Here, for what it's worth is my summary of lecture XI. I've set it up as a dialogue.

This lecture is about Warnock on Berkeley – a restatement or revision of “Our own ideas are what is immediately perceived” – i.e. what makes no assumptions, takes nothing for granted.

Warnock Making assumptions is not necessarily speaking loosely (as Berkeley thinks). Eradicating assumptions is a matter of paying attention to what we are entitled to say. The case of the witness being asked to report only “what he actually saw” results in the witness being more cautious.(p.133)
Austin But this doesn’t justify sense-data. “sometimes I may supposedly see, or take it that I see, more than I actually see, but sometimes less”. (p.134)

Warnock “Immediately perceive” has no ordinary meaning so Berkeley can decide how it is to be used.
Austin This is an over-statement. In any case, both Berkeley and Warnock do trade on the ordinary uses of “immediately” and “perceive”. (p.135)

Warnock The patch of red that we immediately perceive might or might not be a book, so what we immediately perceive is something different from the book.
Austin This is a confusion, since that patch of red is the book. (p.136)

Warnock rejects Berkeley’s view that there are entities of some sort which are what we immediately perceive. He looks for the kind of sentence which expresses a “judgement of immediate perception”. (p.136)
Austin Possible wrong assumptions are not a matter of propositions/sentences (i.e forms of words) but of forms of words in the circumstances of their use, i.e.statements.

Warnock’s discussion of “Hearing a car” assumes there is nothing else to go on.
Austin But what if there is something else to go on? (p. 137)

Warnock “Material object” does not mean the same as “collections of ideas”. They are related as verdicts to evidence. (p.140)
Austin This model only applies to second-hand judgements. It excludes the possibility of being in the best position to make a judgement. It leaves out the position of the “eye-witness”. (p.140)

Austin Sense-data are the result of the demand to find the minimally adventurous form of words. Warnock’s approach is a matter of hedging from statements about material objects, not building up to them. (p. 141) But we don’t hedge unless there’s some reason for doing so. The best policy is not to ask the question. (p.142)

"Translation" here is an idea that came up earlier in the discussion. It treat the idea of sense-data as a question of language than of metaphysics. — Ludwig V

I think this is very good, and it is an important aspect of the "sense-data" perspective. We need to look at all acts of sensing as acts of interpreting. The tendency is to think that all human beings sense things in the same way, due to similar physical constitution. But just like we each interpret the same proposition in a unique, slightly different way from others, so we also interpret sense-data in a unique way. The difference becomes evident and very significant when one undergoes certain illnesses, toxins, hallucinogens, etc.. But simple experiments can demonstrate the magnitude of the fundamental differences unique to each being. For example, line up a group of people facing a particular direction, tell them to take mental note of what they see, then have them turn around and write it down.

But it is difficult to imagine a different way of interpreting the world which was completely incomprehensible to human beings - we couldn't even identify it as an interpretation of the world. (That's a vey brief gesture towards how the argument might go.) — Ludwig V

I would say that such a thing is not difficult at all. Consider the human being's temporal perspective, one's "present" in time. The average person's "present" is said by psychologists to be about two to three seconds. This time period, the temporal frame of reference, grounds what we know as the present state, "what is", the base for interpretation of the world. Now imagine if one's temporal frame of reference was a couple billion years, or just a couple nanoseconds. Each of these would give us a completely different grounding for "what is", at the present time. The extremely long frame of reference would have billions of years of celestial motions all blurred into one "now", while the extremely short frame of reference would show precise positioning of tiny fundamental particles. To me, when the temporal frame of reference is considered, it is not at all difficult to imagine that there would be ways of interpreting the world which would be completely incomprehensible to human beings.

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We need to look at all acts of sensing as acts of interpreting. — Metaphysician Undercover

Different interpretations of a picture presuppose a picture that is the original and mediates between interpretations. Ditto different interpretations of a law or other text. So if all acts of seeing are acts of interpretation, what is the original of what is being interpreted?

To be sure, we give different descriptions of what we see which are, or amount to, different interpretations of what we see. I would be happy to describe "what we see" as sense-data. However, I interpret that in the ordinary sense of see, not the sense required by sense-datum theory. Whether the sense of "see" required by sense-datum theory is coherent or not is one of the key questions.

For example, line up a group of people facing a particular direction, tell them to take mental note of what they see, then have them turn around and write it down. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not clear whether those differences result from differences in what is seen (unlikely, but possible) or differences in what they notice or attend to, or perhaps in what they remember or even in differences in what they think I want to hear.

Now imagine if one's temporal frame of reference was a couple billion years, or just a couple nanoseconds. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm afraid I can't imagine that. However, I can consider the possibility that someone's temporal frame of reference is different from mine. Indeed, while it is unlikely that any actual beings are as so radically different from mine, it is more than likely that other living beings have different temporal frames of reference. Quite how that would play out, is harder to work out, so I'm not much further forward. While I grant that it's possible, I have no idea how one might come to know that it differs or by how much. However, even considering the possibility presupposes a) that I can identify them as conscious, therefore alive and b) that their subjective time would relate to mine in some way, such that I could explain differences by the difference in temporal frame of reference.

I understand what speculation means in ordinary life, but in cases like this, I lose my bearings. How do you manage?

Yes, in a way. You are using "observation" in a common sense way, and I'm on board with that. But Ayer's argument is that all observations other than sense-data are inferences from sense-data. — Ludwig V

The theory of sense data is a view in the philosophy of perception, popularly held in the early 20th century by philosophers such as Bertrand Russell, C. D. Broad, H. H. Price, A. J. Ayer, and G. E. Moore. Sense data are taken to be mind-dependent objects whose existence and properties are known directly to us in perception. These objects are unanalyzed experiences inside the mind, which appear to subsequent more advanced mental operations exactly as they are.

Sense data are often placed in a time and/or causality series, such that they occur after the potential unreliability of our perceptual systems yet before the possibility of error during higher-level conceptual analysis and are thus incorrigible. They are thus distinct from the 'real' objects in the world outside the mind, about whose existence and properties we often can be mistaken.

Talk of sense-data has since been largely replaced by talk of the closely related qualia. The formulation the given is also closely related. None of these terms has a single coherent and widely agreed-upon definition, so their exact relationships are unclear. One of the greatest troubling aspects of 20th century theories of sense data are their unclear rubric nature. — Wiki

Bertrand Russell heard the sound of his knuckles rapping his writing table, felt the table's hardness and saw its apparent colour (which he knew 'really' to be the brown of wood) change significantly under shifting lighting conditions.

H. H. Price found that although he was able to doubt the presence of a tomato before him, he was unable to doubt the existence of his red, round and 'somewhat bulgy' sense-datum and his consciousness of this sense-datum.

When we twist a coin it 'appears' to us as elliptical. This elliptical 'appearance' cannot be identical with the coin (for the coin is perfectly round), and is therefore a sense datum, which somehow represents the round coin to us.

Consider a reflection which appears to us in a mirror. There is nothing corresponding to the reflection in the world external to the mind (for our reflection appears to us as the image of a human being apparently located inside a wall, or a wardrobe). The appearance is therefore a mental object, a sense datum. — Wiki

So from here sense-data are the immediate "impressions" upon the senses. I actually don't see how that's much different than Hume's "impressions" as that is a very good name for this notion. I understand how Hume's Ideas (combinations of impressions into abstractions and such), but impressions seems pretty equivalent to sense-datum, unless there is some weird technicality I am not understanding.

From all this it is clear that it is the phenomenal experiences that the mind is having. The part that is in contention here with Austin is that Austin wants to add "From all this it is clear that it is the phenomenal experiences that the mind is having with the world."

Ayer can be accused of an extreme solipsism and this kind of epistemology might rub people the wrong way if they want to maintain the external world and the veracity of the human mind. Ayer is ever closing the human off to only phenomenal and not "the world". The two shall never meet, so to say. This is ripe then for being taken to more speculative extremes and uncertainty in general whereby Kantianism and Idealism, more generally might save the day. The middle ground is a kind of "indirect realism" which some might still find distasteful as "Kantianism in drag". That is to say, the "real world" is never known, just represented, and now this creates the division of mind/body that many philosophers want to get away from as it again, brings in the "specter" of the ghostly mind, which is to be eradicated and replaced. Thus this whole argument needs to go away to preserve realism.

My responses to Lecture XI

There's a good deal of familiar ground in this. But there are differences of detail and elaboration that are of interest. The only thing that seems to materially add is the concluding section on hedging, which I've already drawn attention to.

One other point struck me:- "Warnock says that a witness being asked to report only “what he actually saw” results in the witness being more cautious. Austin's reply is that "I might begin, for instance, by saying that I saw a little silvery speck, and go on to say that what I actually saw was a star. I might say in evidence that I saw a man firing a gun, and say afterwards, 'I actually saw him committing the murder!' That is (to put it shortly and roughly), sometimes I may supposedly see, or take it that I see, more than I actually see, but sometimes less." (p. 134)

It occurs to me that the quest for certainty has missed something. There are two ways of being wrong. One is to state more than I really saw. The other way is to state less. In other words, falsehood is not just suggestio falsi (saying what is false), but also suppressio veri (not saying what is true). Exaggeration is not true, but neither is understatement.

Thus this whole argument needs to go away to preserve realism. — schopenhauer1

You, I and Austin can all agree on that conclusion - depending on what you mean by realism. The trouble is, it hasn't. (See qualia).

Forgive me, I have to go now. I can't respond to this in detail.

You, I and Austin can all agree on that conclusion - depending on what you mean by realism. The trouble is, it hasn't. (See qualia). — Ludwig V

Well, I don't necessarily believe that, but I am just positing a hypothetical view for why this whole debate might be important in the debates surrounding epistemology.

Besides the broader implication (no real world fits in here, oh no!), the idea itself as we discussed just seems odd one if it is the point for which verification is to be obtained. That is to say, verification happens at broader observational levels, not immediate impressions upon the body. Verification is a judgement. The computer makes a judgement. Even if the judgement is based on experience, that doesn't mean necessarily, "sense impressions" but various judgements and inferences derived from those sense impressions. Thus, one can jettison the "sense impressions" if there is a sufficient tool for the "judgements and inferences" part. So that is why I am not computing Ayer very well here. Perhaps I am not being charitable in the right way with his view.

impressions seems pretty equivalent to sense-datum, unless there is some weird technicality I am not understanding. — schopenhauer1

You are dead right about that. Berkeley used "idea" a bit more widely but clearly included the same idea(!) in its scope. Kant's "phenomena" is also very similar. "Sense data" is an update to the idea designed to suit the 20th century.

Ayer is ever closing the human off to only phenomenal and not "the world". — schopenhauer1

To be fair to him, he doesn't deny the external world and doesn't deny that we know things about it.

However he would agree with you that

Even if the judgement is based on experience, that doesn't mean necessarily, "sense impressions" but various judgements and inferences derived from those sense impressions. — schopenhauer1

It's the idea that all knowledge of the external world is based on evidence from the senses. This is useful because it closes the infinite regress of evidence - (sense-data, for Ayer, are incorrigible, so immune from sceptical doubt). So part of what is at issue here is whether all knowledge of the external world is an inference. Austin spends a good deal of time dismantling (or trying to dismantle) that model. The lesson from Austin (and I'm pretty sure he intended this) is that incorrigiblity is a philosophical dream inspired for the search for absolute certainty.

There is a complication here, that Ayer says that physical objects are "constructed" from sense-data. I think he means "logically constructed", so this isn't a straightforward metaphysical claim, but exactly what it means is not clear.

My version of this is that life is not really about avoiding error, but coping with it when it crops up.

That is to say, the "real world" is never known, just represented.. — schopenhauer1

I have an issue with this. First of all, if the "real world" is never known, you have changed the standard meaning of "know" for a distortion created by the idea that "certainty" means immunity from error (see above) and if "representing" means nothing unless what is represented is also known. Comparing representation with original is how you know it is a representation - think picture vs original. How do you know what the picture is a picture of if there is no way of, at least sometimes, comparing them?

..this creates the division of mind/body that many philosophers want to get away from as it again, brings in the "specter" of the ghostly mind, which is to be eradicated and replaced. — schopenhauer1

That is exactly what is at stake in the broader context. I'm sure you know that the modern idea of "qualia" is a (not unsuccessful) attempt to preserve the ghost.

To be fair to him, he doesn't deny the external world and doesn't deny that we know things about it. — Ludwig V

Right, this would be the wishy-washy (from accusers I mean) "indirect realism". He mine well be a Kantian! Might be the (exaggerated) pearl clutching on this accusation.

There is a complication here, that Ayer says that physical objects are "constructed" from sense-data. I think he means "logically constructed", so this isn't a straightforward metaphysical claim, but exactly what it means is not clear.

My version of this is that life is not really about avoiding error, but coping with it when it crops up. — Ludwig V

Well, I think he means it in the Humean way of "impressions" and "ideas". Ideas are built up from impressions. And here we get the seeds for the difference between straight up epistemological empiricism (tabula rasa), and Kantian cognitivism (there are innate mental faculties which shape the impressions). That debate is rather archaic now, but it does show up in various modern forms in terms of just how it is our minds construct the world from experience.

I have an issue with this. First of all, if the "real world" is never known, you have changed the standard meaning of "know" for a distortion created by the idea that "certainty" means immunity from error (see above) and if "representing" means nothing unless what is represented is also known. Comparing representation with original is how you know it is a representation - think picture vs original. How do you know what the picture is a picture of if there is no way of, at least sometimes, comparing them? — Ludwig V

I think this is possibly where language breaks down and word-games begins. The external object exists and creates the same events because it holds some primary property. This is the "real". No one usually doubts this. However, the word-games come in as to "what" counts as representation. Is a photon hitting the pupil and electro-chemical nerve firings being equivalent to or causing a mental perception and conception a "representation"? Some say yes some say no. Some might say, the sensory parts of the brain are "direct" and the higher ones are "indirect". But how is that the case? Is it the "whole body" is involved and thus, one cannot separate it? If that's the case, how does one avoid panpsychism? There are things like object-oriented ontologies where all objects have some sort of qualitative aspect, for example. Then there is process philosophy etc. But no respectable empiricist/positivist is going to go down that route.

That is exactly what is at stake in the broader context. I'm sure you know that the modern idea of "qualia" is a (not unsuccessful) attempt to preserve the ghost. — Ludwig V

Is it an "attempt" or is it simply a more just what "seems to be the case". It "seems" that there are sensory qualities. Many people consider this secondary properties as the qualities themselves are only apparent to an observer, not "there" in some non-observational sense, other than the physical substrata from which the qualities become realized. And now we are back to the Philosophy of Mind.

Different interpretations of a picture presuppose a picture that is the original and mediates between interpretations. — Ludwig V

You're missing the point. You are assuming "a picture". But if some of the different interpretations of the supposed "same thing", do include "a picture", there is nothing to suppose as the original except the assumption of "the same thing". But if the interpretations are different, where's the logic in assuming that they are interpretations of the same thing in the first place?

I'm not clear whether those differences result from differences in what is seen (unlikely, but possible) or differences in what they notice or attend to, or perhaps in what they remember or even in differences in what they think I want to hear. — Ludwig V

This is the problem, "seeing" requires noticing and attending to. This mental activity constitutes a basic part of seeing, such that there is no seeing without it. Therefore, premising that the difference is due to a difference in attention does not imply that the difference is not also a difference in what is seen, because attention plays an active role in determining what is seen.

I understand what speculation means in ordinary life, but in cases like this, I lose my bearings. How do you manage? — Ludwig V

I have no problem with this, it seems to come naturally for me. See, you and I have very distinct modes of interpretation. Can you imagine that a plant might produce interpretations of its world? We can go far beyond "consciousness", in our speculations about interpretations. What about a non-conscious machine, an AI or something, couldn't that thing being doing some sort of interpretations?

Well, I think he means it in the Humean way of "impressions" and "ideas". — schopenhauer1

I agree that's what's in the background. (There was a great revival of Hume amongst analytic philosophers, at least in the UK, at the time.) But Hume posits "relations between ideas" and rejects "reason" (or some sense or other of it). So Ayer is riffing off Hume, rather than reproducing him.

Some say yes some say no. — schopenhauer1

If photons can count as sense data, then I say yes. But the idea is that we aware of them, so then I say know. So I just say I don't know what they are (supposed to be.)

Is it the "whole body" is involved and thus, one cannot separate it? If that's the case, how does one avoid panpsychism? — schopenhauer1

Well, the idea that the mind is the brain is clearly physiologically inaccurate and since action is embedded in perception, I go for the whole person. But I don't see panpsychism as a problem - just a mistake, generated by the philosophical fondness for exaggerated generlization.

There are things like object-oriented ontologies where all objects have some sort of qualitative aspect, for example. — schopenhauer1

It depends on what you mean by "object". If "to be is to be the value of a variable" is true, then clearly that's false.

Many people consider this secondary properties as the qualities themselves are only apparent to an observer, not "there" in some non-observational sense, other than the physical substrata from which the qualities become realized. — schopenhauer1

I'm coming round to the idea that accepting Locke's argument is a mistake. After all, in ordinary language (for what it is worth), there is no doubt that it is the stop-light that is red and that there is nothing red in my head. Moreover, Berkley's argument that the distinction between primary and secondary qualities won't stand up seems a good one.

And now we are back to the Philosophy of Mind. — schopenhauer1

Perhaps we should never have been anywhere else.

But if the interpretations are different, where's the logic in assuming that they are interpretations of the same thing in the first place? — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, sometimes they are, and sometimes they're not. What's the criterion for saying that two interpretations are interpretations of the same thing or that they are interpretations of different things?Without that, interpretations objects in their own right, with no connection to anything else. Strictly speaking, to speak of an interpretation without saying what it is an interpretation of, and indeed we often add "as". So Freud's theory was an interpretation of dream as the outcome of unconscious hopes and fears.

Therefore, premising that the difference is due to a difference in attention does not imply that the difference is not also a difference in what is seen, because attention plays an active role in determining what is seen. — Metaphysician Undercover

Good point. So now I ask whether "those differences result from differences in what is seen, or perhaps in what they remember or even in differences in what they think I want to hear."

Can you imagine that a plant might produce interpretations of its world? We can go far beyond "consciousness", in our speculations about interpretations. What about a non-conscious machine, an AI or something, couldn't that thing being doing some sort of interpretations? — Metaphysician Undercover

If a plant produced interpretations of its world, it would be conscious. If an AI produced some sort of interpretation, it would have some sort of consciousness.

A longer reply might (possibly) be more helpful. It depends on circumstances in which you would interpret something as an interpretation. That's why I can't answer the questions. They seem to me idle playing with words. There's nothing to argue about here, because there's nothing to agree or disagree with. All I can do is ask you to elaborate your fantasy. I'm certainly not going to draw any conclusions from it.

Certainly, there are plenty of stories about conscious AIs. But they are writing stories about rather peculiar human beings and then inserting "AI" where they are thinking "person". Don't get me wrong - I enjoy some of them, but they don't face up to the philosophical question about when an AI would be conscious. That's not a criticism. Art is not supposed to be science.

So now I ask whether "those differences result from differences in what is seen, or perhaps in what they remember or even in differences in what they think I want to hear." — Ludwig V

It makes no sense to ask that question. Memories and anticipations inhere within, and are necessary to, the act of seeing. Therefore differences in what is remembered or anticipated manifest as differences in what is seen. The distinction you ask for cannot be made.

If a plant produced interpretations of its world, it would be conscious. If an AI produced some sort of interpretation, it would have some sort of consciousness. — Ludwig V

All you are doing is unnecessarily restricting the meaning of "interpretation" in a way so that only consciousness can perform the act which produces an interpretation. The problem is that I do not see the reason for this restriction. I see very little in any conventional definition, or use of the word, to support your requested restriction.

The word is generally used to signify an act which presents the meaning of something, and "an interpretation" would be an instance of what is produced by this act. There is nothing to indicate to me that this type of act could only be carried out by a consciousness. There is however, an implication of "understanding" in some usage, but this is somewhat problematic. Nothing necessitates that the interpretation consists of understanding rather than misunderstanding. Since the interpretation might equally be misunderstanding as well as understanding, we cannot say that "understanding" is implied by "interpretation", so the link between consciousness and interpretation may be denied in that way.

But that is only my, very subjective, interpretation of "interpretation". And of course, I admit that it may be a misunderstanding. But this leaves me with no principles to distinguish understanding from misunderstanding, correct from incorrect. Therefore the principles which distinguish understanding from misunderstanding, correct from incorrect, or in general, good from bad, cannot be derived from sense-data, which would require interpretation. A judgement of this kind must be prior to, and active in the production of the interpretation. That makes the perspective of "sense-data" ontologically problematic because our innate sense of good and bad must be derived in some means other than through the senses, because it must have an active role in the process of interpretation.

Memories and anticipations inhere within, and are necessary to, the act of seeing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, but the sense-datum is supposed to be what is left when all assumptions are set aside.

I see very little in any conventional definition, or use of the word, to support your requested restriction. — Metaphysician Undercover

Would the Cambridge dictionary definition be evidence of what the conventional definition is:-

interpretation - an explanation or opinion of what something means.
The dispute is based on two widely differing interpretations of the law.
It is difficult for many people to accept a literal interpretation of the Bible.
We were disappointed that they insisted on such a rigid interpretation of the rules.

interpretation - a particular way of performing a piece of music, a part in a play, etc.:
Her interpretation of Juliet was one of the best performances I have ever seen.

An interpretation by actors or musicians is the expression by their performance of their understanding of the part or parts they are playing:
Masur’s interpretation of the Brahms symphony was masterful.
This does seem to be the best interpretation of their observations.

There is nothing to indicate to me that this type of act could only be carried out by a consciousness. — Metaphysician Undercover

Really? So the chair you are sitting on might understand what you are saying, and your dustbin might understand that to-day is the day it gets emptied?

Since the interpretation might equally be misunderstanding as well as understanding, we cannot say that "understanding" is implied by "interpretation", so the link between consciousness and interpretation may be denied in that way. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not quite. Something that is not conscious cannot understand or misunderstand, so your argument does not "break the link".

That makes the perspective of "sense-data" ontologically problematic because our innate sense of good and bad must be derived in some means other than through the senses, because it must have an active role in the process of interpretation. — Metaphysician Undercover

I would put it this way. We are innately inclined to remember feed-back on what we do. In the case of seeing, that's how we get feed-back. So we learn pretty quickly what works and what doesn't. That's the basis for how we see something. Interpretation can play a role sometimes, but I'm not sure it's meaningful to suppose that it always plays a role.

But I don't see panpsychism as a problem - just a mistake, generated by the philosophical fondness for exaggerated generlization. — Ludwig V

:up:

I agree that's what's in the background. (There was a great revival of Hume amongst analytic philosophers, at least in the UK, at the time.) But Hume posits "relations between ideas" and rejects "reason" (or some sense or other of it). So Ayer is riffing off Hume, rather than reproducing him. — Ludwig V

I kind of like the idea of a 18th century Hume being more (the age of Enlightenment) cynical than the 20th century Ayer in regards to human "reason". Hume's biting critiques really are unmatched, and it seems like everyone after has tried, but failed or has simply copied his critiques with new vocabulary...

If photons can count as sense data, then I say yes. But the idea is that we aware of them, so then I say know. So I just say I don't know what they are (supposed to be.) — Ludwig V

Well, my point was photons hitting the pupil is not sense data. That is simply the physical events we correlate with the sense data. That's the whole problem we are trying to solve... that all of these arguments go back to.. We can try to quibble about what a specific author said in a text in a chapter, in a passage, but let's get to what the subtext is, it's this (the hard problem.. )

Well, the idea that the mind is the brain is clearly physiologically inaccurate and since action is embedded in perception, I go for the whole person. But I don't see panpsychism as a problem - just a mistake, generated by the philosophical fondness for exaggerated generlization. — Ludwig V

You'd REALLY have to elaborate on that because right there is a huge generalization and handwave itself. But assuming by "whole person" we mean the theory "embedded cognition", I don't see how it really solves the problem any differently to recognize that indeed it's about the whole body's embeddedness in its environment.

It depends on what you mean by "object". If "to be is to be the value of a variable" is true, then clearly that's false. — Ludwig V

It's basically that objects interact with the world through vicarious properties but retain a sort of hidden property that makes the object itself and not just a composite of properties. Actually, it is sort of like the idea of "whole body" but spread out to objects, not just humans/animals. Specifically the theory is about not undermining objects (to just its vicarious properties), or overmining objects (to every relation it can ever possibly be a part of). There is something that makes an object that object, without dissolving it, but also recognizes that object has properties that allow it to interact with other objects, etc.

I'm coming round to the idea that accepting Locke's argument is a mistake. After all, in ordinary language (for what it is worth), there is no doubt that it is the stop-light that is red and that there is nothing red in my head. Moreover, Berkley's argument that the distinction between primary and secondary qualities won't stand up seems a good one. — Ludwig V

And here again is the crux of the argument. What does it mean that the stop-light IS red, rather than the stop-light has properties which if an observer were there would instantiate as the quale "red"? That is to say, what is red in and of itself? If you start talking wavelengths and rods/cones we are back to a dualism so that doesn't help your case much for "directly" perceiving the object. And then you can say why is it photons, rods, cones, and EM spectrum frequencies ARE the quale of red?

This goes to a deeper question I have I was going to start a thread on. What would it mean for something to have the "property" of a sensation? So the sensation of red/sound/touch/taste/smell, what if that is a "property" then what does that mean?

The generic answer would be that as long as X, Y, Z events are in place, property 1 obtains. This gets into the problem of emergentism. So 1 is emergent from the background of X, Y, Z. But whence "emergence"? It seems like a sort of pseudo-answer, like a Homunculus Fallacy by another name. It is the "magic" that can be conjured as an end to all inquiries.

Well done. Interesting format.

Again I'm noticing how much this presages Wittgenstein. This time the discussion of doubt in On Certainty, with "hedging" taking on the role of doubting.

I kind of like the idea of a 18th century Hume being more (the age of Enlightenment) cynical than the 20th century — schopenhauer1

The irony is, of course, that he didn't think he was a sceptic, and, given that he believed in the Christian story on faith, despite his own demonstration that there is no reason to believe it, he certainly doesn't seem particularly cynical.

We can try to quibble about what a specific author said in a text in a chapter, in a passage, but let's get to what the subtext is, it's this (the hard problem.. ) — schopenhauer1

I'm afraid I find it helpful to focus on a specific text. However, since I don't properly understand how the problem arises (though I've seen a lot of arm-waving), I don't yet have a basis for discussing solutions. (I find it very liberating not to have to pretend to know all about everything now that I'm retired.)

I don't see how it really solves the problem any differently to recognize that indeed it's about the whole body's embeddedness in its environment. — schopenhauer1

But assuming by "whole person" we mean the theory "embedded cognition", — schopenhauer1

Those theories look attractive, though the range of what's on offer is a bit confusing. But when I say "whole person" I meant the context of human life and practices, not cognition, embedded or not. I don't have allegiance anywhere yet, though who knows what may happen next.

It's basically that objects interact with the world through vicarious properties but retain a sort of hidden property that makes the object itself and not just a composite of properties. — schopenhauer1

You are like someone who takes delivery of a flat-pack bookcase, unpacks all the bits and the instructions and wonders where the actual bookcase is. It's a paradox of analysis - the subject of the analysis seems to disappear.

There is something that makes an object that object, without dissolving it, but also recognizes that object has properties that allow it to interact with other objects, etc. — schopenhauer1

You are beginning with a mistake. If there was something that makes an object that object, it would be just another component. It's the problem that Aristotle tried to solve with his idea of "essence" (literally, in the Greek "the what it is to be"), the scholastics with "quiddity" and Locke with his idea of substance ("something, I know not what"). Not even chasing wild geese, but unicorns.

What would it mean for something to have the "property" of a sensation? — schopenhauer1

I grasp the idea that sensation is an activity or an event or partly both; there is a standard verb for it. But "property" is not so clear; I don't know what the adjective would be for it.

But whence "emergence"? It seems like a sort of pseudo-answer, like a Homunculus Fallacy by another name. — schopenhauer1

Yes. I have the impression that the idea was proposed as a project, and that various ideas have been proposed. As one would expect, there are several candidates, none particularly appealing. The sunlight and the rain interact and a rainbow is the result. Would it be fair to say the rainbow emerges? I suppose so, but I don't find it particularly enlightening, compared to the pedestrian scientific explanation.

Well done. Interesting format. — Banno

Thanks. I hoped it would work, but wasn't sure. The text just seemed to fall into that format.

Again I'm noticing how much this presages Wittgenstein. This time the discussion of doubt in On Certainty, with "hedging" taking on the role of doubting. — Banno

I don't want to be picky, but Philosophical Investigations was published in 1953 and Sense and Sensibilia in 1962 (both posthumously - I guess that must be just a coincidence), So any presaging must be the other way round. However, the relationship between the two is intriguingly mysterious. It would be wonderful if there was something from him about Wittgenstein. Isn't there an unflattering (to Wittgenstein) anecdote about a comment by Austin on the private language argument?

So any presaging must be the other way round. — Ludwig V

Well, Searle and others have made the claim that Austin only took a passing interest in Wittgenstein, and the stuff about doubt is mostly in On Certainty, which I think came out in 1969. But yes, it is a point of contention.

Searle seemed to think Austin had not understood Private Language.

Yes, but the sense-datum is supposed to be what is left when all assumptions are set aside. — Ludwig V

I know, and that's why it's incoherent to say that the sense-datum is what is seen, because seeing necessarily involves what you call "assumptions". What is seen includes "assumptions".

So the chair you are sitting on might understand what you are saying, and your dustbin might understand that to-day is the day it gets emptied? — Ludwig V

You are citing specifics again, and that is a problem. If the chair is capable of making an interpretation, this does not imply that the chair is capable of understanding what I am saying. What the chair is interpreting might be something that we have no idea of. The dustbin example suffers the same problem.

That's the complexity of "interpretation". I am not necessarily capable of interpreting the same thing with meaning that you are capable of interpreting. And, I might not even recognize as meaningful, something which you are capable of interpreting the meaning of. Furthermore, all these difficulties make it so that we cannot even understand exactly what the act of interpreting actually consists of, so we can't even say for sure whether a chair is interpreting or not. We'll say that the chair does not interpret in the way that human beings do, but since other animals interpret in other ways which we really cannot relate to, we can't rule out the possibility that plants and even inanimate objects might themselves have different modes of interpretation.

. Something that is not conscious cannot understand or misunderstand, so your argument does not "break the link". — Ludwig V

The argument holds, because neither understanding nor misunderstanding can be implied by "interpretation" itself. These are judgements made as to correct or incorrect interpretation. Therefore understanding and misunderstanding are not things intrinsic to the interpretation, but are determinations attributed to the interpretations post hoc, often by a third party. The interpreter does not necessarily assume to understand, nor to misunderstand, in the act of interpretation. Nor does the interpreter necessarily believe that the interpretation must be one or the other of these two. What is done is merely interpretation, a judgement of meaning. So the non-conscious cannot be excluded from interpretation through the requirement of understanding or misunderstanding. However, there is necessarily some underlying inclination toward a good, or intention, purpose, which drives the act as an act of judgement. But acting with purpose, intention, is not restricted to consciousness.

So we learn pretty quickly what works and what doesn't. That's the basis for how we see something. Interpretation can play a role sometimes, but I'm not sure it's meaningful to suppose that it always plays a role. — Ludwig V

"What works and what doesn't" implies purpose, and purpose implies intention. And any act with intention has meaning, as what was meant. So I do not think you can disassociate interpretation from seeing in this way. If learning to see is a matter of learning "what works and what doesn't", then it is directed by intention and judgements of value and meaning are involved, therefore interpretation is involved.

You are beginning with a mistake. If there was something that makes an object that object, it would be just another component. It's the problem that Aristotle tried to solve with his idea of "essence" (literally, in the Greek "the what it is to be"), the scholastics with "quiddity" and Locke with his idea of substance ("something, I know not what"). Not even chasing wild geese, but unicorns. — Ludwig V

Yes, it is very much hearkening back to that. Here is the gist of it...
It is placed in the camp of "Speculative Realism" which according to Wiki is:

Object-oriented ontology is often viewed as a subset of speculative realism, a contemporary school of thought that criticizes the post-Kantian reduction of philosophical enquiry to a correlation between thought and being (correlationism), such that the reality of anything outside of this correlation is unknowable. — Wiki

His inspiration was:

For Harman, Heideggerian Zuhandenheit, or readiness-to-hand, refers to the withdrawal of objects from human perception into a reality that cannot be manifested by practical or theoretical action.[9] Furthering this idea, Harman contends that when objects withdraw in this way, they distance themselves from other objects, as well as humans.

And basically the theory is:

Harman further contends that objects withdraw not just from human interaction, but also from other objects. He maintains:

If the human perception of a house or a tree is forever haunted by some hidden surplus in the things that never become present, the same is true of the sheer causal interaction between rocks or raindrops. Even inanimate things only unlock each other's realities to a minimal extent, reducing one another to caricatures...even if rocks are not sentient creatures, they never encounter one another in their deepest being, but only as present-at-hand; it is only Heidegger's confusion of two distinct senses of the as-structure that prevents this strange result from being accepted.[1]

From this, Harman concludes that the primary site of ontological investigation is objects and relations, instead of the post-Kantian emphasis on the human-world correlate. Moreover, this holds true for all entities, be they human, nonhuman, natural, or artificial, leading to the downplaying of Dasein as an ontological priority. In its place, Harman proposes a concept of objects that are irreducible to both material particles and human perception, and "exceed every relation into which they might enter".[24]

Coupling Heidegger's tool analysis with the phenomenological insights of Edmund Husserl, Harman introduces two types of objects: real objects and sensual objects. Real objects are objects that withdraw from all experience, whereas sensual objects are those that exist only in experience.[25] Additionally, Harman suggests two kinds of qualities: sensual qualities, or those found in experience, and real qualities, which are accessed through intellectual probing.[25] Pairing sensual and real objects and qualities yields the following framework:

Real Object/Real Qualities: This pairing grounds the capacity of real objects to differ from one another, without collapsing into indefinite substrata.[26]
Real Object/Sensual Qualities: As in the tool-analysis, a withdrawn object is translated into sensual apprehension via a "surface" accessed by thought and/or action.[26]
Sensual Object/Real Qualities: The structure of conscious phenomena are forged from eidetic, or experientially interpretive, qualities intuited intellectually.[26]
Sensual Object/Sensual Qualities: Sensual objects are present, but enmeshed within a "mist of accidental features and profiles".[27]
To explain how withdrawn objects make contact with and relate to one another, Harman submits the theory of vicarious causation, whereby two hypothetical entities meet in the interior of a third entity, existing side-by-side until something occurs to prompt interaction.[28] Harman compares this idea to the classical notion of formal causation, in which forms do not directly touch, but influence one another in a common space "from which all are partly absent".

Being that this is "speculative" realism, I am sure you will find this all quite distasteful :D. Unlike logical positivism and the analytics who only interact via sense-datum (or broadly human experience) to world, and/or propositions of language/logic-to-world, this is trying to understand "world", even if using human conventions to portray it. Not sure how well the project can hold up for "Speculative Realism". But just wanted to share a new idea for you if you were unfamiliar.

I grasp the idea that sensation is an activity or an event or partly both; there is a standard verb for it. But "property" is not so clear; I don't know what the adjective would be for it. — Ludwig V

Sensing? Yes, what is this "sensing"? It is an event, sure, but many people want to posit that a "property" to mental events. So, the property of liquid, solid, gas, or the property of magnetism, or mass or pressure, is supposed to be likened to a property of some mental event. Mentality is thus deemed an EMERGENET property of X, Y, Z events taking place. Whenever XYZ is there, the mental property must be present. It was not there previously or after its arrangement, but that particular arrangement will cause the emergence of that property. And indeed, if this sounds like a Homunculus Fallacy, it is!

Yes. I have the impression that the idea was proposed as a project, and that various ideas have been proposed. As one would expect, there are several candidates, none particularly appealing. The sunlight and the rain interact and a rainbow is the result. Would it be fair to say the rainbow emerges? I suppose so, but I don't find it particularly enlightening, compared to the pedestrian scientific explanation. — Ludwig V

It's not only not enlightening, it's not the same in kind, in my estimation, to that of a mental event. That is to say, the emergence of all other things are understood by way of our observations. That is to say, properties cohere in a sufficient observer. But how does the observer itself emerge onto ITSELF?

Searle seemed to think Austin had not understood Private Language. — Banno

What I remember about that anecdote fits with that. But then, he's not alone, neither in his time, nor now.

the stuff about doubt is mostly in On Certainty, which I think came out in 1969. — Banno

OK. And it certainly isn't clear what he thought.

@Banno

Possible wrong assumptions are not a matter of propositions/sentences (i.e forms of words) but of forms of words in the circumstances of their use, i.e.statements. — Ludwig V

I feel this might be misunderstood if we don’t make clear that the circumstances are of greater importance than any “form of words”. Yes, there are expressions that take a particular form, like a statement (or “empirical proposition”), but it is the attendant circumstances which make stating a fact important; whether that it is true, or hurtful, or both. More than that, there are also expressions that do not take a “form of words” at all, because they are simply a threatening gesture, but also because we don’t judge by the words (or the word’s “use”; or my “use” of them) but by the place the expression (or practice) holds in the circumstances, i.e., its sense or “use” (which is here what Wittgenstein is referring to) e.g., a plea, an overture, an apology, pointing, seeing, mocking, etc. To some expressions, the form (or practice) is crucial, like a knock-knock joke, to others, it is the deviance from any form that makes the expression what it is, like modern art, or its singularity, say, the cry of pain from me.

But we don’t hedge unless there’s some reason for doing so. The best policy is not to ask the question. — Ludwig V

This harkens back to Lecture X (p.112), when Austin pointed out that Ayer was pulling back behind “precise” sense-data to allow us to be uncommitted to our expressions. Here “hedging” our claims about the world qualifies our relation in order to mitigate our liability as well. Austin is claiming that our ordinary expressions do not inherently need to be hedged, unless there “is something strange or a bit off-colour about the particular situation.” (P.142) But Austin is not championing the status quo, as if it was more entitled or that it naturally has more solidity. We can unreasonably question another, but in doing so we put ourselves out (too familiar perhaps), or put them out (opening ourselves to calls of libel). In any case, we subject ourselves to judgment, and it is that responsibility Austin wants to be certain we understand.

I know, and that's why it's incoherent to say that the sense-datum is what is seen, because seeing necessarily involves what you call "assumptions". What is seen includes "assumptions". — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree with that. So I conclude that the concept of sense-data, as adopted by some philosophers, is incoherent.

You are citing specifics again, and that is a problem. — Metaphysician Undercover

If the specifics don't conform to the generalization, it's a problem for the generalization, not for the specific.

since other animals interpret in other ways which we really cannot relate to — Metaphysician Undercover

How do you know that? Surely, if we can know that their perceptions of the world are different from ours, we can "relate" to them.

The argument holds, because neither understanding nor misunderstanding can be implied by "interpretation" itself. These are judgements made as to correct or incorrect interpretation. — Metaphysician Undercover

So we formulate a judgement, which is not an interpretation, and then promote it to an interpretation and then decide whether it is correct or not? At first sight, it would resolve my problem. But what is this promotion process?
To put the point another way, surely to make a judgement is normally to evaluate it as correct? If one doesn't judge that a proposition is correct, one can make a range of different judgements, that it is false, or possible and so on. All of which involve evaluating that these different judgements are correct.

So the non-conscious cannot be excluded from interpretation through the requirement of understanding or misunderstanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

Some interpretations seem to be based on a process that we are not subjectively aware of. The usual term for that is unconscious, which is distinct from non-conscious. Non-conscious beings neither have nor lack an unconscious.

However, there is necessarily some underlying inclination toward a good, or intention, purpose, which drives the act as an act of judgement. But acting with purpose, intention, is not restricted to consciousness. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree with the first sentence, and we should, perhaps, take more account of it in our analysis of perception. But philosophy is interested in theory, which is supposed to be driven only by the pursuit of truth. I would agree that this stance can lead philosophers into mistakes.

So I do not think you can disassociate interpretation from seeing in this way. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not trying to disassociate it. I'm trying to understand it. I'm arguing that there is a problem with the standard model of interpretation.

I'll try to articulate some reasonably appropriate responses. As you expect, this isn't my philosophical cup of tea. I don't automatically dismiss all non-analytic philosophy as nonsense. (Actually, my somewhat heretical belief is that there is some analytic philosophy which really is nonsense.) But much of those philosophies seems to be written in a different language, so I can't engage with it fully. But there may be some over-laps.

a contemporary school of thought that criticizes the post-Kantian reduction of philosophical enquiry to a correlation between thought and being (correlationism), such that the reality of anything outside of this correlation is unknowable. — Wiki

Since to know something is precisely "to correlate thought and being", if there is anything "outside" (whatever that may mean) that correlation, it stands to reason that it is unknowable; one might speculate that it will also be impossible to know whether there is or is not anything in that situation. If the Heidegerrian line of thought you go on to explain works, it, by the same token, correlates thought and those beings. But there are some points that might mean something.

Heideggerian Zuhandenheit, or readiness-to-hand, refers to the withdrawal of objects from human perception into a reality that cannot be manifested by practical or theoretical action.

I've come across readiness-to-hand before and I can see Heidegger's point and in a sense would endorse it. The various things that we take an interest in are not merely theoretical objects, but things that we interact with (and which interact with us).
There is that temptation to consider any description of an object and to feel that there is more to be said, as if something had escaped us. I think we've agreed on that.

If the human perception of a house or a tree is forever haunted by some hidden surplus in the things that never become present, the same is true of the sheer causal interaction between rocks or raindrops.

I grant you that there is more to rocks and rain that their interaction; many other things can happen to both.

Coupling Heidegger's tool analysis with the phenomenological insights of Edmund Husserl, Harman introduces two types of objects: real objects and sensual objects. Real objects are objects that withdraw from all experience, whereas sensual objects are those that exist only in experience.

I'll set aside my objections to the use of "real" in the philosophical sense that treats is as a property like colour or shape. From my benighted point of view, the point of the senses is that they (mostly) inform us about real objects; positing sensual objects as an additional category of existence is precisely the key mistake of sense-datum theory.

It's not only not enlightening, it's not the same in kind, in my estimation, to that of a mental event. — schopenhauer1

You misunderstand me. Certainly a rainbow is not a mental event. My point is that the explanation of a rainbow "reduces" it, to use the jargon word, and so seems to assert that it does not exist. But the rainbow is not merely caused by, but is the refraction of light through drops of water. A physical, physiological, account of seeing the rainbow is not a normal causal account, where cause and effect are two distinct entities, but an analysis of what seeing the rainbow is.

But how does the observer itself emerge onto ITSELF? — schopenhauer1

This is just mystification. There is a theoretical construct which is implied in most pictures; it is known as the "point of view". In addition, we perceive ourselves as three-dimensional objects in the world, partly through various self-monitoring parts of our nervous system and partly from acting (and being acted upon) in the world.

Whenever XYZ is there, the mental property must be present. — schopenhauer1

I can accept that as a rough draft of the kind of thing we expect to find. But I'm sure it will be a lot more complicated than that.

that the circumstances are of greater importance than any “form of words”. — Antony Nickles

It seems to me that a form of words always suggests a context, no matter how tiny the thumbnail sketch. So philosophers who think they are just considering a form of words are mistaken. Context isn't everything, but it isn't an optional extra. (I get really annoyed about the examples one sees that are tiny thumbnails, which are treated as the whole story, when it is clear that a wider context would reveal complexities that are ignored.

But Austin is not championing the status quo, as if it was more entitled or that it naturally has more solidity. — Antony Nickles

I'm sorry. I don't see quite what you are getting at. The complaint that OLP is in some way inherently conservative ignores the fact that their project was a philosophical revolution, even if it was not a political or social revolution.

But Austin is not championing the status quo, as if it was more entitled or that it naturally has more solidity. We can unreasonably question another, but in doing so we put ourselves out (too familiar perhaps), or put them out (opening ourselves to calls of libel). In any case, we subject ourselves to judgment, and it is that responsibility Austin wants to be certain we understand. — Antony Nickles

Given the accusation of a conservatism so strong that it refused to engage at all with politics, this is a point that it might be worth following up on.

A sympathetic question - can this stance be justified from the text?

And more generally - how might Austin answer the question of relevance here:

Especially the last few seconds.

Ah, I see you had much the same thought.

:rofl: :rofl: :rofl:

Wow, that somehow encapsulates how I picture it in my head. Great sketch! Pedantic. Stuffy. Self-important. Self-referential. Greatest hits!

It doesn't matter. Think of the loonies and colossi of affectation he savaged, so politely. Well, fairly politely. — Ciceronianus

You still don't get it.