One core problem has already been mentioned by
↪Ciceronianus
.
Keep in mind that when Kant posited his ideas, microscopes were a novelty and Dalton had yet to explicate the place of atoms in Chemistry. Much that was hidden was subsequently revealed. We've learned quite a lot about the stuff we couldn't see. This has obliged Kantians to move to treating of phenomena rather than of reality.
So you might reconsider your first argument. Folk have experiences that do not imply that something exists - hallucinations, dreams, illusions and so on. Your conclusion is not justified.
Oh, not a contention, to be sure - but while Tully might speak for himself, it's plain that talk about a thing about which we can say nothing is at least awkward.By Ciceronianus own admission, it is not a contention with transcendental idealism; as it is a necessary and perfectly anticipated consequence of it. — Bob Ross
:100:... you are already making us of language, along with all that entails; so your very line of thinking presupposes far more than it pretends. — Banno
Tautology.1. There is experience, therefore something exists. — Bob Ross
(See my reply to #1.)2. That something, or a part of it, must be producing experience.
How do you/we know this is the case?3. The unified parts of that something which are producing it is the ‘I’.
(See my reply to #3.)4. The ‘I’ can only produce experience through (data) input (i.e., sensibility).
Solipsism.5. The production of experience via sensibility (and whatever may afterwards interpret such sensibility) entails that one’s experience is a representation.
Instead, I know that what I am given is not a thing-in-itself, but the thing-in-itself could turn out to be a mirror (by happenstance) of what I am given (and I would never know it). — Bob Ross
Thusly, I cannot say "this X is not Y" but rather "I only have knowledge of Y, which is not X". — Bob Ross
I don’t see how that would entail a close mirroring of the things-in-themselves. — Bob Ross
I have a different interpretation of this passage. — J
Odd, isn't it, that when some folk discover that the chair they are sitting on is composed of atoms, and is overwhelmingly space, they sometimes decide that therefore it's no longer really a chair. — Banno
Whatever the things are in-themselves is entirely impossible to know. — Bob Ross
it's plain that talk about a thing about which we can say nothing is at least awkward.
And our perceptions reach much further than they did in Kant's day, in ways he could hardly have imagined. I wonder would he have been so ready to talk about the thing-in-itself as beyond our understanding had he seen how far recent physics has taken us. Which is just to say he was a product of his time
Finally, if all we are to take from "There is experience, therefore something exists" is the existence of the experience, I don't see that we have made much progress
it's rather that you are already making us of language, along with all that entails; so your very line of thinking presupposes far more than it pretends.
1. There is experience, therefore something exists. — Bob Ross
Tautology.
2. That something, or a part of it, must be producing experience.
(See my reply to #1.)
3. The unified parts of that something which are producing it is the ‘I’.
How do you/we know this is the case?
It is definitional. The ‘I’ is the unified parts of that something which is producing experience. Are you asking why I know that there are unified parts? The parts of the something which produces experience must be unified insofar as they can “communicate” or “interact” with each other: if they were completely cut off from each other then they could not produce that experience.
I guess we could also say part of the ‘I’ is the thing-in-itself which is being represented.
4. The ‘I’ can only produce experience through (data) input (i.e., sensibility).
(See my reply to #3.)
5. The production of experience via sensibility (and whatever may afterwards interpret such sensibility) entails that one’s experience is a representation.
Solipsism.
Could you please elaborate and clarify on this sentence? What do you mean by "mirror"? Where does the "mirror" come from? How do you know the mirror was given to you? By whom?
Thusly, I cannot say "this X is not Y" but rather "I only have knowledge of Y, which is not X".
the thing of perception, or appearance, is the thing of the thing-in-itself, the only difference being time, or, occassion.
My belief is in Indirect Realism, whereby our ideas of objects existing in a mind-independent world are interpretations of sensory input derived from a mind-independent world that is real. I also believe that Kant and @Bob Ross can be said to be Indirect Realists.
As both good philosophy and good science are founded on sound logic, your argument aiming at being logical is as much science as it is philosophy.
When we perceive the colour red, there is the appearance of the colour red in our sensibilities, which we can reason to have been caused by a particular thing-in-itself. When we perceive the colour green, there is the appearance of the colour green in our sensibilities, which we can reason to have been caused by a different particular thing-in-itself.
It is true that we cannot know the thing-in-itself that has caused our perception of the colour red, but we can reason that it is different to the thing-in-itself that has caused our perception of the colour green.
it could be the case that my sensibility is 100% accurate and everything about the thing-in-itself can be and is gathered by my senses; but I would never know it. — Bob Ross
I cannot say “this thing-in-itself is not square” but rather “I only have knowledge of a representation of the thing-in-itself, which is not the thing-in-itself.”. So I know the thing-in-itself is not a phenomena, but that does not count as any sort of knowledge of it. — Bob Ross
A shame. It is apparent that arguing the point pushes you to defend Kantianism, reinforcing it in your mind.Not really. — Bob Ross
Yep. You say that as if it were a bad thing. I suggest that the idea that we need a proof that things exist is affected, an intellectual pretence. Descartes' bad idea. There are other ways of dealing with sceptics.This just disqualifies the idea that nothing exists, and nothing produces experience. — Bob Ross
Doesn't that sound a bit too good? A bit like the way in which disciples will praise the words of their Guru? Are his ideas perfect, and if not where do they go astray? If idealism is that good, it's odd that philosopher overwhelmingly reject it. Perhaps Kant was right, so far as he went, but was asking the wrong questions.That’s the nice thing about Kant: he stuck to a very oddly specific subject matter which can easily subsume all others underneath it. — Bob Ross
Your very participation here shows that you hold that there are others who understand something of what you are saying and will participate in a dialogue with you. You're already well past "I think therefore I am".Like what? — Bob Ross
Isn't it the case that when your sensibility is 100% accurate and everything about the thing-in-itself can be and is gathered by your senses, you cannot fail to know it?
Saying that your sensibility is 100% accurate and everything about the thing-in-itself can be and is gathered by your senses, but you would never know it, sounds like a contradiction, if not misunderstanding Transcendental Idealism, no?
So you have knowledge of a representation of the thing-in-itself, but that does not count as any sort of knowledge of the thing-in-itself.
Then where does knowledge of the representation of the thing-in-itself come from? I read you saying, it is not the thing-in-itself.
A shame. It is apparent that arguing the point pushes you to defend Kantianism, reinforcing it in your mind.
...
Doesn't that sound a bit too good? A bit like the way in which disciples will praise the words of their Guru? Are his ideas perfect, and if not where do they go astray? If idealism is that good, it's odd that philosopher overwhelmingly reject it. Perhaps Kant was right, so far as he went, but was asking the wrong questions
…
As I alluded earlier, flirting with Descartes, Kant, Spinoza and so on is a philosophical rite of passage. It's lack of critique that marks the novice. Can you tell us where Kant went wrong?
Your very participation here shows that you hold that there are others who understand something of what you are saying and will participate in a dialogue with you. You're already well past "I think therefore I am".
Most of them?So, what arguments do you find convincing against transcendental idealism? — Bob Ross
I think it's been made clear, by myself and by others, that there are problems with the very idea of a thing in itself.
There's also the problem of one or two worlds - an area of disagreement amongst Kantians in themselves...
When you count the things that exist - say the chair on which you sit, or the cup on your table - how many do you count? Is it one, roughly the cup-in-itself as you perceive it? Or are there two, the cup-in-itself, unamenable to conversation, and the cup-as-perceived, about which we somehow can converse?
Or will you agree with me that being obliged to ask this question shows that something has gone badly astray?
:100:A congenital problem with idealism is that, in denying that things exits outside the mind, it throws out the existence of other minds. Of course over the last few hundred years various arguments and excuses have accreted around Kant's thinking, but it seems difficult to see how we cannot be sure of the chair on which we sit, and yet we can be sure of the folk to whom we talk. — Banno
Yeah, I can see your lack of comprehension.I don’t think you have said much in terms of your contentions yet. — Bob Ross
Interesting: could you please elaborate? — Bob Ross
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