Not at all. There are now in your world, some things you can doubt and some things that it is silly to doubt. I'll count that as progress. — Banno

I see now that you are not interested in having a discussion as you have nothing to contribute yourself besides pretending to be smarter than you really are on an anonymous forum.

So now the question arrises, what to doubt and what to believe? — Banno

I would suggest reading a few philosophy books if you want to come up with philosophical views of your own. I already have mine, I am just not here to discuss them. If the existence of the outside world is such a silly question, write your thesis on how Descartes or Hume were big idiots and you got it figured out and send it to Harvard for your automatic doctor degree.

Ah. You are new.

Have a look at Austin: Sense and Sensibilia and When Does Philosophy Become Affectation?

Cheers.

Isnt it precisely the intention to objectivity that lends itself
to skepticism? Since Descartes the modern formulation of the subject-object relation depends on a gap that courts doubt. — Joshs

That would be the case if we talked about truth as correspondence. But for me, correspondence and adequatio are forms of thought by which it becomes frustrated, leading it to skepticism. And yet I claim a meaning of "objectivity" that is discovered by the impossibility of closure of the subject in the monad. This impossibility is what grounds the theoretical activity of the subject and forces him to be oriented to an other (which is also the world), including himself as another in the case of self-knowledge.

The skepticism that questions the "external" world (as if we were not already world) would be, in a certain sense, the closure feigned by the subject in the absolutely immanent monad. A subject who believes he can distinguish himself absolutely from something else that he calls the "external world."

The two theories of truth: correspondence deals with sensations and coherence deals with abstractions. AKA the synthetic versus analytic divide. — PL Olcott

A splendid juxtaposition. Says much with few words.

Do you think a further distinction can be made between real and unreal abstractions? Would you agree, for example, that arithmetical primitives, such as the natural numbers, are abstractions, but that they are real, and that the same could be said of logical principles, such as the law of the excluded middle, and other abstracta. But that there are also abstractions that are unreal, meaning they don't refer to anything over and above the content of speech or thought - for example, fictional characters or imaginary numbers. I say this, because I resist the idea that abstractions are the constructions of the mind. Such things as logical and arithmetical proofs can only be grasped by the mind, but they are not therefore the products of the mind (or at least, of our minds) - they are not thoughts, but when they are perceived they appear as thoughts (to paraphrase Bertrand Russell).

Do you think a further distinction can be made between real and unreal abstractions? — Wayfarer

Coherent versus incoherent.

there are also abstractions that are unreal, meaning they don't refer to anything over and above the content of speech or thought - for example, fictional characters or imaginary numbers. — Wayfarer

Good example now I know exactly what you mean.

I resist the idea that abstractions are the constructions of the mind. — Wayfarer

The way that I address this is that the value of PI was entailed by the concept of round at least at the point in time that the first caveman looked up and saw a round full Moon.

I believe the first documented instance of Pi is from Babylonian sources, but never mind, the basic point stands.

↪PL Olcott I believe the first documented instance of Pi is from Babylonian sources, but never mind, the basic point stands. — Wayfarer

My example was to show that mathematical truths are discovered thus not created.

Yes, I got that, and I concur.

The point of Noumenon is very important to the use of the term ‘existing’. — I like sushi

Likewise. Your thread. Make your point.

Present what you mean by the terms you use. I can wait.

Until then bye bye :) — I like sushi

It was "you" who raised the question with the claim that the point of Noumenon is very important to the use of the term 'existing'. So I have a justified belief that you have the definition of Noumenon and the concept 'existing' in order for you to come to the conclusion / proposition you raised.

I can see what you mean roughly by your claim, but the claim has no premises, arguments or the points on why and how you came with such a claim. If you elaborate your claim with the missing elements and information, then I could come back with my ideas on the points.

I might start some discussion threads about some common misconceptions about his philosophy and psychology. — Vaskane

:up: :cool:

In fact this aphorism was in part how I knew English wasn't your primary language, which I commend you with great admiration that you're capable of diversifying your mind to the point it can pull from many different languages. It provides an interesting scope in perspective, a certain overcoming of objectivity in a sense. — Vaskane

Thanks :) I was reading Philosophy with German initially, but then I realised English is better language in that there are more translated and originally authored books in English in all subjects under the sun, than in any other language. Plus English is easier language to learn than German.

I am still wondering on the aphorism, whether it was "blind faith" or "it" is telling you that you are thinking. I am also not sure what "it" means. "It" usually denotes some object.

And yes, I think translation of any original text into another language will render loss of some original meaning inevitably. But then all reading is inevitably interpretation in some sense.

It seems like special pleading to believe in the existence of your brain but not in the existence of a cup that you cannot see. It is reasonable to believe in either the existence of both or the non-existence of both. So I think you need to either accept materialism or commit fully to idealism. — Michael

As promised I thought over your points on the belief in the existence of the brain compared to a cup.

Brain is a biological organ, just like the other organs the human body has. Its main function is not just having mental events, but keeping the body alive. Brain controls all the biological functions happening in the body. When it comes to mental events, all we know is that the relationship between the brain and mental events are causality. Nothing else.

If you look into the brain, then you won't see anything that resembles or makes sense about any mental events. Because it is just a lump of tissue, blood vessels and neural cells.
We have no idea why and how the brain works in terms of any mental events. But neurologists have mapped out which part of the brain is linked to what type of mental events. And the injuries or problems of certain parts of the brain cause certain types of problems in the mental events or operations.

Because of this fact, it would not be meaningful to say, because we believe in the existence without seeing it, that explains our belief in the existence of an unperceived object or world.

The belief in the existence of the brain is purely based on the educated information or guess.
But belief in the existence of unperceived objects is based on, according to Hume, our imagination and memory of the perception. They are totally different types of beliefs.

Depending on the situation, the belief in the existence of a cup or barbecue rack in the garden can change i.e. if you threw out the rusty barbecue rack in the garden in the bin, and saw the bin getting emptied into the collection truck, then you have a reason / ground to believe why the barbecue rack doesn't exist anymore in your garden.

But there is no way, reason or ground to believe that one's brain doesn't exist as long as the person is alive, and the belief is based on purely educational information.

This is the limitation of Materialism. They can tell us what mental events are caused by the brain activities, but that is all there is to it. Nothing more, nothing else. It is too obvious mental events are caused by the brain, because upon the removal of the brain, there are no mental events. On the injuries to certain parts of the brain, there are always certain types of mental events problems are noticed. Nothing more.

Idealists have their problems too. They are imprisoned in their own mental space locked up, and think that whatever is projected into the wall of the mind is the objects themselves or the content of the world. This view has its points too, but it falls into solipsism. There are definitely material objects out there, and the world exists separate from the mind. But to show that it is objective knowledge rather than dogmatism, we need more arguments, evidence and proofs.

The skepticism that questions the "external" world (as if we were not already world) would be, in a certain sense, the closure feigned by the subject in the absolutely immanent monad. A subject who believes he can distinguish himself absolutely from something else that he calls the "external world." — JuanZu

If we accept the definition that every knowledge is justified belief, then scepticism is a methodology to obtain the justifications. If one rejects scepticism, then one is rejecting the methodology for justification allowing possibility for mistaking groundless beliefs, superstitions and dogmas for knowledge.

Present what you mean by ‘world’ and ‘exist’ in some kind of context to your position/s.

Until then nothing I have said has any relevance because I have literally no idea what the OP is saying.

Last time I am asking.

Give an account of PRECISELY what you are asking for.

Doesn't it necessarily fall into the liar's paradox? Doubting the world would be like cutting the branch on which I am sitting, waiting for the tree to fall and not the branch. — JuanZu

Doubting is not thoughtless action. Doubting starts with observation and investigation, then reasoning, and then conclusion for either action or non-action.
If you have adopted a proper scepticism as your methodology for knowledge, you would have inspected the tree and turned away looking for a tree with the solid sound branches to sit on that needn't cut and is concrete enough to support your weight, before you climbed up onto the unstable tree, and sat on the rotten branch.

Present what you mean by ‘world’ and ‘exist’ in some kind of context to your position/s.

Until then nothing I have said has any relevance because I have literally no idea what the OP is saying.

Last time I am asking.

Give an account of PRECISELY what you are asking for. — I like sushi

So, it sounds like you have asked something that you have no idea what you were asking for.
If you read the OP, and some discussions in the thread, I would imagine that you would know what it is about.

I think I made it pretty clear what I was asking for.

The World meaning what?

‘Exist’ meaning what?

I don't think this is right: the statement is valid, but in that abstract generic form is not truth apt. — Janus

1. All As are Bs, all Bs are Cs, therefore all As are Cs
2. "All As are Bs, all Bs are Cs, therefore all As are Cs" is a valid argument

I'm not saying that (1) is objectively true; I'm saying that (2) is objectively true.

It is objectively true that (1) is valid, and this does not depend on the existence of an external world; it certainly does not depend on the existence of spacetime or any material object, and I would even say that it does not depend on the existence of any abstract object (à la Platonism).

Objective truths do not depend on the existence of anything (except in the obvious case of something like "X exists").

Empty intentions and such might be worth going into here maybe. Could help progress the discussion?

If we accept the definition that every knowledge is justified belief, then scepticism is a methodology to obtain the justifications. If one rejects scepticism, then one is rejecting the methodology for justification allowing possibility for mistaking groundless beliefs, superstitions and dogmas for knowledge. — Corvus

Well, what I say about the skeptical subject is said fortiori for what he thinks is his act of doubting. That is, I claim that skeptical doubt is already rooted in a decision or an assumption I.E. the clear distinction of the subject and the world. And in that case it would not be a coincidence that methodological skepticism finds its formulation from an "undoubted" subject (Descartes).

I think I made it pretty clear what I was asking for.

The World meaning what?

‘Exist’ meaning what? — I like sushi

I stated this in the previous messages to Mww, but will say again.  Kant says that the world is not a legitimate object of perception, because the totality of appearances in the world is incomprehensible by reason.  The world is a subject of cosmology, and he lists 4 antinomies regarding the world in CPR.

Due to this view, Kant believes that the proposition "The world exists." is a form of subreption caused by hypostatisation.

I claim that skeptical doubt is already rooted in a decision or an assumption I.E. the clear distinction of the subject and the world. — JuanZu

:ok:

The skepticism that questions the "external" world (as if we were not already world) would be, in a certain sense, the closure feigned by the subject in the absolutely immanent monad. A subject who believes he can distinguish himself absolutely from something else that he calls the "external world."… I claim a meaning of "objectivity" that is discovered by the impossibility of closure of the subject in the monad. This impossibility is what grounds the theoretical activity of the subject and forces him to be oriented to an other (which is also the world), including himself as another in the case of self-knowledge. — JuanZu

You apparently consider Kant to be a proponent of this latter kind of objectivity. But doesn’t Kant ‘s thinking, in its own way, lead to skepticism? Doesn’t he retain a gap between the thing in itself and our concepts?

If we are fully conscious and not under the influence of alcohol, drugs, etc., I cannot call an illusion my view of the world in that state. — Alkis Piskas

Could you tell us what is your criterion for being conscious and unconscious? What do you mean by you are conscious? and unconscious?

This is my reality. I live with it. (Well, most of the time.) Otherwise, we have to call everything that exists for us an illusion. — Alkis Piskas

Isn't the point of philosophy to get you out from the illusions by adopting and applying the rational sceptical methodology in perceiving truths?

This is basically true. But it's you who have insisted to go on! :smile:
And I don't complain. I enjoyed the trip. — Alkis Piskas

Thank you for your opinions and interactions. But our journey for the truths is never over. Because according to Heidegger, we are all "auf dem weg sein." - existence on the road.

Due to this view, Kant believes that the proposition "The world exists." is a form of subreption{1} caused by hypostatisation{2}. — Corvus

“…..I should have a reasonable hope of putting an end for ever to this sophistical mode of argumentation, by a strict definition of the conception of existence, did not my own experience teach me that the illusion{1} arising from our confounding a logical with a real predicate{2} (a predicate which aids in the determination of a thing) resists almost all the endeavours of explanation and illustration. A logical predicate may be what you please, even the subject may be predicated of itself; for logic pays no regard to the content of a judgement. But the determination of a conception is a predicate, which adds to and enlarges the conception. It must not, therefore, be contained in the conception….”

One man’s mental masturbations, re: Leibniz, et al, ca1712-14, is another’s epiphanic paradigm shift.

A logical predicate may be what you please, even the subject may be predicated of itself; for logic pays no regard to the content of a judgement. But the determination of a conception is a predicate, which adds to and enlarges the conception. It must not, therefore, be contained in the conception….” — Mww

But in that case, are you not committing yourself into the dark chamber of solipsism? If you say, the world is not an object, but a concept, and the predicate 'exist' is logical rather than real, then wouldn't Kant say you are an idealist with extreme solipsism? If the world is a concept, and it resides in your mind only, then it suddenly transforms into a mental dildo, rather than presenting into you from outside as a physical existence, where all the livings and objects co-exist struggling and enduring.

One man’s mental masturbations, re: Leibniz, et al, ca1712-14, is another’s epiphanic paradigm shift. — Mww

Didn't Kant revolt against the rationalist crowds such as Leibniz, Wolf, Spinoza opposing to their innate ideas only knowledge, trying to establish a new system of Metaphysics adopting Hume's empiricism thanking him for awakening Kant from dogmatic slumber?

are you not committing yourself into the dark chamber of solipsism? — Corvus

Of a sort, perhaps. On the other hand, if late-Enlightenment transcendental philosophy stands as a legitimate, albeit speculative methodological system, every human thinking subject/moral agent resides in the same chamber, which implies it is the default modus operandi of the human intellect in general, from which follows…..how dark can it be? Besides, given the overwhelming commonality in human thought that we’re all fundamentally the same between the ears gains credence. So if we all happen to be solipsists, big deal, right?

If you say, the world is not an object, but a concept, and the predicate 'exist' is logical rather than real, then wouldn't Kant say to you, that you are an idealist with extreme solipsism? — Corvus

Hell, that guy can say anything he wants about me. If he said that, I’d say, imitating my ol’ buddy Col Jessup….you damn right I am!!!!! Seriously though, I should hope he’d call me a transcendental idealist, insofar as I have not drank the real for merely logical predicate Kool-Aid.

Regarding solipsistic mentality though, it is foolish of me to deny to any cogent rationality a mind as functional as my own, just as it is foolish of that mind to think to know me as well as I know myself. It never should be a matter of capacity, which is granted, but of accessibility, which is denied.
————

The record shows Kant had high esteem for Wolff generally, but only for Leibniz or Spinoza in the pre-critical era, for both of whom he established refutations of, or in your words, revolted against, their respective primary theses in his critical era, the former in CPR, the latter in CpR and Lectures on Metaphysics.

Still, in order to relate how all that is the case, one would need an equal exposure to all those guys, which I don’t have. Secondary literature tells me so, is all I got, plus the few-and-far-between direct references in the relevant Kant texts.

Kant was apparently a proper Prussian gentlemen, in that he didn’t blast the guys he disagreed with, re: Schopenhaur regarding Hegelians, but made no bones about praising those with whom he did agree. It was left to the reader, intended to be an academic peer, to fathom who he was refuting by his arguments but without being always named.
————

Regarding “dogmatic slumbers”, care is advised in the subtlety of the expression, in light of this….

“…. This critical science is not opposed to the dogmatic procedure of reason in pure cognition; for pure cognition must always be dogmatic, that is, must rest on strict demonstration from sure principles à priori…”

….which implies it is his slumber that is being critiqued, not what quality of the slumber it has.

↪PL Olcott Yes, I got that, and I concur. — Wayfarer

This is by far the greatest philosophy group that I have ever been in.

I would like to see the logical and epistemic arguments laid out for the reason for believing in the existence of the world. — Corvus

I can now outline an answer to this.

I experience. ‘Objects’ of experience vary. When I am not experiencing any ‘object’ (ie. Unconscious and not dreaming) I do not seem to cease to exist as I am existing again upon waking.

If I am able to hold a belief in anything I necessarily must attach said belief to some form of existence. I cannot believe in something that I am unable to have any inkling of - such is beyond me (non-existent).

There is no ‘thing-in-itself’. Such is a limit of human understanding (the ONLY understanding we have or can ever have). The horizon is an ever shifting item that will forever remind us of our limitations.

In more day-to-day terms people do not question existence of most things because they are too busy interacting with said things.

In terms of knowledge, what is known remains known with set limits too. A clearly set out abstract realm possesses Truths but non-abstract (day-to-day things) are always subject to some level of scrutiny as our certainty within experience had limits.

I can question this or that World because I cannot hold it all at once. I can question gravity but in day-to-day life I simply pay it no direct attention, just like I pay no heed to my legs moving when I walk.

There are countless perspectives to look at. What remains pretty clear overall is that to ‘believe’ is the existing world is a rather bizarre way of putting things. The answer (just like the no one around to hear a tree question) depends on the approach and meaning of ‘hear’ within the context given. The ‘sound waves’ exist but with no ear to hear it can be argued that there is no sound quite reasonably. To extend this to the totality of existence just leads me to ask why anyone would bother to do so?

The task Kant set himself was to ask ‘What can we know before experience?’

As for Noumenon. It is pretty bloody obvious you know how this relates to ideas of existence so why are you asking me to explain?

We can talk of what we know not of what we do not.
We can never talk of what we can never know.

Those are not the same. The first does not say we cannot in the future. The second ‘points at’ (for want of some non-existent term) some inexplicable limitation that is not even possible to outline as a shadow on the wall.

The task Kant set himself was to ask ‘What can we know before experience? — I like sushi

Do you think he came to a reasonable conclusion on that? I'm not done with CPR - and it's so dense, i'm asking this question without a preconceived possible answer.