I have a fairly strong argument for the conceivability of philosophical zombies, based on the premise that folks can very easily mistake a clearly non conscious language program for a conscious being.

If one finds things that exist inconceivable, one is in trouble, philosophically.

No, I do not mean physicalism. I'm saying that all behaviour, including language, can be predicted from physics. That is compatible with physicalism, but it is not physicalism. I'll recommend Sean Carroll again: section Passive Mentalism and Zombies in his essay Consciousness and the Laws of Physics at https://philarchive.org/rec/CARCAT-33 .

Before conceiving a P-Zombie we must prove that the opposite, in lack of a better term, conscious human, is in itself not a P-Zombie. In a deterministic sense, we are just machines of causal events, and if so, our qualia may only be an emergent illusion, an "afterthought". In that situation we are essentially a P-Zombie and our qualia is a separate emergent factor.

If you have a P-Zombie that has a separated experience not in direct relation to the function of the P-Zombie's automation as a system, then you have a P-Zombie and a qualia experience as two separate things.

So how can we prove a conscious human with proposed qualia, is in fact not already a P-Zombie at the first stage of function, in essence an autonomous machine that is "leaking qualia" as a byproduct?

I don't think that's clear at all — flannel jesus

Didn't you watch Bladerunner? :grin:

Strong argument against the conceivability of p-zombies?

How can there be one, when successful arguments affirming such conception have been given? — Mww

I freely admit that I am not well-versed in a lot of the things I’m trying to talk about. The definition of the word conceivability, for example. Let me try to explain what I mean.

We can say the words “square circle.” Does that mean we conceive of square circles? I don’t believe so. We are only saying words. But there is no such thing as a square circle, and there is no possibility of such a thing. I don’t think being able to string together any combination of words is the same thing as conceiving of the thing represented by every particular string of words.

However, maybe I’m wrong. Maybe we are conceiving of square circles when we say the words “square circles.” In which case, I disagree with the idea that conceivability implies possibility. A square circle is not possible.

I was in agreement with @Patterner's point. Reading Carroll's 2021 article, he seems to base it on there being only two options. A mental (phenomenal) ontology would change the laws of physics in some places (and no such is detected), or it's just "passive mentalism" (epiphenomenal).

But if phenomenality has always been baked into our universe 'stuff' (as he also calls it), why would it not just be part of the causal processes, why would it need to change the laws of physics in places in our universe? So therefore I couldn't get on board with his p-zombie points.

I appreciated how firm and clear he is on e.g. "From the point of view of particle physics, a brain is not a densely packed system; indeed, it’s practically empty space. There is no physical rationale for expecting the dynamics of the Core Theory to break down in such an environment, regardless of how complex the overall situation is. For any particular electron or nucleus, almost all of the rest of the brain is so far away as to be essentially irrelevant."

But I wasn't sure how his preferred 'weak emergence' would be real phenomenality as he indicates, as he seemed to switch to talking about levels of explanation. He refers to functions (brain functions not just wave function maths) but I wasn't sure what version of functionalism in Phil of Mind he would ascribe to.

yes, love it. I don't believe it's ever implied that they're not truly conscious or don't experience qualia. Would you like to explain the relevance of that piece of fiction here?

I don't believe it's ever implied that they're not truly conscious or don't experience qualia. — flannel jesus

I don't know if they're conscious or not. That's the point.

your ignorance of something isn't much of a point in any direction at all. Not knowing something SURELY doesn't make something "clear", that's the opposite of clarity. Especially if it's just your own ignorance about a work of fiction... not sure what that's supposed to tell us about consciousness in real life.

The possibility of p-zombies is a much more rigorous question than just analysing your own ignorance of consciousness.

The possibility of p-zombies is a much more rigorous question than just analysing your own ignorance of consciousness. — flannel jesus

It's metaphysical possibility we're considering. That boils down to conceivibility. If I couldn't conceive of Deckard being an p-zombie, then I wouldn't say I don't know if he is. I would say he couldn't be.

Since I say I don't know, that shows it's conceivable, and therefore metaphysically possible.

That's not what other people mean by "conceivable". Not in this context anyway.

That's not what other people mean by "conceivable". Not in this context anyway. — flannel jesus

It's what David Chalmers meant by it.

I don't think that's the case. David Chalmers makes conclusions given the "conceivability of p zombies". If they're conceivable just because you're ignorant of any reason why they'd be impossible, you can't make any conclusion based on that. The type of conceivability you need to make conclusions off it is a much more rigorous sort of conceivability.

I'd encourage you to read his own words.

I encourage you to really investigate what "conceivable" actually is meant in this context. It's actually trickier than just saying "I'm completely ignorant about it".

Cool.

All I’m saying is for the guy that thinks up….conceives……a thing, then for him to be presented with an argument implying he didn’t think it, might cause him to seriously reject the argument.

Invoking square circles in juxtaposition to the topic here, is a categorical error, in that both squares and circles are established knowledge regarding classes of objects in general, such that the combining of them leads to a contradiction. For that which is not established knowledge, on the other hand, the contradiction may still arise, but not necessarily, depending on the conceptions being combined. In the case of p-zombies, the conception itself combines other conceptions, if not actually deemed knowledge, at least do not contradict each other, from which follows the conception itself is not invalid as the conception of square circles would necessarily be. Which is to say….it cannot be said the guy didn’t really conceive it, or, which is the same thing, there is no strong argument for the inconceivability of the very thing the guy conceived. I mean….the guy can bend a listener’s ear for days about that thing, so for him to be told he didn’t conceive it, or what he conceived wasn’t really what he thought it to be, says more about the listener than the guy.

Maybe a compromise. Maybe the strong argument should be against the rationality of the conception of p-zombies, rather than the conceivability thereof. It must be the case there is no argument strong enough to negate the conceivability of them, insofar as they reside in the domain of discourse, where the inconceivable is never found.

I encourage you to really investigate what "conceivable" actually is meant in this context. It's actually trickier than just saying "I'm completely ignorant about it". — flannel jesus

Ok.

Frank, patterner here is also attacking the naive notion of "conceivability". If something's conceivable just because you can string a couple words together and have no idea why those concepts don't actually work out, just because of personal ignorance, then you can't really make the sorts of conclusions that Chalmers makes. The naive notion of conceivability does not work in this context.

You responded to a post I made three years ago. I'm not too interested in explaining Chalmers' agenda. If you're satisfied with your conclusion, that's fine with me. Bon voyage. :grin:

How would p-zombies develop a language that refers to consciousness and/or mental states?

That's the neat part - they wouldn't!

From https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie,

According to Chalmers, one can coherently conceive of an entire zombie world, a world physically indistinguishable from this one but entirely lacking conscious experience. Since such a world is conceivable, Chalmers claims, it is metaphysically possible, which is all the argument requires. Chalmers writes: "Zombies are probably not naturally possible: they probably cannot exist in our world, with its laws of nature."

This seems to me to be the `real' zombie argument, about another world, or another universe. (I don't like Chalmer's use of 'laws', nor do I like Carroll's use of 'stuff', nor your use of both. :smile: )

But I wasn't sure how his preferred 'weak emergence' would be real phenomenality as he indicates, as he seemed to switch to talking about levels of explanation. — Danno

I tend to agree.

If you can't establish that they're impossible, then I think that establishes that they are conceivable, if by conceivable we mean things we can imagine that could possibly exist. To me, the more relevant question is: who cares if they exist? If they're indistinguishable from the non-zombies, what does it matter? It's not like we'd be living in the horror genre if they existed... "Night of the Philosophical Zombies." Try to conceive of that movie script.

That's the neat part - they wouldn't! — flannel jesus

Right. So then we can't conceive of beings like us, who have the same vocabulary as we do, but with no mental states. They're impossible.

If you can't establish that they're impossible, then I think that establishes that they are conceivable, if by conceivable we mean things we can imagine that could possibly exist. — GRWelsh

That’s my point. They can’t possibly exist.

How would p-zombies develop a language that refers to consciousness and/or mental states? — RogueAI

That's the neat part - they wouldn't!
— flannel jesus

Right. So then we can't conceive of beings like us, who have the same vocabulary as we do, but with no mental states. They're impossible. — RogueAI

Exactly.

I mean, that's my view, which I am pretty confident of but I am of course not the final arbiter, and plenty of smart people disagree.

I mean, that's my view, which I am pretty confident of but I am of course not the final arbiter, and plenty of smart people disagree. — flannel jesus

I wonder how they argue p-zombies could develop a language that has referents to mental states.

I wonder how they argue p-zombies could develop a language that has referents to mental states. — RogueAI

They don't. The hallmark of metaphysical possibility is that you can have God create the situation however you like. God made the p-zombies that way.

There isn't a big difference between metaphysical and logical possibility. Remember, logical possibility just means you haven't conjured a contradiction.

No, I do not mean physicalism. I'm saying that all behaviour, including language, can be predicted from physics. — GrahamJ

As far as I'm concerned, that is physicalism pure and simple. Sorry, but I don't rate Carroll as a philosopher.

They don't. The hallmark of metaphysical possibility is that you can have God create the situation however you like. God made the p-zombies that way.

There isn't a big difference between metaphysical and logical possibility. Remember, logical possibility just means you haven't conjured a contradiction. — frank

That's true, but that forces proponents of the conceivability of p-zombies to basically use the "god did it" explanation. That sounds kind of like a copout.