it doesn't seem so far like any of your takes about compatibilism match what normal compatibilists think. Most compatibilists don't rely on any sort of retro causality. They don't argue determinism and free will can't be defined.

That's the thing with fighting strawmen, you always win. — LuckyR

What strawman? It sounds to me like you don't have an answer to my question, and you're just trying to excuse your way out of it. I'm not trying to win anything, what i'm trying to do is figure out how one comes to the conclusion that free will exists in the midst of determinism, or indeterminism.

No one I know who believes in Free Will (as well as serious Determinists) supposes that the concept applies to anything more than decision making, ie they agree that physical systems are Determined. — LuckyR

Sounds like those people want to have their cake and eat it too. How do you suppose decision making is not governed by the deterministic laws of the universe? Whomever believes in determinism and yet believes in free will anywhere in the whole of the universe (from quantum particles to human brains) either does not understand determinism, or does not understand what they mean by free will, and are definitely not serious determinists. What exactly is free about free will? What is it about making a decision that trumps the laws of a deterministically evolving universe?

There really is only one will, the singular will of a deterministic universe, and free will is no more than a misnomer of a deeply misunderstood nature of the universe by some people. One's decisions do not belong to one self, they belong to literally the universe, yet since each and everyone of us is completely part of the universe, our wills naturally feel free to us, i mean why wouldn't it?. I do not believe in free will in any which way, and still i feel as if my will is free and all my own. I feel just like you except my priority is in accepting truth for what it is, and not for what i feel like it is or should be. If that were the case i would be practicing religion and not philosophy.

We don't have to address this subject any further if you are not willing or comfortable in applying logic and reason to the matter. I'm not in competition with you brother, believe it or not i think we are on the same team (i hope); that is we both want to know (i assume), and we are both philosophers (i'm guessing).

So, what determines the "free part" of the decision making process?

If it's nothing, then it's random.

If it's us, then it seems like our choices are based on the type of people we are, which is in turn shaped by past events and our nature. In which case our choices "follow from" us. And since we preexist our choices, it would seem to be the case that we also exist in states that are antecedent to our choices.

If it's a "free will" that exists without reference to our past experiences, preferences, and nature, how does that work? I don't see how our choices can be both "determined by," but "not really determined" by the self that exists prior to a choice being made. But even more so, if seems that, for me to be free, my decisions have to be based on my knowledge, preferences, feelings, past experiences, desires, rational thinking, etc. These pre-exist any "choosing," and to the extent that my choices are based on a free floating free will instead of on these pre-existing factors, I would say I am not free. Some will that has nothing to do with what makes me who I am is then chosing.

This is of course leaving aside the problem of how our choices could ever reflect our will if our actions lack determinate effects. We can only make choices that bring about the states of affairs that we prefer because we know what the effects of our actions will be (which goes back to past experience).

It would seem to me that most philosophers take the "free" to simply means "possessing freedom." They all define freedom differently. Saying "free" means "free from determinism," is just begging the question on libertarianism versus compatibilism.

Neither you nor anyone else has ever provided me with a 4th option to my list, do you have one? — punos

Nope, and no one ever will. Your list seeks natural causality for the way the universe behaves in relation to the possibility for free will, but in considerations for how human agency itself behaves, which presupposes free will, natural causality won’t work. Hence, the introduction of a non-natural causality, or force in your terms, sufficient for metaphysically establishing a logical ground for human behavior, re: freedom.

I’m using free will because you did…..dialectical consistency and all that. They do not belong together, insofar as free does not describe the will under every possible condition of its use in human agency.

But, as you say, I don’t do debates either. You asked, I offered; do with it as you wish.

Nope, and no one ever will. — Mww

I kinda already knew that.

Your list seeks natural causality for the way the universe behaves in relation to the possibility for free will, but in considerations for how human agency itself behaves, which presupposes free will, natural causality won’t work. — Mww

Nope. In fact the purpose of my list was to lay out all the ways the universe might work, and listed all the ones i know. I was hoping that you or someone had some framework under which free will makes sense. I've tried to steelman the free will argument before, but to tell you the honest truth i don't even know how to begin to describe something so contradictory in a sensible way. Obviously you have a way of thinking about it that makes sense to you, and one of the things i'm trying to do is find out how it makes sense to you.

What considerations of human agency are you referring to, and why would you presuppose free will first before investigating the matter, that seems backwards. It is like i'm going to presuppose the Earth is flat and thus i will only conclude that the Earth is flat, even though all other planets that we know of in the universe are spherical in nature. Explain to me how natural causality won't work, show me where it breaks down, and i'll show you where you are wrong, if you or anyone else can even answer that question.

I’m using free will because you did — Mww

And i only did because that's the topic of this thread, and i had no choice even though i felt i did.

free does not describe the will under every possible condition of its use in human agency. — Mww

Ok good that's a start, how do you know there are some conditions under which free will is not a valid description, and how do you know which ones are, and what makes the difference?

But, as you say, I don’t do debates either. You asked, I offered; do with it as you wish. — Mww

You're right, i'm not debating really, i already know there is no free will, but what i really wish to do is to know where such disconnected ideas from reality come from. I'm actually asking for a coherent explanation of free will. If supernatural is all you got then i get it... you're intellectually bankrupt in that specific area at least (not meant to be offensive, just an observation). If that is the case then so be it.

If supernatural is all you got then i get it... you're intellectually bankrupt in that specific area at least (not meant to be offensive, just an observation). — punos

I’d agree to intellectual bankruptcy…..not my own of course; no one willingly admits impoverished rationality…..if supernatural predication was all there was. But it isn’t, and because I’m approaching the issue of will and non-natural causality from the domain of pure practical reason, I’m exempted from any such indirect accusation.

There really is only one will, the singular will of a deterministic universe…… — punos

Ahhh, a Schopenhaur-ian then. Of some sort? Very far from my interest, so….carry on.

:up:

Which my response is making a claim -- lets see how free the will is without the body. — Vaskane

Wouldn't it be absolutely free, without any boundaries or limitations whatsoever? But that's just my guess, I really don't know what you're talking about.

The will without the body was your proposition. Do you accept it or not?

No one expects that the will is free in an absolute way. That is not how we use 'free", and it seems like a sort of ridiculous idea. That's what I was trying to say. You and I are "free", but we cannot break the law without being punished. Freedom always has its limits.

Have you ever considered that perhaps the will chose to have a body, so that it could use the body as a tool? Then having a body is the means by which the will is expanding is boundaries.

Alas no one knows at the granular level how exactly human decision making happens. We do know that if someone could take detailed knowledge of the antecedent state and correctly predict the resultant state (the decision) 100% of the time, most, including myself would take that as proof of Determinism and a refutation of the concept of Free Will.

We also know that knowledge of the antecedent state allows prediction of decision making better than random chance but nowhere near 100% accuracy. Thus the antecedent state clearly Influences decision making, just it isn't proven that it Determines it.

Now, everyone has experienced the process of pondering a choice. Determinism proclaims that while the process of pondering is real, that one can actually choose either vanilla or chocolate is an illusion. In other words our subjective feeling that we can choose is false. All Free Will is claiming is that our subjective feeling of choice is correct, that you really could have chosen vanilla or chocolate.

It doesn't require disintegration of the Universe. That's just hyperbole.

We do know that if someone could take detailed knowledge of the antecedent state and correctly predict the resultant state (the decision) 100% of the time, most, including myself would take that as proof of Determinism and a refutation of the concept of Free Will. — LuckyR

The thing I don't like about this framing is that it's impossible in a practical sense - we'll never get to a point where we can do that perfectly, and in fact any physical system in any possible universe prohibits predicting the future perfectly faster than the universe calculates that future itself.

So even if we did live in a deterministic universe, predicting the future perfectly faster than the future comes is necessarily impossible.

You could predict it imperfectly faster, of course - we can do that now for many scenarios - but that can't have 100% accuracy and we could do that even if there is some genuine randomness.

So basically, what I'm saying is, realistically our ability to predict things doesn't actually tell us if we live in a deterministic universe or not. I mean, it does mean at don't live in a COMPLETELY random universe, but it doesn't tell us if we live in a universe with 0 randomness or some randomness

We do know that if someone could take detailed knowledge of the antecedent state and correctly predict the resultant state (the decision) 100% of the time, most, including myself would take that as proof of Determinism and a refutation of the concept of Free Will.

This is a statement of the position known as "incompatibilism." "If things are determined, then there is no freedom." Claiming that we universally "know" this is simply to beg the question re compatibilism.

But there is a reason incompatibilism is no longer a dominant position in debates free will. It's arguably incoherent, as I've tried to point out. If I'm "free" when I act according to my desires, preferences, and rational decision making process, then it is also clear that all of those must preexist my acts.

You say this makes us somehow unfree, by virtue of our rationality, desires, knowledge, and preferences pre-existing our actions. My question is: what doesn't preexist our making a choice that is meaningfully "us," such that this non-prexisting force has anything to do with us and thus can be an extension of our will? The demand that some core element of "what is doing the choosing," not pre-exist our choosing seems to preclude that any
of the freedom described is actually "ours."

And then what determines how this special choosing part chooses? If it has nothing to do with our knowledge, desires, etc. then it doesn't seem to have anything to do with us. We are acted upon by ghosts outside our understanding.

That is, the metaphysical problem of "where is this will in space time," is only part of the challenge to incompatiblist free will. The other problem is that it seems to deny that "we," who pre-exist our choices, could be what determines those choices.

Certainly, advocates of libertarian free will still exist (e.g., Thomas Pink), but IMO they all seem to either turn libertarianism into compatibilism, or handwave the issues away with semantics by claiming "freedom just IS the act of chosing that organisms do," (Pink).

Determinism does not entail reductionism. It doesn't entail that our choices reduce to "the states of all the atoms that make up our body before we choose," or anything like that. It simply means, "what comes before dictates what comes after." We come before our choices. This seems to be a prerequisite for freedom in that we have to come before our choices to affect them. Determinism doesn't preclude "self determination." Only determinism wed to smallism claims that actions reduce to physical states in phase space or something like that.

Determinism proclaims that while the process of pondering is real, that one can actually choose either vanilla or chocolate is an illusion.

Again, this is the position of incompatibilism, not determinism. Leibniz came up with the Principal of Sufficient Reason in part to explain why it was necessary for freedom, not how it precluded it.

But there is a reason incompatibilism is no longer a dominant position in debates free will. It's arguably incoherent, as I've tried to point out. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree, compatibilists are generally people who do not want to think out the problems, so they insist there is no problem.

You say this makes us somehow unfree, by virtue of our rationality, desires, knowledge, and preferences pre-existing our actions. My question is: what doesn't preexist our making a choice that is meaningfully "us," such that this non-prexisting force has anything to do with us and thus can be an extension of our will? The demand that some core element of "what is doing the choosing," not pre-exist our choosing seems to preclude that any
of the freedom described is actually "ours." — Count Timothy von Icarus

You are characterizing "the will", and the freedom which the will has, as a property of "us". But if you allow that each person is an individual, and the free will as a property of "us" is something which preexists the individual, (and this is evident by the nature of life), then you will see that an individual's free will is an extension of the will which precedes the individual. As I said to Vaskane above, consider that to have a body was a choice made by the will.

Ok, that still doesn't answer how such decisions are "mine" in they aren't determined by my rationality, beliefs, desires, instincts, etc? What exactly is this free floating will that isn't determined by anything that comes before? You can declare by fiat that free floating "will" is ours, but what exactly does it have to do with us if it isn't determined by our feelings, memories, etc?

And incompatibilism runs in to even more problems explaining how it is that people in France might be, in important ways, "more free" than people in North Korea. Or how is it that a prisoner can be "less free" due to their imprisonment? Do we have to posit a different, sui generis type of freedom here? It seems to me like we would, since otherwise the free floating freedom of individuals turns out to be exactly the sort of thing that is influenced by prior circumstances.

Further, we can consider positive freedom. In key ways, things like education seem to empower or freedom. We are not "free to become a literary critic" if no one will teach us how to read. We aren't "free to become an engineer," without training in mathematics. But these are, like political liberties and rights, tied to the prior state of the world. I am not free to become a lawyer if only the nobility can practice law, etc.

Then there is the whole issue of how any will can possibly effectively work to bring about states of affairs it prefers, and prevent states of affairs it does not prefer, if its actions lack determinant effects. If my showing my son books might make him forget how to read, how am I free to teach him to read? I am only free to do this because I know that specific acts help with the acquisition of literacy (acts have determinant, predictable consequences)

Finally, consider the alcoholic, drug addict, sex addict, sufferer of OCD, or "rageoholic" They are influenced by internal causes outside their control in a way many who suffer these conditions liken to "slavery." But how can we explain this sort of internal bondage if our freedom isn't determined by our personal history?

I agree, compatibilists are generally people who do not want to think out the problems, so they insist there is no problem.

Because there doesn't seem to be a problem if freedom is grounded in "self-determination." It doesn't seem like much of a definition stretch to say that we are free when "we do what we want and don't do what we don't want," and that "we are the cause of our own actions."

Such a definition doesn't clash with determinism. The definition which clashes with determinism is: "we are free if we can do other than we actually do,"which just seems like a bad definition since, by necessity, we only ever do what we actually do. The freedom we care about lies in how we make our actual choices, not metaphysical potentialities re choice, so this ends up being a non-sequitur. Not to mention that free will as self-determination makes it much easier to define how we can be relatively more or less free, which certainly seems to be the case (freedom is not bivalent, we can experience gradations of coercion).

If we offer hungry people two dishes of food, one fresh, and one rancid, we are probably justified in expecting 100% of them choose the non-rancid food. Were they unfree? It doesn't seem so. Was their choice determined by what came before - the rancidity of the one plate? It seems so.

Ok, that still doesn't answer how such decisions are "mine"... — Count Timothy von Icarus

You are just asking for a contradiction. You want to say "the decisions are mine", as if you are determining them, so that you can say "this contradicts 'the will is free'".

You can declare by fiat that free floating "will" is ours, but what exactly does it have to do with us if it isn't determined by our feelings, memories, etc? — Count Timothy von Icarus

It is not declared by fiat, it is known by evidence. Your parents preexisted you, and so did the will which brought your body into being. It is only when you move to make the will the property of the individual, instead of the individual a property of the will, that you separate a multitude of wills, the wills of your parents, and yourself into individual wills. But you do this only because you are asking for contradiction.

Then there is the whole issue of how any will can possibly effectively work to bring about states of affairs they prefer, and prevent states of affairs they don't prefer, if their actions lack determinant effects. If my showing my son books might make him forget how to read, how am I free to teach him to read? I am only free to do this because I know that specific acts help with the aquisition of literacy. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I do not understand this criticism. Learning is attributable to the combined and unified will of both teacher and student, with the unified goal of education. If the will for education was only on one side, as you portray, there could be no education.

Finally, consider the alcoholic, drug addict, sex addict, sufferer of OCD, or "rageoholic" They are influenced by internal causes outside their control in a way many who suffer these conditions liken to "slavery." But how can we explain this sort of internal bondage if our freedom isn't determined by our personal history? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I do not understand this criticism either. The will is free to choose, but it must live with the consequences of its choices. That is the nature of time. Mistakes happen and we suffer from the consequences. That we suffer from mistaken choices of the past, does not imply that those choices were not freely made.

And, as I also explained to Viskane above, in no way is "free" ever used to signify something absolute. There is always restrictions to freedom. It is only by asking for absolute freedom in the concept of "free will", that the incoherency which you find, arises. But that incoherency is really the result of making "free" something which it never is in reality, and that is absolute. In reality, "free" is always qualified.

Because there doesn't seem to be a problem is freedom is grounded in "self-determination." It doesn't seem like much of a definition stretch to say that we are free when "we do what we want and don't do what we don't want," and that "we are the cause of our own actions." Such a definition doesn't clash with determinism. The definition the clashes with determinism is: "we are free if we can do other than we actually do,"which just seems like a bad definition since, by necessity, we only do what we actually do. The freedom we care about lies in how we make our actual choices, not the metaphysical potentialities re choice, so this ends up being a non-sequitur. Not to mention that free will as self-determination makes it much easier to define how we can be relatively more or less free, which certainly seems to be the case. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The problems described here arise from a misrepresentation of the nature of time. We would require a better representation of freedom in relation to passing time, in order to sort out these issues. We are free in relation to the future, and not free in relation to the past, is a position which does clash with determinism, and it does not require that we are free to do other than we did.

and it does not require that we are free to do other than we did. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think anybody's concpetion of freed will literally requires the ability to change past choices made.

I agree, it's asking for a contradiction. That's why libertarian free will makes no sense. The idea of "us" choosing in a way that is autonomous from the past - our experiences, memories, desires, past thinking, etc. removes "us" from the will.

To say that such a "free will," "isn't actually totally free, that it's constrained by (determined by) all sorts of things like past experience, memory, desire, physics etc." is to simply grant the main claim of compatibilism. This is what I mean by "libertarianism turning itself into compatibilism."

If you say "no, only most of our decision making is pre-determined, there is an extra bit of free floating free will that isn't determined by anything in the past," then I'd just repeat the same question: "what does such a will have to do with me?"

It basically comes down to this; "If something is not determined by anything in what way is it not random?" The uncaused is random, and there is no reason anything uncaused should tend towards any choice and not another. It seems incoherent to me to say "our wills are determined by our past experiences, thoughts, desires" but then also that there is also an "extra bit" that isn't determined by any of these. Ok, even if this is true, it doesn't result in more freedom, it just makes my actions partly random and unfathomable. If I can't possibly know what determined my actions, how am I to become free?

I do not understand this criticism. Learning is attributable to the combined and unified will of both teacher and student, with the unified goal of education. If the will for education was only on one side, as you portray, there could be no education.

The point isn't about whose will is involved, it is that, in every such instance of positive freedom the past dictates what we are free to do in the future. I have no problem saying that "past free choices influence future free choices." But this is still the past determining the future.

If you don't learn to read, you're not free to read War and Peace. This is past states of the world determining freedom of action.

It basically comes down to this; "If something is not determined by anything in what way is it not random? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think that alternative interpretations of 'chance' is the key to non-classical compatibilism, where by "non-classical" I am referring to considerations from modern logic.

Consider the fact that the definition of chance appears to be circular - ordinarily, chance is taken to mean "to not be determined", where to be "determined" is taken to mean "to not be subject to chance".

One way out of this circularity is to consider determinism and chance to be relative to perspective, by taking inspiration from game-theory in which "chance nodes" are understood to refer to states of a game in which it isn't the player's turn to move, but someone else's.

Non-classical compatibilism that is based on this logic, can take metaphysical "free choice" as an axiom that is true for every player of the game, whose actions impose constraints on both the possible futures and possible 'pasts' of every other player. This position can be regarded as "compatibilist" to the extent that it can successfully reduce the empirical observations of modern theoretical physics in terms of a set of laws, whose 'determinism' is considered to be relative to the frame of reference used.

Transactional QM seems to be the closest theory in this regard.

Consider the fact that the definition of chance appears to be circular - ordinarily, chance is taken to mean "to not be determined", where to be "determined" is taken to mean "to not be subject to chance".

I think there are definitely problems with the main ways of defining probability, particularly frequentism, but I don't think circularity is one of them. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/probability-interpret/

The classical and logical views don't seem to be as much a problem for metaphysical potentialities as for epistemology and the idea of rational credence.

One way out of this circularity is to consider determinism and chance to be relative to perspective, by taking inspiration from game-theory in which "chance nodes" are understood to refer to states of a game in which it isn't the player's turn to move, but someone else's.

Non-classical compatibilism that is based on this logic, can take metaphysical "free choice" as an axiom that is true for every player of the game, whose actions impose constraints on both the possible futures and possible 'pasts' of every other player. This position can be regarded as "compatibilist" to the extent that it can successfully reduce the empirical observations of modern theoretical physics in terms of a set of laws, whose 'determinism' is considered to be relative to the frame of reference used.

Transactional QM seems to be the closest theory in this regard.

That's an interesting idea. Any tips on a place to read more?

But what about situations where we have been manipulated? In those cases, it seems like we are making a free choice at the time, but we come to find out that we made choices we otherwise wouldn't have. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That doesn't matter, because free will isn't wisdom, omnipotence, or omniscience.

Of course it's possible that with more knowledge, more resources, one would make different choices. But this has no bearing on whether one has free will or not.

That doesn't matter, because free will isn't wisdom, omnipotence, or omniscience.

Not sure what the relevance of this is.

Of course it's possible that with more knowledge, more resources, one would make different choices. But this has no bearing on whether one has free will or not.

So what does have bearing on free will?

Did the shift in Western culture that allowed women to start being educated in large numbers not affect their freedom? Does being raised in a religious cult not effect freedom? Are the characters in 1984 not made less free by the omnipotent manipulation of information by the state?

That doesn't matter, because free will isn't wisdom, omnipotence, or omniscience.
Not sure what the relevance of this is. — Count Timothy von Icarus

When people talk about lack of free will, they're usually actually talking about lack of wisdom, lack of omniscience, or lack of omnipotence.

(Or, in Libet's absurd case, a person would have to be without the ability to plan and act accordingly in order to qualify as having free will.)

So what does have bearing on free will?

Only whether the person feels they have free will or not.

Did the shift in Western culture that allowed women to start being educated in large numbers not affect their freedom? Does being raised in a religious cult not effect freedom? Are the characters in 1984 not made less free by the omnipotent manipulation of information by the state?

In some of the above cases, free will is affected only in the sense that people were directly taught and internalized things to the effect that they are deterministic automatons, or that whatever they do is guided and decided by some "higher power".

Knowledge, information, and resources only define and limit options on which to think or act, but they don't limit free will.

I entirely agree with you. If it's not the result of influences, then it's random.

My answer to the question of "What is free will free from?" is "The properties and forces that physics is aware of." My decisions/choices are not reducible to arrangements of the constituent parts of my brain, progressing from moment to moment due to the laws of physics.

Gotcha. Personally, I don't think freedom can be reduced to "the feeling of volition." At the very least, such a view would seem to require multiple disjunct types of freedom. Slaves presumably experience the sensation of volition the same way as non-slaves, and yet there is still an important sense in which they aren't "free" in the same ways. The same goes for alcoholism, drug addiction, etc., which don't have any effect on the sensation of volition.



That seems plausible to me. But even if some sort of substance dualism were the case, it would still seem to me that what determines our choices must exist before we choose in order for our choices to be truly "ours." So, even if I entertain the idea of "nonphysical souls," compatibalism seems more right.

That seems plausible to me. But even if some sort of substance dualism were the case, it would still seem to me that what determines our choices must exist before we choose in order for our choices to be truly "ours." So, even if I entertain the idea of "nonphysical souls," compatibalism seems more right. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree - whether choices are purely physical or happen in some sort of "soul realm", the picture doesn't change at all.

Gotcha. Personally, I don't think freedom can be reduced to "the feeling of volition." At the very least, such a view would seem to require multiple disjunct types of freedom. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Freedom is about "freedom from something" and "freedom to do something". This doesn't have to do with "free will".

Slaves presumably experience the sensation of volition the same way as non-slaves, and yet there is still an important sense in which they aren't "free" in the same ways. The same goes for alcoholism, drug addiction, etc., which don't have any effect on the sensation of volition.

Sure. Someone with less information, less knowledge, fewer resources will just have it harder to carry out their decisions. Making a decision in free will and the ease of acting on said decision are two different things.

That seems plausible to me. But even if some sort of substance dualism were the case, it would still seem to me that what determines our choices must exist before we choose in order for our choices to be truly "ours." So, even if I entertain the idea of "nonphysical souls," compatibalism seems more right.

We don't talk about "love" or "friendship" or "democracy" etc. on the level of cells and tissues, as if "love" etc. would exist on the level of biochemistry. But why do this when it comes to free will?

Do you think it would make sense to test someone whether they love you or believe in democracy by measuring their brain waves or some such?

We don't talk about "love" or "friendship" or "democracy" etc. on the level of cells and tissues, as if "love" etc. would exist on the level of biochemistry. But why do this when it comes to free will?

IMHO, it's the prevalence of smallism in modern explanations of determinism.

Old way of explaining determinism: the world follows the Principal of Sufficient Reason, "everything has a sufficent cause." Causes come before effects. Causes determine effects. We can consider several types of causes (substance, essence, form, telos, etc.)

Modern Way: X are the ways in which physics and chemistry are deterministic. Everything reduces to facts about chemistry and physics, thus the world is deterministic.

And then this is used to support fatalism. "If all facts about people are reducible to facts about atoms, and atoms aren't free, then freedom can never enter the equation (see: Hume, Jaegeon Kim)."

To my mind, this is problematic because there is much more evidence for a broad concept of causation than smallism. On the balance of evidence, I would say smallism sounds quite unlikely, while some concept of cause seems necessary to explain the world (and likely PSR as well).

Is "smallism" a view that anyone actually endorses?