And again I will suggest that these are issues of convention, which have broad agreement across speakers of English, and so are not, as you suggested, subjective. — Banno

I don't understand how that description provides an escape from being subjective? Wide-spread acceptance of a custom doesn't make it an objective fact about the state of affairs underlying it, does it?

Or would this end up coming under the rubric I tacitly accepted, that if you're referencing 'objective' within a framework viz. 'given the custom' outline, calling the 'correct' piece of land London is then objectively true?

So here you claim that "'London' is what we call a certain bit of land which, via custom for certain purposes, has been called 'London'". and I'll reply "'That table' is what we call a certain bit of the room, which, via custom for certain purposes, has been called 'that table'". — Banno

I don't understand how thats analogous. London is consists in a piece of land. A table consists in a piece of wood (if it's wooden, lol). You can't have a wooden table made of glass.

What do you mean? I feel like you just sidestepped the questions I asked. It still stands: how do we "discover", "figure out", "decipher", etc. which moral propositions are true (under your view)? — Bob Ross

Ok. Have you been following the discussion here about direction of fit? If not, have a read of .

To "discover" something, it has to already be there to be uncovered. So the direction of fit for making a discovery is that one produces sentences that set out what it is that has been discovered.

But this is not what we do when we talk of ethics. We reverse the process, setting out how the world ought to be, then hopefully implementing our words.

You asked:

So, for your view, how do we discover the moral facts? — Bob Ross

We don't discover them.

...how do we evaluate which moral propositions are actually true? — Bob Ross

There can be no algorithmic process here, that sets out which moral propositions are true and which are not.

In our example, you are supposing that "London" refers only by some convention, and so is subjective; but that "that table" has something that makes it objective. — Banno

I genuinely cannot understand how you've concluded this.

I have, more than once, outlined the problem of a 'table' being an objective demarcation - and artificially took it for granted to make my point of distinction. It is a problem, but it's a problem at a higher level than the one we're dealing with.

Assuming we don't question the identity of a table, it being wood is objective. But i have elsewhere outright owned that if we don't make that assumption, it's a subjective statement. I just removed that grey area for discussion purposes.

I don't understand how that description provides an escape from being subjective? Wide-spread acceptance of a custom doesn't make it an objective fact about the state of affairs underlying it, does it? — AmadeusD

I don't want moral statements to "escape from being subjective", any more than I want them to escape from being green. I'm saying that the framing of the issue in terms of "objective" and "subjective" is misleading.

I was unable to follow you here. That we happen to use the phrase "that table" for that table is a question of convention, nothing to do with subjective or objective truth.

Let's reset that discussion. I have taken you to be arguing that the distinction between ethical and physical sentences is that ethical sentences are subjective and moral sentences are objective. I've been following up on that by trying to have you give a clear account of the difference between "subjective" and "objective". Your first try had "London is in England" as being subjective, while I argued that it's not subjective but conventional, and that hence you had not provided an adequate account of "subjective".

Ok. What is it that makes "This table is made of wood" an objective sentence?

I have taken you to be arguing that the distinction between ethical and physical sentences is that ethical sentences are subjective and moral sentences are objective — Banno

Not the case. I don't subscribe to any objective morals or ethics, currently. However, I am green to this type of 'proper' argumentation so please feel free where i made have made either technical or terminological mistakes that lead you to that conclusion..

I've been following up on that by trying to have you give a clear account of the difference between "subjective" and "objective" — Banno

My intention was never to give a distinct account of subjective vs objective, but to lay out why a custom is not objective unless you insert the condition that it's objective because of the custom and not because of any mind-independent state of affairs. To this end, i don't think i've at all missed the mark - but i take and accept your point here in that it's a pretty imprecise discussion of subjective vs objective. I was attempting discount the objective, not place it squarely within the subjective. Though, that does seem to necesasrily follow.

Ok. What is it that makes "This table is made of wood" an objective sentence? — Banno

It isn't one, unless you accept that the object is actually a table. But both the object being a table, and being made of wood are liable to this discussion. I concede the 'table' element is not at all objective unless referring to custom (as noted above wrt London).

Edit: Sorry, to make this clearer - I am taking as inarguable that London, whether it is objectively London, is actually a plot of land. Which sort of reverses the analogy you're making - The 'table' whether or not it is a table in actuality, is made of wood.

I take the 'land' and 'wood' as objective facts about the two objects, but their naming as non-necessary and a mere custom.

Not the case. — AmadeusD

Oh, my bad. That should have read "physical", not "moral".

My intention was never to give a distinct account of subjective vs objective — AmadeusD

I know. But I'm attempting to have you do so, so as to show that the distinction cannot be made do the work you set for it.

I concede the 'table' element is not at all objective... — AmadeusD

Ok, why is "This is a table" not objective? Seems to me that its being a table is at least as clear as its being made of wood.

Ok, why is "This is a table" not objective? Seems to me that its being a table is at least as clear as its being made of wood. — Banno

Thank you; good question.

To my mind, that fact of any object being 'wood' is a fact about the object's constitution, not it's identity.
The object would be 'wood' (a symbol for a mind-independent fact about the arrangement of molecules which requires no perception to be extant). A 'table' is a concept of perception, rather than discovery. We can discover 'other things' to also be wood, but we run into the same obstacle defining any object as a 'table'. 'wood', in any usage, is still wood. A table may not be, if used for a distinctly 'other' purpose (e.g as a pedastal)

I may be ignoring a botanist's objection that the definition of Wood is murky (i don't know that it is, though). I understand it to be a discovered arrangement of molecules, universally discernable. And could be wrong on that - if I am, then I concede the entire thought.

To my mind, that fact of any object being 'wood' is a fact about the object's constitution, not it's identity. — AmadeusD

Ok, so your argument is that facts about an objects constitution are objective, but facts about an object's identity are subjective? And further we "discover" what things are constituted of, but we "perceive" their identity?

Ok, so your argument is that facts about an objects constitution are objective, but facts about an object's identity are subjective? And further we "discover" what things are constituted of, but we "perceive" their identity? — Banno

I would say this is true for objects which are customary, rather than symbolic (i.e 'table' is customary, 'tree' is symbolic)

Ok. Have you been following the discussion here about direction of fit? If not, have a read of
↪Moliere

I have not: thank you for the link!

To "discover" something, it has to already be there to be uncovered. So the direction of fit for making a discovery is that one produces sentences that set out what it is that has been discovered.

But this is not what we do when we talk of ethics. We reverse the process, setting out how the world ought to be, then hopefully implementing our words.

You asked:
So, for your view, how do we discover the moral facts? — Bob Ross
We don't discover them.
...how do we evaluate which moral propositions are actually true? — Bob Ross
There can be no algorithmic process here, that sets out which moral propositions are true and which are not.

I see. So, under your view, how do we know we are actually abiding by the moral facts then? Intuition? What vessel do we use to prescribe moral facts as opposed to non-facts?

My take on the post by @Moliere that you referenced was that the moral facts would be an ‘is’ that is an ‘ought’: they would be mind-independently existing prescriptions. It seems like you both disagree with that, and are in favor of some sort of neo-Humian Guillotine.

I would say this is true for objects which are customary, rather than symbolic (i.e 'table' is customary, 'tree' is symbolic) — AmadeusD

How are we to tell which is which, in new cases?

For example, the tree fern in the front yard... customary or symbolic? Note that it's a Dicksonia antarctica, and so not a tree; isn't not counting it as a tree a matter of convention?

I wasn't playing devil's advocate. I was just saying that religion is the only legit moral realism. I think what you're saying is that religion doesn't provide for moral realism either. My point was that it does if it's your worldview.

Interesting, I would say various religious views contain within them moral realist positions (not in the sense that I agree with them but rather that they purport to lay claim to moral facts); but there are non-theistic views (albeit probably still religious) which equally purport such claims and (I would say) with equal (if not more) plausibility.

A moral anti-realist says Neanderthals aren't evil. Let's see if we can understand why they became cannibals. Was it climate change? Was it encroachment by those Homo Sapiens? What happened? And this is the grand payoff for moral anti-realism. It gives you space to understand. Moral realism gives you no such space. Understanding is the beginning of mercy and compassion, both of which are anathema to moral realism.

I disagree. Both anti-realists and realists can attempt to understand why they became cannibals, and a moral anti-realist can condemn them as evil (if they want).

isn't not counting it as a tree a matter of convention? — Banno

Not my mind, but I recognize the difficulty in clearly delineating and may well end up conceding, so take the following as my muddling through intuition...
The symbolism "tree" or "plant" are customary as English-speakers have agreed to use them to refer, but they refer to an object, without custom, that has necessarily limited distribution. Here, an idealist would say i'm already off. But i take objects to actually exist.

A 'table' is merely a concept of mentation, attached, by custom, to objects with various and ill-defined forms and uses. The fact of their constitution (wood, glass, resin(that one's murky) etc..) aren't liable to the same murkiness and so whether we think your object is a tree or plant can be, definitively, shown to be true or false with reference to the actual circumstances of its constitution.

If there is a definition of 'fern' then using that term can be 'correct', if used in conjunction with an object which in fact, is, those things whcih constitute the meaning of fern. We could have used any other word, but it would refer to the same set of mind-independent properties contained in the currently symbol of 'fern'. Equally with tree. (again, a botanists correction notwithstanding).

but there are non-theistic views (albeit probably still religious) which equally purport such claims and (I would say) with equal (if not more) plausibility. — Bob Ross

Like what?

I disagree. Both anti-realists and realists can attempt to understand why they became cannibals, and a moral anti-realist can condemn them as evil (if they want). — Bob Ross

Imagine there's a spectrum. On one end is the extreme moral realist view. On the other is the extreme anti-realist. Most of us swing between the two. When we want to understand the criminal, we put aside judgment in order to see the facts. When judgment is important, we become blind to circumstances that formed the sinner and we just condemn.

If you look closely at anyone who strongly believes in moral realism, you'll find a bit of a misanthropist. They're stuck on the realism side because their psyche is full of hatred and condemnation. The compulsion to condemn is so strong that they can't tolerate any notion of relativity. Or so it seems to me. :razz:

Like what?

Ethical intuitionism & neo-platonism.

If you look closely at anyone who strongly believes in moral realism, you'll find a bit of a misanthropist. They're stuck on the realism side because their psyche is full of hatred and condemnation. The compulsion to condemn is so strong that they can't tolerate any notion of relativity. Or so it seems to me. :razz:

Interesting. I could see saying moral realists tend to be quicker to judge, but I think this may becoming a bit of an ad hominem on moral realists out there...

Interesting. I could see saying moral realists tend to be quicker to judge, but I think this may becoming a bit of an ad hominem on moral realists out there... — Bob Ross

Fwiw, i felt the same - though, the underlying idea is probably close to my experience.

@Banno @Moliere

Moliere's exposition of directional fitness has got me thinking. Perhaps there is an argument to be formulated in favor of moral anti-realism (or a hybrid kind of view) here:

P1: How the world is does not entail how the world should be.
P2: States-of-affairs are about how the world is.
P3: Normative judgments are about how the world should be.
P4: Moral judgments are normative judgments.
C1: Therefore, states-of-affairs do not entail any moral judgments.

P5: Moral facts are states-of-affairs.
P6: States-of-affairs do not entail any moral judgments [C1].
C2: Therefore, moral facts do not entail any moral judgments.

I think, Banno, you will have to reject P5. But if this argument holds, then we get a weird severing between the moral facts and the moral judgments we make, such that we cannot infer how to morally judge from whatever moral facts are presented to us. Let me know what you think.

P5: Moral facts are states-of-affairs. — Bob Ross

Arent facts derived from states of affairs, rather than consist in them?

Ethical intuitionism & neo-platonism. — Bob Ross

How would an ethical intuitionist say moral truths exist? I'm somewhat familiar with Neoplatonism. Christianity absorbed it.

...how do we know we are actually abiding by the moral facts then? — Bob Ross

One has to come to terms with how different, and how similar, moral statements are from physical statements.

Analytic considerations, as I hope is clear from my part in this discussion, are not about what one ought to do in particular cases, but about the plumbing behind such considerations. we've I hope made some progress, in working out that there can be moral truths, and that one way to differentiate ethical statements is by their direction of fit.

It would be a surprise if analytic considerations, or philosophical considerations generally, could tell us which statements about the physical world are true and which false. To do that one has to go out and engage with the world to make observations and talk to others about their observations and so on. By having a conversation. It's also a commonplace in the sciences to suppose that the statements we say are "true" are true only tentatively, open to revision.

We might not expect analytic considerations to tell us which ethical statements are true and which false. We might expect that we work out which ethical statements are tire and which false again by engaging with the world, talking to others, by having a conversation. But in place of the word-to-world observations, we need a world-to-word direction of fit; that is, ethics is about doing things, about actions.

Speaking roughly, perhaps we (in the plural, not "I") make ethical statements true by our enacting them. Not by making them the case, but by intending them to be the case and acting to that end. And again, what we consider to be true might well be revised on further consideration.

So if what folk are after is a list of eternal moral verities, then I can't help them. but further, such a list would be mistaking "ought" for the "is" of the list.

No grand moral programs; just a path.

And again, what we consider to be true might well be revised on further consideration. — Banno

For clarity, I reject the suggestion in your post.

But im very interested in what could constitute a reason to revise a moral 'fact'?

The symbolism "tree" or "plant" are customary as English-speakers have agreed to use them to refer, but they refer to an object, without custom, that has necessarily limited distribution. — AmadeusD

yet

A 'table' is merely a concept of mentation, attached, by custom, to objects with various and ill-defined forms and uses. — AmadeusD

There's nothing here that helps us see a difference. One might as well claim:

The symbolism table is customary as English-speakers have agreed to use it to refer, but they refer to an object, without custom, that has necessarily limited distribution

and

A 'tree' is merely a concept of mentation, attached, by custom, to objects with various and ill-defined forms and uses

Is this supposedly the justification...?

The fact of their constitution (wood, glass, resin(that one's murky) etc..) aren't liable to the same murkiness and so whether we think your object is a tree or plant can be, definitively, shown to be true or false with reference to the actual circumstances of its constitution. — AmadeusD

The Dicksonia example shows the murkiness is right there - it's a tree but not a tree. What counts as a tree is an issue of convention.

You've rejected P5 at P2. The two are inconsistent. You've defined states of affairs as having a word-to-world direction of fit, and hence as not including moral statements.

There's more than one way to use (the word "fact"), sometimes folk use it to refer to any truth, sometimes, and especially sometimes when doing philosophy, only to those truths that have a direction of fit of word-to-world; the speaker is attempting to match there words to the way things are.

Having two differing senses is fine, provided they are used consistently.

What would be an error, and I think we can see this in the OP, would be to mix the two uses and think one had found an argument. To say that "facts" are only sentences about the material world, and that only facts are true, and therefore only sentences about the material world are true. — Banno

The Dicksonia example shows the murkiness is right there - it's a tree but not a tree. What counts as a tree is an issue of convention. — Banno

Your response seems to boil down to this - some labels are ill-defined. If the scientific fact is that tree is ill-defined, then yes, sure. That doesn't affect my distinction. It just means the distinction can't apply here. We can change the word, but not what it refers to, in a lot of cases. Water is a great one.

I would it looks like you're trying to defeat a rule by bringing up examples to which the 'rule' just wouldn't apply. It wouldn't apply to something artificially demarcated ( the plot of land called London) named by convention (the act of calling that plot of land London). For clarity, th 'rule' i refer to is the criteria of being objective.

Something to which we refer, without any grey area (water), by convention, can be objective, despite the use of the word 'water' being arbitrary. The object is the thing 'water' refers to, without ambiguity, whether you call it fire, paper, water, hogwash, bone or anything else.

Without the convention of London as to a border within what is called England, it ceases to be, in any sense other than imagination. The piece of land exists, but the restriction of it being 'London' vanishes immediately the convention isn't in play.
The Mines of Moria do not actually exist, as written in Tolkien, but we could refer to any plot of land as 'The Mines of Moria'. Would convention somehow bring them into existence, in that case? Or would we be merely enacting a naming, without having any effect on the object?

Which is, essentially, the point i made. Name is a convention - WHAT is being named, can either be convention (London) or not (wood). If we have to conclude that the mere use of language is what sets something upon the subjective pedestal, i just can't buy into that and need to do more work to enunciate why.

Your response seems to boil down to this - some labels are ill-defined. — AmadeusD

I've lost you somewhere.

It's nothing to do with ill-defined definitions. It was about attempting to get a clear notion of what your word "subjective" was doing. The discussion got lost along the way.

I'll take some solace from the fact that you are talking in terms of conventions, and maybe leave it there.

That is true, P5 should have been "Moral facts are about states-of-affairs".

Ethical intuitionism is a form of moral non-naturalism, and says that we intuit the moral facts. Its main argument for moral realism is that:

1. One ought to trust their intuitions (intellectual seemings) unless there are good reasons to doubt them (phenomenal conservatism).

2. It intellectually seems as though there are moral facts and there are no good reasons to doubt those intuitions.

3. Therefore, there are moral facts.

I just disagree with the second part of #2. But this view is compatible with platonism: we intuit the moral facts which are platonic forms.

It would be a surprise if analytic considerations, or philosophical considerations generally, could tell us which statements about the physical world are true and which false
…
No grand moral programs; just a path.

I see. The problem is that I don’t see you actually describing, even in principle, where or what the moral facts subsist in—so how do you even know they exist nor how to come to know them? Nothing you said actually explains how you can discern a moral fact from a taste. Performing an ‘ethical’ action presupposes that you know it is ethical—but I am failing to see how you would know this in your view. It seems like moral facts are sui generis under your view, perhaps like in moral non-naturalism, and I just fail to see how you would ever know them.

Simply asked, how do you discern that what you are doing is actually moral as opposed to a strongly held taste that you have?

Fair enough. Within your view, please define 'fact'. For me, it definitely is a 'statement which refers to a stance-independently existing thing'. What world-to-word fit-style definition do you have for fact?

But this view is compatible with platonism: we intuit the moral facts which are platonic forms. — Bob Ross

I think with most Neoplatonism, the divine intellect (of which the human intellect is supposed to be a reflection) is associated with goodness. Evil is just separation or distance from the Nous, sinking into matter. Goodness and truth are essentially the same thing, with evil being a kind of illusion. So you're right that in Neoplatonism one intuits the Good by virtue of the intellect.

But morality is often defined as some sort of code of behavior. It's rules. The Christian take on Neoplatonism isn't about rules. It's about love. "Love and do what you will" as Augustine said.