Still, after 510 pages, no one has given a shred of evidence for the “Russian threat” prior to 2008, when the NATO provocation began.

No one was claiming Putin had imperialist ambitions back then. Now the story has changed retroactively, ignoring historical fact to justify the continuation of war and take a sizable responsibility off the US.

Still, after 510 pages, no one has given a shred of evidence for the “Russian threat” prior to 2008, when the NATO provocation began. — Mikie

Well it depends on what you take to be relevant evidences to fix security dilemmas in geopolitics (have you ever heard of Mearsheimer's offensive realism?). Of course if you ignore Russian history [1] and Russian grievances after the fall of Soviet Union. And Putin's political history even prior 2008, sure there is no shred of evidence.


[1]
So much so that you guru Mearsheimer wrote an article about it in Summer 1993
https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Mearsheimer-Case-for-Ukrainian-Nuclear-Deterrent.pdf (page 54)

WHY RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN CONFLICT IS LIKELY
Despite some testy moments, relations between Russia and Ukraine have generally been stable since the Soviet breakup. There are, however, good reasons to fear that these relations might deterio
rate. First, the situation between Ukraine and Russia is ripe for the outbreak of security competition between them. Great powers that share a long and unprotected common border, like that between
Russia and Ukraine, often lapse into competition driven by security fears. Russia and Ukraine might overcome this dynamic and learn to live together in harmony, but it would be unusual if they do.
Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrence there is the danger of hypernationalism, the belief that other nations or nation states are both inferior and threatening and must therefore be dealt with harshly. Expressions of Russian and Ukrainian nationalism have been largely benign since the Soviet col lapse, and there have been few manifestations of communal hatred on either side. Nevertheless, the Russians and the Ukrainians neither like nor trust each other. The grim history that has passed between
these two peoples provides explosive material that could ignite conflict between them.
Russia has dominated an unwilling and angry Ukraine for more than two centuries, and has attempted to crush Ukraine's sense of self-identity. Recent history witnessed the greatest horrors in this
relationship: Stalins government murdered an astounding 12million Ukrainians during the 1930s. Though Stalin was a Georgian, and the Soviet Union was not a formally "Russian' government, Russia had predominant power within the Soviet Union, and much of the killing was done by Russians. Therefore, the Ukrainians are bound to lay heavy blame on the Russians for their vast
Bolshevism. Against this explosive psychological disputes could trigger an outbreak of hypernationalism suffering under backdrop, small on either side.
several such disputes are already on the horizon: ownership of the Black Sea Fleet, control of the Crimea, ownership of Ukraine's nuclear arsenal, and a host of economic issues stemming from the
of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, many Russians would breakup change the present border with Ukraine, and some even reject the idea of an independent Ukraine. Senior Russian officials, for exam
ple, have recently been describing Ukraine's independence as a "transitional" phenomenon and have been warning other European governments not to open embassies in Kiev because they would soon
be downgraded to consular sections subordinate to their embassies in Moscow.
Fourth, there is the problem of mixed populations. Roughly 11.5 million Russians live in Ukraine (comprising 22 percent of Ukraine's population) and approximately 4.5 million Ukrainians live in Russia. Abuse of either minority by the local majority could be a flash point for crisis.

:up:

relevant evidences to fix security dilemmas in geopolitics (have you ever heard of Mearsheimer's offensive realism?). — neomac

The same Mearsheimer who agrees there was no evidence whatsoever of Putin’s imperialism for the NATO provocation in 2008? Sure.

Russian history? That’s like arguing that we should surround the nation of Germany because, you know…stuff that happened 80+ years ago. If that’s what you mean, no I don’t consider that evidence for why NATO needed expansion at the Bucharest summit in April of 2008. A meeting in which Putin was invited. (Odd move if he was considered such a threat.)

The narrative of Russian imperialism prior to 2008 necessitating the expansion of NATO is revisionism. That’s not what happened. Which is why you and people like you can give no evidence of it, and have to report to vague statements like “Russian history.”

So much so that you guru Mearsheimer wrote an article about it in Summer 2013 — neomac

No he didn’t. He wrote that in 1993. And he never once advocates for Ukraine becoming a member of NATO— in fact accurately predicts that any tensions between the countries would only escalate if that happened. Which is exactly what happened. He states this clearly in the paper you cite but apparently didn’t read.

Try to get the basic facts right at least.

relevant evidences to fix security dilemmas in geopolitics (have you ever heard of Mearsheimer's offensive realism?). — neomac


The same Mearsheimer who agrees there was no evidence whatsoever of Putin’s imperialism for the NATO provocation in 2008? Sure. — Mikie

Russian history? That’s like arguing that we should surround the nation of Germany because, you know…stuff that happened 80+ years ago.

Yes it is, indeed this is what was argued to support NATO:
By the end of his tenure however, Ismay had become the biggest advocate of the organisation he had famously said earlier on in his political career, was created to “keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.”https://www.nato.int/cps/uk/natohq/declassified_137930.htm

If that’s what you mean, no I don’t consider that evidence for why NATO needed expansion at the Bucharest summit in April of 2008. A meeting in which Putin was invited. (Odd move if he was considered such a threat.) — Mikie

All the rhetoric strength of your argument relies on this mystiphying locution “he was considered such a threat” (again ask your offensive-realist guru Mearsheimer how he thinks States assess threat).
After the collapse of Soviet Union, the US didn’t fear imminent hegemonic competition from Russia OBVIOUSLY.
The liberal views of the American governments were optimistic enough and thought they could play stick and carrot with Russia (economic aids, reintegration in the Western-led international community, energy business with Europe, returning nuclear weapons from Ukraine to Russia, go figure!). And stick wasn’t meant to be much of a stick, since NATO is a defensive alliance which in the US even East European lobbies supported, fearing a Russian imperialist-nationalist revival.
This was obvious to every prominent geopolitical analyst since immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union: it’s not just the Russo-phobo Brzezinski (whose views were much more influential than your guru Mearsheimer’s on the American administration) but also your guru offensive-realist Mearsheimer who were aware of it and warned pretty vocally on not UNDERESTIMATING the Russian threat.
So the leading Western Europeans didn’t hear the Eastern Europeans warnings about Russia, at the prospect of having cheap oil/gas for their industries, Russia was far away and they felt well protected by the US.
And American administrations didn’t feel pressed by Russian revanchism at the end of the Cold War no matter how American analysts (including your guru Mearsheimer) were vocal about it.
So Russia was considered “such a threat” by many prominent/influential Western analysts and East European countries even though it wasn’t considered “such a threat” by many optimistic Western administrations. They thought they could close en eye while Russia was playing friendly, even two when Russia took Crimea. Until they couldn't when Russia invaded Ukraine.
BTW also the reunification of Germany and now its rearming triggered and triggers security dilemmas in neighbouring countries. The point is that Germany lost the war , they elites completely replaced. That’s not true for Russia, after the collapse of Soviet Union, as President Putin himself is living proof of.

The narrative of Russian imperialism prior to 2008 necessitating the expansion of NATO is revisionism. That’s not what happened. Which is why you and people like you can give no evidence of it, and have to report to vague statements like “Russian history.” — Mikie

It hurts badly when your chosen guru embarrasses you so patently, I know. Do you want a hug?

So much so that you guru Mearsheimer wrote an article about it in Summer 2013 — neomac

No he didn’t. He wrote that in 1993. And he never once advocates for Ukraine becoming a member of NATO— in fact accurately predicts that any tensions between the countries would only escalate if that happened. Which is exactly what happened. He states this clearly in the paper you cite but apparently didn’t read.
Try to get the basic facts right at least. — Mikie

Absolutely, mine was just a typo, whose correction I highly welcome. Indeed I cited it precisely because it talks about Russian threats prior 2008 and it comes from your guru. So thanks! LOL

Yes it is, indeed this is what was argued to support NATO — neomac

70 years ago.

That’s not what was argued in 2008.

After the collapse of Soviet Union, the US didn’t fear imminent hegemonic competition from Russia OBVIOUSLY. — neomac

Right— which makes the Bucharest Summit an unnecessary and stupid provocation.

So Russia was considered “such a threat” by many prominent/influential Western analysts and East European countries — neomac

No, it wasn’t.

Nor was Russian imperialism cited as a reason in 2008.

Indeed I cited it precisely because it talks about Russian threats prior 2008 — neomac

No, it doesn’t. You’re inability to comprehend what you read isn’t my problem. I’ll help:

No one was claiming Putin had imperialist ambitions back then. — Mikie

Which is true. Which your falsely-dated reference outlines very well:

Political will aside, extending NATO’s security umbrella into the heart of the old Soviet Union is not wise. It is sure to enrage the Russians and cause them to act belligerently. — The Article You Quoted But Didn’t Understand

Which is exactly what happened 15 years after this article, at the Bucharest Summit. It’s laughable you still think this somehow supports all the smoke you blow

your guru Mearsheimer

He’s not my guru. You’re the one citing him, not me.

I’m more partial to the late Stephen Cohen. I’d recommended his analysis too.

mine was just a typo — neomac

It wasn’t a typo. 1993 and 2013 are vastly different. You simply misread the fact that the article was accessed in the 2010s. You just carelessly used it in the hopes it would support your case, failing to notice it supports exactly what I mentioned — and which you can’t seem to follow (or won’t allow yourself to). But your poor reading comprehension isn’t my fault.

But good to know you can’t even own up to mistakes, and that I’m basically dealing with a child. Your poor writing skills and silly attempts at insults were proof enough. I appreciate the extra confirmation though. :up:

NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO. Both nations have made valuable contributions to Alliance operations. We welcome the democratic reforms in Ukraine and Georgia and look forward to free and fair parliamentary elections in Georgia in May. MAP is the next step for Ukraine and Georgia on their direct way to membership. Today we make clear that we support these countries’ applications for MAP. Therefore we will now begin a period of intensive engagement with both at a high political level to address the questions still outstanding pertaining to their MAP applications. We have asked Foreign Ministers to make a first assessment of progress at their December 2008 meeting. Foreign Ministers have the authority to decide on the MAP applications of Ukraine and Georgia.

Where is the mention of Russian imperialism? Where is the Russian threat that warranted NATO membership, after it was made clear this would be considered by Russia to be a provocation?

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm

I guess it’ll just never be admitted that the US provoked this war long ago, out of fear that this somehow makes Putin inculpable. Which it doesn’t.

On a side note, the idea that Russia went to war to prevent NATO expansion into Ukraine has been (for whatever reason) a controversial topic here.

Here's what Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General, said about that recently:

First of all, it is historic that now Finland is member of the Alliance. And we have to remember the background. The background was that President Putin declared in the autumn of 2021, and actually sent a draft treaty that they wanted NATO to sign, to promise no more NATO enlargement. That was what he sent us. And was a pre-condition for not invade Ukraine. Of course we didn't sign that.

The opposite happened. He wanted us to sign that promise, never to enlarge NATO. He wanted us to remove our military infrastructure in all Allies that have joined NATO since 1997, meaning half of NATO, all the Central and Eastern Europe, we should remove NATO from that part of our Alliance, introducing some kind of B, or second class membership. We rejected that.

So he went to war to prevent NATO, more NATO, close to his borders. He has got the exact opposite. He has got more NATO presence in eastern part of the Alliance and he has also seen that Finland has already joined the Alliance and Sweden will soon be a full member.

Ol' Jens here saying the quiet part out loud. Russia voiced clear concerns about NATO enlargement, and what did NATO do? It doubled down. We sure showed those Russians not to tell us what to do, eh?

It's clear to me that this war was purposefully provoked.

Maybe the rhetoric will change several years after this war is over - that is, if it finishes without an accident happening.

It's well beyond that point of sending Ukrainian solders to get back territory, it's just to lead them to certain death. Sad.

Yes it is, indeed this is what was argued to support NATO — neomac

70 years ago.

That’s not what was argued in 2008.

After the collapse of Soviet Union, the US didn’t fear imminent hegemonic competition from Russia OBVIOUSLY. — neomac


Right— which makes the Bucharest Summit an unnecessary and stupid provocation — Mikie

.


Why stupid provocation? If the premise of the Bucharest Summit was “We recall that the NATO-Russia partnership was conceived as a strategic element in fostering security in the Euro-Atlantic area, based on core principles, values and commitments, including democracy, civil liberties and political pluralism.” And “We reaffirm to Russia that NATO’s Open Door policy and current, as well as any future, NATO Missile Defence efforts are intended to better address the security challenges we all face, and reiterate that, far from posing a threat to our relationship, they offer opportunities to deepen levels of cooperation and stability.” Then the conclusion “NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO.  We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO.  Both nations have made valuable contributions to Alliance operations.  We welcome the democratic reforms in Ukraine and Georgia and look forward to free and fair parliamentary elections in Georgia in May.  MAP is the next step for Ukraine and Georgia on their direct way to membership.  Today we make clear that we support these countries’ applications for MAP.  Therefore we will now begin a period of intensive engagement with both at a high political level to address the questions still outstanding pertaining to their MAP applications.  We have asked Foreign Ministers to make a first assessment of progress at their December 2008 meeting.  Foreign Ministers have the authority to decide on the MAP applications of Ukraine and Georgia.” (https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm) is consequential. If it isn’t, it means that the premise is wrong.
Your argument is self-defeating: to be a stupid provocation, one must admit a hegemonic ambition from Russia over Ukraine as Mearsheimer does. Which could have been VERY WELL overlooked by an overconfident American administration in light of all concessions made to Russia and partnership with Russia after the collapse of Soviet Union. That doesn’t exclude at all the perception of a potential conflicts in Ukraine. If A and B are likely going to fight (as Mearsheimer suggests Russia and Ukraine would do in 1993, and Russia being the bully one, with or without Putin), a third party could keep them separated.
It’s obvious for the hegemon to play the hegemon, if it isn’t it’s because a competitor intends to challenge the hegemon. But than that’s a threat for the hegemon.

So Russia was considered “such a threat” by many prominent/influential Western analysts and East European countries — neomac


No, it wasn’t.

Nor was Russian imperialism cited as a reason in 2008 — Mikie

.


So what? “Imperialism’ can be easily taken as a derogatory expression, so while one is playing diplomacy with a potential competitor to be tamed and whose declared intentions are not fully trusted, of course this word won’t be used . Unless you are really claiming that NATO declaration should have sounded more like “NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO because fucking Russian imperialism has to stop, right little Putin?”. Surely that would be a provocation, wouldn’t it? But then what was the point of having Ukraine joining NATO?
In any case the issue of Russian imperialism was totally evident among American anlysts prior to 2008:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1992/03/26/the-russia-debate-nixon-vs-brzezinski/31124b6b-f0d3-4449-a0ce-da2b8e55043e/
“Two opposing camps have formed in America's foreign policy establishment over the opportunities and dangers rising from the breakup of the Soviet Union. The one you will want to join depends on how you view the nature and strength of Russian imperialism at the end of the 20th century.”

Indeed I cited it precisely because it talks about Russian threats prior 2008 — neomac


No, it doesn’t. You’re inability to comprehend what you read isn’t my problem. I’ll help:

No one was claiming Putin had imperialist ambitions back then. — Mikie


Which is true. Which your falsely-dated reference outlines very well:

Political will aside, extending NATO’s security umbrella into the heart of the old Soviet Union is not wise. It is sure to engage the Russians and cause them to act belligerently. — The Article You Quoted But Didn’t Understand

It’s laughable you still think this somehow supports all the smoke you blow. — Mikie

I don’t think you understood my argument at all. You keep assessing it from within your frame of implicit assumptions, which I’m questioning. For example I’m questioning Mearsheimer TOO. I just pointed out that Mearsheimer, your guru not mine, in his article of 1993 prior 2008 was expressly talking about the risks of conflict based on historical reasons concerning Russia and Ukraine which you were so ready to discount (“Russia has dominated an unwilling and angry Ukraine for more than two centuries, and has attempted to crush Ukraine's sense of self-identity. Recent history witnessed the greatest horrors in this relationship: Stalins government murdered an astounding 12million Ukrainians during the 1930s. Though Stalin was a Georgian, and the Soviet Union was not a formally "Russian' government, Russia had predominant power within the Soviet Union, and much of the killing was done by Russians. Therefore, the Ukrainians are bound to lay heavy blame on the Russians for their vast Bolshevism.”) not based on the DECLARED INTENTIONS by Russian President Yeltsin. And that the Russians didn’t tolerate an independent Ukraine “several such disputes are already on the horizon: ownership of the Black Sea Fleet, control of the Crimea, ownership of Ukraine's nuclear arsenal, and a host of economic issues stemming from the of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, many Russians would breakup change the present border with Ukraine, and some even reject the idea of an independent Ukraine. Senior Russian officials, for example, have recently been describing Ukraine's independence as a ‘transitional’ phenomenon and have been warning other European governments not to open embassies in Kiev because they would soon be downgraded to consular sections subordinate to their embassies in Moscow.” which again is not an assessment based on the DECLARED INTENTIONS by Russian President Yeltsin. And claiming that joining NATO was or was not a good idea is based on this premise about Great Powers like Russia are perceived as a threat by countries like Ukraine.
The general point here is that assessing security dilemmas involving Great Powers doesn’t need to go through declared intentions of presidents AT ALL. And this general point is not contradicted by Mearsheimer’s offensive realism principles:
The third assumption is that states can never be certain about the intentions of other states. Specifically, no state can be certain another state will not use its offensive military capability against the first. This is not to say that states necessarily have malign intentions. Another state may be reliably benign, but it is impossible to be certain of that judgment because intentions are impossible to divine with 100 percent certainty.
There are many possible causes of aggression, and no state can be sure that another state is not motivated by one of them. Furthermore, intentions can change quickly, so a state's intentions can be benign one day and malign the next. Uncertainty is unavoidable when assessing intentions, which simply means that states can never be sure that other states do not have offensive intentions to go with their offensive military capability
https://www.sv.uio.no/livet-rundt-studiene/studiestart/kollokviefadder/artikler-til-kollokvietreff/the-false-promise-of-international-institutions.pdf (1994-1995)
That is why your belief that evidences of Putin’s declared intentions or American President’s declared intentions in a precise moment are all that counts in assessing responsibilities without understanding deeper geopolitical dynamics is catastrophically misguided. And that’s a problem for latest Mearsheimer’s pro-Putin arguments too (I suspect there are theoretical reasons why he made this argument, but they are irrelavant to the point I’m making).
Besides nobody needs to stick to Mearsheimer’s apparently narrow notion and application of the notion “Russian imperialism” AT ALL. And I certainly don’t. So I can’t care less if Mearsheimer uses the word “imperialism” for his own reason. I can care if he acknowledges or not what to me counts as expression of Russian imperialism. And he does. That’s the evidence I need, not his word choices.
On the other side Mearsheimer’s wording choices are important to you because he is your guru, so if he is critical toward the expression “Russia imperialism” for whatever reason, you feel you kicked my ass so badly. Besides your understanding of geopolitics seems grounded on declared intentions of presidents which is simply outlandish also from the perspective of Mearshaimer’s offensive realism.

mine was just a typo — neomac

It wasn’t a typo. 1993 and 2013 are vastly different. You simply misread the fact that the article was accessed in the 2010s. You just carelessly used it in the hopes it would support your case, failing to notice it supports exactly what I mentioned — and which you can’t seem to follow (or won’t allow yourself to). But your poor reading comprehension isn’t my fault. — Mikie

It was a typo. And once you understand my argument correctly you would understand why it was important for me to report Mearsheimer’s views on Russia before 2008 (and not after), because your challenge was about evidences concerning Russian threat prior to 2008, and that what you mentioned (Mearsheimer’s disagreeing with NATO expansion) supports my argument that Russia was a threat: indeed that’s why Mearsheimer supported leaving a nuclear deterrence in Ukraine. And if Mearsheimer doesn’t call that “Russian imperialism”, who gives a shit?

Why stupid provocation? — neomac

Because Russia had stated, for years, that NATO membership in Ukraine was considered a red line. There was no reason to do so.

You’re confusing the very real tensions between Ukraine and Russia, which Mearsheimer discusses, and the justification for NATO involvement, which today is claimed to be the threat of Russian imperialism — which is incorrect, and which is why the very same person (Mearsheimer) was rightly against it all along, including 1993.

If Russia was such a threat, surely that would have been mentioned in 2008. But even if kept secret for whatever reason, anyone with a working brain would see that NATO involvement would only exacerbate the issue, thus creating a self fulfilling prophecy.

But then what was the point of having Ukraine joining NATO? — neomac

US hegemony. To make Ukraine a “Western bulwark on Russian borders.” Russia was believed to be too WEAK to prevent NATO expansion at that point, in 2008.

It certainly wasn’t because of a Russian imperialist threat. Which is why none of that was mentioned, and which is why Putin was himself at the summit. Any talk of Russian threats as justification for NATO wasn’t even mentioned until 2014.

I’ll skip the rest of your jumbled ramblings. You’ve not shown you even understand what’s being argued. I’m talking about Putin’s Russia, 2000-2008, and about NATO. I’m not talking about historical relations or ancient history or 90s reactions to the dissolution of the USSR. That’s your own diversion.

Because Russia had stated, for years, that NATO membership in Ukraine was considered a red line. There was no reason to do so. — Mikie

From the official Kremlin press release on the creation of the NATO-Russia Council:

On the topic of Ukraine’s accession to NATO, the Russian President said that it was entitled to make the decision independently. He does not see it as something that could cloud the relations between Russia and Ukraine. But President Putin stressed that Russia’s position on the expansion of the bloc remained unchanged. — President of Russia

But President Putin stressed that Russia’s position on the expansion of the bloc remained unchanged. — President of Russia

And what was that position exactly?

And what was that position exactly? — Mikie

That they are not too happy about it, as they felt it does not contribute to the security in Europe. Still, the quote given above from the press release still available on Putin's official site clearly shows that Ukraine's joining NATO obviously was not a 'red line'.

"The appearance on our borders of a powerful military bloc ... will be considered by Russia as a direct threat to our country's security,"

That’s fairly straightforward. This is 2008.

It wasn’t just Putin, of course.

The US ambassador, William Burns, said as much in his memo to the secretary of state:

Ukrainian entry into NATO is the brightest of all red lines for the Russian elite (not just Putin). In more than two and a half years of conversations with key Russian players, from knuckle-draggers in the dark recesses of the Kremlin to Putin’s sharpest liberal critics, I have yet to find anyone who views Ukraine in NATO as anything other than a direct challenge to Russian interests.

https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/04/28/did-the-us-really-take-russias-nato-concerns-very-seriously/

Why stupid provocation? — neomac

Because Russia had stated, for years, that NATO membership in Ukraine was considered a red line. There was no reason to do so. — Mikie

This is a non sequitur. At most you can argue that there was a “very strong” reason NOT to do so (Russia’s strong opposition). Not that there was NO reason to do so. And reasons are more or less strong compared to other reasons. So the US, NATO, Ukraine may have had THEIR strong reasons to counter such Russian strong opposition (among them, all the concessions they made to Russia).
“Red lines” are not necessarily a geopolitical imperative AT ALL. Attacking Crimea was a “red line”, it got attacked. Killing Soleimani was crossing a red line, it got crossed. But most of all, why was Ukraine a “red line”? What does it mean? What does it imply? Pls fill in a few of the most unequivocal quotes from Putin 2000-2008 presidency explaining why Ukraine is a “red line” and what that implies, what is going to happen if it is crossed, since “declared intentions” seem to be so decisive to your argument.

You’re confusing the very real tensions between Ukraine and Russia, which Mearsheimer discusses, and the justification for NATO involvement — Mikie

You wish I made such confusion but I didn’t. Indeed I limited myself to cite Mearsheimer to counter your dismissive attitude toward overwhelming historical evidences concerning “the very real tensions between Ukraine and Russia”, reason why Russia was perceived as a troublemaker by many prominent geopolitical analysts (including your guru Mearsheimer), independently from Russian presidents’ declared intentions. I didn’t argue that suffices to support NATO involvement. Yet.
First let’s get on the same track over the relevant facts.

which today is claimed to be the threat of Russian imperialism — which is incorrect, and which is why the very same person (Mearsheimer) was rightly against it all along, including 1993. — Mikie

That the claimed “threat of Russian imperialism” is incorrect is just a cheap claim. I’m more interested to hear effective arguments to support it. That also presupposes shared understanding of what “threat of Russian imperialism” means and what constitutes evidence for it.
“Mearsheimer said so” may be a strong argument if one takes Mearsheimer as his guru. That’s not my case.

If Russia was such a threat, surely that would have been mentioned in 2008. But even if kept secret for whatever reason, anyone with a working brain would see that NATO involvement would only exacerbate the issue, thus creating a self fulfilling prophecy. — Mikie

Again what do you mean by “Russia was such a threat”, why “surely” that would have been mentioned in 2008?
Your reasoning is all behind these ambiguous expressions. I clarified what is my understanding of “Russia was such a threat” and why “surely” should have NOT been mentioned. NATO is a hegemonic security supplier and Ukraine is a non-hegemonic security seeker (from Russian threats), that is how they met each other. Anyone with a working brain would get that knowing the history of Russia and the history of Ukraine. Even between 2000 and 2008.
The notion of “provocation” presupposes that Russia had interest in having NATO out of Ukraine not to preserve its independence from an oppressive hegemon, because we agree that the perceived historical oppressor of Ukraine was Russia not the US, and Ukraine was seeking security from NATO against Russia. So Russian interest was about taking control over Ukraine. In other words, it was matter of hegemonic competition, about great powers antagonising each others and having the means to act accordingly (let's not forget the Russia is a nuclear power even after the collapse of Soviet Union).
Geopolitical relations can be rife of provocations and self-fulfilling prophecies: Russia was afraid of NATO expansion and wanted to counter it, but then a decaying NATO revived and expanded even more thanks to Putin. This phenomenon is very much EXPECTED because when there are reasons to mistrust one another (as in Russia Ukraine or Russia and the US), any defensive move by a state to contain a potential threat from the other will be perceived as a hostile move. So, calling it “provocation” doesn’t hold as a justification for NOT expanding NATO either (Brzezinski uses this as an argument IN FAVOR of NATO expansion, go figure!). Unless you are conflating facts (Russia’s perceived provocation from NATO expansion) with justification.
What I may concede is a weaker version of “a working brain would see that NATO involvement would only exacerbate the issue”, that is why I talked about overconfidence. Indeed American as any hegemon can commit mistakes and very big ones, but even in this case that doesn’t necessarily mean that NATO involvement in Ukraine was not justified AT ALL. It can simply mean that NATO involvement was poorly planned and/or executed.
Until you take more seriously the task of expliciting your reasoning from your implicit assumptions about geopolitics, your arguments or claims look myopic and dogmatic to me.

But then what was the point of having Ukraine joining NATO? — neomac

US hegemony. To make Ukraine a “Western bulwark on Russian borders.” Russia was believed to be to WEAK to prevent NATO expansion at that point, in 2008.
It certainly wasn’t because of a Russian imperialist threat. Which is why none of that was mentioned, and which is why Putin was himself at the summit. Any talk of Russian threats as justification for NATO wasn’t even mentioned until 2014. — Mikie

Dude, focus, I argued about it already. I agree with “because of US hegemony” and with “Russia was believed to be to WEAK to prevent NATO expansion at that point, in 2008” but the latter PRESUPPOSES that Russia was interested in preventing NATO expansion in Ukraine, the competing hegemonic interest on both sides IS the threat and security dilemma I’m talking about. AND OF COURSE the hegemon (the US) acts at the expense of its competitors (Russia) when the latter ARE PERCEIVED AS WEAK, and postpone it further may be already TOO late to do it. For the same reason Russia aggressed Ukraine NOW and not in 2008, because Putin thinks he is strong enough, and NATO/US/ the West is weak enough that they can’t do much about it. And why would Russia do that? Because NATO is perceived as a threat by Russians! Even though I just said that Putin felt confident (or overconfident?) that NATO was brain dead!
Competing great powers constitute a reciprocal threat, this is the expected core of their security dilemmas. Such power politics dynamics perfectly in line with your guru Mearsheimer’s offensive-realist views on how states assess security threats in the geopolitical arena. However all these facts are not enough to decide how to establish moral or geopolitical justifications of NATO expansion or blame for the ongoing war.
Until you take more seriously the task of expliciting your reasoning from your assumptions about geopolitics, your arguments or claims look not only myopic, dogmatic, but self-defeating.

I’ll skip the rest of your jumbled ramblings. You’ve not shown you even understand what’s being argued. I’m talking about Putin’s Russia, 2000-2008, and about NATO. I’m not talking about historical relations or ancient history or 90s reactions to the dissolution of the USSR. — Mikie

Again, your argument is grounded on a load of implicit assumptions which I’m questioning and you have a hard time to make them explicit and compelling.

1 - On what grounds should we exclusively focus our understanding of Russia vs the US/NATO on “Putin’s Russia, 2000-2008” to understand justifications and place blames? NATO expansion started BEFORE Putin, NATO-Ukraine relationships started BEFORE Putin, relevant reasons by involved parties were based on the historical antagonism between Russia and Ukraine, Russian Soviet Union and NATO and the future of European security, and not based on Russian presidents declared intentions at a given time. Mearshimer’s 1993 prediction of the Russia-Ukraine conflict was based on historical evidences not on President Yeltsin’s declarations of intents, and was concerning the future not just 1993, immediately after the collapse of Soviet Union, the most vulnerable moment of recent Russian history. So much so that for some the concern was not to humiliate them (as it happened with Germany after WW I) and find a way to reintegrate them in the international community, maybe even as an ally of the West. While the idea of Ukraine joining NATO dragged forever.
Additionally, after the collapse of Soviet Union, the elites of the soviet unions didn’t vanish like in Nazi Germany, they survived. Putin is indeed one of them. So why shouldn’t the reasons of the past concern these 8 years of Putin’s Russia, 2000-2008? There would be no perceived provocation and no need of NATO expansion if those reasons weren’t there. Putin himself has plenty of historical claims about his right to land grabbing in Ukraine, which apparently weren’t brought up during the Bucharest Summit, right?

2 - Security dilemmas do not need to be exclusively or primarily grounded on presidents’ declared intentions AT ALL. As also your guru Mearsheimer writes: “states can never be certain about the intentions of other states. Specifically, no state can be certain another state will not use its offensive military capability against the first. This is not to say that states necessarily have malign intentions. Another state may be reliably benign, but it is impossible to be certain of that judgment because intentions are impossible to divine with 100 percent certainty. There are many possible causes of aggression, and no state can be sure that another state is not motivated by one of them. Furthermore, intentions can change quickly, so a state's intentions can be benign one day and malign the next. Uncertainty is unavoidable when assessing intentions, which simply means that states can never be sure that other states do not have offensive intentions to go with their offensive military capability
https://www.sv.uio.no/livet-rundt-studiene/studiestart/kollokviefadder/artikler-til-kollokvietreff/the-false-promise-of-international-institutions.pdf (1994-1995)

3 - What was doing Putin in 2000-2008? Consolidating authoritarian power in Russia, crushing independents movements within Russian borders, nurturing far-right ethnic nationalist fan-base, grunting over coloured revolutions in ex-Soviet area, instead of using the Western support, indulgence and partnership to increase democracy, welfare and quell revanchist ideologies. And when it finished with that he started projecting Russian power beyond its boarders. Actually China and Iran did the same : enjoyed the economic and institutional benefits of American promoted globalisation and then used what has been capitalised to grow authoritarian, revanchist against the hegemon, and to project power beyond their borders. So even during 2000-2008 Putin was NOT PERCEIVED as a piece of cake AT ALL (https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/pm_0151.pdf), and most vocally not by Eastern European countries neighbouring Russia (including Poland and Baltic countries). For them talking about Russian imperialism was not taboo EVEN during 2000-2008.
However the most evident threat of that time, especially for the US and West Europe, was Islamist terrorism which Putin also wanted to fight. And in any case the hegemon preferred “the carrot and stick” strategy to deal with Russia, China and Iran, even though later these countries turned against the US. The point is that the story is not just NATO expanded and provoked Russia, but at the same time globalisation expanded BENEFITING RUSSIA and its resourgence.

Because Russia had stated, for years, that NATO membership in Ukraine was considered a red line. There was no reason to do so. — Mikie


From the official Kremlin press release on the creation of the NATO-Russia Council:

On the topic of Ukraine’s accession to NATO, the Russian President said that it was entitled to make the decision independently. He does not see it as something that could cloud the relations between Russia and Ukraine. But President Putin stressed that Russia’s position on the expansion of the bloc remained unchanged. — President of Russia — Jabberwock

02.01.2005 Interview with Sergej Lavrov (Foreign minister of Russia) by the German business newspaper Handelsblatt:

Question: Does the right to sovereignty also mean for Georgia and Ukraine, for example, that Russia would have nothing against their accession to the EU and NATO?

Lavrov: That is their choice. We respect the right of every state - including our neighbors - to choose its own partners, to decide for itself which organization to join. We assume that they will consider for themselves how they develop their politics and economy and which partners and allies they rely on.

https://amp2.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/handelsblatt-interview-mit-aussenminister-lawrow-russland-oeffnet-ukraine-den-weg-in-die-nato/2460820.html

This is a non sequitur. — neomac

Learn what these words mean before using them.

your dismissive attitude toward overwhelming historical evidences — neomac

Nope. That was your projection.

Pls fill in a few of the most unequivocal quotes from Putin 2000-2008 presidency explaining why Ukraine is a “red line” and what that implies, what is going to happen if it is crossed — neomac

I just did above. Plenty more.

The appearance on our borders of a powerful military bloc ... will be considered by Russia as a direct threat to our country's security,

Again what do you mean by “Russia was such a threat”, — neomac

That Russia has imperial ambitions, that they seek to conquer not just Ukraine but other countries, etc. Claims that have been made by the US and others since 2014, and retroactively made as justification for 2008 — which isn’t true.

NATO is a hegemonic security supplier and Ukraine is a non-hegemonic security seeker (from Russian threats), that is how they met each other. Anyone with a working brain would get that knowing the history of Russia and the history of Ukraine. — neomac

I’ve already acknowledged this.

Indeed American as any hegemon can commit mistakes and very big ones, but even in this case that doesn’t necessarily mean that NATO involvement was not justified AT ALL. It can simply mean that NATO involvement was poorly planned and/or executed. — neomac

It wasn’t poorly planned, and of course there are reasons and justifications given. The actual reason is that the US wanted to make Eastern Europe like Western Europe, and figured Russia was to weak to do anything about it. So in 2008, despite warnings, they started the process anyway.

You can buy the US rationale if you want to. I don’t. But either way, the outcome was clear: it would provoke Russia. This was known since the early 90s, in fact.

but the latter PRESUPPOSES that Russia was interested in preventing NATO expansion in Ukraine — neomac

Are you really not convinced that at least by 2008, Russia considered NATO expansion in Ukraine to be threatening to Russian security? They said so explicitly. It’s not about what you or I feel, it’s about how they felt about it. The US knew, and has known for years, and made the decision to go forward with expansion anyway. So Crimea and now the Ukraine War shouldn’t be a mystery.

As I quoted above, the US’s own ambassador knew this and warned the secretary of state (Rice):

Ukrainian entry into NATO is the brightest of all red lines for the Russian elite (not just Putin). In more than two and a half years of conversations with key Russian players, from knuckle-draggers in the dark recesses of the Kremlin to Putin’s sharpest liberal critics, I have yet to find anyone who views Ukraine in NATO as anything other than a direct challenge to Russian interests.

your guru Mearsheimer) — neomac

your guru Mearsheimer — neomac

your guru Mearsheimer — neomac

You seem obsessed with this guy. I haven’t cited him once— except in response to your referencing him. He’s hardly a “guru” of mine, although he’s a valuable resource.

So, are you just ignorant or what? Hard to take you seriously when you repeatedly sound so silly. Makes it easier to ignore most of your cumbersome writing though.

That’s fairly straightforward. This is 2008.

It wasn’t just Putin, of course. — Mikie

If in 2002 Russia clearly declared that they have some reservations, but in general they do not object to Ukraine's joining, then the West did not cross any lines in 2008, given that it was just a continuation of the process started even before 2002. It is Russia's reaction that is unexpected and somewhat irrational - if it was not a vital threat in 2002, why would it be in 2008?

if it was not a vital threat in 2002, why would it be in 2008? — Jabberwock

He didn’t say it wasn’t a threat in 2002. But recall this was after 9/11, and the issue was terrorism. Yes, things changed between 2002 and 2008. Is that not obvious?

What happened? The Orange Revolution, for one. But there were other tensions, including issues with Nosovo at the beginning of 2008. Any cooperation with NATO was out the window long before the Bucharest summit.

And let's not forget the 2004 NATO tranche, that added another 7 countries.

Well, it was not a threat enough to draw any 'red lines' then. At the time he treated the expansion of NATO with Ukraine exactly as he then treated joining by the Baltics or now he treats joining by Sweden and Finland - as slightly annoying, but nothing more. He drew no red lines in those cases.

The proponents of the theory 'it is all because of NATO expansion' are just content with stating that he suddenly in 2008 started to see Ukraine in NATO as a vital threat, while he was and is perfectly calm about the Baltics or the Scandinavian countries. They feel no need to explain that difference, even though such view is absurdly irrational.

The proponents of the theory 'it is all because of NATO expansion' are just content with stating that he suddenly in 2008 started to see Ukraine in NATO as a vital threat, while he was and is perfectly calm about the Baltics or the Scandinavian countries. They feel no need to explain that difference, even though such view is absurdly irrational. — Jabberwock

Concerns over the effects of NATO enlargement literally started as soon as the Soviet Union dissolved, so lets not play coy here.

On your second point, it's obvious why Finland and Sweden pose little threat. Do you know what the Russian-Finnish border looks like?

But that is exactly the point: in 2002 the expansion with the seven was well underway and Putin did not declare it as a grave threat, on the contrary, as given in the quote above, he very warmly spoke about cooperation with NATO.

I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernisation of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact? Where are those declarations today? No one even remembers them. But I will allow myself to remind this audience what was said. I would like to quote the speech of NATO General Secretary Mr Woerner in Brussels on 17 May 1990. He said at the time that: “the fact that we are ready not to place a NATO army outside of German territory gives the Soviet Union a firm security guarantee”. Where are these guarantees? — Putin, March 10, 2007, Munich

Unfortunately for some, the archives are actually loaded with proclamations like this. Not just from the Russians themselves, but from people in the Washington establishment too.

This 'head-in-sand' style approach where you hope people won't go digging through the archives to prove you wrong is getting rather tiresome.

The proponents of the theory 'it is all because of NATO expansion' are just content with stating that he suddenly in 2008 started to see Ukraine in NATO as a vital threat, while he was and is perfectly calm about the Baltics or the Scandinavian countries. They feel no need to explain that difference, even though such view is absurdly irrational. — Jabberwock

It’s not all because of NATO expansion. But that’s the most direct cause.

Also, it wasn’t “sudden.” As explained earlier. You seem to ignore changes from 2002 to 2008.

Lastly, the differences are obvious. Russia doesn’t like any of it, as they were promised NATO wouldnt expand in the 90s, but Ukraine is unique. Look at a map and you’ll see why.

It’s not all because of NATO expansion. But that’s the most direct cause.

Also, it wasn’t “sudden.” As explained earlier. You seem to ignore changes from 2002 to 2008.

Lastly, the differences are obvious. Russia doesn’t like any of it, as they were promised NATO working expand in the 90s, but Ukraine is unique. Look at a map and you’ll see why. — Mikie

No, it is not the most direct cause, as it was not a cause of war with Lithuania, Latvia or Estonia.

And no, your explanations did not explain anything - NATO did not organize the Orange Revolution and the differences about Kosovo in no way made NATO more threatening to Russia. NATO did not actively do anything in that period that would make it a bigger threat to Russia.

And no, differences are not obvious. The distance from Ukraine to Moscow is about 100 km shorter than from Latvia, so it is negligible. But to be sure, I have checked the map from 2002 and Ukraine has not moved a bit from that time. Thus the difference between 'Ukraine in NATO is not a big concern to us' in 2002 and 'it is a grave threat' in 2008 has nothing to do with its location.

It is Russia's reaction that is unexpected and somewhat irrational — Jabberwock

Russia's position on Ukraine / Georgia NATO membership was known well before the 2008 Bucharest Summit, and not 'unexpected' at all. The Russian view is discussed at length in several leaked memos written by former CIA director William Burns, one of which is titled 'Nyet Means Nyet: Russia's NATO Enlargement Redlines'.

Here's are two memos from the lead up to the 2008 Summit:

https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08MOSCOW748_a.html
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08MOSCOW265_a.html


It's honestly quite stunning how poorly read people here are after 511 pages of discussion.

An embarrassing moment for Trudeau and the Canadian government. Trudeau, Zelensky, and the Ministers of parliament gave a standing ovation to a Ukrainian WW2 veteran in the House of Commons. It turns out he was an actual Nazi, fought for the SS in Ukraine and everything. You can’t make this stuff up. — NOS4A2

Embarrassing!

Actually, embarrassment is a good word here, because everyone already knows that Canada isn't ruled by a Nazi regime (or fascist or authoritarian). That won't deter certain parties from using the event as diversion, or to sow mistrust or division, though.