Putin sends message in German to Schröder's critics
^{— t-online · Oct 24, 2023}

I would like to say, the further one gets from Schröder, the closer one comes to Anthony Rota, the Speaker of the Canadian Parliament, who sympathizes with the Nazis. There are many decent people in Germany, and I am sure many will hear this. — Pukin

Plainly, Rota isn't Nazi or a sympathizer. Neither is the Canadian government, nor the Canadian populace at large. That then makes Putin a liar, caught in the act. Don't know if any of his home peers called him out; if any have or will, hopefully, they won't get "sent away" as "extremists".

But, hey, yes, there are many good Germans.

‘So Russians don’t fear them’ Putin administration tells pro-government media not to report on crimes committed by returning soldiers
^{— Andrey Pertsev · Meduza · Oct 24, 2023}

Oh yeah, it's tactically useful, for sure. I just question the rationale for expending the massive amount of resources that have already been lost there given the apparent odds of success. It would be the equivalent of the AFU launching another NATO style maneuver offensive directly into Russian defenses (and on a significantly larger scale), with the goal apparently being to secure an arbitrary political border for x date .

Particularly the use of penal assault brigades given how wonderfully that went last time. :roll:

Migrants Reportedly Being Forced To Sign Contracts With Defense Ministry To Obtain Russian Citizenship
^{— Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, Frederick W Kagan · RFE/RL · Aug 28, 2023}

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 24, 2023
^{— Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, Frederick W Kagan · ISW · Oct 24, 2023}

Russian authorities are intensifying mobilization efforts targeting Central Asian migrant communities in Russia. Russian Internal Affairs (MVD) Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev met with the MVD board to discuss “migration problems” and “ethnic crime” and insinuated that migrants commit crimes at a higher rate than natural born Russian citizens.⁽⁷⁾ Kolokoltsev defended recent Russian law enforcement mobilization raids on migrant communities and claimed that Russian law enforcement is enforcing standard legal norms.⁽⁸⁾ A Russian insider source claimed that the Russian Investigative Committee is conducting investigations into naturalized migrants with Russian citizenship and is reopening previously terminated and canceled criminal cases in order to mobilize migrants to fight in Ukraine.⁽⁹⁾ The insider source also claimed that the Russian Investigative Committee will now investigate migrants for committing any offense, even minor ones, and will expand that individual’s investigation to include their friends and family. The insider source claimed that unspecified actors, possibly the MVD or MVD Head Alexander Bastrykin, ordered Russian state media to increase reporting about ethnic crime in Russia, likely to set informational conditions for further mobilization raids on migrant communities.⁽¹⁰⁾ Bastrykin has continually advocated for the targeted mobilization of migrants with Russian citizenship, in line with Russian law enforcement’s recent expansion of its efforts to detain and forcibly register migrants with Russian citizenship for military service.<sup>(11)

(7) https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/30299 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/13239 ; https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/15640 ; https://mvdmedia.ru/news/official/vladimir-kolokoltsev-provel-zasedanie-kollegii-mvd-rossii-posvyashchennoe-protivodeystviyu-nelegalno/
(8) https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/30299 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/13239 ; https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/15640 ; https://mvdmedia.ru/news/official/vladimir-kolokoltsev-provel-zasedanie-kollegii-mvd-rossii-posvyashchennoe-protivodeystviyu-nelegalno/
(9) https://t.me/vchkogpu/43131
(10) https://t.me/vchkogpu/43131
(11) https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-22-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-20-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-12-2023</sup>

Oh yeah, it's tactically useful, for sure. I just question the rationale for expending the massive amount of resources that have already been lost there given the apparent odds of success. It would be the equivalent of the AFU launching another NATO style maneuver offensive directly into Russian defenses (and on a significantly larger scale), with the goal apparently being to secure an arbitrary political border for x date . — Count Timothy von Icarus

This was Ukraine's militarily nonsensical reasoning for their offensive.

Nonsensical because achieving an "arbitrary political border for x date" had essentially zero chance of success and also doesn't end the war. Russia would still be there with an army and able to invade at any point along the entire border (the front line is the entire border with Russia and Belarus).

The need for the Ukrainian offensive was purely for PR purposes of propping up the narrative that Ukraine can "win".

However, there is no symmetry here. The reason Ukraine's offensive makes no military sense is because Ukraine has no chance of winning the war of attrition, and even less chance by recklessly charging at Russian prepared defences.

Russia on the other hand can win the war of attrition. It is an illusion to believe Ukraine can "keep it up" indefinitely.

Some forces and equipment were expended to secure positions around Avdiivka to create a cauldron to attrit Ukrainian forces there everyday, which as @'Tzeentch' has already pointed out.

Given the state of foreign support for Ukraine amidst the Middle-East crisis, there will be a lot of pressure on the Ukrainian forces to defend it, which how the Russians aim to attrition the Ukrainian forces. — Tzeentch

So, the losses needed to secure the position needs to be evaluated against the attritional value of the cauldron. If the Ukrainians retreat to better positions then the losses achieved the political value of winning a battle.

Point being, it is erroneous to equate the Russian offensive with the recent Ukrainian offensive. Yes, Russia faces the same challenges that the Ukrainians faced but with more equipment, air superiority, and more man power available.

That Ukraine attacked Russian prepared defences and attritted a large part of their forces is essentially a dream come true if you're trying to win a war of attrition.

The correct military strategy for Ukraine would be to not attack Russian lines but focus on defence and maximize the cost of Russian advances.

However, the problem Ukraine has is that the Western and Ukrainian narrative is that they can and will "win" on the battlefield. This narrative maximizes support for more war and rejecting peace talks (why talk peace if you can just win), but requires Ukraine to recklessly attack Russian lines in order to keep the narrative somewhat plausible. Of course politically speaking, if Ukraine can't secure aid then the entire government would collapse so the strategy must be to play to what sounds good to a Western audience (which is that we're repeating WWII somehow ... and what people remember most about WWII is that "we won"); so in this light it is the only strategy that keeps things going (especially when there was hope that economic sanctions would lead to economic collapse in Russia) the main problem now is that there is no where to go for Ukraine.

Unless the promise of economic collapse and political breakdown in Russia actually materializes, Ukraine will lose the war of attrition which means at some point total collapse of Ukrainian lines.

The point of the drive was take the railhead at Tocomak and cut off forces on the river in Russian held Kherson to withdraw. It's aim was cutting ground lines of communications, the exact thing it did to force a Russian withdrawal from the rest of Kherson and Kharkiv.

The other objective is obviously to get the bridge to Crimea in MLRS range so it can be destroyed. A follow on goal would be to drive to Melitopol and encircle Russian forced in Kherson if they had yet to withdraw.

Russia is aiming at a far smaller operation here, nothing that can really be said to be of strategic value, unless one considers that getting the "legally defined boundaries of the Donbass," within their control might make suing for some sort of peace more palatable domestically.

The point of the drive was take the railhead at Tocomak and cut off forces on the river in Russian held Kherson to withdraw. It's aim was cutting ground lines of communications, the exact thing it did to force a Russian withdrawal from the rest of Kherson and Kharkiv. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Which then accomplishes what? What did the withdrawal from Kherson and around Kharkiv accomplish for the Ukrainians other than feeding the narrative they can "win"?

The other objective is obviously to get the bridge to Crimea in MLRS range so it can be destroyed. A follow on goal would be to drive to Melitopol and encircle Russian forced in Kherson if they had yet to withdraw. — Count Timothy von Icarus

If hitting the bridge was so important ... why not just ask the US to supply the longer range ATACMS rather than waste precious lives and equipment to carve out a a tiny cauldron into Russian heavily fortified lines?

Oh right, because Ukraine only gets the "next thing" after suffering military disasters and so the "next thing" is no longer an escalation but can drag the war out a bit longer.

Russia is aiming at a far smaller operation here, nothing that can really be said to be of strategic value, unless one considers that getting the "legally defined boundaries of the Donbass," within their control might make suing for some sort of peace more palatable domestically. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I just explained to you, after @Tzeentch just explained to you, that Russia's aim is to attrit the Ukrainians to the breaking point (which just like every individual, every organization has). They do this by creating cauldron's around Ukrainian forces and hitting them with artillery and glide bombs until they leave.

We can definitely say the strategic value of capturing some high ground around said cauldron is to more efficiently attrit the Ukrainians while minimizing losses. Of course maybe the losses weren't "worth it" to achieve this purpose, but that is beside the point as Russia can absorb far more losses than the Ukrainians: that's what attritional warfare means when you are the larger force.

The facts are Ukraine essentially does not have any air power and Russia seems to have now nearly completely attritted their air defence (just as the leaked pentagon papers informed us), enough to effectively use glide bombs and attack helicopters at will.

Zelensky was recently in Washington to explain that with 100 000 000 000 USD more that "maybe" they can achieve a stalemate for the next year.



In other words, what I and others pointed out in the first weeks of the war (that Ukraine has zero hope of some sort of military victory) is now official policy of both the US and Ukraine nearly 2 years later.

For, Ukraine is not only at a significant military disadvantage in terms of numbers and capabilities, but its economy is in ruins and backers need not only provide militarily but float the entire Ukrainian government and heavily subsidize the economy ... all while Russia's economy is growing and able to self-finance its war effort.

The situation is not good for Ukraine and cannot possibly last.

What is clear is that the current goal is to try to keep things together until the next US election, since as unpopular as the 100 000 000 000 more USD to Ukraine maybe, a complete military debacle for the "friend" Ukraine would be even worse.

A goal I think is achievable and then we'll see the war wound down after said election (whoever wins).

why not just ask the US to supply the longer range — boethius

Not just the US, but you're right. They should just have been given the tools/resources from the get-go.


On Russian Nuclear Threat, Putin Lets Others Rattle the Saber
^{— Paul Sonne, David E Sanger · New York Times · Oct 7, 2023}

Oct 20, 2023

Ukraine holds peace formula talks in Malta, Russia absent
^{— Christopher Scicluna, Elaine Monaghan, Andrew Gray, Olena Harmash, David Evans, Mike Harrison · Reuters · Oct 28, 2023}

The world has told the Kremlin όχι.

Domitilla Sagramoso interview:

'Momentum is on side of Russia' despite minor Ukrainian victories, 'increasing opposition' to Putin
^{— François Picard · France 24 · 9m:44s · Oct 26, 2023}

Slovakia's new populist Prime Minister Robert Fico said Thursday that his government was stopping military aid to Ukraine. Fico told MPs that the country would "no longer supply weapons to Ukraine", repeating promises made during his election campaign, but would still supply humanitarian aid to its war-torn neighbour. For in-depth analysis and a deeper perspective on Russia's brutal war on Ukraine and Slovakia's decision to end military aid to Kyiv, FRANCE 24's François Picard is joined by Dr. Domitilla Sagramoso, Senior Lecturer in Security and Development and expert on Russian foreign and security policy at King's College London.

By the way, , Hawley's comments, "I also wish our European allies to do their part", echoes what Obama and others have aired prior. So easily post-Yalta is forgotten (also set out in some detail by Anne Applebaum (2012)).

Opinion | Josh Hawley Is Wrong About Israel and Ukraine
^{— Rich Lowry · POLITICO · Oct 11, 2023}

Russia-Ukraine are warring, Hamas-Israel are warring, though not China. Hawley's "I don't see where this is going" oddly forgets the active and violent proliferation of authoritarianism regression oppression contra democracy transparency freedom. I suppose Kara-Murza likely agrees.

Which then accomplishes what? What did the withdrawal from Kherson and around Kharkiv accomplish for the Ukrainians other than feeding the narrative they can "win"? — boethius

It freed a bunch of their territory and subjects from russian occupation?

That's kinda what the war is about, isn't it?

Oh right, because Ukraine only gets the "next thing" after suffering military disasters and so the "next thing" is no longer an escalation but can drag the war out a bit longer. — boethius

What military disasters had Ukraine suffered?

I just explained to you, after Tzeentch just explained to you, that Russia's aim is to attrit the Ukrainians to the breaking point (which just like every individual, every organization has). They do this by creating cauldron's around Ukrainian forces and hitting them with artillery and glide bombs until they leave. — boethius

So why are they loosing more men and materiel every day? That doesn't sound like winning a war of attrition.

The facts are Ukraine essentially does not have any air power and Russia seems to have now nearly completely attritted their air defence (just as the leaked pentagon papers informed us), enough to effectively use glide bombs and attack helicopters at will. — boethius

And your evidence for this is?

Zelensky was recently in Washington to explain that with 100 000 000 000 USD more that "maybe" they can achieve a stalemate for the next year. — boethius

Lol, yeah according to Josh Hawley, one of the people trying to turn the US into a Putin style "managed democracy". Why would I believe anything a known con-man like this says?

Positive? Hmm.. :chin:

(Ukrainska Pravda, 30th Oct 2023) Sergey Shoigu, Russia's Minister of Defence, claimed that his country is ready for political discussions about "post-conflict regulation concerning Ukraine" and "further co-existence with the West".

Might be something in the air...

Not just the US, but you're right. They should just have been given the tools/resources from the get-go. — jorndoe

Obviously if the intention was to actually "beat" the Russians then that's what would have occurred.

It didn't occur because that is not the intention.

You really haven't caught on? You really believe the drip feed of weapons systems to Ukraine since the start of the war, just enough to prop them up, is just a bureaucratic oversight of some kind or well intentioned difference in policy that just so happens to have been proven wrong?

You're really that naive?

Obviously if the intention was to actually "beat" the Russians then that's what would have occurred.

It didn't occur because that is not the intention. — boethius

I mean you're right about that, but your reasoning is odd.

There's a very obvious reason why the west wouldn't want Ukraine to "beat" the russians. The same reason why they didn't send their air forces to flatten the russian invaders. The west doesn't want to give Russia an excuse to use nukes.

So yes the western strategy is a kind of death by a thousand cuts. They prefer the russians to bleed themselves dry in a slow grind over some calamitous collapse which could have unforeseeable consequences for russian internal politics. They even prefer Ukraine to loose in a slow grind over such a scenario.

It freed a bunch of their territory and subjects from russian occupation?

That's kinda what the war is about, isn't it? — Echarmion

I guess just playing dumb is the copium of choice at this stage of the war.

But to play along to your obtuse delusions, "freeing" a bunch of people, more so in regions that had already largely been evacuated of anyone who wanted to leave to Ukraine, is not justification for military action. In this case, even if "fighting for freedom" was the goal (which I very much doubt) the interest of the greater number must prevail over the smaller number.

There was a tiny number of people to "free" in these regions compared to the total Ukrainian population, so therefore it would not be justified to expend valuable military resources to free a small number of people if it greatly increases the risk to the larger number.

Going on these offensives is extremely costly to Ukraine in terms of men and material.

Now, if they "win" the war of attrition against Russia, then clearly they had those resources to spare, but if they don't win the war that is actually currently happening then it will become clear what the cost of expending large amounts of resources on offensives actually turns out to be.

What military disasters had Ukraine suffered? — Echarmion

Losing 20% of their territory in the first days of the war, not even striking the bridges out of Crimea but letting massive columns go through and behind the prepared defences around the Donbas was definitely a military disaster. Bahkmut was a military disaster. This latest offensive was a military disaster.

Now, if you think Ukraine can just keep grinding indefinitely like a tech bro in a coffee shop, then you're just completely delusional.

We are now at a phase of the war where it is accepted Ukraine has no potential for victory with some sort of maneuver warfare, which is, by definition, the only way to win against superior numbers and resources, so the only other way to win is through attrition which is a war that Ukraine can't possibly win.

I prepend "military" to all this analysis as there would still be the option of victory through some sort of revolution in Russia or total economic failing under the sanctions (the theory of victory when Ukraine rejected peace talks), which maybe someone here will still argue will actually happen "this time", but that seems a distant dream even to the present dreamers.

So why are they loosing more men and materiel every day? That doesn't sound like winning a war of attrition. — Echarmion

The analysis is answering the question of why Russia took the position in question.

Yes, Russia loses men and material, but so too the Ukrainians, that's what makes it a war of attrition.

And your evidence for this is? — Echarmion

Russia's use of glide bombs and attack helicopters has been covered extensively even by the Western mainstream press, so if you don't follow events in the slightest why do you feel you contribute anything to this conversation.

But to satisfy your lazy quest for knowledge here's a journalist from Forbes literally using the words "at will".

Only the Russian air force can deploy attack helicopters and fighter-bombers at will directly over the heaviest ground fighting. — Forbes

Lol, yeah according to Josh Hawley, one of the people trying to turn the US into a Putin style "managed democracy". Why would I believe anything a known con-man like this says? — Echarmion

He's reporting what Zelensky said to him and his colleagues, what the administration said the day before, it would be a pretty bold lie which others in attendance could easily call him out on.

So your contention is that he's a liar and everyone else present in these meetings or privy to the information is a liar?

Perhaps he is a conman generally speaking, but you should have some of that actual evidence you so easily demand of others in calling a sitting US senator a liar about events that literally just happened, in which no one's contradicting his narrative, and "stalemate" is the key word coming from plenty of angles so hardly implausible that's exactly what Zelensky stated.

I mean you're right about that, but your reasoning is odd.

There's a very obvious reason why the west wouldn't want Ukraine to "beat" the russians. The same reason why they didn't send their air forces to flatten the russian invaders. The west doesn't want to give Russia an excuse to use nukes. — Echarmion

First, the reasoning is not odd, it didn't happen because that was not the intention.

Second, I've explained dozens of times already that the drip feed of weapons systems to Ukraine is precisely because Russia has nuclear weapons.

So yes the western strategy is a kind of death by a thousand cuts. They prefer the russians to grind bleed themselves dry in a slow grind over some calamitous collapse which could have unforeseeable consequences for russian internal politics. They even prefer Ukraine to loose in a slow grind over such a scenario. — Echarmion

This is the new copium of choice in recent comments.

For, if there is no collapse ... how exactly does Russia lose exactly? Isn't the key word in a "death by a thousand cuts" the death part? How exactly does Russia die by a thousand cuts without a "calamitous collapse" which could have "unforeseeable consequences for russian internal politics"?

The war is about separating Russian resources from German industry and locking in the Europeans as vassal states without sovereignty being even an option on the table anymore; destroy the Euro as a possible competitor to the dollar while we're at it.

However, we are in agreement that the US / NATO "They even prefer Ukraine to loose in a slow grind over such a scenario".

But to satisfy your lazy quest for knowledge here's a journalist from Forbes literally using the words "at will".

"Only the Russian air force can deploy attack helicopters and fighter-bombers at will directly over the heaviest ground fighting."
— Forbes

This is literally an article about Russian helicopters being shot down by advancing UAF forces. It details how Ukraine has increased the air defense capabilities over brigades advancing into Russian-held territory.

The destruction of a large number of rotary wing craft over the past two weeks thanks to the US (finally) delivering long(er) range missiles has further reduced Russia's ability to use rotary wing craft. First, because obviously they can't use destroyed craft, and must repair damaged craft, but moreover because they now have to store them quite far out, near the limits of their operational range.

The claim that Russia can use their air force "at will" is patently ridiculous no matter who says it. Why would they be trying to knock out the power grid by lobbing air defense and anti-ship missiles at power plants, and firing off volleys over the Black Sea if they were actually free to just hit Ukrainian cities with their massive supply of cheap gravity bombs? It makes absolutely no sense.

Have Russian sorties been increasing as of late? They haven't. They have been using air assets less and less. They have sometimes thrown them into operations to help fill a gap (e.g., the rout in Kharkiv was plugged using air assets, although at the cost of several losses). They have been using more glide bombs, which is helping them, but they have been prioritizing longer range glide bombs precisely because they can't use the same strategies they were using in Syria due to losses. Moreover, their problem is more lack of trained pilots than airframes.

Russia retains a significant advantage in air power, but this is more of an aid to them on defense than offense, since they have been unable to carry out complex air operations for the entire war nor to carry out successful SEAD.

So why are they loosing more men and materiel every day? That doesn't sound like winning a war of attrition.

Right. Getting to a place where you have less armor and less artillery than your opponent, where things look to be ending up, is not a sign that you are winning a war of attrition.

I would certainly allow that Ukraine may not be able to break Russian defenses and take back additional large areas of territory, although this doesn't seem that unlikely. I would even allow that in the long term, looking out to 2026-2028, if the stars align right, Russia might be in a position to carry out significant offensive operations; but it's hard to see the current strategy as "paying off" in the short term.

Of course, it is unclear if even "victory" in a long war is in Russia's long-term interests. The longer the war goes on, the more permanent Europe's move away from Russian energy exports. Substitute infrastructure will be constructed, new supply chains set up. The war was obviously intended to be short. How exactly is Russia's security enhanced by gaining a bit more territory over 3-4 more years of conflict, and maybe another 200,000-300,000 losses? At this point, it seems like any realistic victory is set to be a pyrrhic one.

The same might be said of Ukrainian reconquest of a good deal of territory. But at least there, one could argue that another collapse in the front ala Kharkiv or Kherson might be enough to end the war. If the bridge to Crimea can be knocked out, the peninsula put under siege, and most land within the 2014 borders put under Ukraine's control, it does seem like it would be quite difficult to continue justifying the invasion.

But to play along to your obtuse delusions, "freeing" a bunch of people, more so in regions that had already largely been evacuated of anyone who wanted to leave to Ukraine, is not justification for military action — boethius

People have been bashing each other's heads in for scraps of territory for hundreds of years.

There was a tiny number of people to "free" in these regions compared to the total Ukrainian population, so therefore it would not be justified to expend valuable military resources to free a small number of people if it greatly increases the risk to the larger number. — boethius

This completely ignores how humans actually think. Noone is going to just hand away what they think is "their land" if they have a choice.

Going on these offensives is extremely costly to Ukraine in terms of men and material.

Now, if they "win" the war of attrition against Russia, then clearly they had those resources to spare, but if they don't win the war that is actually currently happening then it will become clear what the cost of expending large amounts of resources on offensives actually turns out to be. — boethius

War isn't fought on some excel spreadsheet where losses are added up and then the winner is decided. The territory matters. Initiative matters. Morale matters. Public opinion matters..

Losing 20% of their territory in the first days of the war, not even striking the bridges out of Crimea but letting massive columns go through and behind the prepared defences around the Donbas was definitely a military disaster. — boethius

Nonsense, holding off the russian invasion the way they did was a massive victory, way beyond what anyone had expected. It was a disaster for Russia.

Bahkmut was a military disaster. — boethius

More bullshit. How was it disastrous? Ukraine lost a single city, and that's it. There was no follow up on the side of Russia.

This latest offensive was a military disaster. — boethius

This is at least vaguely plausible, but still there's no evidence Ukraine has been decisively weakened by the failure to push further.

Now, if you think Ukraine can just keep grinding indefinitely like a tech bro in a coffee shop, then you're just completely delusional.

We are now at a phase of the war where it is accepted Ukraine has no potential for victory with some sort of maneuver warfare, which is, by definition, the only way to win against superior numbers and resources, so the only other way to win is through attrition which is a war that Ukraine can't possibly win.

I prepend "military" to all this analysis as there would still be the option of victory through some sort of revolution in Russia or total economic failing under the sanctions (the theory of victory when Ukraine rejected peace talks), which maybe someone here will still argue will actually happen "this time", but that seems a distant dream even to the present dreamers. — boethius

Everyone has limited resources. Russia doesn't have magical endless potential to wage war. Russia can absolutely loose a war of attrition in Ukraine. The soviet union, which was much stronger then than Russia is today, lost a war of attrition in Afghanistan.

Russia's use of glide bombs and attack helicopters has been covered extensively even by the Western mainstream press, so if you don't follow events in the slightest why do you feel you contribute anything to this conversation.

But to satisfy your lazy quest for knowledge here's a journalist from Forbes literally using the words "at will". — boethius

The point of glide bombs is literally that you can use them from out of range of air defenses...

And the helicopters cannot operate at will above the frontline, as the Forbes article you linked shows regardless of the poorly written last paragraph.

He's reporting what Zelensky said to him and his colleagues, what the administration said the day before, it would be a pretty bold lie which others in attendance could easily call him out on. — boethius

Given that he claims the US election was "stolen", bold lies seem right up his alley. What does it matter to him if he is called out? He's a MAGA republican so anyone who calls him out is a globalist shill and that is that.

More to the point, noone else is reporting these bold claims.

hardly implausible that's exactly what Zelensky stated. — boethius

It's very implausible if you actually follow how the war develops day by day.

This is the new copium of choice in recent comments ... for, if there is no collapse ... how exactly does Russia lose exactly? Isn't the key word in a "death by a thousand cuts" the death part? How exactly does Russia die by a thousand cuts without a "calamitous collapse" which could have "unforeseeable consequences for russian internal politics"? — boethius

The same way they lost in Afghanistan, or Chechnya. The same way the US lost in Vietnam or again in Afghanistan. They're fighting a limited war for political goals. Their opponent is fighting a total war. This has not often worked out for the side trying to fight a limited war.

The war is about separating Russian resources from German industry and locking in the Europeans as vassal states without sovereignty being even an option on the table anymore, destroy the Euro as a possible competitor to the dollar while we're at it. — boethius

Oh right, Putin invaded in order to turn the EU into US vassals, that makes sense.

Particularly because the US is well known for its policy of turning allies into vassal states without sovereignty. Just look at....uh....

This is literally an article about Russian helicopters being shot down by advancing UAF forces. It details how Ukraine has increased the air defense capabilities over brigades advancing into Russian-held territory. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The point is Ukraine doesn't have such helicopters to be shot down.

The other point would be the damage these helicopters do.

Sure, Ukraine can shoot some down from time to time, that's what attritional warfare is.

Both sides take losses in a war of attrition, that's sort of the definition.

Ukraine has less man power and less capabilities ... so how is it going to win a war of attrition?

The destruction of a large number of rotary wing craft over the past two weeks thanks to the US (finally) delivering long(er) range missiles has further reduced Russia's ability to use rotary wing craft. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Again why is it "finally"?

Why didn't US just supply these weapons before the Ukrainian offensive ... or then during when Ukraine was having so much trouble even getting to Russian fortified lines with armoured vehicles due to said helicopters?

Why only supply the missiles after the offensive has failed and the capability of the attack helicopters was realized in their ideal role of destroying advancing armoured columns?

The copium is so thick it's hard to see in here.

The claim that Russia can use their air force "at will" is patently ridiculous no matter who says it. — Count Timothy von Icarus

So the same journalist you just cited to minimize the effectiveness of Russian helicopter (which his point was more that "maybe" Ukraine will be able to deal with them ) is also "ridiculous" when he says something you don't like. We can of course get pedantic over what exactly "at will" means, how pervasive and permissive it means "exactly", but we at agree that Forbes and myself use it in the same way; if you'd reserve the expression more for explaining wizards literally conjuring up glide bombs with their minds and solemn chants, that's your prerogative.

Have Russian sorties been increasing as of late? They haven't. — Count Timothy von Icarus

They have been using more glide bombs — Count Timothy von Icarus

How do you use more glide bombs with less sorties?

But again, the point is Ukraine essentially has no airforce in which it can be attritted.

Having less men and less capabilities is not a good position in a war of attrition.

Of course, maybe Russia will "tire out", feel free to present evidence that will happen "this time", but there's a lot of lives to gamble to test such a theory.

People have been bashing each other's heads in for scraps of territory for hundreds of years. — Echarmion

Did you even read what I wrote?

What I wrote assumed Ukraine's goal of "freedom" and pointed out that freeing a few while putting the rest at risk makes no military sense.

Attacking prepared defences in a war of attrition as the smaller party is the opposite of military sanity. This is the point to make it more clear.

Of course, the reason for doing so is to maintain a (delusional) narrative that the West just kind of needs to hear right now and since the star of the war, which leads to the vast sums of money required to even be in the game. To have "a chance", Ukraine needs to do militarily stupid things for the sake of optics.

Now, if the required sacrifices on the Western political altar led to the promised demise of the Russian state by mechanism that were and remain essentially voodoo (i.e. magical thinking without any precedent in history at all), then the military moves would have had to have made sense had the things that would have made them make sense happened to have actually happened. But they didn't.

What I wrote assumed Ukraine's goal of "freedom" and pointed out that freeing a few while putting the rest at risk makes no military sense.

Attacking prepared defences in a war of attrition as the smaller party is the opposite of military sanity. This is the point to make it more clear. — boethius

That entirely depends on the larger situation. You can't just sit on the defensive all the time either. There are plenty of plausible reasons why Ukraine might want to push even into prepared russian defenses - to fix troops in place, to keep russian commanders on the defensive psychologically, to seize tactically advantageous positions, to force the russian artillery to fire so they can be targeted with counter-battery fire. I could go on, but the point is your analysis is simplistic to the point of being useless.

Now, if the required sacrifices on the Western political altar led to the promised demise of the Russian state by mechanism that were and remain essentially voodoo (i.e. magical thinking without any precedent in history at all), then the military moves would have had to have made sense had the things that would have made them make sense happened to have actually happened. But they didn't. — boethius

Noone wants the demise of the russian state, that would be a terrible outcome for everyone. The west has plenty of good reasons to want Russia to fail in this endavour, do I need to list them?

The same way they lost in Afghanistan, or Chechnya. The same way the US lost in Vietnam or again in Afghanistan. They're fighting a limited war for political goals. Their opponent is fighting a total war. This has not often worked out for the side trying to fight a limited war. — Echarmion

This is true. One is fighting for survival, one for limited objectives. A small anecdote: when Hamas attacked Israel you had many reports of Israeli reservists flying from abroad to get to their units. Just like many Ukrainians opted to go back to Ukraine when the war started. However I didn't find reporting of Russian expats flying back to Russia to join the mobilization...

Of course, maybe Russia will "tire out", feel free to present evidence that will happen "this time", but there's a lot of lives to gamble to test such a theory. — boethius

Well, a Soviet Union, with far more arms and men, did tire from fighting a far smaller war Afghanistan, even they managed to kill far more Afghans than the US ever. But you assume this war hasn't had any effect on Russia?

The "quiet invasion" ...

Denial of Georgia's EU membership bid would be "a big victory for Russia," President Zourabichvili says
^{— Sharyn Alfonsi, Ashley Velie, Jennifer Dozor, Erin DuCharme, Peter M Berman · CBS · Oct 29, 2023}

, let me just check that I understand your theory, the military-industrial complex decides what is and isn't sent to Ukraine, and they're in business.

For perspective on the use of prisoners, Russia's pre invasion prison population was 420,000. Today it is just 266,000.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/10/26/russia-prison-population-convicts-war/

How many more prisoners they can recruit for combat roles is anyone's guess. The heavy use of prisoners, who are seen as "disposable," in front line combat roles and assault teams seems like one of the causes of the incredibly high losses for the Russians (UK MOD estimate, 190,000 KIA or permanently disabled, 300,000 casualties). Leaked US estimates had Russian fatalities 71% higher than Ukrainian losses (120,000 versus 70,000), and the use of prisoners in "meat assaults," is the primary culprit per both Western defense agencies and Russian milbloggers. But once this pool is depleted, can tactics change?

Treating conscripts the same way seems to risk larger morale issues across the force.

I'd say worth serious consideration, except keep it legit. Either way, when the Kremlin deteriorates, all kinds of things are affected. Agreement/unity is unlikely, though. Has come up before.

EU leaders approve using profits from frozen Russian assets
^{— Paola Tamma, Jacopo Barigazzi, Laura Hülsemann · POLITICO · Oct 27, 2023}
Moscow will confiscate EU assets if Brussels 'steals' frozen Russian funds, Putin ally [†] says
^{— Reuters · Oct 29, 2023}

For: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Poland
Cautious due to legalities and economics: Belgium, Luxembourg
Hesitant due to € financialities: France, Germany, ... (The European Central Bank)

[†] Volodin


Out of Solovyov, Medvedev, Trump, who rambles or bullshits the most? :D

Attention, Germany! Russian propagandist Solovyev threatens that Berlin will exist "under the Russian flag." (Gerashchenko · 1m:18s · Oct 30, 2023)

For perspective on the use of prisoners, Russia's pre invasion prison population was 420,000. Today it is just 266,000. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Quite incredible statistics, actually.

More so when you consider the concentration of prisoner losses in the limited areas of offensive operations, (Bakhmut and Pisky earlier and Avdiika now).

Over the past days Russia has declared control of the waste heap near Avdviika! Yet then the UAF published media showing the waste heap being retaken! Russia again demonstrated that they had planted a flag on the waste heap. UAF released video of Russian waste heap forces being destroyed. Then the waste heap was no man's land. Now the UAF once again appears to control the waste heap!

Last count I saw was 190 Russian vehicles destroyed in the vicinity of the waste heap. I haven't seen a count of Ukrainian vehicles, although they are much lower because they are defending and so using far fewer vehicles and not moving through enemy mine fields.

The contested landfill that has become the hot spot of the entire conflict for now.



When soldiers say they are "fighting World War I, just with drones and social media," I see why.

I guess, by some odd logic, North Korea is waging a proxy war with Ukraine:

North Korea believed to have exported over 1 million shells to Russia
^{— Yoonjung Seo, Sophie Tanno · CNN · Nov 1, 2023}

Those 10 shipments could have made a big :fire: somewhere.

, seems absurd. I guess there's some sort of tactical advantage of sitting on the hill.

When soldiers say they are "fighting World War I, just with drones and social media," I see why. — Count Timothy von Icarus

And I think the part that it's a landfill tell it's well.

But simply in the times of drones, ATGMs, instant artillery and good Ground Based Air Defence on both sides, it comes to very limited fighting. For large scale maneuvers simply would result into far heavier losses.

Unverified independently (though consistent with other efforts):

New recruitment scheme for those unwilling to join the Russian army. (Anton Gerashchenko · Nov 1, 2023)

Some Russian polls, FYI:

Conflict with Ukraine: October 2023 estimates (en) (Levada-Center · Oct 31, 2023)

Ukraine’s commander-in-chief on the breakthrough he needs to beat Russia
^{— The Economist · Nov 1, 2023}

Just like in the first world war we have reached the level of technology that puts us into a stalemate.
I realised that is exactly where we are because just like then, the level of our technological development today has put both us and our enemies in a stupor.
On our monitor screens the day I was there we saw 140 Russian machines ablaze—destroyed within four hours of coming within firing range of our artillery.
The simple fact is that we see everything the enemy is doing and they see everything we are doing. In order for us to break this deadlock we need something new, like the gunpowder which the Chinese invented and which we are still using to kill each other.
It is important to understand that this war cannot be won with the weapons of the past generation and outdated methods.
Let’s be honest, it’s a feudal state where the cheapest resource is human life. And for us…the most expensive thing we have is our people. — Zaluzhnyi

Peskov commented on Zaluzhnyi’s words about the deadlock in the conflict in Ukraine (en)
^{— TASS · Nov 2, 2023}

No, it has not reached a stalemate. Russia is consistently continuing to conduct a special military operation. All the goals set must be fulfilled. — Pesky

Five factors, according to Zaluzhnyi, for Ukraine to progress significantly: air force, electronic warfare, counter-battery fire, dealing with the extensive minefields, reserves.

The Kremlin's (official) goals have gone a bit here and there, though:

Lavrov says Russia’s objectives in Ukraine now extend beyond eastern Donbas region
^{— Radina Gigova, Sana Noor Haq, Jack Guy, Rob Picheta, Tim Lister, Kostan Nechyporenko, Oren Liebermann · CNN · Jul 20, 2022}

At least Zaluzhnyi isn't propagandizing like Pesky.

U.S., European officials broach topic of peace negotiations with Ukraine, sources say
^{— Courtney Kube, Carol E Lee, Kristen Welker · NBC · Nov 3, 2023}

Going by the (official current) Kremlin, it's either continue bombing/destruction, or expansion of authoritarianism regress oppression (and wherever that may lead). Meanwhile their prison population has halved or something.