Kierkegaard meshes well with the Lublin School because of their focus on human experience while not falling into relativism. — Dermot Griffin

Saint Thomas presents a philosophy based on existence, which we may call “existentialism” (but we must avoid any confusion with the philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre in this regard). — Brief Overview of Lublin Thomism

I often think that fellow Christians see them as just different philosophical traditions or religions (especially Buddhism) and do not realize the worth they have as lens to view the Bible from. — Dermot Griffin

fell out of the routine three years ago, and haven't gone back to it. I've become sceptical of Western Buddhism - that is, Buddhism as practiced and propogated in modern culture. And while I have considerable respect for the teaching and principles I don't feel as though I've been able to successfully integrate into them or with them. I did have some real epiphanies associated with meditation earlier in life, but then it's been like a 'seeds and weeds' scenario in the subsequent years. (I'm in a quandary about it, although I suppose internet forums aren't really a good medium to air such things.) — Wayfarer

The third and final part will discuss how these positions are similar to Orthodox Christianity and ultimately conclude with what Catholic and Protestant thought are lacking in and that is an emphasis on mystical theology.

I've become sceptical of Western Buddhism - that is, Buddhism as practiced and propogated in modern culture. And while I have considerable respect for the teaching and principles I don't feel as though I've been able to successfully integrate into them or with them. I did have some real epiphanies associated with meditation earlier in life, but then it's been like a 'seeds and weeds' scenario in the subsequent years. — Wayfarer

I also realise that I have been very much influenced by Christian Platonism - I think it's a kind of inborn cultural archetype. — Wayfarer

I just wish there were an association or teacher - not an online one! - that I could associate with in that genre. — Wayfarer

This sort of universalist self-confidence has been badly damaged though. You still see it in later figures though, Erasmus, Cusa, Boheme, Zwingli, Hegel, etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus

It seems to me like the mystical tradition is generally much weaker in Protestantism. — Count Timothy von Icarus

the promise of mystical union with the divine seems to be a major part of the "Good News," that is neglected in contemporary accounts of the Gospel. Instead, Christianity is reduced to a story about how one avoids punishment and gains reward. Christianity as a path to freedom — freedom over circumstance, desire, and instinct — the sort of unification of the will Plato and Hegel talk about, is particularly neglected. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I find interreligious dialogue between Catholicism and Hinduism to be more apropos and compelling than interreligious dialogue between Catholicism and Buddhism — Leontiskos

What follows is that Buddhism and Protestantism do not transplant well — Leontiskos

That leads to the dessicated social religion that Christianity has become - 'belief without evidence' as it's usually described here. — Wayfarer

In my opinion (and experience), a direct encounter with the mystical is extremely powerful evidence in support of theism. — J

Have you ever tried LSD? — wonderer1

Have I ever! Don't get me started . . . :starstruck: — J

"Belief without evidence" is trickier. There's all kinds of evidence for the existence of God and even the divinity of Jesus, but none of it is rock solid. As in so many areas, we're left with beliefs that fall far short of certainty, but are hardly as bereft as "belief without evidence" sounds. In my opinion (and experience), a direct encounter with the mystical is extremely powerful evidence in support of theism. — J

Have you ever tried LSD? — wonderer1

Science is implicitly understood as the arbiter of what should be taken seriously — Wayfarer

The "perennial philosophy" is ...defined as a doctrine which holds [1] that as far as worthwhile knowledge is concerned not all men are equal, but that there is a hierarchy of persons, some of whom, through what they are, can know much more than others; [2] that there is a hierarchy also of the levels of reality, some of which are more "real," because more exalted than others; and [3] that the wise have found a "wisdom" which is true, although it has no "empirical" basis in observations which can be made by everyone and everybody; and that in fact there is a rare and unordinary faculty in some of us by which we can attain direct contact with actual reality--through the Prajñāpāramitā of the Buddhists, the logos of Parmenides, the sophia of Aristotle and others, Spinoza's amor dei intellectualis, Hegel's Vernunft, and so on; and [4] that true teaching is based on an authority which legitimizes itself by the exemplary life and charismatic quality of its exponents.

The memories I retain are a sense of rapture at the extraordinary beauty of natural things, some vivid hallucinatory experiences, and a sense of 'why isn't life always like this?' — Wayfarer

But the accusation of belief without evidence is often raised on this forum whenever any vaguely religious sentiment is expressed. — Wayfarer

Not only that, but the meaning of "evidence" to some here has been so narrowed down by empirical principles, that it could only mean something which appears directly through an individual's sensations. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don’t know if you’ve read Walker Percy. He makes an interesting distinction between “knowledge” and “news.” Knowledge would be the sort of thing that, broadly, science investigates. News, on the other hand, is information that you can’t deduce or discover for yourself; someone has to tell you. This would include religious revelation, for Percy. And he says that the “credentials of the news-bearer” are important evidence for whether to trust the news.

This may be too black-and-white, but I see what he’s getting at and I think it’s a valuable insight. I wonder what Aquinas would say, getting back to the OP. He made a distinction between natural and revealed religion, didn’t he? And I'm sure Kierkegaard, that champion of subjectivity, would agree. — J

Christianity believes, that is to say, not in the doctrines of philosophy, which are nothing
but an alphabetic scribbling of human speculation, and subject to the fluctuating cycles of
moon and fashion! – not in images and the worship of images! – not in the worship of
animals and heroes! – not in symbolic elements and passwords or in some black figures
obscurely painted by the invisible hand on the white wall! – not in Pythagorean-Platonic
numbers!!! – not in the passing shadows of actions and ceremonies that will not remain
and not endure, which are thought to possess a secret power and inexplicable magic! – –
not in any laws, which must be followed even without faith, as the theorist somewhere
says, notwithstanding his Epicurean-Stoic hairsplitting about faith and knowledge! – –
No, Christianity knows of and recognizes no other bonds of faith than the sure prophetic
Word as recorded in the most ancient documents of the human race and in the holy scrip-
tures of authentic Judaism, without Samaritan segregation and apocryphal Mishnah. — After Enlightenment: Hamann as Post-Secular Visionary, by John R. Betz, p. 283

I wonder what Aquinas would say, getting back to the OP. He made a distinction between natural and revealed religion, didn’t he? — J

As other sciences do not argue in proof of their principles, but argue from their principles to demonstrate other truths in these sciences: so [sacred doctrine] does not argue in proof of its principles, which are the articles of faith, but from them it goes on to prove something else [...] . However, it is to be borne in mind, in regard to the philosophical sciences, that the inferior sciences neither prove their principles nor dispute with those who deny them, but leave this to a higher science; whereas the highest of them, viz. metaphysics, can dispute with one who denies its principles, if only the opponent will make some concession; but if he concede nothing, it can have no dispute with him, though it can answer his objections. Hence Sacred Scripture, since it has no science above itself, can dispute with one who denies its principles only if the opponent admits some at least of the truths obtained through divine revelation; thus we can argue with heretics from texts in Holy Writ, and against those who deny one article of faith, we can argue from another. If our opponent believes nothing of divine revelation, there is no longer any means of proving the articles of faith by reasoning, but only of answering his objections — if he has any — against faith. Since faith rests upon infallible truth, and since the contrary of a truth can never be demonstrated, it is clear that the arguments brought against faith cannot be demonstrations, but are difficulties that can be answered. — Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia, Q. 1, A. 8

A common thread in all of these positions is the idea that knowledge is not merely cerebral and abstract (e.g. the Hebrew, Indian, Platonic, and Christian traditions — Leontiskos