So we could, following this idea, quantify either over the universe of space/time objects, or over a different set, in this case the set of statements, or facts. — J
I think the example often given of this (I’m taking it from Copi & Gould’s Readings on Logic) is: “Sentences having ‛ghosts’ as a subject-term are not really about ghosts . . . but about some people’s statements about ghosts, or perhaps certain ideas about ghosts.” — J
This implies, even if it is conceded that normative facts exist, that what informs the individual of ‘what they ought to do’ is a taste: not a normative fact. — Bob Ross
P2 is "P2: T is a normative fact.". That is, "T is true adn T is normative". To be a fact is just to be true. And to be true is just to be a fact.Okay, but this would be an implication of the assertion of P2 — Leontiskos
S1: Walking the dog is a normative fact.
S2: All normative facts are volitional.
S3: Therefore, walking the dog is volitional.
H1: One ought to walk their dog.
H2: Fred is Hanover's dog.
H3: Therefore, Hanover ought to walk Fred. — Leontiskos
I'm repeating myself, but I don't see how what you have set out addresses what I have set out. — Banno
I don't think I addressed Sirius...? — Banno
My concern is simply that folk accept that there are moral truths. — Banno
The proposition “there is a normative fact such that ‘one actually ought not harm another’” does not entail, if true, that “one actually ought not harm another” — Bob Ross
Why is it wrong to do that? — bert1
Nor does the idea have any credibility. "One ought not kick puppies for fun" is true; the remainder of your post shows that you agree that it is true. You sensibly wish ethics to work in a way quite different to science, but throw out the babe.
Indeed, adopting the proposal that ethical statements are not truth-apt is a way not of highlighting ethics but of reducing it so it may be thrown out of consideration. If ethical propositions are not truth apt, they cannot take a place in logic, and hence are outside of rational consideration.
So, please, reconsider. — Banno
where does that leave moral realism, then? As opposed to normative realism? — Bob Ross
Okay, that is somewhat helpful, but the other problem is that you don't seem to present any arguments for your position in the OP. Your whole thesis rests on a single sentence:
I think that Hume’s Guillotine can be deployed to validly extinguish the existence of moral facticity, if ‘moral’ language signifies ‘what one ought to be doing’, since in any event of reasoning about ‘what one ought to do’ it is going to be grounded in non-facts.
No matter what prescription is being utilized, even if it is a normative fact or not, it will eventually take the form of the following (no matter how many syllogisms it takes to get there):
P1: [normative non-fact]
P2: [non-normative fact]
C: [target normative statement {or some other normative fact/non-fact that derives the target}]
As a quick short-circuited example, let’s say that the target normative statement, T, is a normative fact, then one would have to argue something which will bottom-out at:
P1: One ought to abide by the normative facts.
P2: T is a normative fact.
C: T
This implies, even if it is conceded that normative facts exist, that what informs the individual of ‘what they ought to do’ is a taste
“One objectively, mind independently, ought not murder” is true because one objectively, mind independently, ought not murder.
To say of some normative statement, that it is true, is itself to make a normative statement, isn't it? — Banno
Oh, OK, so you meant that "T is a normative fact" is a non-normative fact. — J
P1: If Hume’s Guillotine is true, then ‘what one ought to do’ is determined by a set of non-factual prescriptions.
P2: Hume’s Guillotine is true.
C1: Therefore, ‘what one ought to do’ is determined by a set of non-factual prescriptions.
P3: ‘What one ought to do’ is the subject matter of morality.
P4: ‘what one ought to do’ is determined by a set of non-factual prescriptions.
C2: Therefore, morality is determined by a set of non-factual prescriptions. — Bob Ross
I think I see what you mean: technically, I did not provide an argument for my conclusion (in a valid syllogistic form) but, rather, just explained it in english. So I amended my OP with the full argument at the bottom. Please let me know which premise you disagree with. — Bob Ross
What part of this did Nietzsche not understand? Was J. L. Mackie unfamiliar with the linguistic practices of his community? — J
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