If I come to you with a piece of paper that does not exist in a spatiotemporal sense I am empty handed because there is no ‘piece of paper’.

I think someone on this forum mentioned some time ago that they chose to distinguish between ‘real’ and ‘exist’ in terms that a unicorn can ‘exist’ but it cannot be ‘real’. The ‘thing-in-itself’ is neither of these as it is just an empty term that can neither be conjured by imagination nor experienced in reality.

Why did Nietzsche renounce Kant? — Corvus

Because Kant was too subtle?

I think someone on this forum mentioned some time ago that they chose to distinguish between ‘real’ and ‘exist’ in terms that a unicorn can ‘exist’ but it cannot be ‘real’ — I like sushi

I often mention that ‘the number 7’ is real, but that it only exists as an intellectual act, and not as a phenomenal object. Unicorns on the other hand are creatures of the imagination but they neither exist, nor are they real, in any sense other than having a common cultural referent (that is, an image with which we are all familiar.)

The ‘thing-in-itself’ is neither of these as it is just an empty term that can neither be conjured by imagination nor experienced in reality. — I like sushi

Kant's introduced the concept of the “thing in itself” to refer to reality as it is independent of our experience of it and unstructured by our cognitive constitution. The concept was harshly criticized in his own time and has been lambasted by generations of critics since. A standard objection to the notion is that Kant has no business positing it given his insistence that we can only know what lies within the limits of possible experience. But a more sympathetic reading is to see the concept of the “thing in itself” as a sort of placeholder in Kant's system; it both marks the limits of what we can know and expresses a sense of mystery that cannot be dissolved, the sense of mystery that underlies our unanswerable questions. Through both of these functions it serves to keep us humble. — Emrys Westacott

Would you not agree that figures of speech can be confusing, and is illogical? — Corvus

Yes, figures of speech can be confusing, but as figures of speech are an inherent part of language, figures of speech and the confusion they bring is unavoidable.

For example, when you wrote in your OP: To see what other folks think about this issue, I have opened this thread asking what is your reason to believe in the world, when you are not perceiving it?, the phrases "to see what other folks think" and "I have opened this thread" are definitely figures of speech. I would argue that words such as "world" and "perceiving" are also figures of speech.

As regards language being logical, there have been attempts to found language on logic, but seemingly unsuccessful. For example, Frege. As the Britannica article on Frege's Revolution notes about Frege, Frege attacked Locke's idea that ideas exist independently of words. Frege proposed that the meaning of a sentence, the thought it expresses, is a function of the structure, the syntax, of the sentence. The thought it expresses is not determined by the speaker or hearer of the sentence, but is determined by the logical structure of the sentence, where an individual word has meaning because of its context within the sentence of which it is a part.

However, Frege's logical language is contrasted with ordinary language, which as the Britannica article on the Ideal Language wrote about an ideal language:
In analytic philosophy, a language that is precise, free of ambiguity, and clear in structure, on the model of symbolic logic, as contrasted with ordinary language, which is vague, misleading, and sometimes contradictory.

The fact that a word such as "world" has created so much discussion and disagreement is because it is a figure of speech, and as a figure of speech is open to multiple interpretations.

Why did Nietzsche renounce Kant?
— Corvus

Because Kant was too subtle? — Wayfarer

In what way, was he so?

…..a unicorn can ‘exist’ but it cannot be ‘real’. The ‘thing-in-itself’ is neither of these. — I like sushi

Actually, the thing-in-itself is both.

“…. The estimate of our rational cognition à priori at which we arrive is that it has only to do with phenomena, and that things in themselves, while possessing a real existence, lie beyond its sphere…”
————

….none of it said anything to me. — I like sushi

No problem.

Yes, figures of speech can be confusing, but as figures of speech are an inherent part of language, figures of speech and the confusion they bring is unavoidable. — RussellA

Yes, good point. Here is the summary from ChatGPT on the problems of OLP.

"1. **Circularity and Conservatism:**
- Critics argue that OLP can be circular in its reasoning. It sometimes relies on everyday language to define philosophical concepts, but this can lead to a conservative stance, where it merely reflects and reinforces existing linguistic practices rather than challenging or transcending them.

2. **Inadequacy for Complex Topics:**
- OLP may be criticized for its perceived inadequacy in dealing with complex philosophical problems that require more abstract and formal analysis. Some argue that it is better suited for addressing everyday language use rather than tackling deep metaphysical or epistemological questions.

3. **Failure to Address Non-Linguistic Aspects:**
- Ordinary Language Philosophy tends to focus heavily on language and linguistic expressions, potentially neglecting non-linguistic aspects of human experience. This limitation can be problematic when dealing with issues that go beyond language, such as emotions, sensations, or certain aspects of consciousness.

4. **Limited Cross-Cultural Applicability:**
- OLP has been criticized for its cultural specificity, as it is primarily based on the analysis of English-language usage. Some argue that the insights gained from studying ordinary language may not be easily translatable or applicable to languages and cultures with different linguistic structures and philosophical traditions.

5. **Development of Later Wittgenstein's Thought:**
- The later works of Ludwig Wittgenstein, often associated with OLP, are complex and open to different interpretations. Some critics argue that later Wittgenstein's ideas are not a unified and coherent system, making it challenging to pin down a clear and consistent account of OLP.

6. **Neglect of Ontological Questions:**
- Ordinary Language Philosophy tends to be more focused on linguistic and conceptual analysis rather than engaging deeply with ontological questions about the nature of reality. Critics argue that it may sidestep important metaphysical issues.

7. **Evolution of Analytic Philosophy:**
- As analytic philosophy evolved, many philosophers moved away from the strictures of OLP. Analytic philosophy developed new methodologies and approaches, which led to a decline in the influence of OLP in mainstream philosophical discourse." - ChatGPT

I think someone on this forum mentioned some time ago that they chose to distinguish between ‘real’ and ‘exist’ in terms that a unicorn can ‘exist’ but it cannot be ‘real’. The ‘thing-in-itself’ is neither of these as it is just an empty term that can neither be conjured by imagination nor experienced in reality. — I like sushi

If I see a broken window, as nothing happens without a reason, I know that at a prior time something broke it. I may never know what broke the window, in that it could have been a bird or a stone, but I know something did. I can name this unknown thing "something", enabling me to say "the window was broken by something".

It is also the case that this word "something" can be replaced by other words such as "thing-in-itself" without affecting the function of the sentence. So I can equally say "the window was broken by a thing-in-itself".

So what is this "something" or "thing-in-itself" referring to? In language are many words that don't refer to one particular concrete thing but do refer to abstract concepts. For example, in the expression "I can imagine a house", the word "house" is not referring to one particular concrete thing but rather is referring to the abstract concept of a house. Similarly, in the expression "I can imagine a thing-in-itself", the word "thing-in-itself" is not referring to one particular concrete thing but rather is referring to the abstract concept of a thing-in-itself.

I can imagine a thing-in-itself as I can imagine a house, not as one particular concrete thing but as an abstract concept. As a "house" isn't an empty term then neither is a "thing-in-itself" an empty term.

Here is the summary from ChatGPT on the problems of OLP. — Corvus

:up:

So I can equally say "the window was broken by a thing-in-itself". — RussellA

You can say what you like, but depending on the ground of the determinations by which you say anything at all, re: how you understand things in general, and in particular from transcendental philosophy, you cannot say with legitimacy “the window was broken by a thing-in-itself”.

“….. Suppose now, on the other hand, that we (….) have learnt that an object may be taken in two senses, first, as a phenomenon, secondly, as a thing in itself; and that, according to the deduction of the conceptions of the understanding, the principle of causality has reference only to things in the first sense….”

While the broken window is that which ends up being the something that caused your perception, that alone is not sufficient to inform you of the cause of the window being broken.

So in saying what you do here, merely reflects that you have not learned to take things in two senses in accordance with this particular methodology, from which follows the sense of a thing by which it can be causal and the sense of it in which it cannot. Which is fine; it is speculative metaphysics writ large, after all.

Quote with no reference to where you got it? Come on now!

What does it matter where it comes from?

It’s fine, though. One inclined to “much prefer the phenomenological approach”, as you admit, isn’t likely to be persuaded by finespun transcendental arguments, regardless of their authors.

you cannot say “the window was broken by a thing-in-itself”.
— Mww — RussellA

As Kant was not a phenomenologist, and believed in both Appearance and Things-in-Themselves, where the Things-in-Themselves are the cause of the Appearance, the Category of Causality cannot apply just to the Appearance but must also apply to the cause of that Appearance, ie the Things-in-Themselves. — RussellA

So then which world is real, Appearance or Thing-in-itself? Or are they the same world?

If you were perceiving the world while you were asleep, then you wouldn't need the alarm clock to be awakened by it. The fact that you set the alarm clock to be awakened by it proves that you don't perceive the world while asleep.

I’m not sure how that proves you’re not perceiving the world. If you weren’t perceiving the world you wouldn’t hear the alarm clock.

Even so, if you’re not perceiving the world, what are you perceiving? Are you perceiving nothing? Are you not perceiving? Or are perceiving something other than the world?

While I look away, I wouldn't know if the cup exist, and I wouldn't know what the person would be doing either. The person could have looked away too, fell asleep, or walked out the room. Anyway, how can I believe in the existence of the cup when I am not seeing it, and base my belief in the existence of the invisible cup relying on the other person's perception, which is totally inaccessible to me?

You would know because the person would tell you that it did not disappear when you looked away. If you did not trust him, he could film the cup while you looked away, and you could review the video after and see that it had not moved. There are a number of experiments one can do find out the answer. Now you have evidence proving to you that it had not disappeared, and zero evidence that it did. Given this, is it reasonable to doubt the existence of the cup when you were not looking at it?

I’m not sure how that proves you’re not perceiving the world. If you weren’t perceiving the world you wouldn’t hear the alarm clock. — NOS4A2

Should you not say that you were disturbed by the alarm clock, which woke you up involuntarily from your sleep, rather than you perceived the alarm bell ringing from the clock?

Even so, if you’re not perceiving the world, what are you perceiving? Are you perceiving nothing? Are you not perceiving? Or are perceiving something other than the world? — NOS4A2

When you are sleeping, I would say you were not perceiving the world, because you would have been unconscious during the sleep. Your brain would have shutdown from your normal perception taking rest. Maybe you might be having dreams in sleep, but no perception on the world for sure. If you were perceiving something in the world in your sleep, then it is likely you weren't in deep sleep, or you weren't asleep at all.

Given this, is it reasonable to doubt the existence of the cup when you were not looking at it? — NOS4A2

If you accept that your perception is caused by the external object, but for some reason, the object you were perceiving is invisible from your sight, then you have no perception because you don't have the object causing your perception anymore. In that case, it would be rational to have no belief in the existence of the object or the world.

We are not saying why you cannot doubt, or can doubt with all the evidence the other person produces to you with the films and videos what have you. We are saying, the cause of your perception is not existing anymore, therefore you have no perception of the object, therefore you have no reason to believe in the existence of the object or world.

What does it matter where it comes from? — Mww

Context.

:up: Interesting point, and great writeup. However, Appearance has hint of being the mental representation. Appearance is not the world either, is it?

If they were a Phenomenalist, the Appearance is the real world. — RussellA

If you are talking about phenomenology this is incorrect. Phenomenology is not directly concerned with what is or is not real as it is a proposed method of exploring experience.

It’s fine, though. One inclined to “much prefer the phenomenological approach”, as you admit, isn’t likely to be persuaded by finespun transcendental arguments, regardless of their authors. — Mww

Try me. Just because I am familiar with one perspective does not mean I adhere to it with fanaticism. I view all popular philosophical positions are ‘tools’ rather than doctrines to live by.

Phenomenology is not directly concerned with what is or is not real as it is a proposed method of exploring experience. — I like sushi

Yes, that's true, for the Phenomenologist, the real world is external to our consciousness, according to the SEP article on Phenomenology:
In its root meaning, then, phenomenology is the study of phenomena: literally, appearances as opposed to reality.
Realistic phenomenology studies the structure of consciousness and intentionality, assuming it occurs in a real world that is largely external to consciousness and not somehow brought into being by consciousness.

On the other hand, the only world the phenomenologist knows is the world as it exists within these experiences, and these experiences are real to them. Could one perhaps say that the world as they experience it is real to them?

Try me — I like sushi

Ehhhh….I’m not finding much joy in the iterations presented here, so I might not be the one to ask.

We are not doubting the world, objects, things, pets or people when we are seeing them. We are doubting when we don't seem them anymore. If your pet is suddenly not there anymore having hidden somewhere in the house, then do you still believe in their existence in your house? Would you worry or doubt that they may not be there anymore having gone out the house, and lost their way back home? If you haven't seen them for weeks, would you still believe that they are with you?

MODERATOR NOTE: several of the comments about Kant's philosophy and his views on realism vs idealism have been moved to Anyone care to read Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason?"

:cool: :ok:

FYI, that didn’t come up as a link. Was it supposed to? Was mine the only machine where it didn’t?

?

Your moderator’s move of some of the comments on here, to a different place on the forum. Usually that shows up as a clickable link, colored letters, underlined, and all. So a guy doesn’t have to cut and paste.

There is a link to the thread I moved it to - you mean you're not seeing that? Try refreshing your screen might be a caching issue.

Ahhh…so it was just my machine. It’s a clickable link now. Not that I’m anxious to partake in reinventing the wheel.

Thanks.

Yes, I felt such an in-depth discussion of Kant belongs in a Kant-related thread.

Not that I’m anxious to partake in reinventing the wheel. — Mww

Where there's a wheel there's a way :-)

Could one perhaps say that the world as they experience it is real to them? — RussellA

We do actually say that for everyone. I will just assume you are wrong then. Bye