How do you know this? — baker

I actually rephrased my claim to say "there is an objective, mind-independent, non-physical fact-of-the-matter."

Whether or not it’s persuasive is a separate matter. Flat Earthers often aren’t persuaded.

I’m only trying to explain moral realism, not argue that it’s correct. — Michael

Oh. Well... I think I understand the explanation of moral realism you've supplied. I can understand that it can be defended, which is why I noted I'm not going for necessity. That's too high a bar, and it's not even interesting to the problem that I see because maybe we could, at some point, find agreement on intractable questions in which case my entire argument would evaporate.

"London" is a subjective term? — Banno

It's subjective in the sense that it's people who are talking about its existence.

Objectivists and moral realists talk as if it's not they, persons, who talk, but that when they open their mouths, The Absolute, Objective Truth comes out.

If your conclusion is that London does not exist, it seems you have gone amiss somewhere in your argument.

Folk hereabouts seem to confuse "subjective" and "conventional".

If you accept moral realism, it's not because of any argument. It's just built in to your assumptions about the world. There is no good argument for moral realism. That there are moral truths does not show moral realism. — frank

In fact, "having reasons of justifications for accepting moral realism" would undermine the whole project.

But I think it's possible to pose as a moral realist. Perhaps most people who appear to be moral realists are in fact posing as such.

The question was:

why "subjective"? What does that word add? — Banno

The first answer:

It strikes me that the claim could not be made, but for a subject perceiving it's value. — AmadeusD

London does't work.

Let's try "The table is made of wood". It strikes me that the claim "The table is made of wood" could not be made, but for a subject perceiving it's value.

So is "The table is made of wood" subjective?

In trying to relate the logical, propositional view with a psychological perspective, I start from the thought that ‘ought’ and ‘should’ arise where there is an indeterminate situation, with at least two outcomes being possible. In science, when we say a certain outcome ought to ensue, we mean that it is statistically likely given our knowledge of the facts involved. When we say a moral outcome ought to ensue, we dont mean one outcome is more likely than the alternatives, but that we prefer one outcome over the others. Where things get tricky from a psychological perspective is when we compare the grounds for our moral preference with the grounds for considering one empirical outcome more likely than another. Even if we believe that moral preferences can be justified on the basis of something more than whim, the social realities we might argue bind our moral preferences ( people shouldn’t happily torture dogs) would seem to be a different category than the empirical realities binding our scientific oughts. But is this distinction justified? If we say the direction of fit for empirical oughts is from the word to the world, aren’t we forgetting that the world we are relying on is already defined on the basis of the social reality of a discursive paradigmatic scheme? So it seems in both the case of the empirical ‘is’ and the moral ‘ought’ , we are relying on a grounding in a social reality that is itself the product of a pragmatic, contingent coordination of values. — Joshs

That's interesting.

I'm with you that we rely upon the social, and that we're embedded in a world with others. But is the social a product, when considered ethically? I think a product is a relation between entities and how they interact, a kind of description of process from one entity to another. Descriptively our empirical "is" and our moral "ought" come from the same space -- and this would be true if we emphasize the social in our description of a psychology or some kind of description of its structure -- but does this explain why we differ in our judgments on particular ethical problems that seem intractable and without answer? Is it simply that we are part of a different tribe which presently enacting values at odds?

That would seem to follow along with there not exactly being an answer here as much as a preference, no? It's like the values we're coordinating with others are the basis upon which we can make a distinction between empirical 'is' and moral 'ought', but does that recognition give us an entry into understanding a path out of seemingly intractable ethical problems?

In the sense I'm ascertaining, there's a stark difference.

In this second case, I would say yes. 'wood' is merely a symbol for a state of affairs (that being liganous plant matter existing). The table part, could certainly be considered subjective - but that's a known issue (what makes a table, such as it is?). So, the statement (taking the identity of a table for granted) is objectively true.

But i say that London is not in the same category as Wood. 'London' doesn't represent the 'state of affairs' of 'land on the Earth'. It represents teh subjective demarcation of certain of that land, as liable to come under the label London due only to custom.

Palestine comes to mind as a better example ;)

I'm not coming to that conclusion at all.

London exists as an abstract concept applied by custom to a plot of land. For someone to know London is where it is (by custom) they have to have that explained. Geopolitically, its objectively real.

But geopolitics are just persistent opinions of the majority.

In this second case, I would say yes. 'wood' is merely a symbol for a state of affairs (that being liganous plant matter existing). The table part, could certainly be considered subjective - but that's a known issue (what makes a table, such as it is?). So, the statement (taking the identity of a table for granted) is objectively true. — AmadeusD

You are saying "yes", it is subjective, then concluding that it is objectively true? I don't follow this at all.

It represents teh subjective demarcation of certain of that land, — AmadeusD

But isn't the table also a subjective demarcation?

Wood exists as an abstract concept applied by custom to certain materials. Chemistry is just persistent opinions of the majority.

So again, what does "subjective" add to "I don't understand this to be a 'feature' of anything, but a subjective judgement"?

I agree that semantics are not that important; but when discussing metaethics, isn't it at least useful to use the standard terminology?

...standard... — Bob Ross

Often the conversation degenerates into arguments about the "true" nature of this or that "ism". Better to keep to the basics. So in this thread, the interesting bit is not who is or is not an antirealist, but whether there are moral truths.

You are saying "yes", it is subjective, then concluding that it is objectively true? I don't follow this at all. — Banno

Sorry, hasty response there. Objectively true. I thought i had delineated between 'table' which would be subjective in some sense, with 'table made of wood'. If we accept a table as-is, then the statement is objectively true. Sorry for the confusion.

But isn't the table also a subjective demarcation? — Banno

Yes. I went over this in that same passage, but i understand the confusion given the above.

The table part, could certainly be considered subjective - but that's a known issue (what makes a table, such as it is?). So, the statement (taking the identity of a table for granted) is objectively true. — AmadeusD

I agree that 'table' is a subjective demarcation of an object (wood, or the tree from which that wood came). But the statement "The table is made of wood", accepting of what a table actually is, can be considered objectively true. It's not a perception that it's made of wood - it's a perception that it's a table. I had entered that claim on the premise that we're not questioning what a table is. If we're still questioning what a table actually is, then it's still subjective. I just purposefully removed that to get at the heart of the question (to my mind) whicih was the difference between 'wood' and 'London'. London is analogous to table. Both merely custom in practice. Wood is what it is - and that can be boiled down to atoms, quarks etc... But the high-level organisation of those things into a ligand-heavy plant matter is wood.

So again, what does "subjective" add to "I don't understand this to be a 'feature' of anything, but a subjective judgement"? — Banno

I guess having reference to the above, i would just repeat my answer with the addition of 'judgement' being ipso facto subjective - apologies for being imprecise. The word 'subjective' itself, adds nothing, but highlights that aspect of a judgement. So I'd probably roll back a claim that using that word has much value.

The time honored perspective is that we know there are moral facts because of God, and they exist in God's nature, and we discover them in the Bible. I don't think there is any other commonly accepted framework for moral facts.

Let me give you my concerns with this kind of Abrahamic-Theistic moral realist view and let me know what you think.

Firstly, if the moral facts are in and of God’s nature, then God didn’t create them. If God didn’t create them, then there is something which is greater than God—which defies the standard Leibnizian definition of God being that which there is no greater being. Perhaps, to be fair, by “no greater being”, we are strictly talking about persons—but then, even in the case Christianity (and the like) are false then the greatest person is now (by definition) God. Irregardless, it seems (to me) to undermine God’s existence.

Secondly, if the moral facts are in and of God’s nature, then that warrants a (conceptual) exposition of (1) how they exist and (2) what they exactly are. To say “the moral facts are derived from God’s nature” just doesn’t cut it for me: how do I know those normative facts are morally signified? Is there a normative fact that one can derive subject-referencing norms from God’s nature? It seems, when one is faced with actually giving an explanation (of those moral facts in God’s nature), that they warrant an existence of their own...such as Platonic Forms.

Thirdly, I don’t believe that the Bible, if granted as true, gives us any insight into how those alleged ‘moral’ facts that exist in God’s nature: it just describes various derived ‘moral’ facts which are predicated with “God’s nature is such that He is omnibenevolent”.

I think that rejecting the above is to reject moral facts.

Interesting. Honestly, I find ethical intuitionism much more plausible than the Biblical moral realist account.

London is analogous to table. — AmadeusD

Why is London analogous to table, but wood isn't? London is also what it is - and that can also be boiled down to atoms, quarks etc... And the high-level organisation of those things is London.

Just repeating, my purpose here is to put the doubt to there being a decisive separation between "objective" and "subjective".

And the reason for doing so is to show that the difference between scientific and ethical statements is not that the one is objective, the other subjective.

it's about what one is doing with each - direction of fit.

In addition, it remains open as to whether we ought follow god's will.

Why ought we do as god says?

One cannot avoid having to make choices.

If, theoretically, there were facts embedded into God's will such that "one ought not torture puppies for fun", then it would be a moral fact and meet your criteria (as a moral realist)(I think) as well...but I just don't see how that actually is the case. Appealing to God just seems like opening up a vacuous concept where one can just throw in "all-good-willed" to justify 'moral facticity', but what makes God all good willed? Some platonic forms?

Yes, god explains everything: God did it. Hence god explains nothing.

If, theoretically, there were facts embedded into God's will such that "one ought not torture puppies for fun", then it would be a moral fact and meet your criteria — Bob Ross

This is where I disagree with Abraham. I don't see that "god wills it" is the same as "It is good" or "one ought do it".

:up:

So, for your view, how do we discover the moral facts? I understand you are a moral cognitivist...but how do we evaluate which moral propositions are actually true? Are moral properties reducible to natural properties in your view? Are they platonic forms? Something else?

...discover... — Bob Ross

That presumes a word-to-world direction of fit.

Why is London analogous to table, but wood isn't? London is also what it is - and that can also be boiled down to atoms, quarks etc... And the high-level organisation of those things is London. — Banno

Perhaps i'm not seeing what you are.. But this seems a bit askance from what i said

London is a piece of naming, not a piece of land. As is table viz. Table is what we call certain bits of wood, used via custom for certain purposes. While there isn't an exact analogy, London is what we call a certain bit of land which, via custom for certain purposes, has been called London.
It's not an exact analogy, granted, but I can't see any connection at all between London and wood as opposed to London and table. The '..is in England' bit just runs into the same problem of England being merely a name for a certain bit of a land which, by custom, we've agreed to call England - within which sits a smaller plot of land *insert above take on London here*. Is that a bit clearer?

And the reason for doing so is to show that the difference between scientific and ethical statements is not that the one is objective, the other subjective. — Banno

I assume on this front you accept there are no 'facts of the matter' beyond impression?

Firstly, if the moral facts are in and of God’s nature, then God didn’t create them.If God didn’t create them, then there is something which is greater than God—which defies the standard Leibnizian definition of God being that which there is no greater being. Perhaps, to be fair, by “no greater being”, we are strictly talking about persons—but then, even in the case Christianity (and the like) are false then the greatest person is now (by definition) God. Irregardless, it seems (to me) to undermine God’s existence. — Bob Ross

Is there an argument for the bolded part? It sounds like you're saying that part of God is greater than God. That doesn't make much sense.

Secondly, if the moral facts are in and of God’s nature, then that warrants a (conceptual) exposition of (1) how they exist and (2) what they exactly are. To say “the moral facts are derived from God’s nature” just doesn’t cut it for me: how do I know those normative facts are morally signified? Is there a normative fact that one can derive subject-referencing norms from God’s nature? It seems, when one is faced with actually giving an explanation (of those moral facts in God’s nature), that they warrant an existence of their own...such as Platonic Forms. — Bob Ross

The idea is that moral facts exist as an aspect of God. This isn't an argument, by the way. It's a worldview. God is a hinge proposition. If you reject it, you reject moral realism.

hirdly, I don’t believe that the Bible, if granted as true, gives us any insight into how those alleged ‘moral’ facts that exist in God’s nature: it just describes various derived ‘moral’ facts which are predicated with “God’s nature is such that He is omnibenevolent”. — Bob Ross

Christianity uses the Bible as a touchstone. It's a living religion, so it doesn't reduce to scripture. It's made of history, the human psyche, and the lives of millions of people for the last 1800 years.

Interesting. Honestly, I find ethical intuitionism much more plausible than the Biblical moral realist account. — Bob Ross

Are you saying that ethical intuitionism is moral realism?

It's subjective in the sense that it's people who are talking about its existence. — baker

I think it goes further. It's subjective in the sense that it is an artificial label upon something that has no conformity to the label other than in the mind of a subject who has accepted the command to apply the label to that plot of land.

What do you mean? I feel like you just sidestepped the questions I asked. It still stands: how do we "discover", "figure out", "decipher", etc. which moral propositions are true (under your view)?

Is there an argument for the bolded part? It sounds like you're saying that part of God is greater than God. That doesn't make much sense

Not an argument per se, but here’s my reasoning. Let’s do it by analogy.

The feeling of hunger is a biological manifestation of my obligation (biologically) to eat food. This obligation exists within my body independently of my desires (as a subject: a mind): I cannot will that feeling of hunger away. This obligation would be ‘greater’, more fundamental ontologically, than me (as a subject): it governs me, not the other way around.

So it is with God and morality if the moral facts are ingrained in God’s nature: God doesn’t choose them, create them, and they dictate him—not the other way around. No matter what God thinks (assuming God could make an error for the sake of making this point), it is wrong to torture babies for fun because it is objectively wrong—and it just so happens that God’s nature is constrained by the moral facts in a way that he wills only what it good. The moral facts would be more fundamentally ontologically than God, because they dictate and govern God, not vice-versa.

The idea is that moral facts exist as an aspect of God. This isn't an argument, by the way. It's a worldview

This is the problem for me: it does not help me when the answer to my questions I gave are roughly “moral facts just exist as an aspect of God”. This is the typical response I get, and it answers none of my questions. I am questioning whether they are moral facts (as opposed to merely normative facts), whether they are binding for us (or do they just reference God), and how they exist in God’s nature (e.g., are they ‘biological’?)

Saying ‘it just is in God’s Nature’ just restates what I was questioning in the first place.

Christianity uses the Bible as a touchstone. It's a living religion, so it doesn't reduce to scripture. It's made of history, the human psyche, and the lives of millions of people for the last 1800 years.

My point is that no where does the Bible actually explain how moral facts exist in God’s nature nor that which one’s do nor their nature.

Are you saying that ethical intuitionism is moral realism?

No. Ethical intuitionism is a form of moral realism, just like your theological view. They both affirm the existence of moral facts, and I was just saying that I find it more plausible than theological views that ground the moral facts in God (whether that be His nature or His will—or both).

Perhaps you believe that only theism has the right metaphysical view to allow for moral facts, but I don’t see why that would be the case at all. An obvious contender is platonism and neo-platonist views (like atheistic platonism).

Ethical intuitionism is a form of moral realism, just like your theological view. — Bob Ross

I'm a moral nihilist. I think moral realism is an aspect of our cultural heritage, specifically religion.

Oh I see...just playing devil's advocate, eh? What did you think of my responses?

Oh I see...just playing devil's advocate, eh? What did you think of my responses? — Bob Ross

I wasn't playing devil's advocate. I was just saying that religion is the only legit moral realism. I think what you're saying is that religion doesn't provide for moral realism either. My point was that it does if it's your worldview.

For example, say we discover that Neanderthals did a fair amount of cannibalism (which they did). A moral realist will say this was immoral and our cousins should be condemned. Damn the Neanderthals for eating babies. It's in the nature of the universe that it was wrong and they should have known better. In fact, they would have known better if they had accepted Jesus as their lord and savior.

A moral anti-realist says Neanderthals aren't evil. Let's see if we can understand why they became cannibals. Was it climate change? Was it encroachment by those Homo Sapiens? What happened? And this is the grand payoff for moral anti-realism. It gives you space to understand. Moral realism gives you no such space. Understanding is the beginning of mercy and compassion, both of which are anathema to moral realism.

London is a piece of naming, not a piece of land. As is table viz. Table is what we call certain bits of wood, used via custom for certain purposes. — AmadeusD

Just to be sure, the concern here is not "table", the type, but "That table", with the definite pronoun. It's an individual table.

What I want to show is that the conventional nature of much of our language is much broader than might casually be thought. In our example, you are supposing that "London" refers only by some convention, and so is subjective; but that "that table" has something that makes it objective. My strategy is to take each definition you give of the difference between the two, and swap tham to show that the difference does not hold.

So here you claim that "'London' is what we call a certain bit of land which, via custom for certain purposes, has been called 'London'". and I'll reply "'That table' is what we call a certain bit of the room, which, via custom for certain purposes, has been called 'that table'".

And again I will suggest that these are issues of convention, which have broad agreement across speakers of English, and so are not, as you suggested, subjective.

and again, the point here is to have you question whether the distinction between "subjective" and "objective" works in the way you suppose; providing a clear segregation of the ethical from the physical.

And again, the alternative on offer is the notion of direction of fit.
______________

I assume on this front you accept there are no 'facts of the matter' beyond impression? — AmadeusD

If you flick back through my comments in this thread, I hope it will be clear that I've argued for there being true "ought" statements, and that I would count these as "facts of the matter".

It's subjective in the sense that it's people who are talking about its existence. — baker

So what is there that is the opposite of "subjective", if we take this as a definition? What could be objective? Because there is nothing we could list here that is not by the very fact that we list it being talked about by people. And that would make everything subjective.

Can you give a better explanation of the distinction between subjective and objective?