The important aspects of life are precisely those which cannot be publicly demonstrated. — Janus
But can they be subject to philosophical discourse? The whole point of the remainder of your post is to uphold a taboo - these things ought not to be discussed, they're subjective, they're transient and basically inconsequential. Hadot himself doesn't say that. He says that philosophy as understood in the contemporary academy has lost sight of its original motivation, to its detriment. — Wayfarer
If we pressure people to stop talking about gold because of the danger of fool's gold, then we deprive many people of the search and possession of real gold. — Leontiskos
In more general terms, how severing reason from the good is nihilism can be seen in the ideal of objectivity and the sequestering of "value judgments". Political philosophy, for example, is shunned in favor of political science.
— Fooloso4
I think this is more or less correct. :up: — Leontiskos
'Physical' meaning what, exactly? — Wayfarer
“You see, one thing is, I can live with doubt and uncertainty and not knowing. I think it's much more interesting to live not knowing than to have answers which might be wrong. I have approximate answers and possible beliefs and different degrees of certainty about different things, but I'm not absolutely sure of anything and there are many things I don't know anything about, such as whether it means anything to ask why we're here, and what the question might mean. I might think about it a little bit and if I can't figure it out, then I go on to something else, but I don't have to know an answer, I don't feel frightened by not knowing things, by being lost in a mysterious universe without having any purpose, which is the way it really is so far as I can tell. It doesn't frighten me.”
― Richard P. Feynman
I can encode information - a recipe, a formula, a set of instructions - in all manner of physical forms, even in different media, binary, analog, engraved on brass. In each case, the physical medium and the symbolic form may be completely different, while the information content remains the same. — Wayfarer
So how can the information be physical? — Wayfarer
Yes, I agree with that. The important aspects of life are precisely those which cannot be publicly demonstrated. The aesthetic dimension in architecture music, literature and the arts is of more value, or at least consists in a different kind of value, even though aesthetic quality, like any form of "direct knowing" cannot be rationally demonstrated or couched in propositional terms. — Janus
I think it also needs to be acknowledged that if such transformations are ever achieved it is exceedingly rare, and mostly (perhaps always) transient, and given that those most likely to achieve such altered states are renunciates, I think it has little practical significance for general human life apart from possibly being a relatively minor (compared to the arts and popular religion) enriching aspect of culture. — Janus
Altered states of consciousness are to be realized not by argument and critique but by praxis. — Janus
To repeat, the point of such philosophies is about practice and not about proving any metaphysical theory. — Janus
What do you mean by 'exactly'? — wonderer1
So how can the information be physical?
— Wayfarer
By being encoded in the structure of physical stuff.
Why think there is information available to us, other than that which can come to us via configurations of physical stuff? — wonderer1
Can you say some more about why? — Tom Storm
Basic to the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle is the desire for and pursuit of the good. This must be understood at the most ordinary level, not as a theory but simply as what we want both for ourselves and those we care about. It is not only basic to their philosophy but basic to their understanding of who we are as human beings. — Fooloso4
But by this account then quite a range of people who believe in transcendent entities, such as gods, might qualify as nihilists - [those who] do not have any conception of the good but only a divine command theory — Tom Storm
True, but I think there is also an inverse correlation between public demonstrability and intrinsic value. That which must be publicly demonstrable tends toward utility, as a means rather than an end. — Leontiskos
As Hadot says in Philosophy as a Way of Life, the ideas in those kinds of ancient philosophies were not to be critiqued or discussed... — Janus
It leads to the idea that, ultimately, there is no reason to do anything. There are only hypothetical imperatives. We could argue about whether that results in nihilism per se, but in any case it seems to come very close. — Leontiskos
Once that is understood then it becomes clear why separating reason from the good entails that there is no ultimate reason to do anything at all. "The good" is the psychological motive force for human beings, if you will (but not only that). — Leontiskos
Divine command theory has a conception of the good. It conceives of the good as that which is divinely commanded. — Leontiskos
Divine command theory has a conception of the good. It conceives of the good as that which is divinely commanded. — Leontiskos
I guess it does. But from my perspective this isn't actively engaged with the good as such and is merely following orders. — Tom Storm
Consequently, I have wondered if we could take Nothingness seriously, and eliminate the perceived necessity for a mysterious ethereal substance. Take a typical atom for example, and watch as an electron (point particle) jumps up, and then back down, between energy levels (orbits). This up & down -- maximum to minimum -- action produces waveforms on an oscilloscope. But the actual jumps seem to occur almost instantaneously. So, what if we imagine them as quantum leaps without passing through the space (nothingness) in between. In that case, the pattern would look more like a series of dots than a sine wave curve. {see image below} — Gnomon
As you've made a claim that 'Meaning depends on a physical interpretive context' so I'm asking, what do you mean by that? — Wayfarer
But how does it come to be so encoded, what is it that does the encoding and what interprets the code? I think you will find that they are very big questions, so I'm not trying to elicit an answer - like Feynmann says! - so much as a recognition that the answer is not obvious, and also not something that can be understood in terms of physics. — Wayfarer
As far as I can discern, the only instances of codes are the biological code - DNA - and in languages. — Wayfarer
Yes, but this is an argument about what is good, and presupposes a desire for the good in both parties. You are saying to the divine command theorist, "You see divine commands as good, but they are not truly good. This other thing is truly good, and it is this that you ought to seek instead." — Leontiskos
I tend to think there is a complex interrelation between ideation and experience. — Leontiskos
Like ↪Wayfarer, I do not read Hadot this way. I think Hadot sees discourse and practice as two poles that mutually influence one another, and he critiques the undue emphasis on discourse in modern philosophy, but I don't see him claiming that practice subsumes or displaces discourse. Or in other words, forms of philosophical practice are in some ways as vulnerable to argumentation as philosophical discourse is. The renewed emphasis on practice creates a more holistic philosophical environment; but it doesn't make argument futile. — Leontiskos
It seems crucial to assert that the intrinsically valuable (ends in themselves) are a proper subject of argument. I think that is where we disagree. I think we must argue about the highest things. — Leontiskos
My claim is that those altered states and their various cultural interpretations underdetermine the various metaphysical beliefs associated with them. — Janus
This is where we disagree because I see no reason to believe that there are any intrinsically valuable things. — Janus
I agree with this. Are you not also saying that the altered states are primary or prior, and the metaphysical beliefs are derivative or posterior? — Leontiskos
I gave the example of music, and the appreciation of music. Do you hold that this is not intrinsically valuable, and is instead only a means to an end? — Leontiskos
Why must we argue about "higher things" when it is not rationally, logically or empirically demonstrable that there are in fact any higher things? — Janus
I guess in your "not only that" space you might come at this from a more platonic perspective? For me The Good is an artifact of human experience and reasoning and can only be contingent, even if there are large intersubjective communities of agreement. The experience of being human doesn't differ all that much in terms of most people wanting to flourish and avoid suffering. — Tom Storm
The questions are really endless and this last perspective seems close to nihilism to me. There is a total disengagement between making a decision to do good as opposed to following some instruction which you don't even know to be true. But yes, I get that there is still rudimentary reasoning happening, even if it is fallacious and, perhaps, complacent. — Tom Storm
Here is where I say that you echo positivism. — Wayfarer
For example, food is good for man, and this truth is not man-made. But I realize you disagree with this and that it will lead us off on a tangent, which is why I bracketed it. — Leontiskos
If you want to take issue with what I said, then present a rational, logical or empirical argument that purports to show that there must be, or that we should believe there are, higher things, and which can be determined to be such. — Janus
Quite the question. I think the primary reasoning or justification available would be some kind of appeal to tradition - Platonism, the perennial philosophy and what not. — Tom Storm
Yes, I would agree with tthat. — Janus
There are people, perhaps not many, who don't like music. If we accept that almost everyone likes some kind of music, althought their tastes may vary considerable, then I would say that for those people liistening to (their preferred) music certainly has value for them. — Janus
So take for example the end of appreciating music. I think we can speak about this end, argue about it, learn about it, teach it, seek it, honor it, etc. Once we understand this end we can then speak/argue/learn/teach/seek/honor the proper means, such as technical proficiency, discernment of quality, etc. Nevertheless, the act of music appreciation is not publicly demonstrable in any obvious way, largely because appreciation is not the sort of thing done for the sake of demonstration. It would be incongruous to try to demonstrate appreciation (because demonstration pertains to means and appreciation pertains to ends). — Leontiskos
Right, but appeal to authority is universally regarded as a philosophical fallacy. — Janus
But let's explore this in a more appropriate place some other time. Thanks for the chat. :up: — Tom Storm
Trying to dismiss what I say by associating it with a philosophical position I don't hold is both a red herring, and a strawman — Janus
Hadot’s founding meta-philosophical claim is that since the time of Socrates, in ancient philosophy “the choice of a way of life [was] not . . . located at the end of the process of philosophical activity, like a kind of accessory or appendix. On the contrary, its stands at the beginning, in a complex interrelationship with critical reaction to other existential attitudes . . .” (WAP 3). All the schools agreed that philosophy involves the individual’s love of and search for wisdom. All also agreed, although in different terms, that this wisdom involved “first and foremost . . . a state of perfect peace of mind,” as well as a comprehensive view of the nature of the whole and humanity’s place within it. They concurred that attaining to such Sophia, or wisdom, was the highest Good for human beings. — Philosophy as a Way of Life
What does this mean for the different, and often conflicting, belief-systems of the religions? It means that they are descriptions of different manifestations of the Ultimate; and as such they do not conflict with one another. They each arise from some immensely powerful moment or period of religious experience, notably the Buddha’s experience of enlightenment under the Bo tree at Bodh Gaya, Jesus’ sense of the presence of the heavenly Father, Muhammad’s experience of hearing the words that became the Qur’an, and also the experiences of Vedic sages, of Hebrew prophets, of Taoist sages. But these experiences are always formed in the terms available to that individual or community at that time and are then further elaborated within the resulting new religious movements. This process of elaboration is one of philosophical or theological construction
But can they be subject to philosophical discourse? — Wayfarer
So how can the information be physical?
— Wayfarer
By being encoded in the structure of physical stuff.
Why think there is information available to us, other than that which can come to us via configurations of physical stuff? — wonderer1
Quantum leaps seem to be inherent in the foundations of the physical world, as revealed by 20th century sub-atomic physics. In the 17th century, Isaac Newton assumed that physical processes are continuous, but the defining property of Quantum Physics is discontinuity. When measured down to the finest details, Energy was found to be, not an unbroken fluid substance, but could only be measured in terms of isolated packets, that came to be called "quanta"*1. Yet, on the human scale, the brain merges the graininess of Nature into a smooth image. There's nothing spooky about that. If you put your face up close to your computer screen, you will see a bunch of individual pixels. But as you move away, those tiny blocks of light merge into recognizable images.I don't think this concept of nothingness works, because it renders what you call the quantum leap as unintelligible, impossible to understand. It may be the case that it actually is unintelligible, that is a real possibility, but we ought not take that as a starting premise. We need to start with theassumption that the medium is intelligible, then we'll be inspired to try to understand it, and only after exhausting all possible intelligible options should we conclude unintelligibility, nothingness. — Metaphysician Undercover
I assume that the "older kind of philosophy" referred to those like Aristotle, who wrote the book on factual Physics. But even he wrote a book on speculative Metaphysics. Today, modern Science is dedicated to understanding material Reality, and disdains philosophical attempts to understand mental Ideality. Even the "soft" science of Psychology is based primarily on an empirical model, and eschews theoretical models. Except in cases where the mechanical models don't work : the neural-net model is a dead-end*1. In which case, Mathematical models like IIT, or Information models, are used to go beyond mechanics to understand the mind philosophically as a whole system.Hadot's point, as I understand it, is that the older kind of philosophy, which was not about argumentation and asserting anything, has been lost. I don't know if that's true; there may be practicing Stoics, Neoplatonists and Epicureans for all I know. To repeat, the point of such philosophies is about practice and not about proving any metaphysical theory. I'm not saying they have no value; obviously they have value to those who want to practice them. — Janus
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