I think you ought to narrow down a little more what you are referring to by 'self.' We can talk about self as a representation, a logical function, or even the notion of reflection itself. For instance, does this implied subject need to be made aware that it is a self in order to deserve the name?

does this implied subject need to be made aware that it is a self in order to deserve the name? — kudos

Good point. I guess I am thinking of the human self, (according to me) the idea that one is an entity with the capacity to affect and be affected by that which is not oneself (whatever oneself thinks one is).

Let me try another way to put it. The self I am trying to explore is that which is the object of thought when you think of yourself. For example, when you think of a car the object of thought is the concept of a car, no matter the colour, the shape, the size, etc. You can take the concept of a car and play with it; you can give it any colour, any shape (as long as you can still call it a car), any material, etc. You cannot do this if you don't posses the concept of a car. When you think of yourself, there is a concept with which you can play with; I am referring to such concept. The idea would be to explore the concepts necessary for the formation of the concept of the self, whatever the true nature of the self is.

Please let me know if that helps clear things up or not. It is important that what is trying to be explored is understood, so I don't mind deviating from the topic to this end.
However, it is not my intention with this thread to define what the true nature of the self is, but to find the concepts necessary for its conceptualization in the human mind*; those concepts one needs to form before being able to form the concept of the self (sorry if I repeat myself so much, I am trying to say the same in different ways to see if it gets clearer).

Now, I might contradict myself or talk nonsense; please, call me out. Again, the aim of the thread is to explore for the sake of exploration; we don't wanna define anything, at least purposefully.

*(let's say both collective and individual, unless people think it complicates matters too much, in that case let's centre on the individual conceptualization of the self - though the collective idea might be easier to explore, I dunno)

When you think of yourself, there is a concept with which you can play with; I am referring to such concept. The idea would be to explore the concepts necessary for the formation of the concept of the self, whatever the true nature of the self is. — Daniel

It forms as the infant's pre- and post-natal neural networks forms: gradually. Concepts are a fairly late addition to the mental development of any intelligence. First, there are only physical sensations, then instinctive responses to environment, then emotions, then recognition of external objects, then recognition of one's own limbs as separate from external objects, then recognition of other animate entities, then one's interaction with both kinds of external entity. Everything to this point is discrete, specific, singular: this thumb, this food, this blanket, this mother - non of these perceived external objects has a name or a category. Generalization is a result of many encounters, memory and association. From generalization comes categorization, and then image-retention, conceptualization and abstraction - that is, the ability to 'play with' an idea, aka imagination.

so, you mean that there is no need of the capacity to conceptualize to generate a self? Or like the idea of it? Again, the purpose of the thread is to see if there are any ideas that are required before I generate that idea of the self. Or do you think it is independent of any other concept?

you mean that there is no need of the capacity to conceptualize to generate a self? — Daniel

That's right. A sense of self - that is, an awareness that inside here is separate from outside there - precedes any concepts.

Ok, first, I wanna admit that my language so far has been very ambiguous, please bear with me. I'll do my best to explain what I am trying to do/say.

Now, I wanna clarify something, and to that end I'd like you to answer a couple questions; do you believe we posses an idea/concept of our individual self? By this, I mean to ask if you believe that there is a discrete mental representation which is the object of thought when one thinks about oneself. I hope this makes sense. If you believe this concept exists, I would like to focus your attention to this idea and ask you if you think that the existence of such idea is dependent on the formation of some other concepts, or if it can be formed without the need of any other concepts, or if what I am trying to do is just irrelevant or useless (I wanna know if you understand what my purpose is)? Also, if you believe the idea of the self exists in our minds, do you believe it to be separate to the sense of self? Is the self and the idea of it two distinct things?

Now in reference to your last response (which concerns the sense of self, which at the moment I am assuming you consider to be different to the idea of the self, just FYI), you mention an awareness that inside here is separate from outside there. In my opinion there is a distinction that must be done for such awareness to occur, namely, here from there. Wouldn't a distinction imply conceptualization? Am I mistaken in assuming that the distinction must be prior to the awareness?

Google Kantian intuitions. That might help you explore a little.

In the language of Kant I guess I am trying to ask if there are any concepts required for the formation of both the intuition and the concept of the (individual) self, I am not concerned about the self as a sensation. And if I understand correctly the intuition, the concept, and the sensation of the self exist, (which I think is not the case for being cold, for example, which can only be a sensation, or for the representation of a car, which can only be either an intuition or a concept).

Authorship seems pretty important for a sense of self.

…..one might say that one needs to form a concept of shape before having a concept of self since it might be very difficult to reference/contemplate/visualize/imagine something if one does not comprehend or has the capacity to comprehend that there are shapes…. — Daniel

It’s almost incomprehensible that there must be that which is affected by itself. How can it be asked about a thing, when the very thing asked about, is doing the asking?

Nature of the metaphysical human beast: look for answers whether or not there are any.

do you believe we posses an idea/concept of our individual self? — Daniel

Yes.

I would like to focus your attention to this idea and ask you if you think that the existence of such idea is dependent on the formation of some other concepts, or if it can be formed without the need of any other concepts, — Daniel

I think it begins as an idea too internal and primitive to articulate. It forms long before the infant acquires language. If that's a concept, then it is the original concept, to which many other concepts - 'me' 'mine', 'you' 'girl' 'dog' 'brother' are later added.

(I wanna know if you understand what my purpose is) — Daniel

Not entirely. But then, I hardly ever understand why philosophers complicate simple facets of creature existence.

Is the self and the idea of it two distinct things? — Daniel

An idea is not a thing. It's a product of the mind. The mind describes - in words and images - what it experiences and encounters, in order to process information to make sense of the world.

Wouldn't a distinction imply conceptualization? — Daniel

Okay, that's a reasonable way to look at a primal sense of being a discrete, self-aware physical entity. But then your whole car analogy is inapplicable; that's a very much more sophisticated concept.
Intuition comes after sensation and before thought or idea. Intuition may be considered as sensation groping for words to describe itself.

Intuition may be considered as sensation groping for words to describe itself. — Vera Mont

:cheer:

t’s almost incomprehensible that there must be that which is affected by itself. — Mww

I don't see things being affected by themselves as being incomprehensible at all. Can you elaborate on what seems almost incomprehensible to you about things affecting themselves?

I go by the concept that the idea of self is identical to self consciousness.  It seems to be a reasonably widely accepted opinion on the topic.  I was looking at "A Companion To Metaphysics" Edited by JG Kim and E. Sosa (1995, Blackwell Companion to Philosophy).  When searched for self or idea of self, it refers to Self Consciousness.

Idea or concept of self is a type of intuition or Apperception (in Kant's terms), that looks into the Mind.  It is embedded or based on all mental perception, feelings, sensations, and bodily and speech  acts too.

By that, I mean,  one cannot be unsure of one's own thoughts, feelings and sensations in one's own mind and body for them as one's own mental events (because it is, by necessity impossible, for one to have the mental events without the self).

But also when one says, "It is raining outside.", what actually it means is, "I perceive that it is raining outside."  "Philosophy is an interesting subject." means that "I think Philosophy is an interesting subject."  "Shall we meet for dinner?" is "I would like to ask you, if we shall meet for dinner. What do you think?" 

"Shut the bloody door!" would be "I ask/tell/order you to shut the bloody door."
There are implied "I"s in every sentence one utters.

I kind of see what your concern is, and I am gonna say I share it to some extent, and for this reason, in this case, I guess Im trying to separate the idea of the self from the self itself. Although like @Corvus, I'm inclined to believe that the idea of the self and the self are the same thing.

In spite of this last point, I separate the proper self from its conceptualization so one can ask about it. And if the self can be thought of as an idea different from other ideas, that is, a particular mental representation, something separate from other concepts such as up, down, the sky, etc, then I ask if I need to form other concepts before I wonder or ask about or conceptualize the self.

….about things affecting themselves… — wonderer1

I wasn’t being so general, meaning only the self by my comment. See below, if you like.
————

I guess Im trying to separate the idea of the self from the self itself. — Daniel

Which gives rise to my comment. That which is trying to separate is the self, which implies the attempt to separate self from self. Even to separate the idea of self is merely once-removed, and still requires that to which the idea belongs, so you end up with an idea you’ve created about yourself, you then wish to remove from yourself.

Why does self need to be something to separate, or separable? I fail to understand what could be gained by attempting to conceptualize something, when the device for constructing conceptions, or to which conceptions are spontaneously given, is just….well….me.

There is a Enlightenment- era philosophy addressing this exact dilemma, however much it has subsequently fallen from favor. The argument therein is, the self can be conceptualized in the somewhat normal method, but there’s no separability connected to such conception.

Anyway….my two or three ha’pennies.

….about things affecting themselves…
— wonderer1

I wasn’t being so general, meaning only the self by my comment. See below, if you like. — Mww

From my perspective it seems fairly obvious that we affect ourselves. For example, I realize that there is something I am interested in knowing more about, and I study and become more knowledgeable. Is that not affecting myself?

Now I take a perdurantist view towards personal identity, so I would think it somewhat more accurate to say my past self affects my future self. But regardless of that, is not voluntarily learning affecting the self?

From my perspective it seems fairly obvious that we affect ourselves — wonderer1

And from mine, I find much more parsimony in the notion my self is affected, or, which is the same thing, I am affected. To be affected by my thoughts, it does not follow that because all my thoughts belong to me, I thereby affect myself.

The argument derives from antiquity, in that the conception contained in the subject of a proposition or statement cannot be at the same time the conception contained in the object, in the same proposition.

Perdurantist. New one on me.

Perdurantist. New one on me. — Mww

I'm surprised the subject hasn't come up around here.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perdurantism:

Perdurantism or perdurance theory is a philosophical theory of persistence and identity.[1] The debate over persistence currently involves three competing theories—one three-dimensionalist theory called "endurantism" and two four-dimensionalist theories called "perdurantism" and "exdurantism". For a perdurantist, all objects are considered to be four-dimensional worms and they make up the different regions of spacetime. It is a fusion of all the perdurant's instantaneous time slices compiled and blended into a complete mereological whole. Perdurantism posits that temporal parts alone are what ultimately change. Katherine Hawley in How Things Persist states that change is "the possession of different properties by different temporal parts of an object".[2]

Take any perdurant and isolate a part of its spatial region. That isolated spatial part has a corresponding temporal part to match it. We can imagine an object, or four-dimensional worm: an apple. This object is not just spatially extended but temporally extended. The complete view of the apple includes its coming to be from the blossom, its development, and its final decay. Each of these stages is a temporal time slice of the apple, but by viewing an object as temporally extended, perdurantism views the object in its entirety.

The use of "endure" and "perdure" to distinguish two ways in which an object can be thought to persist can be traced to David Kellogg Lewis (1986)...

I want to re-state the exercise I am interested in conducting taking into account the replies posted so far.

Again, the purpose of this exercise is not to define the true nature of the self, it is simply to explore a fictitious space, the space of ideas, with relation to the idea of the self. Let me try to explain my line of thought better. One could consider the mind to be a sort of abstract space populated by sensations, intuitions, concepts, and whatever else is found in a human mind; in other words, it could be consider as a set that contains other sets... a collection of (mental) collections. If we focus on the set of ideas/concepts (or the space of ideas), one could say that it is populated by distinct ideas; that is, the set of ideas contains more than one element. Of these, one could say some are simple and others are composite; for example, we could say that the idea of a car and the idea of a shoe are simple ideas, but that the idea of a shoe inside a car is a composite idea, one needs to have an idea of a shoe and an idea of a car before one can have an idea of a shoe in a car. Let me try now a more complex example of what I am trying to convey when I say composite and simple ideas. So, we could say that the ideas of quantity and change are simple ideas, but that the idea of addition is a composite one since a notion of quantity and a notion of change are required to form a notion of the process of addition. In other words, composite ideas require simple ideas to exist, and the space of ideas contains both simple and composite ideas, and composite ideas are different from the simple ideas that make them.

Now, if we assume that the self can be conceptualized, i.e., there is an element in the set/space of ideas which represents the self, then the purpose of this exercise becomes to find if this idea of the self is a simple or a composite idea. And if it is a composite idea, which are the simple ideas required for its existence.

Following this line of thought, I would say @Vera Mont considers the idea of the self to be a simple idea; that is, the idea of the self does not require the prior formation of other ideas to exist.

I think @Corvus and @Mww argue that the idea of the self is not an element of the set of ideas. If I understand correctly, this is because one cannot form an idea of the very thing that supports them (?). I think I am mistaken with my interpretation, but I would like to argue that the self is a subject of this conversation, and I dont think it could be such if it could not be conceptualized.

I am assuming that for this exercise the self and the idea of the self are different, and the exercise is concerned with the idea of the self.

I think Corvus and Mww argue that the idea of the self is not an element of the set of ideas. — Daniel

Not what I’m arguing; THE self is a valid general idea, having a myriad of representative conceptualizations from various ways of being understood. MY self is a particular, and as such, is more a logical deduction represented as an object of MY reason, given the name transcendental object in order to distinguish its origin, rather than a conception of the understanding.

the exercise is concerned with the idea of the self. — Daniel

This concern is different from your “The self I am trying to explore is that which is the object of thought when you think of yourself”, insofar as me thinking of myself is incomprehensible. Nothing contradictory in examining the self in general as an object of thought, but to think myself as an object of my own thought, invites the anathema of Cartesian theater.

It would be helpful, if you could clarify, whether your idea of self is purely mental, or physical in nature, or combinations of both.  In other words, is the self made of purely perceptions, feelings and sensations? Or is it a combination of body, brain and mental states? Or maybe could it be just functions of brain (There is no mental existence, but only the biological neural state of brain)?

I am assuming that for this exercise the self and the idea of the self are different, and the exercise is concerned with the idea of the self. — Daniel

How are they different?

So, the purpose of this thread is to explore those ideas/concepts/mental objects that might be required for the formation and sustenance of the self, assuming the self is contingent on previously formed concepts; — Daniel

At one moment in time, if I am conscious, I must be conscious of something, there must be an intentionality about my consciousness. For example, at one moment in time, I can be conscious of the concept circular shape, the concept of pain, the concept of the colour red and the concept of an acrid smell.

As regards my consciousnesses of the concept circular shape, at the same time not only am I conscious of a simple concept, a circular shape, but also I am conscious of a set of composite concepts, an arc at the top, an arc to the right, an arc at the bottom and an arc to the left.

As for my consciousness of a single concept, it may be the same for my consciousness of a set of concepts

For a single concept, at the same time I am conscious not only of a simple whole but also a set of composite parts. Similarly, for a set of concepts. At the same time I can be conscious of a simple whole, ie, a self, as well as a set of composite parts, ie, the individual concepts making up the whole.

From Kant, Hegel, and the Transcendental Unity of Apperception, by Kourosh Alizadeh, Hegel takes the basic Kantian idea of the original unity of apperception.

It may be that this unity of apperception becomes a single conscious self out of the many different concepts that we are aware of at any one moment in time.

IE, rather than certain ideas/concepts/mental objects pre-existing the self, these ideas/concepts/mental objects are the self.

When I think directly about the idea of my own self, which were formed primarily through the first ten years of my life I will often notice that it is a rather evasive thought, as others have noted it feels very solid until one actually stands on top of it.

So instead of attempting a phenomenological approach I would assert certain things that I concluded with as the foundation for the self in previous investigations.

My self is made out of shame, for in want of the means for the power I seek I am able to side with my offenders in times when I can imagine that it benefits those means.

That is, the self were made under the pressure of two equal forces, the will for unquestioned power and the comprehension of my own limited power, shame is the consequence.

Or in other terms still: my self is my social conscience, something I could only be shamed into. Can I induce that this applies to other people? Are we statisticians?

IE, rather than certain ideas/concepts/mental objects pre-existing the self, these ideas/concepts/mental objects are the self. — RussellA

This idea is absurd in that, if all these ideas/concepts/mental objects are the self, then you end up having 1000s of different selfs.

This idea is absurd in that, if all these ideas/concepts/mental objects are the self, then you end up having 1000s of different selfs. — Corvus

You used Kant's concept of Apperception when you wrote:
Idea or concept of self is a type of intuition or Apperception (in Kant's terms), that looks into the Mind.

The Wikipedia article on Transcendental apperception wrote:
Transcendental apperception is the uniting and building of coherent consciousness out of different elementary inner experiences (differing in both time and topic, but all belonging to self-consciousness).
1) All experience is the succession of a variety of contents (an idea taken from David Hume).
2) To be experienced at all, the successive data must be combined or held together in a unity for consciousness.
3) Unity of experience therefore implies a unity of self.
4) The unity of self is as much an object of experience as anything is.
5) Therefore, experience both of the self and its objects rests on acts of synthesis that, because they are the conditions of any experience, are not themselves experienced.
6) These prior syntheses are made possible by the categories. Categories allow us to synthesize the self and the objects.

It seems to me that the whole point of Kant's concept of the unity of apperception is the possibility of the unity in the mind of different experiences.

Is your understanding of Kant's apperception different?

I think having all these different perceptions in the mind is evidence for the existence of self, but perceptions, sensations and feelings are not the self itself.

I feel that self is a special perception (apperception of Kant's term), that looks inwards into the mind, whereas all the standard perceptions look outwards into the external world. The mind has two sides, i.e. the inside (self) and outside (perceptions for the external world).

Because the self can only look inwards into the mind, it is invisible to the other perceptions. I am not 100% certain of Kant's idea of self, as I have not read it yet.  I did read the definition of Kant's apperception, and borrowed the idea to make up my own thoughts on the self. Could be wrong, but will keep on reading to further clarify and discuss. :)

There is a Zen poem that says: "You cannot catch hold of it, nor can you get rid of it. In not being able to get it, you get it. When you speak, it is silent. When you are silent, it speaks." And the last two lines are the most important - ideas and concepts only complicate things. That's why philosophy is so bad at defining these phenomena - we can talk about it, but it doesn't make much sense.