Maybe if they say of the defensive instead of burning through hundreds of vehicles, tubes, and thousands of soldiers in attacks on entrenched positions. The fighting is a walkable distance from the pre-2022 borders, progress as been... slow to say the least.

With contract troops being chewed up on defense and them trending towards having less armor and less artillery, IDK. Conscripts work a lot better for sitting in trenches and defending when attacked, when they have to defend to live, then being forced to attack.

It's possible the whole reason for the annexation was to pre-empt pacifists in the higher echelons by forcing them to commit to "defending Russia".

If the exact borders are unclear that gives room for political maneuvers. Seems like the kind of thing Putin, still a KGB man at heart, would do.

Oh I think it can recover. Every year brings a fresh new batch of conscripts and the Russian military industrial complex can chug out a limited number of tanks, guns and ammo. It will be likely more than the West provides Ukraine.

I think Russia could make an offensive let's say next year spring/summer. — ssu

I think the best Russia can hope for in the foreseeable future is to force Ukraine onto the defensive and continue the kind of grinding single-target assaults that so far have been the only successful strategy.

I think it's unlikely Russia can do any sweeping offensive even if western aid to Ukraine is reduced.

So far neither side in the conflict has found a way to break through prepared defenses.

The only big game changer that seems in the cards is if either side gains air superiority. The state of Ukraine's air defense seems the best kept secret of the war so far. They seem to be doing fine, but it's hard to tell whether there is a secret crisis brewing. OTOH Ukraine will likely get at least some F16, which might make a difference (probably also depending on what kind of ammunition is supplied).

In other news it looks like the more moderate Republicans in the US are not going down without a fight. Jim Jordan might need to agree to further aid on Ukraine (which is still popular even with republicans, though less of them want to ship weapons directly).

The Russian losses at Avdiivka are grim. And yet another "deadline" has been set to secure the Donbas. I don't see how Russia's ability for offensive operations can recover, and yet clearly the calculus is that "more must be taken to make it worth it." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Unverified as far as I know:

From Kyiv in 3 days to a "deficit in body bags in Donetsk": Russian volunteer urgently needs help with purchasing corpse bags for soldiers currently assaulting in Avdiivka. They also need food, but this must only come in closed packages, because "you don't know if someone's going to add something to it". (@wartranslated · Oct 13, 2023 · 1m)

:o

Putin Outlines What Makes a 'True World Leader'
^{— Brendan Cole · Newsweek · Oct 17, 2023}

This is what distinguishes a true world leader from the people we call temporary caretakers, who come for five minutes to show off on the international platform, and then disappear just as quietly. — Putin

Apart from Gerashchenko's comments, is this ↑ also a sneaky way of justifying "extending" his (and Xi's) presidency...? :)

Another major ATACSM taking out a large number of Russian helicopters. Given how these were instrumental in stopping Ukraine's abortive attempt at a "maneuver warfare," offensive, one wonders how much better it would have gone if these were provided earlier.

one wonders how much better it would have gone if these were provided earlier. — Count Timothy von Icarus

One wonders about a lot of the support. But the support is given by politician who illogically see one or another weapon system as "escalatory" or something, then only give few. Which then drags the war on.

It's incredibly frustrating. Tanks and IFVs should have been provided from the outset. The F-16 should already be operating, and significantly more units of MLRS (although supplying munitions might be difficult, but they could have upped production). The "surge" in production for shells and artillery systems is also quite underwhelming.

If these had all been brought in before the summer, maybe with modern attack helicopters too, the war would very likely be over, or at least largely no longer in Ukraine's borders.

We've drifted into a very brittle situation, and we don't think Russia will widen the war because Russia hasn't widened the war, but of course that can change. Every weapons system we give the Ukranians carries the risk of escalation. The politicians have to be extremely cautious. It sucks for the Ukranians.

If these had all been brought in before the summer, maybe with modern attack helicopters too, the war would very likely be over, or at least largely no longer in Ukraine's borders. — Count Timothy von Icarus

What can I say?

Yes. Perhaps!

Russia is unable to widen the war without jumping up a nuclear option. They're fielding 40, 50, sometimes 60 year old unupdated hardware and rushing under strength formations that were promised they wouldn't be deployed until January (time to actually be trained and equipped) to stabilize the front. They are increasingly reliant on conscripts. They just had a coup that forced the government to flee the capital. They now have fewer tanks than Ukraine and are headed towards being behind them in artillery.

Fears of collapsing the Russian state if they are defeated to badly? Sure, that makes sense.

Fears that they are going to successfully invade Poland or something? That seems completely implausible. They can't even keep momentum in the current war they have.

Any doubt that NATO would have total air supremacy in a war with Russia was cleared up by the fact that the Ukrainian air force is still operating to this day. They were able to carry out enough SEAD with rigged up HARMS on old platforms they were never designed to work with to carry out CAS missions in Kherson. Russian AD, which proved so permeable in Syria to Israeli sorties (thousands a year for a decade straight without losing a pilot) has looked anemic here too on a larger scale. The pitiful response to the Wagner advance on Moscow was the definitive proof. If Russia tried to widen the war they would be comically outmatched.

They aren't even defending the Armenians, so there is obviously internal recognition of this.

Mariupol is becoming a military installation. A resort city not so much, at the moment.

a direct railway connection with Mariupol, Volnovakha and Donetsk — Petro Andriushchenko · Sep 27, 2023

Russians build rail links to Mariupol, Volnovakha and Donetsk
^{— Alona Mazurenko · Ukrainska Pravda · Sep 27, 2023}

Russians so worried about Ukrainian breakthrough on Donetsk front that they have begun to fortify occupied Mariupol
^{— The New Voice of Ukraine · Oct 12, 2023}

Ukraine’s Next Target: Russian Supply Lines
^{— Daniel Michaels · Wall Street Journal · Oct 12, 2023}

The new rail link that Russia is building to Mariupol—a Black Sea port on the land bridge—would, if successful, relieve pressure on supplies coming from Crimea, said an assistant to Mariupol’s exiled mayor, and so poses a threat to Ukrainian troops. — Daniel Michaels

I don't think the Russian Mariupol efforts are new, though. Strategic importance for them. Meanwhile, Avdiivka is keeping both parties busy.

Russia is unable to widen the war without jumping up a nuclear option. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes. That's what worries a lot of people.

Yes. That's what worries a lot of people. — RogueAI

It has always struck me as kind of a useless worry though. Noone has been able to identify a scenario where any use of nukes makes strategic sense for Russia. Indeed this conflict seems like a very good example for the argument that as military weapons in the strict sense, nukes are useless.

While the possibility remains that the Russian regime turns into some kind of death cult and tries to burn it all down, it doesn't seem to make sense to base any decisions on this possibility.

Some interesting posts from Murz (you can google translate them):
https://t.me/wehearfromyanina/2860
https://t.me/wehearfromyanina/2861
https://t.me/wehearfromyanina/2865

While he always was a bit on the pessimistic side (although not completely into doomposting, like Girkin), his observations seem consistent with what is happening on the ground.

While the possibility remains that the Russian regime turns into some kind of death cult and tries to burn it all down, it doesn't seem to make sense to base any decisions on this possibility. — Echarmion

It doesn't have to be a death cult. The Regime just has to be very desperate, to the point where they start thinking, "a few tactical nukes, strategically placed..." If it looks like Ukraine starts pushing Russia back to their border, or Putin thinks he's about to be overthrown, why not roll the dice, from his point of view? If he thinks it's likely he's going to be deposed and killed, what would he have to lose?

Nuclear posturing of late has been Russian and North Korean. The Kremlin appears to be going for a Cold War II. Incidentally, the kind of environment Putin was trained in, grew up in, knows, where he made some buddies.

To what end, though?

If Putin is willing to hit the red button over Ukraine, then the world (in general) already has a markedly larger problem (sort of masked/hidden in rhetoric). For that matter, certainly not in the best interest of Russians. On the other hand, as a promised response to a nuclear attack, it seems to work well enough. Maybe. (I'd be more worried about Kim Jong Un at the moment.)

The Putinistas have had a decade or two to think Ukraine over, when they had spare time. There are some suggestions that parts of the (current) Kremlin's moves have been prepared/strategized for a long while, despite setbacks/bumps.

It doesn't have to be a death cult. The Regime just has to be very desperate, to the point where they start thinking, "a few tactical nukes, strategically placed..." If it looks like Ukraine starts pushing Russia back to their border, or Putin thinks he's about to be overthrown, why not roll the dice, from his point of view? If he thinks it's likely he's going to be deposed and killed, what would he have to lose? — RogueAI

AFAIK Putin doesn't have the ability to unilaterally instigate a nuclear strike, he'd need the cooperation of the army high command. Which, in a scenario where his head is on the line, he presumably doesn't have.

It's hard to see how any use of nukes doesn't make the situation simply worse for Russia. It seems almost guaranteed that, if Russia uses any nuclear weapon, they'll loose their remaining allies. China isn't going to want to be associated with it, nor will anyone else.

It's also highly questionable whether any military advantage that's even remotely commensurate could be achieved.

Bombing the direct frontline will achieve little unless you positively blanket it with bombs. Hitting any kind of strategic target like transportation, C&C or production will almost inevitably involve hitting a city.

I don't think the Russian people will accept nuking a Ukrainian city as part of the "special military operation". Given Putin's reluctance to even call a general mobilisation, I think it's safe to assume he doesn't believe the population would accept a total war against Ukraine.

So really all that seems even remotely useful is to stage some kind of nuclear demonstration to scare Ukraine's western allies. But even that might just have the opposite effect and ensure an even more unanimous front against Russia.

And that's not considering the likely NATO response, which would probably be a no fly zone over Ukraine and possibly airstrikes on russian troops in Ukraine.

I doubt those among Russian top brass who are against the war can/will do much:

Carnegie · Apr 7, 2023
Bloomberg · Jun 8, 2023

If within Putin's reach, it's safer for them to play along in any case (for now at least). :death:

UN · Jul 28, 2023
POLITICO · Aug 4, 2023

Marcus Keupp seems too optimistic (to me):

watson · Oct 20, 2023 (en)

Mentioned Russian losses alone won't do it, at least not in the near future, though at some point...

Besides, with friends like Kim Jong Un, what can go wrong? :)

Al Jazeera · Sep 13, 2023
ABC · Oct 8, 2023

The last vestiges of colonialism will die with the decline of the American Empire and the Zionist state of Israel. The global shift of power to a multipolar world is unstoppable, but for the death of the planet. That is what the Ukraine war is about, and that is what the Zionist-Israel war on the Palatine is about, the curtain is coming down on colonialism. Let us hope the love of colonialism is not the end of civilization.

LONG LIVE THE BRICS!

The Propaganda Forum

This is kinda hilarious, given that Ukraine has a history of colonialism, and the coloniser was Russia.

From Russian Telegram.



Russia has lost at least around two regiments worth of equipment, and probably more men since they switched to unsupported infantry assaults, attacking a literal trash heap. This might be more WWIesque than even Bakhmut.

It seems a decision was made that an offensive must occur somewhere but why they picked a frontal assault on a an area they have banged their head against without progress for just under a decade is beyond me. Then, another Russian helicopter appears to have been downed by Russian air defenses, this after the heavy losses to their remaining rotary wing craft from MLRS attacks earlier in the week.

Of course, Russian milbloggers don't think this will slow things down. "After the armor is expended, then come the 'meat assaults.'" Grim.

The documented armor losses do not suggest blew production capabilities. A lot of hardware is stuff that hasn't been produced in 50-60+ years.

The documented armor losses do not suggest blew production capabilities. A lot of hardware is stuff that hasn't been produced in 50-60+ years. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Once the ammo and armor are in short in supply, then suddenly it's back to a nearly frozen conflict. Nearly. And time for that wonderful trench warfare.

Kremlin says U.S. can't build 'new world order' that Biden spoke of
^{— Gareth Jones · Reuters · Oct 23, 2023}

Allow me to rephrase Pesky's statement :D

In this part we disagree because the United States... no matter what world order they talk about, they mean an American-centric world order of democracies, that is, a world that revolves around the United States democracy transparency freedom. It won't be that way any more.

Anyone up for watching a crime drama about poisoning and trying to hide it, detective work, political activism, courage, might check Navalny (2022).

I was a bit taken aback by the strength of evidence implicating the Kremlin circle, a real-life conspiracy if you will.

For his flaws, Navalny's story is also a story of Putin's authoritarian regime. I doubt Navalny would be a worse president than Putin is (regressive opaque oppressive sinister).

A Discussion of “Navalny": the Documentary
^{— Wilson Center · 58m · Apr 18, 2022}

Bits and pieces of Putin's televised response in 2020 (or related) can be found out there ... RFE/RL, CBC, CNN, DW, Daily Mail, BBC, ... "Yeah, sorry Pukin. Won't fly."

Column: Is the documentary ‘Navalny’ a life insurance policy for the imprisoned Russian opposition leader?
^{— Robin Abcarian · Los Angeles Times · Dec 14, 2022}

Unless something changes, it seems unlikely Navalny will ever see the light of day again (or his lawyers), but whatever happened to Kudryavtsev...?

If I were in Kyiv, I'd be looking elsewhere.

Read animal farm. Your rephrasing is a bit silly.

Ukraine’s race to build its own arms industry
^{— Alec Russell, Christopher Miller, Roman Olearchyk · Financial Times · Oct 23, 2023}

We have a huge deficit of ammunition not just in Ukraine but all over the world. We understand we should produce this here in Ukraine because all around the world it’s finished, it’s depleted. All the warehouses are empty. — Denys Shmyhal

Back to sticks'n'stones? :) (if only everyone would run out at the same time :cool:)

Concerning if Ukraine becomes a military-industrial powerhouse? At the moment they have good reasons. Later?

, the Kremlin blamed the Navalny poisoning thing on the CIA of all things. It became ridiculous some time ago. Meanwhile, they proliferate authoritarianism regression oppression contra democracy transparency freedom, which they continue to divert/misdirect from when blaming everyone else (with some success I might add).

Unexpected:

Anchor of Chinese container vessel caused damage to Balticconnector gas pipeline, Finnish police say
^{— Jari Tanner · AP · Oct 24, 2023}

The continued use of penal battalions for offensive operations seems like it could be a harbinger. Once you normalize forcing men into attacks sure to incur high losses, with little hope of gain, how long before you run out of prisoners and start doing that with the conscripts? At an estimated 290,000 losses to date, Russia is going to reach the point soon where, if it wants to continue offensives, it's going to need to force the mobiks to do it.

Also an interesting choice given the last "frontal assaults until we grind down our manpower," style offensive ended in a coup and the government having to flee Moscow.

Bright side for them, it seems possible from reports that they may have gained a foot hold on the trash heap they're fighting over (seriously).

The "slag heap" as it's referred to is the terrain feature that commands the battlefield over Avdiivka. That's why they are fighting over it.

Basically Avdiivka will now turn into the next Bakhmut, where the Ukrainian forces will have to choose between defending the city from a severely compromised position, or retreating.

Given the state of foreign support for Ukraine amidst the Middle-East crisis, there will be a lot of pressure on the Ukrainian forces to defend it, which how the Russians aim to attrition the Ukrainian forces.

It seems like, just like with Bakhmut, they're planning the heaviest fighting over the winter months.

Uh-oh Azerbaijan → Armenia :fire:

Is one of Russia’s oldest allies slipping from the Kremlin’s orbit?
^{— Christian Edwards, Caolán Magee · CNN · Sep 17, 2023}
France sends weapons to Armenia amid fears of new conflict with Azerbaijan
^{— Laura Kayali, Gabriel Gavin · POLITICO · Oct 23, 2023}
Azerbaijan Could Invade Armenia. The U.S. Must Intervene
^{— Simon Maghakyan · TIME · Oct 24, 2023}

Perhaps a "world order" ought to be one by which attacks/takeovers are less feasible, more disincentivized? Ethics-driven culture seems to have partially failed.

US says China has significantly expanded its nuclear arsenal
^{— Al Jazeera · Oct 20, 2023}
Russia unconcerned by China increasing nuclear arsenal capabilities, says Kremlin
^{— Alexander Marrow, Gareth Jones · Reuters · Oct 25, 2023}

This does not cause us concern, our relations are an advanced strategic partnership, we have the most advanced stage of political dialogue, economic interaction. And in this case, China, which faces very serious challenges for its own security in the region, is taking steps that it considers appropriate. This is the absolute sovereign right of this country. — Pesky

What threats have been exerted prompting China's (supposed) need for a fresh nuclear arms race? Oddly perhaps, the Kremlin comes up first in that respect.