Evolutionary Overreach: Midgley suggests that some scientists and science popularizers overreach by making broad philosophical or moral claims based on evolutionary theory. They treat evolution not just as a biological theory but as a complete worldview or ideology.
"Just-so" Stories: Midgley critiques certain evolutionary explanations, especially in the realm of sociobiology, as being akin to Rudyard Kipling's "just-so" stories – speculative narratives that seem more about confirming existing biases than rigorous scientific explanations. — Wayfarer
doesn't it seem plausible that only animals have the capacity for "qualities" (experience, a point of view)? And even amongst animals, doesn't it seem plausible that only animals with some form of nervous system have this capacity of qualities/experience/point of view? — schopenhauer1
The physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order – our structure and behavior in space and time – but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view. There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject — without which it would not be a conscious experience at all.
Also, not all evolutionary theories are "Just so", per se, but descriptive. A "just so" story might be something like, "Our ancestor's propensity for favoring the strongest alpha male, is why we have a strong tendency towards fascism". But, a theory that describes how language evolved in humans by examining various models that fit the evidence from artifacts, brain development and anatomy, developmental psychology, etc. might be a legitimately descriptive theory?
I suggest that the 'subjective essence of experience' is one of the connotations of the term 'being' when used as a noun - that 'a being' is precisely the kind of entity that possesses the element of subjectivity, even if in rudimentary form. This is the point at which qualities of being a.k.a qualia start to become manifest. — Wayfarer
An amoeba has reactions, but not intentions it would seem. — schopenhauer1
Primates used logic to express immediate need. This led to further development of x part of the brain that mediates language, etc. Statements like this carry baggage, like for instance the idea of the individual narrative, the modern self, and the accidental. These are not particular to the quality of the science, but inherited by the form of the storytelling. — kudos
If we are to have any value come out of the sciences, other than technology, it would be getting a better synthesis of what could have happened, or is the case, in regards to nature based on the evidence we have, and honing that or creating a better interpretation. This endeavor is likely to not end in some absolute consensus of interpretation any time soon, however. — schopenhauer1
I'm inclined to think gaining better understanding of our own natures would be more beneficial than more accurate understanding of our history, although the latter would surely contribute to the former. — wonderer1
Just to be the devil's advocate here, but doesn't it seem plausible that only animals have the capacity for "qualities" (experience, a point of view)? — schopenhauer1
If we are to have any value come out of the sciences, other than technology, it would be getting a better synthesis of what could have happened, or is the case, in regards to nature based on the evidence we have, and honing that or creating a better interpretation.
I think it's a bit of an historical accident that evolutionary biology has become so tied to battles over religion. — Count Timothy von Icarus
People keep saying things like this. Where's the evidence that they really made up those stories, and for those stated purposes? — baker
That's assuming that those stories were invented (?) for the purposes that you claim. How do you know they were invented for those purposes?The evidence is in the multitude of different mutually contradictory stories. They can all be wrong, but they can't all be right. — wonderer1
Again, that's assuming the purpose you ascribe to them is the true and relevant one.How implausible the stories are is evidence for them being a product of relatively uninformed thinkers.
Of course. Has it ever occured to you that those stories, even when they are in the form of descriptions or explanations, are actually instructions, statements of the norms of the particular communities that told those stories?Religions (communities of religious followers) propagate claims about the nature of ourselves which are based on stories that the religion originating story tellers told.
What religion doesn't make claims about what we are?
That's assuming that those stories were invented (?) for the purposes that you claim. — baker
Has it ever occured to you that those stories, even when they are in the form of descriptions or explanations, are actually instructions, statements of the norms of the particular communities that told those stories? — baker
Yes, but you have pulled a switcheroo on the word 'value,' which is here supposed to mean 'applications to.' We're not talking about science as having any value beyond analytic and synthetic proposals that convey the essence of a thing. They are not going to be the key that unlocks reason, consciousness, the meaning of life, or any other glossy-eyed delusions. — kudos
In the end, doesn't the sponge have just as much to do with consciousness and mentality? Of course the sponge can't have a point of view, if what you mean by that is a mental 'map' of its own conscious life. But I might suggest that the sponge still could be said to have concrete being 'for itself.' Even in terms of its atomic structure, if you want to dabble in the scientific, it is built in such a way as to cohere itself and have a unified being that is continually representing its essential qualities. I might go as far as saying that it might not be possible to talk about mind or spirituality without considering matter not purely in content but also as a whole. — kudos
My challenge is to understand what this fundamental difference between the two is.
That right there is the essence of the origins of the hard problem of consciousness.
Wow! That is a deep philosophical insight. But, like all philosophical intuitions, it may not convince those who require physical evidence. Could subjectivity be evolutionarily associated with some physical development, like Broca's bit of brain? Seriously, I'm just kidding. :joke:I suggest that the 'subjective essence of experience' is one of the connotations of the term 'being' when used as a noun - that 'a being' is precisely the kind of entity that possesses the element of subjectivity, even if in rudimentary form. This is the point at which qualities of being a.k.a qualia start to become manifest. — Wayfarer
If this is the aim of your work, an excellent topic. You are onto something here... — kudos
This speculation is where a problem of logical extension is occurring. The essence of consciousness may or may not include other components than simple rationality and functional neural networks — kudos
if a computer program could read it's own code, would it totally understand from that it's own place in the world as a computer program? — kudos
It has now become ideology and is no longer the scientific inquiry front that it was formerly impersonating. It works because you have made no scientific assumptions, but have included ontological ones instead, that do not affect the structure of the synthetic propositions outlined. — kudos
The arthropod eye, on the other hand, has one of the best-studied examples of selective signal enhancement. It sharpens the signals related to visual edges and suppresses other visual signals, generating an outline sketch of the world. Selective enhancement therefore probably evolved sometime between hydras and arthropods—between about 700 and 600 million years ago, close to the beginning of complex, multicellular life. Selective signal enhancement is so primitive that it doesn’t even require a central brain. The eye, the network of touch sensors on the body, and the auditory system can each have their own local versions of attention focusing on a few select signals.
The next evolutionary advance was a centralized controller for attention that could coordinate among all senses. In many animals, that central controller is a brain area called the tectum. (Tectum means roof in Latin, and it often covers the top of the brain.) It coordinates something called overt attention—aiming the satellite dishes of the eyes, ears, and nose toward anything important.
All vertebrates—fish, reptiles, birds, and mammals—have a tectum. Even lampreys have one, and they appeared so early in evolution that they don’t even have a lower jaw. But as far as anyone knows, the tectum is absent from all invertebrates. The fact that vertebrates have it and invertebrates don’t allows us to bracket its evolution. According to fossil and genetic evidence, vertebrates evolved around 520 million years ago. The tectum and the central control of attention probably evolved around then, during the so-called Cambrian Explosion when vertebrates were tiny wriggling creatures competing with a vast range of invertebrates in the sea.
Even if you’ve turned your back on an object, your cortex can still focus its processing resources on it.
The tectum is a beautiful piece of engineering. To control the head and the eyes efficiently, it constructs something called an internal model, a feature well known to engineers. An internal model is a simulation that keeps track of whatever is being controlled and allows for predictions and planning. The tectum’s internal model is a set of information encoded in the complex pattern of activity of the neurons. That information simulates the current state of the eyes, head, and other major body parts, making predictions about how these body parts will move next and about the consequences of their movement. For example, if you move your eyes to the right, the visual world should shift across your retinas to the left in a predictable way. The tectum compares the predicted visual signals to the actual visual input, to make sure that your movements are going as planned. These computations are extraordinarily complex and yet well worth the extra energy for the benefit to movement control. In fish and amphibians, the tectum is the pinnacle of sophistication and the largest part of the brain. A frog has a pretty good simulation of itself. — A New Theory Explains How Consciousness Evolved A neuroscientist on how we came to be aware of ourselves By Michael Graziano
But what is the "simulation" here? What is that? (the HARD PROBLEM).An internal model is a simulation that keeps track of whatever is being controlled and allows for predictions and planning.
The tectum’s internal model is a set of information encoded in the complex pattern of activity of the neurons. That information simulates the current state of the eyes, head, and other major body parts, making predictions about how these body parts will move next and about the consequences of their movement.
One implication is the rejection of "kinds" in favor of degrees of difference. — Fooloso4
So the big deal I see is that sponges have very basic neural networks that most scientists agree is behavioral but without a mental representation of the world. However, with animals like jellyfish, worms, and insects, the neural nets equates to a mental representation (however basic) of the world. My challenge is to understand what this fundamental difference between the two is. That right there is the essence of the origins of the hard problem of consciousness. However, this seems like an impossible question. It would seem on the surface, there shouldn't be any qualitative difference whereby on one side of the divide a certain number of neurons means no mental representation and on the other side, it does. What does that even mean? — schopenhauer1
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