Can you give an example that comports with what humans envisage morality to be viz. contemplated outcomes resulting in a judgement informing the decision to act with regard to other sentient beings? — AmadeusD

This is a "philosophical" account of morality whose connection to lived reality is dubious at best. For a more reasonable approach see here

Good article. You should consider starting a thread specifically on it. It might be fun.

:up:

↪hypericin Good article. You should consider starting a thread specifically on it. It might be fun. — Banno

I agree.

But would you say that this ‘fact of our position in the world’ exists mind(stance)-independently and has ‘moral’ signification? I wouldn’t. Having importance or power doesn’t make something a fact. — Bob Ross

The fact of it is not because of its import. The “reality” of it is the structure of our relation to ourselves and society following the limitation of knowledge (to answer independent of us). The fact is that what creates our moral responsibility is that our words and acts speak to who we are; that our responsiveness to others is a duty beyond trying to decide and be sure (know, be certain) what is to be done. So, although I don’t understand the terms you are couching this in, I would say that, yes, our human condition exists apart from me and has significance because it is the possibility of the moral realm at all (and not just rules or impulse).

I take it you imagine the choice is that morality is either tied to something certain (the world, etc), or at least not me, because we are arbitrary. What I am saying is that moral choices are not arbitrary (necessarily) because they are tied to me (at a certain point, beyond society’s ordinary norms and expectations).

↪hypericin Good article. You should consider starting a thread specifically on it. It might be fun. — Banno

@hypericin Agree with the above..
Not the whole way through it; but very interesting and I imagine a fairly colourful area to be discussed at -large.

Yes. The basic dichotomy I'm setting out and working from is moral and not.
…
The moral fact is such that one made a promise.

Ok, but, like I said before, someone being in the event of making moral judgments (“considering what counts as acceptable or unacceptable behavior”) is not a moral fact in any meaningful sense. Literally every moral anti-realist position agrees that there are people “considering what counts as acceptable or unacceptable behavior”--the disagreement is about whether those considerations are about mind(stance)-independently existing morals. Your view, I think, just completely sidesteps the actual metaethical discussion.

I get that you define ‘moral fact’ in a way such that a promise is one, being an event which has to do with “considering what counts as acceptable or unacceptable behavior”, but that, again, is just sidestepping the issue: is that promise, or that “considering what counts as acceptable or unacceptable behavior”, about something objective? It seems as though your use of ‘moral facticity’ just doesn’t find this question relevant, since someone can be “considering what counts as acceptable or unacceptable behavior” without unacceptable or acceptable behavior being itself objective.

By virtue of promising, one already obligates themselves to make the world match their words(keep their promise). That's the whole point of promise making. If one does not already obligate themselves to keep their word, then they do not intend to make the world match their words, and hence they've not made a promise at all, for they did not believe what they said. They've just plain lied. The moral obligation remains regardless. The moral fact is such that one made a promise. True statements about that moral fact will correspond to it.

I understand what you are saying here, and I don’t think I would be saying anything new about my position on it by addressing it. So I am going to agree to disagree on this one.

Hence, if today you promise to plant me a rose garden on Monday, then come Tuesday I ought to have one. That's true by virtue of corresponding to the relevant moral fact of the matter at hand.

If moral facts are just events where someone is considering what is acceptable/unacceptable to do, then it isn’t necessarily the case that their judgment (conclusion they make) about what is acceptable/unacceptable corresponds to what mind(stance)-independently exists. Hence, it is not necessarily the case that ‘moral facts’ exist in any metaethically meaningful sense of the term.

:up:

Your problem just may be the terminological usage you've confined yourself with. Are you using the terms "moral" and "facts" consistently? If so, exactly what counts as "moral" and "fact"?

By 'moral' language, I mean language which signifies 'what one ought to be doing'; and by 'fact' I mean 'a statement which corresponds to reality such that what it refers to about reality is there'.

"One cannot move pawns backwards"

Is true within the context of the social practice of chess. Moreover, it is the social practice of chess that makes it true; without this practice, the truth of it loses its foundation.

Perhaps I am misunderstanding, but I would say it is true because once one understands that we are talking about the game of chess, there are certain rules in place. I guess, to be technical, the rules themselves are inter-subjective, not objective (if that is what you are trying to get at). They are like money.

That one cannot move pawns backwards in the game of chess is true independently of what anyone thinks because it is a fact, but the actually rule that prohibits the action of going backwards with a pawn is inter-subjective. By analogy, imagine that a loaf of bread is $10. It being $10 is inter-subjective (and thusly non-factual: non-objective), but it is a fact that it is currently inter-subjectively valued at $10. These are two entirely different propositions; and I think you may be conflating them.

So you are granting that if there was a moral statement true in, and because of, its social context, then this statement is a moral fact?

No. The moral (rule), like chess rules, are inter-subjective (at best); but if it is the case that we inter-subjectively agree on a moral rule, then it is a fact that we inter-subjectively agree on that moral rule: thusly, the moral rule is not a fact, but that we agree on it is—they two different propositions.

In fact, animals also exhibit moral behavior. Isn't the most natural explanation that it is instinctive?

Moral judgments being biologically motivated does not mean that morals are biological.

So, although I don’t understand the terms you are couching this in, I would say that, yes, our human condition exists apart from me and has significance because it is the possibility of the moral realm at all (and not just rules or impulse).

I have no problem with this, I just don’t agree that it is objective. I would say it is inter-subjective. Something can be independent of me and still be subjective, and it can be independent of any randomly selected person and still be subjective.

I take it you imagine the choice is that morality is either tied to something certain (the world, etc), or at least not me, because we are arbitrary. What I am saying is that moral choices are not arbitrary (necessarily) because they are tied to me (at a certain point, beyond society’s ordinary norms and expectations).

I don’t think morality is completely arbitrary. I think that morality is either objective (exists mind[stance]-independently) or it does not (e.g., subjective, inter-subjective, etc.).

I don’t even think that it is arbitrary when a person creates their own moral rules.

I don’t know how to interpret this any other way ... — Bob Ross

Okay.

... could you please elaborate?

Elaborate on what?

For example, you say ‘species' defects function as moral facts’: wouldn’t it be accurate to then say that concerns about species’ defects [of natural beings] are equivalent to morality?

No.

I did re-read it, and found the same conclusion; ...

Okay.

... so perhaps it would be useful if you could elaborate on what I am misinterpreting?

Sorry my precis isn't clear enough, Bob; but I don't get anything out of spoon-feeding you (or @AmadeusD) further. FWIW, I'll refer you again to 'the influences' on my moral naturalism:

Laozi, Epicurus, Spinoza, Peirce-Dewey, C. Rosset, A. Murray, D. Parfit, M. Nussbaum, O. Flanagan, P. Foot et al — 180 Proof

I think I’ve found the “cool kids”

No "cool kids" here, just thinkers and blinkers.

That, my friend, is corroboration

Yes. In order to know that there is a difference between two things, one must have access to both in order to compare them. — creativesoul

It's not that simplistic. I have no "access" to your parents and yet I know that they're different. Some things we understand rationally. The distinction between "analytic", "synthetic a priori", and "empirical" knowledge is central to Kant's philosophy.

It's been a while since I've read him, but I think his argument is that knowledge of noumena is synthetic a priori, whereas you seem to be arguing that because it's not empirical then it's fallacious?

Although I think modern science has discovered to an extent Kant's noumena; the fundamental particles of the Standard Model. They're the mind-independent things causally responsible for the subjective phenomena that we are familiar with.

and by 'fact' I mean 'a statement which corresponds to reality such that what it refers to about reality is there' — Bob Ross

So it is not a fact that Santa doesn't exist? I don't think it makes sense to say that Santa's non-existence is "there".

:lol: I feel like I just got kicked out of the cool kids table.



That response seems a bit harsh and unhelpful. I think I have demonstrated that I am dissecting your view with genuineness and intellectual honesty, and I am merely asking for basic clarification of what you are trying to convey. It seems like you are shutting down and unwilling to discuss your moral naturalism with anyone who doesn't immediately understand what you are saying in your first post.

With that being said, if you are ever willing to converse in further detail about it, then I am all ears! I enjoy hearing other metaethical theories.

So it is not a fact that Santa doesn't exist? I don't think it makes sense to say that Santa's non-existence is "there".

"santa doesn't exist" is the same as it is false that "santa does exist": either way, it is conveying that the proposition "santa does exist" does not agree with reality. In your formulation, it could also be interpreted as an agreement with reality that santa isn't there. I see no problems with this.

It is a fact that "santa does not exist" because what the proposition is referencing about reality is that there is no santa in it, and this is true.

It is a fact that "santa does not exist" because what the proposition is referencing about reality is that there is no santa in it, and this is true. — Bob Ross

And the moral realist will say that it is a fact that one ought not harm another because what the proposition is referencing about reality is that one ought not harm another, and this is true.

At times it seems that you think of a fact as referring to something that physically exists, e.g. here where you say "[facts] correspond to a state-of-affairs in reality (where ‘reality’ is the ‘totality of stance-independently, existent things’)," although this is inconsistent with what you're now saying about the fact of Santa's non-existence.

Santa's non-existence is a state-of-affairs, but not an existing thing. This assumption that something is a state-of-affairs only if it exists is a false one, and so morality not existing (e.g. as some physical thing) does not entail that there are no moral states-of-affairs.

And the moral realist will say that it is a fact that one ought not harm another because what the proposition is referencing about reality is that one ought not harm another, and this is true. — Michael

I think what you need to carry this through to what is commonly imagined as moral realism is the correspondence theory of truth. Attempts to bypass that with talk of the T-sentence rule or directions of fit only obscure the issue because the T-sentence rule accommodates both realists and anti realists.

If you want to argue that because moral statement M is true, then moral realism, go ahead and advocate correspondence. That position has weaknesses, though

The proposition "Santa does not exist" is true because it corresponds to the state of affairs that Santa does not exist.

The proposition "1 + 1 = 2" is true because it corresponds to the state of affairs that 1 + 1 = 2.

The proposition "one ought not harm another" is true because it corresponds to the state of affairs that one ought not harm another.

I'm not exactly sure what it is you want. If you want to say that a statement is true only if it corresponds to some physical thing, then I would dispute that. Santa not existing and 1 + 1 equalling 2 are not physical things, and yet they definitely are the case. The moral realist will say that that one ought nor harm another is not a physical thing, and yet definitely is the case.

The proposition "Santa does not exist" is true because it corresponds to the state of affairs that Santa does not exist.

The proposition "1 + 1 = 2" is true because it corresponds to the state of affairs that 1 + 1 = 2.

The proposition "one ought not harm another" is true because it corresponds to the state of affairs that one ought not harm another.

I'm not exactly sure what it is you want. If you want to say that a statement is true only if it corresponds to some physical thing, then I would dispute that. Santa not existing and 1 + 1 equalling 2 are not physical things, and yet they definitely are the case. The moral realist will say that that one ought nor harm another is not a physical thing, and yet definitely is the case. — Michael

So we're dispensing with talk of the T-sentence and directions of fit, right? We're now directly addressing this argument for moral realism:

1. premise: Correspondence theory of truth
2. Moral statement M is true.
3. because of correspondence theory, M corresponds to a state of the world.
4. therefore, moral realism.

Do you agree with that? Correspondence theory is not rooted in physicalism. It was first expressed during the "age of essence" by Aristotle. It's blind to ontological commitments.

Edit: except that if you're a physicalist and you endorse correspondence theory, then for you, true statements are going to have to refer to physical things (or things that reduce to the physical.)

Edit: except that if you're a physicalist and you endorse correspondence theory, then for you, true statements are going to have to refer to physical things (or things that reduce to the physical.) — frank

I think of physicalism as the thesis that everything that exists is physical. That's not the same as saying that every true statement refers to a physical thing. The sentences "Santa does not exist" and "1 + 1 = 2" are true but do not refer to physical things.

I think too many in this discussion equate "truth" with "existence". They are separate matters of enquiry.

So we're dispensing with talk of the T-sentence and directions of fit, right? We're now directly addressing this argument for moral realism:

1. premise: Correspondence theory of truth
2. Moral statement M is true.
3. because of correspondence theory, M corresponds to a state of the world.
4. therefore, moral realism.

Do you agree with that? Correspondence theory is not rooted in physicalism. It was first expressed during the "age of essence" by Aristotle. It's blind to ontological commitments. — frank

I think of moral realism as the thesis that moral propositions are truth-apt and (attempt to) refer to objective features of the world, and that some such propositions are true.

If a statement "corresponding" to the world just is that it refers to the world and is true, then sure, moral realism implicitly endorses the correspondence theory of truth.

I think of moral realism as the thesis that moral propositions are truth-apt and (attempt to) refer to objective features of the world, and that some such propositions are true. — Michael

Moral anti-realists may also claim that moral statements are truth-apt, so what you have left to distinguish your take on moral realism is that it says moral statements refer to objective features of the world. If you agree to that, we can put the whole issue of truth to the side and just talk about how statements refer, right?

If you agree to that, we can put the whole issue of truth to the side and just talk about how statements refer, right? — frank

Sure, although I don't know how statements refer.

. Attempts to bypass that with talk of the T-sentence rule or directions of fit only obscure the issue because the T-sentence rule accommodates both realists and anti realists. — frank

:cheer:

Sure, although I don't know how statements refer. — Michael

I don't either.

And the moral realist will say that it is a fact that one ought not harm another because what the proposition is referencing about reality is that one ought not harm another, and this is true.

True.

At times it seems that you think of a fact as referring to something that physically exists, e.g. here where you say "[facts] correspond to a state-of-affairs in reality (where ‘reality’ is the ‘totality of stance-independently, existent things’)," although this is inconsistent with what you're now saying about the fact of Santa's non-existence.

But what you quoted doesn’t reference physical existence, it references existence. This includes any supersensible or platonic realms.

What I am saying is that it is a fact that santa does not exist because that statement agrees with reality. I never precluded the existence of facts about negations of propositions. It is a fact that it is false that ‘santa exists’ because ‘santa exists’ does not agree with reality: it being false does agree with reality, and thusly would be a fact.

Santa's non-existence is a state-of-affairs, but not an existing thing.

That’s not what the agreement (between the statement and reality) is in this case: it is that there is a state-of-affairs such santa is not a part of any state-of-affair in reality. Of course, santa’s non-existence is not a state-of-affairs, him not existing agrees with the state-of-affairs in reality since there is no santa in them.

It’s like saying “there’s no ball in this room”. This is true iff there really isn’t a ball in this room. It isn’t true because the ball’s non-existence is a state-of-affairs in that room; it is true because the state-of-affairs in the room agrees with the statement “the ball is not in this room” such that there is no ball associated with them.

This assumption that something is a state-of-affairs only if it exists is a false one, and so morality not existing (e.g. as some physical thing) does not entail that there are no moral states-of-affairs.

Existence and physical existence are two different things, and I understand you are targeting the latter; but I just want to clarify that I agree with the statement that “something is a state-of-affairs only if it exists” and disagreeing with “something is a state-of-affairs if it physically/tangibly exists”.