So we could, following this idea, quantify either over the universe of space/time objects, or over a different set, in this case the set of statements, or facts. — J

I was considering this possibility as well, but I decided not to run with it. I tend to think there is something subtly mistaken about it, but I cannot put my finger on it.

I think the example often given of this (I’m taking it from Copi & Gould’s Readings on Logic) is: “Sentences having ‛ghosts’ as a subject-term are not really about ghosts . . . but about some people’s statements about ghosts, or perhaps certain ideas about ghosts.” — J

I think this is also slightly off, but working from the idea:

G1: Anyone who sees a ghost gets an eerie feeling.
G2: Those who experience an eerie feeling often get goosebumps.
G3: Therefore, those who see a ghost often get goosebumps.

The point here is that the syllogism works whether or not we put "ghost" in scare quotes and make it overtly perceptual. That is, one will agree with the syllogism whether or not they believe ghosts exist. Technically we might say that G is overdetermined, and works whether we are talking about objective states of affairs or subjective statements. It seems to me that is much the point: prescinding from one or more implications in favor of a different implication. "But I don't think ghosts exist," isn't necessarily a legitimate objection to G.

For <me> such an ambiguity could be resolved not only by further specifying the terms, but alternatively by understanding the syllogism's conclusion and form. As I said earlier, one could leverage a normative claim in a non-normative manner.

But it is worth noting that Banno's objection to the OP is definitive insofar as the OP was not trading in any of these more complicated things we are now discussing.

Okay, that is somewhat helpful, but the other problem is that you don't seem to present any arguments for your position in the OP. Your whole thesis rests on a single sentence:

This implies, even if it is conceded that normative facts exist, that what informs the individual of ‘what they ought to do’ is a taste: not a normative fact. — Bob Ross

This is really just an assertion. Else, what rule of inference are you using to arrive at this conclusion? What in the OP supports such a conclusion? The word "taste" appears exactly once in your OP, and this in itself is evidence that your conclusion is not the result of an argument.

Okay, but this would be an implication of the assertion of P2 — Leontiskos

P2 is "P2: T is a normative fact.". That is, "T is true adn T is normative". To be a fact is just to be true. And to be true is just to be a fact.

S1: Walking the dog is a normative fact.
vs.
H1: One ought to walk their dog.

IF S1 were "walking the dog is a normative sentence", then their truth value might differ. S1 would not then be a normative truth. "Walking the dog is a normative sentence" does not imply "One ought to walk their dog"

But saying it is a fact is saying that it is true. Hence "Walking the dog is a normative fact" implies "Walking the dog is a normative truth" and implies "One ought to walk their dog".

I'm repeating myself, but I don't see how what you have set out addresses what I have set out.

I'm repeating myself, but I don't see how what you have set out addresses what I have set out. — Banno

Let me clarify the post you were responding to. Consider the original proposition and two inferences:

• P2: T is a normative fact.
• I1: T is factual.*
• I2: T is normative.

Now we agree that P2 implies both I1 and I2 when considered in itself. But with reference to <my previous post>, H involves both I1 and I2, whereas S really involves only I2. S2 and S3 depend not on the facticity of S1, but rather on the normativity of S1. This is why I said in another post that one is "prescinding from one or more implications in favor of a different implication" (). Again, the key is that, "S1 differs from H1 vis-à-vis normativity, and this is seen by looking to the conclusions..." ().

Similarly, we could have a premise, "Lightning McQueen is a red car." The predicate of course involves two notions (red+car). An argument could utilize this premise on the basis of both notions simultaneously, but it could also leverage only a single notion in a way that prescinds, partially or wholly, from the other one. <Lightning McQueen is a red car; Red cars look like apples; Therefore Lightning McQueen looks like an apple>. Even though all red cars are cars, this syllogism has very little to do with cars per se. Presumably it has more to do with redness than carness, and the second premise could have equally been, "Red things look like apples" (or, "Red things that are rounded and shiny look like apples").

Just because something is a fact or a car does not mean that every piece of reasoning about that thing must be based on its facticity or carness. Bringing this back to the original question, the same applies to normativity. Something which is normative can be thought and reasoned about in non-normative ways (e.g. even though S1 implies H1, H1 is at best accidental to the conclusion S3).

* Note that I do not accept the idea that 'truth' and 'fact' are exact synonyms. The word 'fact' has a long and interesting history, but it has never been simply equated with 'truth', or 'individual truth'. Nevertheless, I am going to ignore this tangent for the moment.

I’m no closer to following you.

What is it you are arguing for?


Edit. Or perhaps I might ask if and how you suppose the op argument works? Because it doesn’t seem to do anything. I’m not even sure it is well formed.

Is that because you do not think that a fact is typically defined as a statement that can be proven to be true or false based on evidence or reality?

Yours is an eccentric use of the word, and you should know that perfectly well...

You know the meaning the term "moral fact" conveys but undermined that meaning by how you've understood the term. By your understanding, a moral fact is nothing more than a moral statement one agrees with. That's quite misleading and deceptive.

:lol:


Can you provide an example of a truth that is not a fact?


Or perhaps a fact that is not true?

It is a true statement that one ought not kick puppies for fun — Banno

Why is it wrong to do that?

That's funny. Are you really saying "lmao your dumb" on a philosophy forum?

To be true is a prerequisite for being a fact.

Statements that are true but not facts:
"Coffee is delicious, and a great way to start the day"
"Cockroaches are disgusting and terrifying"
"Germany is a wonderful country to visit"
"I tried shopping at a market near me, but everything was overpriced"

Examples of true statements that aren't facts are statements that have truth conditions that depend on the personal circumstances of the speaker. Whether something is "disgusting" or "terrifying" differs by person, so a statement with such words won't be referred to as a fact, generally speaking.

I don't think I addressed Sirius...? — Banno

Yeah, sorry, got mixed up with another discussion. I meant Bob Ross.

My concern is simply that folk accept that there are moral truths. — Banno

That's fine, but there can be a big difference between the various ways that such truths are understood. Consider mathematics; both mathematical realists and mathematical ant-realists believe that there are mathematical truths, but there is a distinction between the Platonism of mathematical realism and the formalism of mathematical anti-realism. Or consider an example from the SEP article: there is a distinction between a diamond being made of carbon and a diamond being worth £1,000.

The question many want an answer to is if moral truths are comparable to Platonism/a diamond being made of carbon (realism), or to formalism/a diamond being worth £1,000 (anti-realism).

The proposition “there is a normative fact such that ‘one actually ought not harm another’” does not entail, if true, that “one actually ought not harm another” — Bob Ross

I'm not stating the former proposition; I'm stating the latter.

One actually, absolutely, really, categorically, objectively, super duper, ought not harm another.

Why is it wrong to do that? — bert1

Why are electrons negatively charged?

I don't think there's a meaningful answer to the question. Some things are simply fundamental, brute facts about the world. Explanations have to come to an end somewhere.

Better questions are: "how do you know that it's wrong?" or "how can one verify that it's wrong?".

Nor does the idea have any credibility. "One ought not kick puppies for fun" is true; the remainder of your post shows that you agree that it is true. You sensibly wish ethics to work in a way quite different to science, but throw out the babe.

Indeed, adopting the proposal that ethical statements are not truth-apt is a way not of highlighting ethics but of reducing it so it may be thrown out of consideration. If ethical propositions are not truth apt, they cannot take a place in logic, and hence are outside of rational consideration.

So, please, reconsider. — Banno

Would that I could! These are genuine doubts on my part, though. I'd say that it's error theory which demonstrates how ethical propositions can be truth-apt, but false. So they can take on logical forms but they cannot form sound inferences. My thought is that if this were not so there'd be a way we could demonstrate moral truths -- but instead it seems to me that we're stuck with simply asserting them. This reminds me of declarations of faith in Christ more than it reminds me of logical inference.

But I'm not willing to let go of the importance of ethics -- in fact I think it's central. So a lot of my thinking in this area has been to attempt to understand how it is ethics is important, how it's still part of a rational inquiry, and yet does not rely upon truth -- or at least, if it does, attempting to understand the manner in which it does.

Further I think that by relying upon moral facts, in particular -- maybe truths is better -- we run the risk of scientism. Another part of my motivation is my doubt that a science of ethics is possible, and I think that talking of moral facts gives more credence to the idea of a science of ethics than it should.

I don't know what the philosophers are doing.
— Inyenzi

Trying to make sense of and justify the many things we simply take for granted. — Michael

:up:

:cool:

Perhaps another way of looking at it --

Sentences are not the bearers of moral worth. Actions are. Whether the sentence is true or false isn't important -- what we do is what's important, and actions are not truth-apt because they are not propositions.

If error theory is correct then moral language is a kind of important fiction. And I note faith because I'm wondering if it's similar to the important fiction, for some, of the belief in God. Isn't moral worth a common point for people who believe in God? Then in what way is our moral deliberations different?

It's important to me that they are different if we want to claim that they are real, because I'm an atheist. I simply cannot believe there is a God in the world I live in.

So I'm happy to entertain the notion of a non-scientific moral realism. But then I want to know what that theory is such that we're not just asserting our convictions.

where does that leave moral realism, then? As opposed to normative realism? — Bob Ross

Dunno, don’t care. I don’t bother with -isms or -ists that confound more than confine. Dunno how to answer where is moral realism left when there’s no non-arbitrary meaning for what moral realism is, insofar as there is no irreducible consensus for what either moral, or real, is.

The ask in the OP was for thoughts; I gave mine, and admittedly, they will have very little in conjunction with the rest of the commentary.

Okay, that is somewhat helpful, but the other problem is that you don't seem to present any arguments for your position in the OP. Your whole thesis rests on a single sentence:

I think this is an unfair and uncharitable interpretation of the OP: I clearly outlined how I think Hume’s Guillotine, if true, provides us sufficient reasons to believe that there are no moral facts.

I said:

I think that Hume’s Guillotine can be deployed to validly extinguish the existence of moral facticity, if ‘moral’ language signifies ‘what one ought to be doing’, since in any event of reasoning about ‘what one ought to do’ it is going to be grounded in non-facts.

And:

No matter what prescription is being utilized, even if it is a normative fact or not, it will eventually take the form of the following (no matter how many syllogisms it takes to get there):

P1: [normative non-fact]
P2: [non-normative fact]
C: [target normative statement {or some other normative fact/non-fact that derives the target}]

As a quick short-circuited example, let’s say that the target normative statement, T, is a normative fact, then one would have to argue something which will bottom-out at:

P1: One ought to abide by the normative facts.
P2: T is a normative fact.
C: T

From the above, it follows that what is grounding what one ought to be doing is (ultimately) derived from a prescriptive non-fact (which is just what I was referring to by a taste):

This implies, even if it is conceded that normative facts exist, that what informs the individual of ‘what they ought to do’ is a taste

If we can only validly justify any given prescription, fact or not, that we confirm as true with a (ultimately) a non-fact, then what is truly informing us what we ought to do is that non-fact (or set of non-facts).

If you want a syllogism, then I could put it this way:

P1: If Hume’s Guillotine is true, then ‘what one ought to do’ is determined by a set of non-factual prescriptions.

P2: Hume’s Guillotine is true.

C1: Therefore, ‘what one ought to do’ is determined by a set of non-factual prescriptions.

P3: ‘What one ought to do’ is the subject matter of morality.

P4: ‘what one ought to do’ is determined by a set of non-factual prescriptions.

C2: Therefore, morality is determined by a set of non-factual prescriptions.

And, the same line of thinking, can result in morality being simply non-factual prescriptions.

Please put it in a syllogism so that I can see where you are coming from. Saying "One ought not harm another" truthity could be subjective or objective: I need to know your line of reasoning in valid logical form. I think it is going to bottom out at a morally non-factual prescription: one cannot validly infer from a description that there is this normative fact that you ought to abide by it--and I think this is the crux, that has to be true, for your argument to work.

I’m not offering a syllogism. I’m using something like Tarski’s T schema.

“Electrons objectively, mind independently, are negatively charged particles” is true because electrons objectively, mind independently, are negatively charged particles.

“One objectively, mind independently, ought not murder” is true because one objectively, mind independently, ought not murder.

I think I see what you mean: technically, I did not provide an argument for my conclusion (in a valid syllogistic form) but, rather, just explained it in english. So I amended my OP with the full argument at the bottom. Please let me know which premise you disagree with.

If you can't provide a syllogism, then how am I to know you have a logically valid argument? Honestly, I don't think you do: you are going from 'this statement is true because it corresponds properly to reality', therefore 'I ought not do whatever is in that statement'--which isn't logically valid.

E.g.,:

“One objectively, mind independently, ought not murder” is true because one objectively, mind independently, ought not murder.

If I parse this into a valid deductive argument, I get:

P1: ???
P2: “One objectively, mind independently, ought not murder” is true because one objectively, mind independently, ought not murder.
C: Therefore, one ought not murder.

The prescription C does not follow from the description P2.

I’m not trying to prove that one ought not harm another. I’m trying to make sense of moral realism. Moral realists claim that there is something like an objective, mind-independent fact that one ought not harm another, and that because of this fact the proposition “one ought not harm another” is true.

To say of some normative statement, that it is true, is itself to make a normative statement, isn't it? — Banno

Glad my post was helpful. Yes, I think you’re on the right track, and let me say again that I am not Prof. Logic and can easily get muddled up myself.

The two ranges of possible variables aren’t mutually exclusive in any deep sense. We just have to specify them. I think there used to be an idea of a “universal class” which was supposed to mean “everything,” but that’s no help. We need to know, in any given formula, what the existential quantifier is quantifying over. (I’m going to use capital E rather than the reversed E cos it’s easier.) ‛Ex’ is paraphrased as ‛There exists an x such that . . .” or words to that effect. But absent an agreement on what “existence” is going to cover, we’re left with all sorts of ambiguities and puzzles. Quine said, famously, “To be is to be the value of a bound variable.” This way of stating it shows, I think, that what counts as “being” or “existing,” for logical purposes, is up to us. There’s no prior, obvious, “right” definition of what “exist” means – and that’s certainly been historically true in philosophy.

And yes, valid propositions can be constructed using either or both of the suggested quantifier ranges – you can say true things about both states of affairs and statements.

Now here is where you’re off track a bit: You say, “ ‛T is a normative fact’ is not itself referencing a statement – it is, rather, referencing a fact.” But the viewpoint I’m advocating makes a sharp distinction between “facts” and “states of affairs.” The rain outside isn’t a fact, it’s a state of affairs. The proposition “It is raining”, if true, is a fact. (See Wittgenstein: “The world is the sum of facts, not of things.” I think this is wrong – and so did he, eventually – but he’s using the distinction in the same way.) So, when you reference a statement, you’re also referencing a (potential) fact, but not a state of affairs. And this is exactly where we’ve all been debating. Let’s substitute “true statement” for “fact.” We get ‛T is a normative true statement’, and what we want to know is whether asserting this is equivalent to asserting the truth of T.

If we’re allowed to use statements as bound variables – that is, if Ex can quantify over “facts” and “statements”, not just “objects” or “states of affairs” -- then it looks like we can quote the statement without committing ourselves to its truth, or even to whether it’s true-or-false. But if only states of affairs can count as existing, then we have to make what is (to me) an awkward translation – and the exact way to do this is, again, what we’re kicking around. Should we say ‛(Ex) n(x)’, with ‛n’ meaning normative? But if x can’t be a statement or a fact, how do we translate this? What would it mean for a state of affairs to be normative? What are we predicating normativity of?

Lastly, yes, the “refurbishment” you suggest makes the question even sharper – but of course it firmly commits us to quantifying over statements.

Where I would like some help is in understanding whether Banno's objection, quoted above, must be correct. Are we making a normative statement in the sense that we're talking about truth, or in the sense that we're talking about whatever the normative behavior is? Does it require both truth and normativity to create a normative statement? Have I even made a meaningful distinction? I think so, but . . . see above re my logical competence.

Just a general comment on where this argument has gone. Clearly, there’s a strong sense on the part of many of us that a statement like “You shouldn’t kick puppies for fun” or “Torturing children is wrong” qualify as moral facts. Moreover, many of us also seem to believe that what makes these statements facts, as opposed to beliefs or preferences or yada yada, is some built-in obviousness, whether resulting from a personal moral intuition or a pragmatic/OL view that we clearly know how to use these sentences and there hasn’t been any problem until the philosophers came strutting in, so . . . no problem.

Either way, on this view, trying to demonstrate a moral fact, or prove its existence, would be bootless. We don’t need arguments, we need . . . what to call it? A certain kind of hermeneutics, I guess, that includes a built-in interpretation. You either see it or you don’t. So if this is right, it’s very confusing why radical skepticism about morality could continue, among brilliant thinkers. What part of this did Nietzsche not understand? Was J. L. Mackie unfamiliar with the linguistic practices of his community?

I’ll stop there, and only add: I don’t believe there are definitive answers to be found on this question within philosophy, but we have to keep asking. May I quote T. Nagel, one of my faves? “[Problems like this] are probably not soluble, but they are irresistible, and the attempt to solve them has yielded over the history of the subject, and continues to yield, brilliant and fascinating philosophical responses and theories, all of which have something wrong with them.”

I'm basically arguing for 's claim. I don't think it has anything to do with the OP (). Again, I think your arguments against the OP are sound. What I am doing here is tangential. All of the interesting parts of this thread are tangential.

Oh, OK, so you meant that "T is a normative fact" is a non-normative fact. — J

...Or to be a bit more precise, I would say that we can reasonably speak about normative realities in non-normative ways.

P1: If Hume’s Guillotine is true, then ‘what one ought to do’ is determined by a set of non-factual prescriptions.

P2: Hume’s Guillotine is true.

C1: Therefore, ‘what one ought to do’ is determined by a set of non-factual prescriptions.

P3: ‘What one ought to do’ is the subject matter of morality.

P4: ‘what one ought to do’ is determined by a set of non-factual prescriptions.

C2: Therefore, morality is determined by a set of non-factual prescriptions. — Bob Ross

So this could have been summed up by, "I agree with Hume." Yet the forum is filled with critiques of Hume. I thought you were attempting to go beyond Hume in one way or another.

I think I see what you mean: technically, I did not provide an argument for my conclusion (in a valid syllogistic form) but, rather, just explained it in english. So I amended my OP with the full argument at the bottom. Please let me know which premise you disagree with. — Bob Ross

Okay, thanks. That is clear enough.

As I said in my first reply to you, you are begging the question. P2-A is the contentious premise, and it receives no defense/justification. You responded to me by setting out an interpretation of what a fact is. Now what you need to do is use that interpretation to flesh out an actual argument in favor of P2-A. Only once you do that will moral realists have something to interact with.

Edit: This seems to be your argument in a simplified form:

1. Anything which depends on non-facts is a matter of taste.
2. Moral claims depend on non-facts.
3. Therefore, moral claims are a matter of taste.

(2) needs to be defended by something more than a mere appeal to Hume.

- This is interesting but I sort of feel like it deserves its own thread. I mean, age-old questions at least deserve their own thread. :razz:

What part of this did Nietzsche not understand? Was J. L. Mackie unfamiliar with the linguistic practices of his community? — J

:D

It's kind of funny to me because my interpretation of N is in conflict with Mackie. But they are also a bit disparate, in terms of time and place, so it's more notional. I'd say that N is the uber-anti-nihilist rather than a nihilist. The way I read him is as a heroic attempt to overcome nihilism in light of the death of God.

If not an entire garment! Yes, enough of meta-ethics for now.

Ah - I see someone else did comment on the question begging.

Played swapsies. No point in being at the bottom when you can be at the top.