Well OLP is not a movement, nor a belief-system, it’s a method, but Austin is not abandoning either truth, as I discuss here nor is OLP giving up on the essence of things, as I argued in the last paragraph here. — Antony Nickles

The following is my understanding, but am ready to be persuaded otherwise.

Is Austin really an OLP?

I see a bent stick and know that my perception could have been caused by either i) seeing a bent stick or ii) seeing a straight stick in water. I see an ellipse and know that my perception could have been caused by either i) seeing an ellipse head on or ii) seeing a circle at an angle.

The Merriam Webster dictionary definition of the word "see" includes i) to perceive by the eye and ii) to imagine the possibility.

Ayer, as an Indirect Realist, is using the word "see" in both ways. He is seeing as in perceiving by the eye a bent stick and is also seeing as in imagining the possible cause as either i) a straight stick in water or ii) a bent stick.

In Ayer's terms, seeing as in perceiving by the eye an effect can be called sense-data and seeing as in imagining the possibility can be called the material object.

But Austin in Sense and Sensibilia is saying that Ayer is wrong, in that we don't see sense-data but do see the material object.

My only conclusion from this is that Austin is saying that using the word "see" as to perceive by the eye is invalid and using the word "see" to imagine the possibility is valid. But this position is against the meaning of the word "see" as set out in the Merriam Webster dictionary as ordinarily used by competent speakers of the language .

As OLP is the position that philosophy should be carried out using words as ordinarily used by competent speakers of the language, and Austin appears not to be following the tenets of OLP, as shown by the Merriam Webster Dictionary example, this suggests that in fact he cannot be described as an OLP.

I'm sorry to have missed this fascinating discussion. There's this thing called ordinary life. Very intrusive, not to say annoying.

The symmetry is broken; and with it the two language theory. — Banno

Yes. But there's an additional step, which I think is the killer move. It occurs in the discussion of Warnock - XI pp. 141,142. "Warnock's picture of the situation gets it upside-down as well as distorted. His statements of 'immediate perception', so far from being that from which we advance to more ordinary statements, are actually arrived at, and are so arrived at in his own account, by retreating from more ordinary statements, by progressive hedging. (There's a tiger-there seems to be a tiger-it seems to me that there's a tiger-it seems to me now that there's a tiger-it seems to me now as if there were a tiger.) It seems extraordinarily perverse to represent as that on which ordinary statements are based a form of words which, starting from and moreover incorporating an ordinary statement, qualifies and hedges it in various ways. You've got to get something on your plate before you can start messing it around. It is not, as Warnock's language suggests, that we can stop hedging if there is a good case for coming right out with it; the fact is that we don't begin to hedge unless there is some special reason for doing so, something a bit strange and off-colour about the particular situation."

The two "languages" are not equal. One is "derived" from the other, as Ayer supposes. But object-language is not derived from sense-data language. It's the other way round. (I'm hedging about "entailment", of course.)

There is also a puzzle about exactly what Ayer means by saying that objects are constructions. What are they constructed out of? Experiences? Patches of colour? Actually, I'm pretty sure he means "logical constructions", but that needs a good deal of explaining, and certainly doesn't include any non-verbal reality.

They are interested in the specific and particular case "do I directly see sense-data or do I directly see an object". — RussellA

... and the point about that particular case is that no clear meaning has been assigned to "direct". One might well reply that I see both directly, or that directly has different meanings in the application to objects and to sense-data. If I see sense-data directly, I see objects indirectly. If I see objects directly, I don't see sense-data at all. So the question can only be answered if I have already made up my mind about the answer.

Well OLP is not a movement, nor a belief-system, it’s a method, but Austin is not abandoning either truth, as I discuss here nor is OLP giving up on the essence of things, as I argued in the last paragraph here. — Antony Nickles

I'm beginning to think that "ordinary language philosophy" is a misnomer. It's a lot closer to philosophy than it seems to be if one reads the programmatic description. Perhaps the project would be better understood if one talked about "natural language". Logicians seem to have a generally accepted concept, which seems at least close to ordinary language.

True. The concept of "reality" is manufactured within language. — RussellA

Quite so. That's why careful attention to language is so important. But there is a very tricky problem attached to that. Language - at least ordinary language - clearly "points to" a non-verbal reality, and Austin himself uses the phrase at least once in these lectures. But if we try to understand that non-verbal reality we find ourselves unable to do so. Hence much philosophy and many doctrines. None of which succeed. I don't have a solution, but wouldn't it be reasonable to explore ordinary language carefully to understand what this "pointing to" amounts to? It doesn't seem reasonable to attach a label ("metaphysics") to this phenomenon of ordinary language and then use it as if we understood the phenomenon, thought that's exactly what happens all too often.

The particular method used to obtain an object will pre-determine any object discovered — RussellA

Quite so. So Ayer's method pre-determines what he will discover. Stalemate. What next?

You could urge us to accept both Austin and Ayer, but that's a position that needs some explanation. Few people think that they do not disagree, and most think that both cannot be right including the two participants.

Actually, I think you over-state the case. It would be more accurate to say that the particular method applied will pre-determine what kind of object can be discovered. A microscope will discover many things, but never a star. For that, of course, you need a telescope, which will never discover a bacterium. And you need a different kind of instrument to measure volts and amps.

and the point about that particular case is that no clear meaning has been assigned to "direct". — Ludwig V

Though the Merriam Webster dictionary does narrow down the definition of "direct" when used as an adverb to:
a) from point to point without deviation, by the shortest way - flew direct to Miami
b) from the source without interruption or diversion - the writer must take his material direct from life
c) without an intervening agency - buy direct from the manufacturer

When I look into the night sky and see the planet Mars, I am able to see Mars because of the photons of light entering my eye. These photons had previously travelled the 380m km through empty space after leaving the planet.

So when I say "I directly see Mars", as there is no information within these photons that their source was Mars, I am using the word "directly" in a figurative rather than literal sense.
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But if we try to understand that non-verbal reality we find ourselves unable to do so. — Ludwig V

Until whilst walking through a town someone driving in a car runs over my foot.
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A microscope will discover many things, but never a star. — Ludwig V

Yes, stalemate. Ayer's method pre-determines what he will discover and Austin's method pre-determines what he will discover.

This is perhaps why on the Forum for a Thread to come to an agreed conclusion is probably as rare as hen's teeth.

As Austin wrote:
In these lectures I am going to discuss some current doctrines (perhaps, by now, not so current as they once were) about sense-perception. We shall not, I fear, get so far as to decide about the truth or falsity of these doctrines; but in fact that is a question that really can't be decided, since it turns out that they all bite off more than they can chew.

Perhaps the moral is that one doctrine cannot criticise another doctrine based on its own particular foundational beliefs.

As the sense-data theory cannot show that OLP is invalid, OLP cannot show that the sense-data theory is invalid.

I'm beginning to think that "ordinary language philosophy" is a misnomer. It's a lot closer to philosophy than it seems to be if one reads the programmatic description. Perhaps the project would be better understood if one talked about "natural language". Logicians seem to have a generally accepted concept, which seems at least close to ordinary language. — Ludwig V

It absolutely is not named by them. It isn’t about language (although Wittgenstein looks at “meaning” as an example to investigate); it’s getting at the criteria and mechanics of, here, seeing (“perceiving”), by looking at examples of what we say (judge, identify, imply, expect, etc.) in particular situations. Some of these are fantasies (with Wittgenstein). Again, it isn’t an argument to say we should use ordinary language, nor is it trying to be “normative” about how we practice seeing; even dry old Austin is inevitably making claims about truth, metaphysics, etc. I did try to explain it here though it’s almost like you have to read the whole huge conversations, as I get something’s wrong and misstated at least initially.

As the sense-data theory cannot show that OLP is invalid, OLP cannot show that the sense-data theory is invalid. — RussellA

Quite so. Perhaps this is where philosophy should begin. But it never does.

Until whilst walking through a town someone driving in a car runs over my foot. — RussellA

It depends what you mean by "understand".

So when I say "I directly see Mars", as there is no information within these photons that their source was Mars, I am using the word "directly" in a figurative rather than literal sense. — RussellA

So far as I know, no-one suggests that photons are the sense-data for the eyes. That would be an entirely different matter. For example, it would be very strange to say that what we see is photons.

c) without an intervening agency - buy direct from the manufacturer — RussellA

Yes. Now we need to work out what it means to buy something indirectly. If one buys from a shop, does one buy indirectly from the manufacturer? If so, I'm not sure that one can buy directly from anyone else. A nice puzzle.

So how does this work in the case of "directly see the car that ran over my foot"?

I don't deny that there's an issue about understanding modern research into vision. If one models the brain as a computer, one would have to classify something as data and something else as output. Both are tricky, but "experiences", "sense-data", "ideas", "impressions", "qualia" are not helpful concepts; they are simply waving one's arms about and worrying (or purporting to worry) about the "hard problem"; but this is simply defining the problem as insoluble, which may be a satisfactory outcome, depending on the point of view you started from. (See my first comment in this post.)

The Merriam Webster dictionary definition of the word "see" includes i) to perceive by the eye and ii) to imagine the possibility. — RussellA

OLP is not about definitions. In trying to understand seeing (“perceiving”) the method is to find examples of the kinds of things we would say in a particular situation.

But we must look, of course, for the minuter differences; and here we must look again at some more examples, asking ourselves in just what circumstances we would say which, and why.
Consider, then: (1) He looks guilty. (2) He appears guilty. (3) He seems guilty. — Austin, p. 36

The point is to draw out from there the implications, expectations, and how we judge, how mistakes are made, distinctions drawn, corrections, i.e., how seeing works. This isn’t an argument that we should use language a certain way, or for one type of language (“ordinary”) against another.

As OLP is the position that philosophy should be carried out using words as ordinarily used by competent speakers of the language, — RussellA

So it’s not that philosophy should “use” ordinary usage. It looks at ordinary usages in individual cases to inform philosophical claims because what we are interested in about a subject, it’s essence, is reflected in how we judge it, which is captured in the kinds of things we say about it in particular cases.

But Austin in Sense and Sensibilia is saying that Ayer is wrong, in that we don't see sense-data but do see the material object. — RussellA

Austin is specifically not claiming we see directly or indirectly (bottom of p. 3), but that the whole thing is made up, including the picture of “material objects”, metaphysics’ “reality”, etc.

I followed your link. That will take some digesting. But I will read it.

it’s almost like you have to read the whole thing, — Antony Nickles

I assume you mean the whole of the book. I'm afraid I have indeed read lecture XI and couldn't wait to share what I think is a jewel.

But it isn’t about language — Antony Nickles

I had taken a rather different direction, thinking about the "ordinary" in philosophy. Descartes starts his meditation from ordinary life. Perhaps that's just a pedagogical device, starting from where his audience is. Berkeley makes great play of his respect for "vulgar opinion" and "what is agreed on all hands", yet rejects "universal assent". Hume's view of the divide between ordinary life and philosophy is well enough known. And Ayer, as Austin points out, starts from the "ordinary" man (who, admittedly turns out to be a stalking-horse, to be slaughtered before the philosophical work can begin) and insists that both his senses of "perception" are ordinary (see p. 93)

It looks at ordinary usages in individual cases to inform philosophical claims because what we are interested in about a subject, it’s essence, is reflected in how we judge it, which is captured in the kinds of things we say about it in particular cases. — Antony Nickles

I would like to add, however, that it is at its best when it actually analyses the uses. His discussion of "real" is really illuminating, because, I suggest, it goes beyond "looking" and gives me what Wittgenstein might have called an "oversight" (in a non-standard sense) of the use of the word. In contrast, his dissection of "vague" and "precise" is effective enough, but doesn't take that step. Maybe I'm not being reasonable, but I think that extra step is important.

I assume you mean the whole of the book. — Ludwig V

I meant the whole discussion, but there are a few essays in Must We Mean What We Say by. Cavell that set it out better than I can.

I had taken a rather different direction, thinking about the "ordinary" in philosophy. Descartes starts his meditation from ordinary life. — Ludwig V

Descartes, Socrates, Hume, etc., they all start from ordinary examples

If I look out of the window and see men crossing the square, as I have just done, I say that I see the men themselves, just as I say that I see the wax; yet do I see any more than hats and coats that could conceal robots? I judge that they are men — Descartes, 2nd Meditation

But when they see the possibility of error they just jump to the conclusion that we must not be able to “know” the way they want and then they project the skeptical/metaphysical picture from there. Here, Descartes takes it that we do not have ordinary criteria for identification, and, out of his desire for unassailable knowledge to solve everything, does not see that we also “judge” a person as a person (“see” them as a person, or not), which is a different matter then just information and conclusion. So Descartes falls back on the picture that “judgment” must be a process of the “mind” that is mysterious and thus without the foundation he presets which drives the whole picture. As Wittgenstein and Austin say, the first step is the killer.

Berkeley makes great play of his respect for "vulgar opinion" and "what is agreed on all hands", yet rejects "universal assent". — Ludwig V

Cavell, in Problems in Modern Aesthetics, points out that Kant (in his critique of judgment) says that we make aesthetic claims, like OLP’s descriptions of its examples, in a universal voice, which is to say “Do you see what I see?” for yourself, coming to it on your own. Thus why Austin sounds so arrogant, and Wittgenstein is always leaving things unfinished, asking questions you have to change your perspective in order to answer. We, of course, may not agree, and agreement is only to the case, to the circumstances imagined.

I would like to add, however, that it is at its best when it actually analyses the uses. — Ludwig V

Most people take it that the examples are the point, as if they are to argue within the same old classic philosophical framework for the same end. But drawing out the examples are evidence or data from which they do make claims about philosophical issues (truth, “reality”, the other, knowledge, ethics, essence, etc.) and, of course, critique the practice of philosophy.

In contrast, his dissection of "vague" and "precise" is effective enough, but doesn't take that step — Ludwig V

Clearing up how those work is not only to take one more chink out of Ayer, but to show, as his diversity of other examples are meant to elsewhere, that our ordinary ways of judging things, etc., can be precise and clear and thorough and explicit and sufficient and of import to philosophy just not foundational, universal, ensured of agreement, etc., which is not to say they are just claiming it is “good enough” (simply practical).

So Austin is not an ordinary language philosopher.

Thank you for that, Russell, since it shows so clearly that you are not paying attention, but making shite up.

to perceive by the eye and ii) to imagine the possibility. — RussellA

What the dictionary says is not (to coin a phrase) definitive. In other words, the definitions in dictionaries have been developed by human beings are not exempt from criticism and revision. They are intended to capture the use of the word by ordinary speaker

You quoted two of the meanings in Merriam Webster. The full list has 9 main meanings with two or three variants for most of them. The two most important ones, in my book are "to perceive by the eye: to perceive the meaning or importance of". I think the latter is metaphorical. The use of "see" to cover "suppose" and "visualize" cited in Merriam Webster is, in my view, marginal and metaphorical. The Cambridge Dictionary has 9 meanings. Dictionary.com has 21 meanings.

Ayer maintains that "see" has two meanings, both of which are covered by "perceive by the eye". So he and Austin disagree about what the ordinary use is. Many people have agreed with Austin. I don't know that any philosopher has directly argued with Austin about his conclusion. Whether you are convinced by Austin's examples that Ayer is wrong is up to you.

But when they see the possibility of error they just jump to the conclusion that we must not be able to “know” the way they want and then they project the skeptical/metaphysical picture from there. — Antony Nickles

Yes, I understand that. My point is only that if one remembers the roots of philosophy in ordinary language, it might seem less of an extraordinary aberration to those who don't see the point.

Cavell, in Problems in Modern Aesthetics, points out that Kant (in his critique of judgment) says that we make aesthetic claims, like OLP’s descriptions of its examples, in a universal voice — Antony Nickles

Yes, I can see the point. So long as that voice is hopeful rather than dogmatic.

Wittgenstein is always leaving things unfinished, asking questions you have to change your perspective in order to answer. — Antony Nickles

Yes. I read somewhere that he was brought up with a practice, not of having heart to heart chats with people when he was going off the rails, but leaving a book by his bedside. I don't know if it's true, but it fits with his practice. It's risky, though.

The accusation of arrogance, in both cases, is the response of those who don't recognize the voice or don't find the expected lesson in the book.

@Banno @javi2541997

My point is only that if one remembers the roots of philosophy in ordinary language, it might seem less of an extraordinary aberration to those who don't see the point. — Ludwig V

Yes, and I think it’s also good to point out that the goal is not to negate everything that Plato, Descartes, Kant, Hume, metaphysical philosophers, did (or are doing) because the search for truth, the tendency to doubt and the desire for certainty are clearly part of the human condition, and the work they did obviously has merit. And I mean not in as a theory or summary (knowledge, to tell), but the example they set and the reward in reading those texts.

So long as that voice is hopeful rather than dogmatic… The accusation of arrogance, in both cases, is the response of those who don't recognize the voice or don't find the expected lesson in the book. — Ludwig V

I like to think of it as provisional, speculative. Unfortunately, people always just want something to take away, so any hint that they are generalizing something and we take that as all the value they have, rather than to show us a practice which we continue with our own interests and examples. Austin used performatives utterances as just one example of how not everything is true or false, and now he is forever just the “performative” guy as if that was meant as an entire theory of language.

and the work they did obviously has merit. — Antony Nickles

My supervisor often used to say that being wrong in interesting ways was nearly as good as being right.
I've quoted this before on this forum, but I'm old enough to believe that some things are worth repeating.

Right or wrong, the best thing is to leave or create a path to continuing the discussion (just as a scientific theory needs to do more than just be "true". It needs to open avenues for further research.). I'm afraid the "no theory" theory, if anyone has ever seriously held it, doesn't do that.

Unfortunately, people always just want something to take away, so any hint that they are generalizing something and we take that as all the value they have, rather than to show us a practice which we continue with our own interests and examples. — Antony Nickles

Well, I was remarking that I like Austin's "analysis" of "real" because it gives me an "oversight" of the yse of the word. So there's that to consider.

The idea of practice is important. When I was a student, it was often emphasized that examples are not marginal, but often critically important to any argument. It's not as easy as Austin makes it look.

It depends what you mean by "understand". — Ludwig V

On the one hand, I would start by looking at the Merriam Webster definition of "understand"

On the other hand, an animal such as a dog has a non-verbal instinctive understanding not to put their paw into an open fire

IE sentient beings can have both a verbal understanding of the word "understanding" and a non-verbal understanding of the concept understanding.
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So far as I know, no-one suggests that photons are the sense-data for the eyes. That would be an entirely different matter. For example, it would be very strange to say that what we see is photons. — Ludwig V

Figures of speech are inherently strange

I agree, it is a very strange thing for the Indirect Realist to say what we see is sense-data. But then it is also a very strange thing for the Direct Realist to say that what we see are material objects.

But such is the strange nature of a language that is fundamentally metaphorical, where the figure of speech is foundational to language. For example, as discussed by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in their book Metaphors We Live By.

As an Indirect Realist, I can say "I see sense-data" meaning "I perceive by the eye sense-data" and I can say "I see a material object" meaning "I imagine the possibility of a material object".

However, the figure of speech is foundational to language, meaning that the expressions "I perceive by the eye", "sense-data", "I imagine the possibility" and "material object" are all figures of speech and therefore not to be taken literally.

As "I see your inner pain" is a figure of speech, "I see sense-data" is also a figure of speech, and neither are intended literally.
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Now we need to work out what it means to buy something indirectly. — Ludwig V

How about:
I bought the table directly from the manufacturer through their outlet shop.
I bought the table indirectly from the manufacturer through their internet site
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So how does this work in the case of "directly see the car that ran over my foot"? — Ludwig V

How about:
I directly saw the car that ran over my foot.
I indirectly saw the car that ran over my foot through a reflection in a shop window
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OLP is not about definitions................... asking ourselves in just what circumstances we would say which, and why. Consider, then: (1) He looks guilty. (2) He appears guilty. (3) He seems guilty. — Antony Nickles

OLP couldn't exist without definitions

A definition is foundational to OLP.

We hear a scream outdoors and our dog enters the room. Consider a fourth possible expression "he x guilty". We have to decide which of the four words "looks", "appears", "seems" or "x" is the most appropriate within the given context. Our task is impossible if we don't know what "x" means, and to discover what "x" means we have to go to the dictionary for a definition.

Without the words "looks", "appears", "seems" or "x" having previously been defined, it would be impossible for us to determine which was the correct word to use in the given context.
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So it’s not that philosophy should “use” ordinary usage. It looks at ordinary usages in individual cases to inform philosophical claims because what we are interested in about a subject — Antony Nickles

The expression "Ordinary Language Philosopher" is ambiguous.

Austin thought that the best way to analyse philosophical problems was by analysing language. He thought that most philosophical problems are caused by the ambiguous use of language, and many philosophical problems would disappear if language was used more rigorously.

I agree that Austin's first step in undertaking philosophy was to analyse language as it is ordinary used by the competent speaker.

However, the expression "Ordinary Language Philosopher" is ambiguous.

Does it mean either 1) the OLP uses ordinary language when analysing ordinary language or 2) the OLP analyses ordinary language but doesn't use ordinary language?

Austin is specifically not claiming we see directly or indirectly (bottom of p. 3), but that the whole thing is made up, including the picture of “material objects”, metaphysics’ “reality”, etc. — Antony Nickles

Austin is conflating sense and reference

Austin is inferring that both the Indirect Realist who argues that there is a difference between sense-data and material object and the Direct Realist who argues there are is no sense-data but only material object hold positions that are spurious:
I am not, then-and this is a point to be clear about from the beginning-going to maintain that we ought to be 'realists', to embrace, that is, the doctrine that we do perceive material things (or objects). This doctrine would be no less scholastic and erroneous than its antithesis. The question, do we perceive material things or sense-data, no doubt looks very simple-too simple-but is entirely misleading ( cp. Thales' similarly vast and oversimple question, what the world is made of). One of the most important points to grasp is that these two terms, 'sense-data' and 'material things', live by taking in each other's washing-what is spurious is not one term of the pair, but the antithesis itself. There is no one kind of thing that we 'perceive' but many different kinds.

Austin describes Ayer's position, which is as an Indirect Realist:
The general doctrine, generally stated, goes like this: we never see or otherwise perceive (or 'sense'), or anyhow we never directly perceive or sense, material objects (or material things), but only sense-data (or our own ideas, impressions, sensa, sense-perceptions, percepts, &c.).

Consider the dichotomies i) far and near and ii) sense-data and material objects.

Expressions such as "far and near" have a sense and a reference. As regards reference, far could refer to something at a distance 100m and near could refer to something at a distance of 1m. As the distances 100m and 1m are not opposites, as a reference, far and near are neither mutually exclusive nor contradictory. However, as regards sense, far and near are mutually exclusive and contradictory.

Similarly, the expression "sense-data and material object" also has a sense and a reference. As regards sense, they are mutually exclusive and contradictory. As regards reference, sense-data could refer to an effect such as photons entering the eye, and material object could refer to a cause, such as photons being emitted by a material object, and as a reference are not mutually exclusive nor contradictory.

The Indirect Realist is considering the pair sense-data and material object in two distinct ways. In one way as sense, which is a linguistic dichotomy, and in another way as reference, which is not a metaphysical dichotomy.

However, Austin's argument is flawed, as he infers that because there is no metaphysical dichotomy, then there cannot be a linguistic dichotomy, which is an invalid argument.

What the dictionary says is not (to coin a phrase) definitive. — Ludwig V

Yes, as Barbossa said about the Pirate's Code, they are more guidelines than actual rules. But in the absence of rules, guidelines are better than nothing.

The two most important ones, in my book are "to perceive by the eye: to perceive the meaning or importance of". I think the latter is metaphorical. — Ludwig V

Perhaps "to perceive by the eye" is also metaphorical, in that is it the eye that is doing the perceiving or the person who is using their eye.

Ayer maintains that "see" has two meanings, both of which are covered by "perceive by the eye". — Ludwig V

Is this likely? There were dictionaries during his lifetime.

Thank you for that, Russell, since it shows so clearly that you are not paying attention, but making shite up. — Banno

I don't need playground bullying, so I'm leaving the Thread.

OLP couldn't exist without definitions — RussellA

I’ll grant you that, but it does not rest on definitions; Austin is drawing out how we judge their use, distinctions, application, possibilities, the circumstances they come up in, etc., so that we understand the variety and logic of more than one case or dichotomy.

Does it mean either 1) the OLP uses ordinary language when analysing ordinary language or 2) the OLP analyses ordinary language but doesn't use ordinary language? — RussellA

Num 2, except it’s technically “what we say when”, like the different kind of things we say on instances of, in this case: “seeing” something, but, also, he’s not just imagining instances of what we say in ordinary use, but also trying to flesh out the criteria and circumstances for philosophical use as well.

OLP couldn't exist without definitions — RussellA

I’ll grant you that, but it does not rest on definitions — Antony Nickles

It may help to clarify "definition" here. If it means a written set of criteria or list of synonyms that can be entered in a dictionary, rule-book or law, it will be important to remember that we manage to learn to use words correctly without them. That doesn't mean that the words we use don't have a definition; it just means that they don't have a formal definition.
Formal definitions are a useful supplement, but not necessary, except in certain formal situations. (Austin makes this point, correctly, in my view - and he adds, also correctly that we learn very many words by ostensive "definition). In addition, the information given in a dictionary will be useless to anyone who does not know how to use the words, that is, how to apply the definition and use the word in sentences that are at least sufficiently grammatical to convey meaning. (Grammar was developed and used long before it was articulated and written down in Alexandria in the 3rd/4th century BCE. (It was developed to help people teaching or learning a language as adults - clearly written grammatical rules cannot be used by someone learning their first language))

On the other hand, an animal such as a dog has a non-verbal instinctive understanding not to put their paw into an open fire — RussellA

Quite so. But non-verbal understandings and beliefs - and perceptions - are different issue.

I agree, it is a very strange thing for the Indirect Realist to say what we see is sense-data. But then it is also a very strange thing for the Direct Realist to say that what we see are material objects. — RussellA

Well, yes. Austin questions (I think, dismantles) Ayer's use of "material objects" as well as his use of "sense-data". He thinks that neither term is useful or coherently usable. But he would be quite content to say that he sees tables and chairs - and rainbows and rain.

Does it mean either 1) the OLP uses ordinary language when analysing ordinary language or 2) the OLP analyses ordinary language but doesn't use ordinary language? — RussellA

This question emphasizes to me that the description "ordinary language philosophy" is not very helpful. The more I consider it, the less I understand what it means. If one reflects that, however many technicalities are used, the fundamental structure of the language is kept, because it is foundational to any use of the language. In a sense, there is no alternative to ordinary language, even though it can be modified and added to in all sorts of ways. (I except mathematical language which uses neither ordinary grammar nor ordinary vocabulary (though even there, there are some ordinary terms that do crop up - "number", for example.)
In a sense, anyone who speaks/writes relies on ordinary language, however much it may be added to or modified.

As an Indirect Realist, I can say "I see sense-data" meaning "I perceive by the eye sense-data" and I can say "I see a material object" meaning "I imagine the possibility of a material object". — RussellA

Yes, you can. It doesn't half help, though, if you make it clear that you are an indirect realist. I know how to interpret what you say.
However, by the same token, a Direct Realist can say "I see a table" meaning "perceive by the eye a table" (though it's a terrible phrase and almost incomprehensible if one takes it seriously) and, if there's an argument going on with an Indirect Realist "I imagine the possibility of sense-data" (because sense-datum language is derived from "material object" language)
But then the disagreement between them seems just a quarrel about words, hardly worth spending any time or effort on. What's at stake here? Nothing.

However, the figure of speech is foundational to language, meaning that the expressions "I perceive by the eye", "sense-data", "I imagine the possibility" and "material object" are all figures of speech and therefore not to be taken literally. — RussellA

Well you could say that any use of a word that isn't a name for a unique object could be described as metaphorical. When I describe a car as red and then describe a coat as red, I am carrying the word over to another case. In other words, you are applying "metaphor" so widely that I can no longer grasp what it means for you. What you be an example of a literal use of, for example "imagine"?
I'm afraid I haven't read Metaphors We Live By, so I can't engage with what they say. But I understand "metaphor" as defined as a non-literal use of a word, and if that's right, not everything can be metaphorical. Mind you, I can just about get my head round the idea that the literal use of a word is also a figure of speech.

The Indirect Realist is considering the pair sense-data and material object in two distinct ways. In one way as sense, which is a linguistic dichotomy, and in another way as reference, which is not a metaphysical dichotomy. — RussellA

Do you mean that "sense-datum" and "material object" are both referring expressions. That depends on us agreeing what they refer to. I can understand that "material object" refers to things like tables and chair, but probably not to rainbows or colours. But I don't understand what "sense-datum" refers to. That's the issue.

However, Austin's argument is flawed, as he infers that because there is no metaphysical dichotomy, then there cannot be a linguistic dichotomy, which is an invalid argument. — RussellA

That's odd. I interpret him as arguing the other way round, that because there is no (valid) linguistic dichotomy, there can be no metaphysical dichotomy.

@Antony Nickles @Ludwig V

I appreciate your considered replies, and because of them have learnt a lot about the philosophy of Austin over the past few weeks, but am leaving the Thread for the reason I gave in response to @Banno.

I'm glad our dialogue was constructive and sorry about your decision to leave.

You made the claim, of the central figure of Ordinary Language Philosophy, that he is not an Ordinary Language Philosopher. This is the person for whom the term was coined.

The only conclusion is that you have not read Sense and Sensibilia, but have instead made up your own version both of what Austin said and what Ordinary Language Philosophy is.

I'm glad you appreciate the efforts of @Antony Nickles and @Ludwig V, but our previous experience tells me that they are attempting to sow on barren ground.

Of course, you might improve. There can be no substitute a detailed, comprehensive engagement with the material.

Read the damn book. Or bugger off.

I'd taken a bit of a hiatus these last few days, distracted by a couple of other threads. That and that your comment needed some digesting. I gather that you are pointing out that the sense-data language is a hedge on the object language; an unnecessary one since "we don't begin to hedge unless there is some special reason for doing so". I think this a fine point.

I supose Ayer might reply that there is good reason - the lack of incorrigibility...

But object-language is not derived from sense-data language. It's the other way round. (I'm hedging about "entailment", of course.) — Ludwig V

For now, I'm going to go with Ayer as arguing that language about material objects is entailed (for some unspecified notion of entailment...) by sense-data, and that sense data are a hedge on our ordinary talk about objects. Then Austin's reply is that there is no reason for such a hedge, especially since the unspecified nature of the entailment does not provide the sort-after incorrigibility.

Everybody has a hiatus from time to time.

For now, I'm going to go with Ayer as arguing that language about material objects is entailed (for some unspecified notion of entailment...) by sense-data, and that sense data are a hedge on our ordinary talk about objects. Then Austin's reply is that there is no reason for such a hedge, especially since the unspecified nature of the entailment does not provide the sort-after incorrigibility. — Banno

I didn't, perhaps specify clearly enough that my problem with Ayer is that he thinks of material objects are "constructions". He might have meant "logical constructions", I suppose. Either way, this needs explanation. (Perhaps the might be some more detail in his book.) I have a clearer idea of "hedging" means, though it's connection with any version of "entailment" is a bit obscure.
I don't think they are incompatible.

I have a feeling that there's no reason not to proceed to lecture XI, and was thinking of producing a summary. Would that be helpful?

I have a feeling that there's no reason not to proceed to lecture XI, — Ludwig V

Please do.

Something has to be said about Carnap and Ayer, as seen by Austin. Carnap had the idea that it didn't much matter which sentences were held to be true, so long as they were consistent with each other.

principle of tolerance: we are not in the business of setting up prohibitions but of arriving at conventions… In logic there are no morals. — SEP:Carnap

So one could have a linguistic pluralism in which one person spoke of rabbits being leporidae, and another a system in which gavagai are, maybe gavaidea... and the two schemes would in the end say much the same thing. For Carnap the touchstone was consistency, not correspondence. Ayer and Austin on the other hand opted for correspondence.

The emphasis on correspondence was a large part of the criticism of Austin by Strawson.

But the main criticism Austin levels against Ayer here is to reject the idea that there are a particular class of sentences which are apt to verification. For Ayer these are sentences about sense data. Austin, again by numerous examples, shows that this is not so, that is anything what is verifiable and what not is dependent on the circumstances - on what needs hedging.

But the main criticism Austin levels against Ayer here is to reject the idea that there are a particular class of sentences which are apt to verification. For Ayer these are sentences about sense data. — Banno

Does the project of "logical positivism" or "empiricism" in general rest solely on Ayer's idea of sense data? Can you explain why Ayer insists that sentences about sense data are the only ones apt for verification? For example, when we determine the chemical makeup of a substance, scientists use an electron spectrometer. There are several tricky things here.. The spectrometer takes all sorts of data that is translated back as chemical compounds. There are detectors in there, providing data that is spit back in real human language. No one need rely on their sense data here for the "verification" of the compounds being detected here. Why is "verification" so narrowly defined as sense data? What kind of data would it be that the spectrometer is outputting? It is data based on known measurements of photoemissions hitting a field, etc. It is mathematical, it is information, it is...

Does the project of "logical positivism" or "empiricism" in general rest solely on Ayer's idea of sense data? — schopenhauer1

Check out the SEP article.

For the rest, yes, all good questions, which add to the puzzle of why Ayer limited his verification only to sense data. Austin's observation, that this is far too limited, is supported by your comment.

Does the project of "logical positivism" or "empiricism" in general rest solely on Ayer's idea of sense data? — schopenhauer1

Two quotations from SEP - Vienna Circle

"The Vienna Circle was a group of scientifically trained philosophers and philosophically interested scientists who met under the (nominal) leadership of Moritz Schlick for often weekly discussions of problems in the philosophy of science during academic terms in the years from 1924 to 1936."

"While the Vienna Circle’s early form of logical empiricism (or logical positivism or neopositivism: these labels will be used interchangeably here) no longer represents an active research program"

And one from SEP - A J Ayer

"Ryle was also instrumental in getting Ayer to go to Vienna in 1933 to study with Moritz Schlick, then leader of the influential Vienna Circle of philosophers, scientists and other intellectuals, joining W. V. O. Quine in being one of only two visitors to be members of the Vienna Circle. His philosophical experience in Vienna was somewhat limited by his uncertain knowledge of German, but he knew enough to pick up the basic tenets of logical positivism."

For example, when we determine the chemical makeup of a substance, scientists use an electron spectrometer. — schopenhauer1

I don't think working scientists ever give a moment's thought to sense-data. But for what it's worth a defence of the idea would go something like this. The spectrometer is a material object like any other, so the usual "translation" could be made. It would be even more complicated that the normal examples of tables or trees, but there's no reason in principle why it could not be made. Reading the information is not specially complicated. The rest is up to interpretation via the various theories. Compare an astronomer observing starts through a telescope. There's no knock-down argument here.

Berekeley considers a watchmaker as a potential counter-example and has no difficulty arguing that, complex as it is, all our knowledge as well as the watchmaker's is easily translatable into collections of ideas. The real argument is in the actions of the watchmaker in building the watch - or so it seems to me. Action in the world establishes that I am embodied - a three-dimensional object among other three-dimensional objects.

Why is "verification" so narrowly defined as sense data? — schopenhauer1

Because Ayer is seeking to find the foundations of knowledge. Sense-data provide the incorrigible and self-evident starting-points of the the chains of evidence that underpin our knowledge. Perhaps, most of the time, we don't actually articulate the chains all the way back to the beginning. But we can, if we need to.

For Carnap the touchstone was consistency, not correspondence. Ayer and Austin on the other hand opted for correspondence. — Banno

The difficulty of consistency/coherence theories is that language itself has a place for non-verbal reality. So I'm with Austin and Ayer here. As you say, Strawson disagreed. However, I don't really know how to articulate words vs world. One of the many topics about which I could do with some revision/refreshment.

For the rest, yes, all good questions, which add to the puzzle of why Ayer limited his verification only to sense data. Austin's observation, that this is far too limited, is supported by your comment. — Banno

Cool.

I don't think working scientists ever give a moment's thought to sense-data. But for what it's worth a defence of the idea would go something like this. The spectrometer is a material object like any other, so the usual "translation" could be made. It would be even more complicated that the normal examples of tables or trees, but there's no reason in principle why it could not be made. Reading the information is not specially complicated. The rest is up to interpretation via the various theories. Compare an astronomer observing starts through a telescope. There's no knock-down argument here.

Berekeley considers a watchmaker as a potential counter-example and has no difficulty arguing that, complex as it is, all our knowledge as well as the watchmaker's is easily translatable into collections of ideas. The real argument is in the actions of the watchmaker in building the watch - or so it seems to me. Action in the world establishes that I am embodied - a three-dimensional object among other three-dimensional objects. — Ludwig V

What do you mean by "translation" here? The spectrometer is spitting out data that signifies levels of known compounds. It would be trivially true, that the person "reading out" the data and "translating it" is using their "sense-data" to indeed confirm the machine's output. If Ayer is trying to say something here, it is that the determination of synthetic truth is sense-data verification. But the determination here was a machine.

If anything, it leads to a much broader discussion to what an observation is composed of. I get logical positivists wanting to keep statements about meaning to be in some way grounded in observation (especially conforming with the other academic disciplines and keeping up with the "Joneses" at the turn of the century if you will..) but why sense-data in particular? Rather, observation can be had by any number of methods, many of them inferential. It's a weird hill to die on, unless you really contort the cause-effect relationship back to "sense-data" to prove your point that it all goes back to that.

To be charitable, you can say that sense-data must be involved in the human way of interpreting the world, but that is pretty charitable. If anything, the whole discussion leads to a sort of Platonic notion of information as agnostic to sense-data and just "existing" in some sense, whatever the interpreter is.

Because Ayer is seeking to find the foundations of knowledge. Sense-data provide the incorrigible and self-evident starting-points of the the chains of evidence that underpin our knowledge. Perhaps, most of the time, we don't actually articulate the chains all the way back to the beginning. But we can, if we need to. — Ludwig V

Yeah, this is the part that seems dubitable to me. As I said, information seems to be agnostic to sense-data. What if a computer was reading and analyzing the results of another computer, and deemed it correct. What "sense-data" was needed for this observation?

"Translation" here is an idea that came up earlier in the discussion. It treat the idea of sense-data as a question of language than of metaphysics. I was referring to that. Here's a summary.

So a translation (interpretation) would have the form :
(This collection of sense-data statements) is true IFF (this statement about a material object)
A rough example, the ubiquitous cup...
(I see a red quadrilateral and a red ovoid and another ovoid) is true IFF this is a red cup. — Banno

Rather, observation can be had by any number of methods, many of them inferential. It's a weird hill to die on, unless you really contort the cause-effect relationship back to "sense-data" to prove your point that it all goes back to that. — schopenhauer1

Yes, in a way. You are using "observation" in a common sense way, and I'm on board with that. But Ayer's argument is that all observations other than sense-data are inferences from sense-data.

To be charitable, you can say that sense-data must be involved in the human way of interpreting the world, but that is pretty charitable. — schopenhauer1

To my mind, the effectiveness of the argument about sense-data depends on the appeal of this argument. Dissecting that is a complicated business. But it is difficult to imagine a different way of interpreting the world which was completely incomprehensible to human beings - we couldn't even identify it as an interpretation of the world. (That's a vey brief gesture towards how the argument might go.)

If anything, the whole discussion leads to a sort of Platonic notion of information as agnostic to sense-data and just "existing" in some sense, whatever the interpreter is. — schopenhauer1

Yes. and I find the idea of information as something that couldn't ever inform anyone somewhat puzzling. The relationship with the idea of sense-data is not clear to me. If one interpreted sense-data as light, sound, etc. (i.e. as physical effects of "the world" on our sense-organs), then they make some sense. But that's not what is intended by Ayer. He has in mind "experiences" or what Berkeley called "ideas" and Hume called "impressions" and Kant and Husserl called "phenomena"