Firstly, anything not impossible is possible in my understanding. What is your understanding?

You're asking me to demonstrate that Free Will is possible, which implies you believe it is impossible. Since there is a robust Determinism vs Free Will debate here and elsewhere that long predated your (and my) existance on this planet and likely will continue long after we're both gone, the general consensus is that Free Will is possible, therefore you're actually in the position of having to demonstrate your outlier position.

Santa Claus (as well as gods) definitely exist. I don't know if that satifies either of them being possible in your way of thinking.

What does "compatibilist" mean in this sentence? It doesn't look like it means the usual free-will/determinism kind of compatibilism, but I'm stumped at what else it could mean. — flannel jesus

I was referring to the usual kind of compatibilism. The problem of compatibilism, at least as i understand it, is how to reconcile two seemingly contradictory premises

1) The principle of causal determinism - by which the future when conditioned upon a hypothetical total knowledge of the past, is believed to consist of precisely one possible world.

2) The metaphysical existence of choice and possibility for agents who interact with the world.

In my opinion, many self-described compatibilists are in fact deniers of either 1 or 2, and so don't qualify as being "compatibilist". For example, they might hold to 1) but interpret possibilities to be epistemic rather than ontic. Or they might hold onto 2 whilst apparently forgetting their alleged commitment to 1, or they might simply fail to provide any reconciliation of their beliefs in 1 and 2.

To actually commit to both 1 and 2 in a way that reconciles them requires a radical re-conception of time and causation along the lines of presentism, such that the logical implications of causal determinism can be either fully, or least partly, recoverable from the interactive choice principles of 2.

I prioritize the pursuit of wisdom over engaging in debates or conforming to popular opinion. My focus lies in what aligns with logical or mathematical reasoning rather than engaging in robust debates. The dichotomy between determinism and indeterminism, fundamental to quantum and classical science respectively, underpins my perspective. If free will were to exist, the universe would descend into chaos, rendering knowledge and existence impossible due to the absence of stable order and structure. The burden of proof, i believe, rests with those advocating for free will. However, i acknowledge the challenge of providing a logically consistent and satisfying account of free will, as it would necessitate introducing a force beyond demonstrable science and outside the laws of our universe.

My understanding is simple and straightforward. The universe can behave in three possible ways:

1) Deterministic: this means that everything is predetermined, rendering free will non-existent.
2) Indeterministic: this means that everything is random, making free will not possible.
3) Both deterministic and indeterministic: this option, like the first two, excludes the possibility of free will.

As for my question: Is there another option not listed that I should be aware of?

Santa Claus (as well as gods) definitely exist. I don't know if that satifies either of them being possible in your way of thinking. — LuckyR

Right, well then don't forget to be a good boy this Christmas, and if you see or talk to him tell him that punos says hi, and that i'm still waiting for my Red Ryder Carbine Action 200-shot Range Model air rifle. Just kidding :joke:

but what does retro casualty have to do with any of that? I know a lot of compatibilists, and they don't have a model of the world involving retro causality.

but what does retro casualty have to do with any of that? I know a lot of compatibilists, and they don't have a model of the world involving retro causality. — flannel jesus

Earlier i was mentioning models that might appear retro-causal, in the sense that the model considers facts about the past to be ontologically dependent on present and future observations, i.e history is considered not to exist unless 'enabled' by the observations of 'future' observers, which isn't to imply that observers get to control the content of history.

Roguelike video games come to mind, in which a computer game generates an on-the-fly history of a world around the player, in direct response to the players actions. The player's possible actions, which he himself controls, are by definition considered to be "future directed" causal events relative to the player. e.g opening a door, digging a hole, killing a monster etc. The information about the world that those actions reveal, but which those actions aren't said to "cause", is information that appears to be retrocausal if it is considered to be nature's on-the-fly response to the players actions.

I still have no clue why you think compatibilism and retro causality have anything to do with each other

I still have no clue why you think compatibilism and retro causality have anything to do with each other — flannel jesus

Because according to classical understanding of causality, the past is both fixed and exactly determines the future, which prevents the possibility of free choice of any agent who lives above the initial cause.

Compatibilism doesn't make sense as a concept unless the past is in some way considered to be ontologically dependent upon the future. Being committed to the appearance of retrocausation isn't to be committed to retro-causation, and super-determinism might even be considered as appearing retro-causal.

i acknowledge the challenge of providing a logically consistent and satisfying account of free will, as it would necessitate introducing a force beyond demonstrable science and outside the laws of our universe. — punos

Because you say there would need to be one, would I be correct in assuming you already know there was such a force? If not, there was, introduced in 1785, meeting your general criteria, although the degree of satisfaction obtainable from the account of that force is rather subjective, to be sure.

Is there another option not listed that I should be aware of? — punos

Maybe that given the mere appearance that sufficiently intelligent beings behave in at least one way not available to non-intelligent beings, the case should be granted that they actually do. It follows that if such behavior is granted, it is only logical that there be a force serving as both justification and necessary causality for it, that is not available to non-intelligent beings.

Compatibilism doesn't make sense as a concept unless the past is in some way considered to be ontologically dependent upon the future. — sime

Why? Says who?

I did not understand that scenario at all. The field is black, but yesterday it was painted white? I... don't understand

Edit. I understand. You're saying, in a very hard to follow way in my opinion, that the previous day it was painted as if the person painting it knew exactly the path this guy would take - he predicted it perfectly so the guy would only see black.

I don't really see what this has to do with free will at all tbh. The scenario tells me nothing about it the guy had free will or not. Knowing how other people answer this question doesn't really tell me much about what they think of free will either. — flannel jesus

Thank you for echoing my confusion, and for figuring out what was going on. I was lost.

How did painter know the path shoveler would take?

exactly, the op doesn't spell out enough information to even start to judge it. Is the painter god and can always tell the future? Is he just really really knowledgeable, and guesses right 99% of the time because he knows people's psychology really well, but is sometimes wrong?

The story is meaningless.

Why? Says who? — flannel jesus

Yours truly. Tell me how i've gone wrong.

well, I've read many thousands of words about compatibilism, written by compatibilists, written against compatibilists, written about compatibilism in general, I've had many dozens of conversations, listened to many hours of podcasts about it, and I am a compatibilist, and this is the very first time I've ever heard anyone say retro causality has something to do with it.

You said it like the compatibilist model of the world has retro causality, but I think instead it's more accurate to say that your model of compatibilism has retro causality.

Which is fine, if you're a compatibilist and you believe it makes sense with retro causality, that can be the kind of compatibilism that works for you. But it's not what compatibilists think in general.

I'm not sure how this is the case. If I am manipulated, brainwashed by propaganda say, then it seems my actions can absolutely be determined by that.

Like, if you're sent to some alien planet to destroy the Goobleblogs and you've been told that this species' one goal is to eradicate all other life in the galaxy. You think you're involved in self defense against an implacable foe, and so you act accordingly.

As it turns out, the Galaxy Defense Force intentionality mislead you because they want all the unobtainium on the Goobleblogs land and they are actually a friendly, peace loving people.

Then it seems like the manipulation plays a key causal role in your actions.

Then it seems like the manipulation plays a key causal role in your actions. — Count Timothy von Icarus

We often base our actions on the information we have, regardless of the accuracy of the information. But does that mean the information caused our actions?

no one thing causes human choices. It's always a complex network of causality, and sometimes it becomes unclear where the buck really stops.

But part of the network of causes can absolutely be information someone tells you, that seems pretty clear to me.

Indeed. I worded that badly. I didn't mean to imply the information, alone, caused the action, or that the Count suggested such.

but I do think it's an important conversation to have. I mean if we're talking about free will and causality, really we're talking about when it makes sense to hold someone responsible for something.

If you make a choice based on information told to you, and that choice turns out to be really damaging, you might want someone to blame. Sometimes, it's the person who gave the information. Sometimes it's the person who made the choice based on the information. Sometimes it's both, sometimes it's neither.

Seems to be the case to me. When a fire alarm goes off, everyone stands up and exits the room. The alarm seems to play an important causal role there. When you see smoke billowing from your kitchen, you go and grab the fire extinguisher. Incoming information affects behavior.

Of course, it isn't the only thing involved. Past experiences with fire drills also play a causal role in people's behavior. Ears and brains are involved, etc.

I would put it like this: given the way the world is, the fact that people experience fire drills routinely, the fact that loud piercing sirens and flashing lights get our attention, etc. the fire alarm sits astride a "leverage point" as a subsystem that is part of the overall system of "the building and all its occupants." By doing something very simple, it can cause a huge change in behavior. This is a trait of complex systems: a small change in one place can cascade into major global changes across the system.

But when we talk about "freedom," things get more complex. Why is the fire alarm there? Because someone engineered it for a certain purpose -- to warn us about fires. If we put an alarm up in our house, then it is basically acting as an extension of our will. So even though it plays a causal role in our behavior, it doesn't necessarily constrain our freedom. It's the same as when we leave a post-it note for ourselves and it reminds us to do something. The note has causal efficacy, but it has the effect we will it to have.

Manipulation and brainwashing are different. In this case, the information guiding us is largely an extension of another person's will. We aren't acting completely freely if we wouldn't commit to the same acts if we weren't being manipulated.

Modifying Lynn Rudder Baker's definition, I would say an act is free when:

• We want to do x and we actually do x.
• We want to want to do x. (i.e., Frankfurt's second order volitions)
• We do x because we want to do it (it is not a coincidence, our wanting is causally involved in the process)
• We would still want to do x even if we understood the full provenance of why we want to will x (i.e., there is not some fact we might discover that would make us no longer want to do x)

These conditions, particularly the last, are difficult to meet entirely. This is no issue, an act can bemore or less free; freedom is not bivalent. Manipulation seems to make us less free by acting on the last point.

Another thing to note here is that, under the above definition, knowledge and information help us to become more free. This makes intuitive sense. Know-how enhances our causal powers; technology lets us do things we otherwise could not. Knowledge of the world affects our decision-making. The more we know, the more we can be guided by unifying reason, instead of by instinct, desire, and circumstance. Knowledge of the "why" behind our actions is especially important. Without such recursive self-knowledge, we are always motivated by what R. Scott Baker calls "the darkness that comes before," things we cannot fathom. This turns us into a mere effect of other causes.

You said it like the compatibilist model of the world has retro causality, but I think instead it's more accurate to say that your model of compatibilism has retro causality. — flannel jesus

Retro-causality is a generally vague and controversial concept, to the point that it seems to rule very little in or out (recalling the fact that QM, which most physicists consider to be forwards-directed, has an innocuous retro-causal interpretation). Causal conventionalists like Hume for instance, even rule out retro-causality as a matter of tautology, which is why i didn't want to appeal to retro-causality as a hypothesis (which some might argue is formally meaningless), but to philosophical and empirical intuitions, naive if you like, that align with the idea.

It might have been better if I had never used the term. What is of underlying importance to compatibilism in my view, isn't the existence of retro-causation (whatever it is supposed to mean), but the treatment of material implication as being symmetric, i.e. of the form A <--> B, which can be interpreted in a number of ways, including Bertrand Russell's directionless "no causality" view, super-determinism and circular causality. In these cases, it is accepted that there exists synchronisation between a so-called "cause" and a so-called "effect", but where the control between "cause" and "effect" is either considered to be bidirectional, directional but a matter of perspective, or directionless in both directions.

I don't know the background motivation of the OP, but the problem that was presented is very reminiscent of the thought experiments that physicists use when selecting among interpretations of QM, which frequently give rise to debates over free-will in magazines such as the scientific american. In fact the OP's thought experiment is more or less identical to premises called "quantum conspiracies" , namely the premise that nature has already decided on the properties that physicists will measure, such that physics experiments cannot reveal anything about nature's properties.

The OP muddles the question because it's impossible to know why the shoveler and the field painter arrived at the same decision of how to meander across the field.

If you asked me to cross the field taking the shortest distance, I would walk a diagonal line, as would most people, but certainly not all because some would get the question wrong. When I walked the diagonal line, I would still do it with free will because I could have done otherwise and could have purposefully refused to comply with the request to take the shortest path. But, to the extent someone asks me to do X and I do X and the person predicted I would do X, that has nothing to do with whether I could have done otherwise and had free will. I could have done anything. It was just most likely I would comply.

The real question arises when we posit an omniscient creature who knows all. For example, if an omniscient creature wrote out all the things I would do over the course of my life in the Book of Hanover, it would create a problem for free will advocates, at least to the extent free will entails the ability to do otherwise when faced with a decision.

For example, if you ask whether I'm going to eat a ham sandwich for dinner today, and the answer can be found at Page 6 of the Book of Hanover, such that I cannot vary from what the book says, then it's hard to say I can do otherwise. In fact, the book would say such things as "At 3:00 p.m. Hanover will flip to page 6 of the book and see what he will do at 7:00 p.m. and he will try to defy what it says, but he can't."

Such is the problem with omniscience, which is part of a myriad of problems dealing with infinity and other problems dealing with time travel generally.

My view is that one cannot make sense of the meaning of free will, but neither can we make sense of a world without free will. It is a necessary prerequisite to be taken as a given to make sense of our world, even if ultimately it cannot be rationally reconciled.

It might have been better if I had never used the term. What is of underlying importance to compatibilism in my view, isn't the existence of retro-causation (whatever it is supposed to mean), but the treatment of material implication as being symmetric, i.e. of the form A <--> B, which can be interpreted in a number of ways, including Bertrand Russell's directionless "no causality" view, super-determinism and circular causality. In these cases, it is accepted that there exists synchronisation between a so-called "cause" and a so-called "effect", but where the control between "cause" and "effect" is either considered to be bidirectional, directional but a matter of perspective, or directionless in both directions. — sime

None of this seems connected in particular to compatibilism. Compatibilism is perfectly compatible with the idea of causality moving exclusively forward in time.

Manipulation and brainwashing are different. In this case, the information guiding us is largely an extension of another person's will. We aren't acting completely freely if we wouldn't commit to the same acts if we weren't being manipulated. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't think I agree. If an easily recognizable person is known to beat to death any child he sees, and I see him approaching my child, I can choose to do whatever is necessary to prevent him from reaching my child, ignore him and live the consequences, or anything in-between.

If I have been lied to about this easily recognizable person, my options, freedom, and decision are the same. No?

Because you say there would need to be one, would I be correct in assuming you already know there was such a force? If not, there was, introduced in 1785, — Mww

No, i'm not aware of such a force that would enable the occurrence of free will, since every force i know of is of a deterministic nature. What is the name of this force discovered in 1785 that you seem to claim serves as the mechanism for free will? Is it gravity? Is it electromagnetism? Is it the strong or weak force? What other fundamental force is there?

Maybe that given the mere appearance that sufficiently intelligent beings behave in at least one way not available to non-intelligent beings, the case should be granted that they actually do. — Mww

At what level of intelligence does a being acquire free will, and why is there a difference between one insufficient level and another sufficient one? For instance if an egg and a sperm do not have free will, at what point after fertilization does free will come into the picture, and how?

It follows that if such behavior is granted, it is only logical that there be a force serving as both justification and necessary causality for it, that is not available to non-intelligent beings. — Mww

Ok, but what is that force is what i'm asking, along with a complimentary description as to how it achieves this free will? Neither you nor anyone else has ever provided me with a 4th option to my list, do you have one?

I don't know the background motivation of the OP... — sime

Me neither, but I want to consider a pragmatic motivation for a compatibilist perspective.

A person can recognize that we are physically determined systems, and recognize that we are systems that develop probabilistic anticipations of future events. Furthermore, it's rather pragmatically valuable for machines like us to discuss such anticipations. (To get a job, to get married, to get to the moon, to end global warming, etc.)

It seems to me there is a pragmatic value, for the sort of machines we are, to being able to communicate in simplistic terms of free will, and as we are able, modify what we mean by "free will" to be more accurate.

IMO, Peter Tse, in The Neural Basis of Free Will: Criterial Causation, does a good job of pointing towards a more accurate understanding.

So what we know doesn't determine our actions at all? Then why does everyone choose to get up when the fire alarm goes off?

If information didn't determine our choices, this would seem to be a serious limit on freedom. I would like to think that I love who I love and despise who I despise because of who they are, what I know about them, etc. That is, past experiences would help determine my actions relative to people.

But if information has no interaction with choice, then what determines our actions? It can't be our opinions, because those are formed by our past experiences and information about the world. It can't be our preferences unless said preferences are free floating, and not grounded in past experiences or our information about the world. This would seem to simply make our actions arbitrary, random — this doesn't seem like freedom.

So to answer your question: no, freedom is about what we choose to do not about metaphysical possibilities.

I don't think a libertarian free will where a "choosing entity" sits free floating outside of all our other experiences is coherent. If I freely decided to turn the AC up because I feel hot, my "feeling hot" determined my actions. If there wasn't this sort of interaction between the rest of my self and my will, my choices could only be random and arbitrary, determined by nothing, and thus I could not be "self-determining," in any sense.

So what we know doesn't determine our actions at all? Then why does everyone choose to get up when the fire alarm goes off? — Count Timothy von Icarus

What we know does determine our actions. At least it plays a big role. I'm saying that the accuracy of what we know plays no role in our freedom to make choices. Whether what we know is accurate in all ways, the result of flawed experiments, lies we have been told, or whatever, if we think we have accurate information in all cases, our freedom is the same in all cases.

That's the thing with fighting strawmen, you always win. No one I know who believes in Free Will (as well as serious Determinists) supposes that the concept applies to anything more than decision making, ie they agree that physical systems are Determined.

As to talking to Santa (and gods) since they both exist inter-subjectively (not objectively) we can speak to them but they don't answer back.

The freedom implied by the word "Free" in Free Will doesn't mean free from influence, it means free from following inevitably from the antecedent state.

A person can recognize that we are physically determined systems, and recognize that we are systems that develop probabilistic anticipations of future events. Furthermore, it's rather pragmatically valuable for machines like us to discuss such anticipations. (To get a job, to get married, to get to the moon, to end global warming, etc.)

It seems to me there is a pragmatic value, for the sort of machines we are, to being able to communicate in simplistic terms of free will, and as we are able, modify what we mean by "free will" to be more accurate. — wonderer1

Yes, but if determinism is accepted by the compatibilist, then probabilities can only be given an epistemic interpretation, while teleological concepts such as "anticipating the future" can only be objectively interpreted as referring to present and past causes. In which case, your pragmatic compatibilist solution must surely collapse on further inspection into standard metaphysical determinism without "free will".

Another possibility which comes to mind, is to deny that there is an absolute metaphysical distinction between determinism and free-will, by arguing that a definition of either is meaningless, by virtue of their definitions being circular. This is analgous to the arguments that Quine used to reject the analytic-synthetic distinction. However, since this is about denying the intelligibility of the determinism/free-will distinction, I can't see how this stance could be described as a "compatibilist" position. Furthermore, it entails re-conceiving the problem of free will as being at least partly grammatical in nature, as opposed to referring to a purely physical conjecture.