and one is false but the other is true, but that’s not the propositions you gave. To make it match what you are thinking, you would have to posit:

“my mind exists”

“my mind and your mind exists” OR “only my mind and your mind exists”

Now, the former proposition is perfectly compatible with the latter two: with the ones you gave, they are incompatible because you didn’t just claim my mind exists in the first scenario: you claimed it was the only one that exists.

True to a strong methodological naturalist bent, on my view, the simplest moral facts existed in their entirety - they emerged onto the world stage - long before our picking them out to the exclusion of all else with our naming and descriptive practices. They do not consist of language use.

Some events count as moral because they share the same basic common denominator that all moral things include. Morality, after all, boils down to coded of conduct. Ethical considerations, after all, are always about what counts as acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. All things moral include that. There are no exceptions. There is no stronger justificatory ground. That all serves as more than adequate ground to discriminate between facts. Moral facts involve what I've been setting out. Non moral ones do not. That commonality makes all ethical considerations and all moral discourse count as moral.

This, in summary, is where the confusion lay: I was thinking you were saying us contemplating what is acceptable/unacceptable counts as moral facts when, if I am understanding you correctly now, you are not saying that. You are saying that something else is the moral facts, and they are emerged naturally through some process (like perhaps evolution?). If I am getting it right this time, then please elaborate on what those facts are. Is tied to well-being, harm and happiness, ingrained into our biology? Something else?

All practiced usage of a term, any term, counts as a 'meaningful' sense(scarequotes intentional) of that particular term. Oddly enough, the term "meaningful" is superfluous here. All senses of all terms are meaningful to the practitioners.

Fair enough.

I'm not alone in holding that events are facts. You insist that in order for me to be arguing in the affirmative for moral realism I must use the subjective/objective dichotomy as well as the mind dependent/independent dichotomy. That's not true.

I mean, I don’t agree with your use of ‘fact’, but I am not trying to convince to use mine; I just didn’t see how us contemplating what is acceptable behavior was a moral fact under your own terms; but now I see you aren’t claiming that.

What grounds your rejection of using the same common denominator to discriminate between kinds of events/facts/states of affairs/happenings?

I am not sure I am following this part yet nor what the property of goodness, wrongness, etc. are reducible to in your naturalist view. I would rather you elaborate more so I have a better grasp of what you are saying than start quarreling about how to discriminate between events and other events.

You seem to find considerable difficulty accepting the facts for what they are when I'm saying stuff that you agree with. That's quite strange to me. What's the title of the thread again? What would a solution be like if not at least somewhat agreeable?

I am not following: are you saying I am disagreeing, or making it difficult, with what I agree with (about what you are saying)?

I am trying to evaluate your moral realist theory internally, and not externally from my view. I was trying to note that you don’t have moral facts (in the contemporary use of the terms in metaethics) in your view since I thought you were saying they are equivalent to human acts of contemplating what is right and wrong.

If you don’t agree with my use of ‘fact’, then that is fine. I am just not seeing what is a moral event/fact under your view which is not simply an act of us contemplating what to do.

You seem to have misunderstood what I was saying.

These are two different sentences with two different truth conditions:

1. My mind exists
2. Only my mind exists

The existence of my mind is sufficient for (1) to be true but insufficient for (2) to be true. Something other than the existence of my mind is (also) required for (2) to be true:

Only my mind exists iff a) my mind exists and b) nothing else exists.

(b) is a state-of-affairs but not something that exists. Therefore your claim that “something is a state-of-affairs only if it exists” is false.

I have to note that, because I am a moral subjectivist--so when my view is just subtly excluded from consideration... — Bob Ross

"Moral subjectivism" seems to be one of those terms that is hopelessly vague and ambiguous. Nevertheless, the fact that you affirm that there are true moral judgments, and that these judgments are universally applicable, would seem to move you out of the "moral subjectivism" category by most definitions of that term. In other words, your "universalism" forecloses "subjectivism," and moves you into what is clearly moral realism.

For example, you think that we should not torture babies, and that this moral norm applies universally and unchangeably. Therefore you are not a subjectivist. Moral subjectivism cannot achieve unchangeable universality, at least as commonly understood.

I have no problem with this, I just don’t agree that it is objective. I would say it is inter-subjective. Something can be independent of me and still be subjective, and it can be independent of any randomly selected person and still be subjective. — Bob Ross

So if there were an intersubjective agreement that it is permissible to torture babies, then it would be permissible to torture babies? Does the wrongness of torturing babies change with the opinions of the day? This is what you are committing yourself to.

So if there were an intersubjective agreement that it is permissible to torture babies, then it would be permissible to torture babies? Does the wrongness of torturing babies change with the opinions of the day? This is what you are committing yourself to. — Leontiskos

I don't read Bob as even intimating that this might be the case. All he's positing is that some judgement could be independent of him and still be subjective. That seems obvious. There are opinions on pieces of art i'm not even aware of. That's an independent-of-me judgement that is still subjective. And an addendum of inter-subject agreement about that wouldn't make it objective.

I don't read more than this into what he's saying. Can you lay out where you're squeezing your reading from? (I use squeezing for fun.. Not in any way a comment on your methods). If you don't want to, that's fine; I'm just curious :)

For example, you think that we should not torture babies, and that this moral norm applies universally and unchangeably. — Leontiskos

In my case, I do think this, but i dont think it's a norm (beyond being 'the norm' for most people) or that it applies universally or unchangeably.
Can i be an anti-realist? :P

Obviously, this clearly isn't an argument for moral realism but it is an argument against the case that moral realism is inherently different to any other kind of realism. If you drop moral realism you should drop all of it. And most people are unwilling to do that it seems. — Apustimelogist

I think there are evolutionary reasons that our thinking is biased in ways that tend to make us successful as a social species. I don't see a reason to think such moral biasing (or similar biasing) of our perspective would bias our perspectives in all regards.

I see what you are saying now, and let me try to address it.

Only my mind exists iff a) my mind exists and b) nothing else exists.

(b) is a state-of-affairs but not something that exists.

B doesn’t have to be a state-of-affairs for my claim to be true. This is just another example of a negative claim: nothing else exists is just like your santa doesn’t exist example. It is true because what it purports about reality agrees with the state-of-affairs in reality, such that there is no santa and there is no other minds that are in that state-of-affairs (of which we call reality). It is not that the negation of something existing entails that there is such a state-of-affairs of non-existence: it is that the state-of-affairs, which exist, agree with the proposition that X doesn’t exist because it really isn’t a part of those states-of-affairs. Go back to my ball analogy in the room, saying “there is not ball in the room” is true iff the state-of-affairs, which all exist, in that room are such that there is no ball in them; you seem to think that it would imply, instead, that there is a state-of-affairs that does not exist such that there is no ball.

it is that the state-of-affairs, which exist, agree with the proposition that X doesn’t exist because it really isn’t a part of those states-of-affairs. Go back to my ball analogy in the room, saying “there is not ball in the room” is true iff the state-of-affairs, which all exist, in that room are such that there is no ball in them; you seem to think that it would imply, instead, that there is a state-of-affairs that does not exist such that there is no ball. — Bob Ross

I had a hypnogogic version of this occur to me this morning. Finally figured what i was trying to say....Which is essentially this. The claim something doesn't exist can be true, but it's only true in relation to a existing state-of-affairs which excludes the object in question. The thing not existing isn't the state of affairs. Does that comport with your take, or have i misread it?

I am not sure I understand what you mean here??

I am not sure I understand what you mean here?? — Apustimelogist

I took the following to mean, "If you drop moral realism you should drop all realism."

If you drop moral realism you should drop all of it. And most people are unwilling to do that it seems. — Apustimelogist

Perhaps I was misinterpreting you, but I was explaining that I don't see a good justification for dropping all realism, on the basis of the nonexistence of moral facts.

Well maybe "should" was too strong a word but I think similar kinds of skepticism as with moral realism can lead you to drop other realisms. Where to draw the line? Depends who you are I guess. It doesn't seem to me a big leap from dropping moral facts to modal facts which do not seem to be anymore facts about actual events as morality is. Dropping normativity in the context of morality does not seem such a stretch either from dropping normativity about beliefs all together which I am sure a lot of moral anti-realists would not find easy. I think the idea that there is no objective fact about what someone ought to do would also cover beliefs if it covers moral facts, ceteris paribus. I think there's probably other parallels too where some argument against moral facts might apply to other facts.

I guess there is no good well-defined place for deciding where you should stop in terms of skepticism though. Even the most stringent anti-realist I am sure will not give up everything.

Correct. The proposition "there is no ball in my room" is true iff the state-of-affairs in my room is such that it excludes the existence of the ball. @Michael appears to think, if I am understanding them correctly, that it being true is in virtue of a state-of-affairs which does not exist but makes it true.

Correct. The proposition "there is no ball in my room" is true iff the state-of-affairs in my room is such that it excludes the existence of the ball. Michael appears to think, if I am understanding them correctly, that it being true is in virtue of a state-of-affairs which does not exist but makes it true. — Bob Ross

That there is no ball in your room is a state of affairs.
That there is no elephant in your room is a different state of affairs.

There is one room but there are (at least) two different states of affairs.

If your room is the only thing that exists then it is the case that a) just one thing exists and b) there are (at least) two different states of affairs.

Therefore, a state of affairs cannot be reduced to the the thing(s) that exist(s).

That there is no ball in your room is a state of affairs.
That there is no elephant in your room is a different state of affairs.

So, I just disagree with this. Those are referencing the same state-of-affairs, but noting different things that are not in that state-of-affairs.

The room in both cases is the exact same: the same couch, same chair, etc.; so why would noting there isn't A vs. B, assuming they both are not in the room, refer to a different state-of-affairs?

For any given state-of-affairs, there is an infinite amount of things of which their existence cannot be found therein and, thusly, can be predicated as "not there".

So, I just disagree with this. Those are referencing the same state-of-affairs, but noting different things that are not in that state-of-affairs.

The room in both cases is the exact same: the same couch, same chair, etc.; so why would noting there isn't A vs. B, assuming they both are not in the room, refer to a different state-of-affairs?

For any given state-of-affairs, there is an infinite amount of things of which their existence cannot be found therein and, thusly, can be predicated as "not there". — Bob Ross

Then you're just using the term "state of affairs" differently to me.

Are you familiar with the distinction between truth makers and truth bearers? A truth bearer is a truth-apt sentence such as "the cat is on the mat." A truth maker is the condition that must be satisfied for a truth bearer to be true.

I use the terms "state of affairs" and "truth maker" interchangeably, but if you don't then I'll rephrase what I said above:

That there is no ball in your room is a truth maker.
That there is no elephant in your room is a different truth maker.

This must be the case otherwise it would be the case that "there is no ball in your room" is true iff there is no elephant in your room, which is of course false.

If your room is the only thing that exists then it is the case that a) just one thing exists and b) there are (at least) two different truth makers.

Therefore, a truth maker cannot be reduced to the thing(s) that exist(s).

Moral realists claim that some truth bearer "one ought not X" is true because a particular truth maker – that one ought not X – objectively obtains.

Their position has nothing to do with what does or doesn't physically (or abstractly) exist.

I am not incredibly familiar with the literature on truth-bearers and truth-makers, but I am aware of the basic idea. I would say that a truth-maker is not reducible to a state-of-affairs in reality, and I would take a necessitation approach by saying that a truth-maker is just that which necessitates something as being true or false (i.e., truth-apt); and I am going to say that ability or aptness for correspondence to reality is what makes a sentence truth-apt...truth-bearing.

That there is no ball in your room is a truth maker.
That there is no elephant in your room is a different truth maker.

I don’t understand why this would be the case. I would say the truth maker of statements is the same for all of them: whether or not it has the ability to have correspondence with reality. So, to me, both of these statements have the same truth-maker, but they are truth-apt about different claims about reality. Am I missing something?

Moral realists claim that some truth bearer "one ought not X" is true because a particular truth maker – that one ought not X – objectively obtains.

This seems odd to me, as you seem to be implying that the truth-maker, which is some sort of ‘state-of-affairs’ that does not exist, is what obtains for moral statements (when they are facts). This seems like an appeal to non-existence to justify facticity.

Their position has nothing to do with what does or doesn't physically (or abstractly) exist.

I think it does though. Moral facts are usually grounded in divinity, abstract objects, or entities (and their relations to other entities) in the physical world. I don’t know what it would mean to appeal to something that doesn’t exist to make something true. Also, I don’t see how truth-makers entail something is true but, rather, how they are truth-apt.

That there is no ball in your room is a state of affairs. — Michael

No, it isn't. The state of affairs is everything which is in the wrong. The exclusion is a necessary inference, but is not a state of affairs in itself. I'm not sure how you're conceptualising a negation as a state of affairs? Again, though, I have adjusted my notion of truth to include statements of this kind - but they refer to no object/s and so can't be a state of afffairs.

That there is no elephant in your room is a different state of affairs. — Michael

That there is no ball in your room is a truth maker.
That there is no elephant in your room is a different truth maker.

No. This is merely another inference from the actual state of affairs, which is only able to capture that which is, not that which isn't. Re: teh second quote there, they don't come into contact with what actually is and so have no truth-value.

If you don't accept that, fair enough - but it seems pretty clear we're not misunderstanding each other anymore which i think is good.

Moral realists claim that some truth bearer "one ought not X" is true because a particular truth maker – that one ought not X – objectively obtains — Michael

Also my understanding of the general claim there. However, i see a serious problem with this. That is tautological. If the position is that a claim is true by tautology, even if it obtains some way, i'm unsure how you could ever convincingly provide this to another person - A T-sentence includes a criterion for the P being found true.
I.e 'One ought not X, if (or IFF) Y". If 'Y' obtains, then P is true. But the sorts of claims which i'm gathering are considered moral realism rely on the speaker merely asserting the claim - and rejecting any further discussion of it, because they see it as self-evident.

So when we look at the "One ought not keep slaves" statement, there HAS to be a 'why' or 'in what condition' that obtains. And it's pretty easy to reduce the claim to 'because it causes suffering'. 'suffering it bad' 'bad is undesirable' 'undesirability is something to avoid' etc.. etc... And i mean here only to point out that the claims don't support themselves in any meaningful way unless you're a deontologist so can just immediately note a rights/obligations violation.

I just can't conceive of a moral statement being self-evident beyond it being (in practice) normative, like not murdering for instance.
But I reiterate, i think this discussion is now actually on decent footing instead of talking past one another or about different things.

I just can't conceive of a moral statement being self-evident — AmadeusD

I said that they're brute facts, not that they're self-evident. It is a brute fact that electrons are negatively charged particles, but it isn't self-evident.

So when we look at the "One ought not keep slaves" statement, there HAS to be a 'why' or 'in what condition' that obtains. — AmadeusD

Why are electrons negatively charge particles?

No. This is merely another inference from the actual state of affairs, which is only able to capture that which is, not that which isn't. Re: teh second quote there, they don't come into contact with what actually is and so have no truth-value.

If you don't accept that, fair enough - but it seems pretty clear we're not misunderstanding each other anymore which i think is good. — AmadeusD

These statements are true:

1) there is no ball in the room
2) there is no elephant in the room

This statement is false:

3) there is no ball in the room iff there is no elephant in the room

Therefore, whatever it is that makes (1) true isn't what makes (2) true. This is the case even if the room is the only thing that exists.

Therefore, something other than everything that exists (the room) is a necessary truth-condition.

Therefore, not all truth conditions are things that exist.

I said that they're brute facts, not that they're self-evident. It is a brute fact that electrons are negatively charged particles, but it isn't self-evident. — Michael

Hmm. I'm not quite sure how you're using 'brute' here. The statement can be reduced to the activity of an electron in relation to other particles. It can be explained by other terms. This might just be relevant to the example, rather than your actual point thought, which i think is a fair point. I understand brute facts to be non-reducible where this is not. More below, though...

Why are electrons negatively charge particles? — Michael

Does this actually establish it as a brute fact? I'm am fairly sure there is a reductive answer, but we may not know how to find it (i.e the process by which the BB caused those facts about particles to emerge may be beyond us). But, as with the above, this may only apply superficially, and so your point is still live, for sure. Or, i'm splitting hairs LOL. If you mean why, from a God's-eye view, then it's by necessity or something similar. Morality doesn't have this move open to it from my position. There is no God's eye view for morality, unless you actually think there's a God. I can't understand taking moral proclamations as representing any kind of fact, brute or otherwise. If one claims no faith, it's incoherent.

These statements are true:

1) there is no ball in the room
2) there is no elephant in the room — Michael

Yes, agree.

3) there is no ball in the room iff there is no elephant in the room — Michael

Yes, agree.

Therefore, not all truth conditions are things that exist. — Michael

Yes. I've had to concede here, at least terminologically. I have been fairly clear that my conception of truth has shifted through this (and the other thread) exchange. So, it's mostly that I just had a keyboard fart and entirely misspoke in the part of my comment you've quoted - I apologise for that. I am no longer claiming that you cannot ascribe truth to the above statements. What I'm saying is they have no objective validity as they refer to no object, and are exclusive, not about a state of affairs.
So they may be true, in the logical sense, but they provide no value whatsover for evaluating some claim about what actually is. They are basically redundant statements. They are self-evident in the state of affairs; not for/of itself.
I realise this could be interpreted as mildly disjunctive, but i think it's coherent. If something isn't there to be spoken about, how can a statement about it imply anything actual? Can only be approached orthogonally.

'Santa does not exist' can't be objectively true because it refers to no object. It is inferred by the actual state of affairs only. The actual state of affairs (the sum total of that which is) doesn't include santa so it's necessarily true, but not objectively.

As far as moral claims go, they never even refer to an object. They don't refer to states of affairs, or exclude things from a state of affairs. They are judgements, plain and simple. Claiming it's brute is nonsensical to me.