The images whose shadows we see are not sense-data, they are: — Fooloso4

Yes, but we see the shadows, never the statues, which are also not what they seem to be, i.e. not men and other animals. So you're right. There are two levels of unreality involved. But Plato is claiming that we never see reality, and that's the central issue in sense-datum theory.

However, if the argument results in self-contradiction or absurdity, it is possible that it is the argument that is self-contradictory or absurd, not the topic of the argument. — RussellA

OK. But the argument in question here is the argument that we never perceive reality, only sense-data.

But Plato is claiming that we never see reality, and that's the central issue in sense-datum theory. — Ludwig V

What Plato is claiming is that we do not have knowledge of those things that are of central concern to the Republic, that is, of the just, the beautiful, and the good. We have opinions about such things not knowledge.

He acknowledges that the craftsmen, physicians, ship captains, and others have knowledge. They see the "reality" of those things they have knowledge of.

The cave has been discussed in other threads and, of course, a new thread can be started.

OK. But the argument in question here is the argument that we never perceive reality, only sense-data. — Ludwig V

Ayers doesn't present that view. There may be advocates of sense data who do believe that, but Ayers agrees with the view that what we see is real, whether it's sense data that we see, or material objects.

OK. But the argument in question here is the argument that we never perceive reality, only sense-data. — Ludwig V

Linguistics and metaphysics are two very different fields of enquiry.

Austin's Sense and Sensibilia is written from the viewpoint of an Ordinary Language Philosopher.

I can understand Austin, as an Ordinary Language Philosopher, making the point that sense-data is not a necessary part of linguistics, which I agree with.

However, I don't agree that he then continues to argue, still as an Ordinary Language Philosopher, that sense-data is not a valid metaphysical position.

The metaphysics of sense-data, which is outside of language, cannot be critiqued by an Ordinary Language Philosopher from a position that reality is established by language.

However, if the argument results in self-contradiction or absurdity, it is possible that it is the argument that is self-contradictory or absurd, not the topic of the argument. — RussellA

That's true. But it depends on the argument. If my argument is that democracy is bound to fail (as Plato argues), that argument may be absurd, but that doesn't show that democracy is absurd. But if the argument is that God exists and that argument is absurd, until there is another argument, there is no basis for asserting that God exists. No?

He acknowledges that the craftsmen, physicians, ship captains, and others have knowledge. — Fooloso4

We would have to get into the texts to settle that. But I pretty clear that he does not think that such people have philosophical knowledge, which is knowledge of the true and the real. They have something lesser; his word is sometimes translated "Knack".

The cave has been discussed in other threads and, of course, a new thread can be started. — Fooloso4

So I think we should leave the topic there.

There may be advocates of sense data who do believe that, but Ayers agrees with the view that what we see is real, whether it's sense data that we see, or material objects. — frank

Well, his position is more complicated than my remark allowed. That is true. If you prefer, he says that it is only sense-data that we see directly, and that "material objects" are "constructions" out of sense-data. So material objects, according to Ayer are not what we think they are.

However, I don't agree that he then continues to argue, still as an Ordinary Language Philosopher, that sense-data is not a valid metaphysical position. — RussellA

So you believe both positions and that no argument can settle the issue? Basically on the grounds that any argument must be from one position or another and that it cannot therefore address the issue. H'm. That would need some explaining.

That is true. If you prefer, he says that it is only sense-data that we see directly, and that "material objects" are "constructions" out of sense-data. So material objects, according to Ayer are not what we think they are. — Ludwig V

But I think we all know that observers who are looking at the same object each see a different scene. Each one could draw out what they see and we could compare, and note differences. No one concludes from this that the observers aren't seeing a material object. I think Ayers was fully up to speed on how this is playing out in language.

I think Austin's criticisms aren't toward Ayers. They're toward a version of sense-data theory that does say we don't see the world around us.

Ordinary Language Philosophy has nothing to do with common sense or with the ordinary man, as I tried to explain here (and elsewhere as referenced in that post), it is a philosophical method, not a position. — Antony Nickles

I would have thought that Ordinary Language Philosophy (OLP) is associated with GE Moore's common sense and the later Wittgenstein's ordinary language of the ordinary person-in-the-street.

OLP doesn't reduce philosophy to ordinary words, but proposes that philosophy can better be undertaken using ordinary words. OLP does not reduce philosophy to the person-in-the-street, but suggests that philosophy should be understood by the person-in-the-street. OLP looks at the ordinary use of words, what words mean within the context they are being used in.

OLP looks at words such as direct and indirect and points out it is not possible to make the simple statement that direct and indirect have opposite meanings. Not only does direct have several different meanings dependent upon context but also indirect has several different meanings dependent upon context.

OLP points out that problems arise when ordinary words having commonly agreed meanings are given unusual new meanings by philosophers in their attempt to solve philosophical problems, thereby creating more philosophical problems than they solve

Because of the nature of language, in that the meaning of a word depends on its context within the whole, and between words are family resemblances, OLP tend to be anti-essentialist, meaning that their philosophy is more about relationships between truth and reality rather than based on an absolute truth or reality.

However, Ernest Gellner in Words and Things 1959 made the valid point that as language derives from the communities within which we live, as these communities are ever-changing and unstable, philosophical ideas expressed within our language will also inevitably be ever-changing and unstable.

(Wikipedia - Ordinary Language Philosophy)

But if the argument is that God exists and that argument is absurd, until there is another argument, there is no basis for asserting that God exists. No? — Ludwig V

True, in the absence of a good argument that God exists people fall back on faith.

So you believe both positions and that no argument can settle the issue? Basically on the grounds that any argument must be from one position or another and that it cannot therefore address the issue. H'm. That would need some explaining. — Ludwig V

Exactly my problem with Austin's Sense and Sensibilia, in that from the position of linguistics he does take a position on the metaphysics of sense-data.

Ctrl-C on a Mac does not do what a Windows’ zombie wants.

Meta is notable for apparently not having even mentioned Austin on a thread about Austin. — Banno

Incorrigible! I thought you'd never notice. I happen to have a strong aversion to certain words, and some names can be even worse for me.

I would have thought that Ordinary Language Philosophy (OLP) is associated with GE Moore's common sense and the later Wittgenstein's ordinary language of the ordinary person-in-the-street. — RussellA

You’re not wrong about Moore. He was simply trying to satisfy the desire of metaphysics for certainty with basically, as you say, common sense (Austin responds to him in “Other Minds”). However, Wittgenstein is using the method of investigating what is said in particular situations, but the lessons from these examples are not a substitute for the foundation that metaphysics wants (I say this to clarify Austin in contrast, but I have no desire to debate this claim here.)

OLP looks at the ordinary use of words, what words mean within the context they are being used in. — RussellA

OLP is examining what anyone would say in a particular situation, in order to find unbiased philosophical data, not as proof of a position. And it makes use only of what anyone would agree is true (though this can be hard for people reading Wittgenstein to see, or agree to; Austin is more understandably insightful, but then without the depth of Wittgenstein). Thus the importance of trying to make the most sense possible of another’s position. Accordingly, here, Austin is also looking at the metaphysical use of words (attempting to give them as much sense as he can—Wittgenstein will actually make up situations that might make sense for them, as he has more sympathy, having been in their position, literally).

And I wouldn’t phrase it that the object is what words “mean”, but the implications that go along with them in different situations, the criteria we use to judge, the distinctions that are made, etc. We could say these are the ways they are meaningful to us. Austin is more concerned with showing that we have the means at hand to address the skeptic’s concerns with errors, illusion, mistakes, etc., where Wittgenstein takes the skeptic’s claims as illuminating the limitations of knowledge of others, expression, understanding, i.e., examples of our relation to ourselves, others, ad the world in general. Austin here only addresses seeing (“perceiving”) but he does elsewhere look at knowing.

OLP tends to be anti-essentialist, meaning that their philosophy is more about relationships between truth and reality rather than based on an absolute truth or reality. — RussellA

I’ll grant that OLP makes it clear that absolute anything is an empty pursuit. But Austin also shows how “reality”, as conceived as a standard for truth or knowledge, is a manufactured idea. Nevertheless, OLP does not abandon the “essence” of the world. I would argue that Austin is reclaiming the myriad ways in which we are interested in things. (I see this as another of Austin’s hidden lessons @Banno @Ludwig V @javi2541997.) Wittgenstein points out that “Essence is expressed by grammar.“ PI, #371 This is not to say that the mechanics of our practices serve the same purpose as metaphysical essence. Grammar is not equal to essence; the standards or criteria we judge by reflect what matters to us about a practice, what is essential to us about the world.

@Ludwig V

However, I don't agree that he then continues to argue, still as an Ordinary Language Philosopher, that sense-data is not a valid metaphysical position.

The metaphysics of sense-data, which is outside of language, cannot be critiqued by an Ordinary Language Philosopher from a position that reality is established by language. — RussellA

Just to follow through here from my response above, OLP is not arguing that reality is established by “language”. “Language” is not its term. It’s a method that only draws out the things anyone would say in a given situation in order to shed light on the way we look at philosophical issues. It is not about linguistics; it’s about what we do, how we ordinarily judge our practices, compared to how philosophy has traditionally created a standard for knowledge.

So Austin is not trying to replace metaphysics. And he is not arguing just that sense-data is not valid; he’s showing that metaphysics itself is not a valid position at all. He reveals that it is argued for the purpose of its own predetermined manufactured fantasy: certain, foundational, universal, abstract, complete, independent knowledge.

But there is the suspicion of technical or specialized concepts. Here's the rub. It is impossible for someone who does not accept the term "quale" or "qualia" as being capable of coherent use to join in the discussion. The only possible strategy is to demonstrate the incoherence of the proposed usage. — Ludwig V

I wouldn’t draw that conclusion about terms from OLP necessarily. Austin’s “terms” of criticism look like ordinary comments, but “circumstance”, “mistake”, “say anything they want”, etc. are in need of unpacking just as he has done with “real” and “perception”, etc. I always feel like the penetration of his insight overwhelms seeing the fact that every philosopher is less aware of themselves than their adversary. Wittgenstein unfortunately used specialty terms to the doom of his being understood, but even pushed words like grammar, criteria, aspect, etc. into terms of art.

I do agree that Austin will seem to be just picking apart others’ terms—and both he and Wittgenstein do talk a lot about nonsense or not making sense—but one of their skills is actually giving others’ terms and arguments as much sense (and circumstance) as they can (both have their limits). I think Austin is asking “What distinction is being made here?”; not to say it is “incoherent”, but to reveal how it is being used, what purpose it is playing, what is important about it to them. What is hard to wrap my head around is that this can be different than what they say, what they want it to do, or the import they wish it had—that they can only mean X. I’ll look back for some examples, but it is not… outright dismissal.

…but there's the issue whether psychosomatic pains and illnesses are "real" or not. I'm in the camp that says they are not deceptions or illusions, even though the usual causal pathways are not involved. — Ludwig V

But if we’ve learned anything from Austin shouldn’t we ask: not whether it is “real” (meets some standard we impose), but what matters to us about pain? What is the distinction we want to impose, and what is the actual criteria and mechanics we judge by. We can try to determine (know) causes. But we, as you said, respond to someone in pain (or ignore them). Could we be fooled? Sure. And there’s our excuse to skip over the other and look inside them instead; to treat the disease rather than the patient (as a human) as is commonly warned against.

But his phenomenological turn, though plausible, is not, I think, particularly illuminating. — Ludwig V

Well no one in this forum has accurately summarized Cavell before, but are you referring to Wittgenstein above? This is obviously for another time, in bulk, but I don’t understand what would be a “phenomenological turn” for either of them.

X continued...

The next part, pp. 106..., concerns the two languages theory, which according to Austin is supported only disingenuously by Ayer.   Now I had previously understood Ayer as suggesting something along the lines of

(This collection of sense-data statements) is true IFF (this statement about a material object)

But it seems I've jumped the gun. I'd been misled by such things as

any pro- position that refers to a material thing must somehow be expressible in terms of sense-data, if it is to be empirically significant — p.107

...supposing that at a minimum the two languages must have some equivalence of truth value. But there is to be no such symmetry. "The material-object language must somehow be reducible to the sense-datum language".

(an incomplete post... an unfinished thought.)

Moore...................Wittgenstein..................but the lessons from these examples are not a substitute for the foundation that metaphysics wants — Antony Nickles

True, but they are a foundation for what Ordinary Language Philosophy wants
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OLP is examining what anyone would say in a particular situation, in order to find unbiased philosophical data, not as proof of a position — Antony Nickles

OLP as any method cannot avoid but being biased

OLP is a method, and as with any method, is only able to discover those things that it is structurally capable of discovering. By that I mean, if given a problem, whether scientific or philosophical, the method I choose in order to solve that problem determines any solution that I may discover. For example, I may want to discover the nature of reality, and my chosen method is visual observation. However, the reality I discover will be only be that part of reality accessible to vision. I will be missing that part of reality only accessible to touch, hearing, etc .

As no method is unbiased, using OLP as a method to investigate the philosophical nature of reality will inevitably come up with a biased answer, an answer biased by the very method being used. OLP is one method amongst many, including Analytic, Logical Positivism, Phenomenology, Scepticism, Common Sense, Verifications, Continental, Aristotelianism, etc, where each will give a different answer biased by the inherent nature of the method itself.

OLP by its very nature of having a specific method can only result in biased conclusions. It is inevitable.
===============================================================================

Austin is also looking at the metaphysical use of words (attempting to give them as much sense as he can — Antony Nickles

I would think that the metaphysical use of words is a logical impossibility.

Words can be used to describe Ayer's metaphysical problem with sense-data. For example, I can say: "when looking at a red postbox, for the Direct Realist the postbox is literally red and for the Indirect Realist the postbox appears red, not that the postbox is literally red".

Ayer's metaphysical problem with sense-data is independent of language and would still happen in a world without language, in that language is not an aspect of the metaphysical situation. When a person looks at a red postbox, is the postbox literally red, or does the person have a private mental sensation of the colour red?

On the one hand, the metaphysical problem of sense-data is independent of language, yet on the other hand, the metaphysical problem of sense-data can be discussed within language. Wittgenstein gave a solution to this conundrum in Philosophical Investigations 293 using the beetle in the box analogy, where we can talk about pain yet cannot describe pain. The private sensation of pain, the beetle in the box, drops out of consideration within the language game. The word "pain" in language is not describing an unknown cause, pain, but is describing the known effect of an unknown cause, ie, pain behaviour.

Similarly, Austin might talk about "the metaphysics of do we directly see sense-data or directly see the object", but this expression is not describing an unknown cause, whether sense-data or an object, but is describing the known effect of an unknown cause, ie, seeing something.

@Banno @Ludwig V @javi2541997

I find Austin a refreshing example of how to productively do philosophy, no matter what the conclusions he comes to; the method is satisfying—the possibility of it (for common ground) is heartening. But when Austin says Ayer & Co “provide the best available expositions of the approved reasons for holding [this position: of the world as, say, hidden]… more full, coherent, and terminologically exact”, I feel like this is a little cagey. He proceeds to tear to pieces what seem clearly strange arguments pieced together like toothpick scaffolding. The only thing I can think is that Austin realized that Ayer throws himself into every part of the position unreservedly, and is detailed and deliberate at every step, however confused. So Austin uses him as a great example of every misstep that metaphysics makes. It’s not that Ayer is a worthy opponent, but that he explicitly hits every touchstone of errors that manifest from the desire for something incorrigible.

Finishing my previous thought, I need to jump ahead a bit to pp119-120 where Austin talks about entailment.

If the equivalence I set up were so, then statements about sense data would entail statements about material objects.

Now I set up this equivalence as a way of understanding the minimum requirement for there being two languages.

Austin shows that

a statement about a 'material thing' entails 'some set ofstatements or other about sense-data'. But-and this is his difficulty-there is no definite and finite set of statements about sense-data entailed by any statement about a 'material thing'.

The symmetry is broken; and with it the two language theory.

As no method is unbiased, using OLP as a method to investigate the philosophical nature of reality will inevitably come up with a biased answer, an answer biased by the very method being used. — RussellA

OLP proposes to try to reach an unbiased take on each example (not, somehow, generally, entirely), subject to acceptance by you, so also subject to correction, refinement, further cases, additional attention to the circumstances. This focus is to strip away any “bias” as in a hidden agenda or prerequisite, like having a standard or goal ahead of time (like incorrigibility) which is thought only needs to be explained, proven. Instead it examines the lay of the land of what we would agree we would say in a particular circumstance to understand the criteria we use, the implications, the distinctions, etc., in that case, and only then using that data to make any philosophical claims.

On the one hand, the metaphysical problem of sense-data is independent of language, yet on the other hand, the metaphysical problem of sense-data can be discussed within language. — RussellA

I am not talking about the “metaphysical problem” (whether it exists in or out of language, or can or can not be discussed), but the metaphysician’s use of words (knowledge, intent, real, direct, etc.) in comparison to our ordinary use of those words, which reveals how and why metaphysics wants to remove context and generalize only one type of case.

Command-c?

Keep in mind that it was Apple who invented this keyboard command. It's Windows that has the command wrong.

it was Apple who invented this keyboard command. — Banno

Window-brain on a Mac at home: thus my shame.

OLP proposes to try to reach an unbiased take on each example — Antony Nickles

OLP cannot be unbiased about sense-data as the Christian cannot be unbiased about Atheism

OLP is a movement that believes philosophy must lose its grand metaphysical aspirations in asking such questions "what is truth" and "what is essence" in favour of a philosophy based on ordinary language used by competent speakers of that language. Philosophers should instead ask what does it mean to say that "is it true that it is raining in Paris" and "this perfume has a fine essence".

Any movement that believes that philosophy must lose its grand metaphysical aspirations is obviously biased against philosophers who have grand metaphysical aspirations.
===============================================================================

I am not talking about the “metaphysical problem” (whether it exists in or out of language, or can or can not be discussed), but the metaphysician’s use of words (knowledge, intent, real, direct, etc.) in comparison to our ordinary use of those words, which reveals how and why metaphysics wants to remove context and generalize only one type of case. — Antony Nickles

The metaphysician interested in the sense-data problem removes linguistic context because the metaphysical question "do I directly see sense-data or do I directly see an object" is independent of language

Yes, OLP believed that philosophy should lose its grand metaphysical aspirations and stop trying to understand words in terms of the universal and abstract, such as "what is truth", but concentrate on understanding words as they are used in ordinary language by any competent speaker, such as "is it true that it is raining in Paris".

This approach follows from Frege's Context Principle, In his book The Foundations of Arithmetic he changed the metaphysical question "what are numbers" into the linguistic question what does it mean to say "the number of horses is four"

The Indirect Realist is asking the metaphysical question "do I directly see sense-data or do I directly see an object". Metaphysical because such a question cannot be answered by the sensations alone but only from reasoning about the sensations.

It is true that the metaphysician interested in sense-data wants to remove context, as such a metaphysical question is independent of language, and context is an inherent part of language.

It is not true that the metaphysician interested in sense-data is wanting to generalize only one type of case. They are interested in the specific and particular case "do I directly see sense-data or do I directly see an object".

(Wikipedia - The Foundations of Arithmetic)

@Banno @javi2541997

But-and this is his difficulty-there is no definite and finite set of statements about sense-data entailed by any statement about a 'material thing'.

Austin on Ayer, p, 119

I agree the above doesn’t track, but what I thought was interesting was that Austin does again hint at the fact there are “expectations” (p.119) in a situation (involving anything), and so rather than what Ayer’s classifies as “statements” that I would (or must) make, or that must be the necessary fallout (not sure on this exactly), we are subject to the implications of what type of thing is said or done, qualified non-systematically by the particular circumstances. So, we need not meet a predetermined standard of evidence, nor is there a level and nature to what is “entailed”, but “entailment” and “implication” appear to be in the same ballpark (which may satisfy @Ludwig V’s interest in continuing what “entailment” stands for or does).

It’s not that Ayer is a worthy opponent, but that he explicitly hits every touchstone of errors that manifest from the desire for something incorrigible. — Antony Nickles

I'm confident that Austin thought in such strategic terms. Well spotted.

Aspects of logical positivism seem to have taken root elsewhere, as is apparent in the rise to defend versions of emotivism elsewhere in the fora.

@Ludwig V @javi2541997

to defend versions of emotivism elsewhere — Banno

This is how I take Austin’s “How to Do Things With Words”. Of course, with him, he is not so much “defending emotivism” as showing how judging only by the criteria of “true or false” of only “statements” excludes all the other various criteria we have that matter to us with similar importance and consequence, depending on each different practices (and their attendant circumstances), including ethics and aesthetics which positivism explicitly ruled out from being able to be rationally addressed at all (thus emotions, or moral intuition, or some other mysterious process).

The absence of explicit Ethics in Austin is regrettable. It created a vacuum which was temporarily filled by Hare, but in a way that was ultimately not substantive. Hare was too quick to follow Kant rather than his own argument.

The absence of explicit Ethics in Austin is regrettable — Banno

I agree, though I don’t think it is absent entirely. Part of what I take Austin to be doing is to defend the practice of philosophy, thus, not what we should conclude, but the way we should conduct ourselves. Thus his bristling at the paucity of examples, the manufactured dichotomies, the inattention to detail, the exclusion of our ongoing responsibility, etc. And, although he does not directly alude to this, the import is that, without fixed standards or preset goals, everyone could benefit from such diligence.

OLP is a movement that believes philosophy must lose its grand metaphysical aspirations in asking such questions "what is truth" and "what is essence" — RussellA

Well OLP is not a movement, nor a belief-system, it’s a method, but Austin is not abandoning either truth, as I discuss here nor is OLP giving up on the essence of things, as I argued in the last paragraph here.

Well OLP is not a movement, nor a belief-system, it’s a method, — Antony Nickles

The particular method used to obtain an object will pre-determine any object discovered

According to the IEP article Ordinary Language Philosophy -
Ordinary Language philosophy, sometimes referred to as ‘Oxford’ philosophy, is a kind of ‘linguistic’ philosophy. Linguistic philosophy may be characterized as the view that a focus on language is key to both the content and method proper to the discipline of philosophy as a whole (and so is distinct from the Philosophy of Language).

According to the Merriam Webster Dictionary, "method" can typically mean a procedure or process for attaining an object: such as a way, technique, or process of or for doing something.

OLP is clearly not a just a method of philosophy, as its chosen method of focusing on language will inevitable pre-determine any conclusions it reaches.

OLP is the belief-system that philosophical enquiry must focus on language.

A method of philosophy that focuses on language will necessarily come to different conclusions to a method of philosophy that doesn't focus on language.
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but Austin is not abandoning either truth, as I discuss here nor is OLP giving up on the essence of things, as I argued in the last paragraph here. — Antony Nickles

As you said "because the truth will “turn on… the circumstances in which it is uttered.”(p.111)"

True. If I said to someone "you are truly hot", this would have several possible meanings dependent upon context. Some literal and some figurative.

As you said "But Austin also shows how “reality”...............is a manufactured idea".

True. The concept of "reality" is manufactured within language.