Crito is not able to give a better argument for why Socrates should not comply with the court's decision. Can we? — Fooloso4

Sure. The court in this case is the judicial arm of a democracy. A democracy is like a ship whose owner has been tricked and manipulated into giving the helm over to sailors who know nothing about navigation. This ship of fools is more likely to end up at the bottom of the Aegean than any where close to where the owner wanted it to go. Where did I hear that argument? :razz:

Since democracies are poorly run, there's no obligation to adhere to their judgments.

I think there is an expression of fear in Crito's argument here. There is also an element of corruption being suggested. The dialogue begins with Crito noting he bribed the jail keeper to get in early. Is the disgrace Crito fears a loss of power at the same time? — Paine

Yes, perhaps all of the above and more. A fascinating story. One that I will have to leave for a few days - for a sunny September break.
If/when Socrates dies, what will Crito do? He will grieve his sad loss.
Without his good friend and mentor, who will keep his thinking straight? What or who will follow?

Socrates will not leave him without talking things through, perhaps with wise words to hold on to.
Will that console Crito? Will he be convinced or let things lie in peace as Socrates desires?
Can you imagine the emotional charge in this prison setting? Intense. This long goodbye.

Thanks for the pointers and questions.

There's quite a lot to be getting on with, isn't there? Crito is a piece of work!

There's quite a lot to be getting on with, isn't there? Crito is a piece of work! — Amity

There is. I've read this dialog a couple of times. I'm rereading it thinking about what it says about normativity: Crito is giving all sorts of das Man type reasons to ignore the court's judgement and sentence. If the crowd gives us ethical normativity, then Crito is right. But the court is part of the foundation of the lives of the members of the crowd. The court is ordained, so to speak, remember the law court is a gift of Athena. The court helps us avoid mob action, so it's about stopping to think things through. The court means our judgments at least have a change to be tempered by reason. So Crito is advising Socrates to forget about rationality.

Except the whole situation shows that the court can be subverted by passions of the day, like with McCarthy. So where does that leave us? It's not the crowd, it's not reason. Then where is normativity really coming from? And since I'm applying all of this to normativity as it related to meaning, Crito suggests that meaning doesn't arise from the whims of the crowd, it doesn't arise from rationality. So from where? With the last two points, Kripke would agree. Meaning is not conventional if we define that as rule following. There is nothing in the world, all the way down to the intimacies of mental states that constitutes rule following in our communication, which is wild.

So if you haven't read Crito before, feel free to read further along. We'll catch up.

Where did I hear that argument? — frank

For those interested in where, Socrates presents this image in the Republic 488a in support of his argument that the philosophers should rule.

For the sake of the argument I am going to put aside the historical question and treat Plato's Socrates as the same man who defends Athenian democracy in the Crito and criticizes democracy elsewhere.

With this in mind, we can conclude that Socrates is not persuaded by this argument. In the argument he makes in the Crito he is silent on the fact that Athens is a democracy. It is the laws of the city that he must answer to (50a). Although not mentioned by name, the Athenian lawgiver the "wise Solon", stand above the multitude as one capable of doing great things, and thus as one to be heeded.

Solon was no longer alive and could not address Socrates, but the wise laws he established can. The question arises as to the status of those laws and their administration. In more general terms the question is whether the claims Socrates makes on behalf of the laws hold up to critical examination.

I think Socrates gives us reason to think they don't. I will address some of them, but first, if this is right, if the city and the laws are not as just as he makes them out to be, why does he think it is still his duty to obey them?

I've read this dialog a couple of times. I'm rereading it thinking about what it says about normativity: Crito is giving all sorts of das Man type reasons to ignore the court's judgement and sentence — frank

OK. Then you already have a firm grasp of Crito and at a deeper level.
[I need to know more about 'Normativity', a quick google:
https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/normativity/v-1]

So if you haven't read Crito before, feel free to read further along. We'll catch up. — frank

Unfortunately, I need to leave the discussion for about 5dys.
You guys are providing food for thought. It's all good! Will see if I can add anything later...

Unfortunately, I need to leave the discussion for about 5dys.
You guys are providing food for thought. It's all good! Will see if I can add anything later... — Amity

Cool.

The Greek term νόμος, from which we get the term 'norm', means custom, law, and also song (νόμος).

Socrates sings the song of the law. A nomos nomos, a song of songs, in which the law lays claim to us.

In the argument he makes in the Crito he is silent on the fact that Athens is a democracy. — Fooloso4

Plato does make one comment that connects to other texts. The following from Crito :

Soc: I really wish the multitude were able to do the greatest harm, Crito, so that they might also be able to do the greatest good, and all would be well.

is echoed in the Statesman:

Stranger: Then again, just as few are intermediate between one and many, so the rule of the “not many” should be regarded accordingly as intermediate in both respects. The rule of the many, for its part, is weak in every respect and, in comparison with the others, is capable neither of great good nor of great evil, because public offices therein are distributed in minute subdivisions to many people. Therefore, when all of the constitutions are lawful, this proves to be the worst of them, and when they are all at variance with the law, it is the best, 303B and when all of them lack restraint, the life in a democracy wins out, but when they are orderly, this is the last one you should live in. But life in the first is by far the best, with the exception of the seventh, for we must separate that one from all of the other constitutions, as we would separate a god from human beings. — Statesman, Horan translation, 303b

The seventh one is that of the Philosopher King. It is deemed the best but most unlikely to ever appear:

Str: So we are saying that a tyrant arises in this way, a king too, and an oligarchy, an aristocracy, and a democracy; from the disgust of humanity with that one sole ruler, and their disbelief that anyone worthy of such rule could ever arise; someone who would be willing and able to rule with knowledge and excellence, 301D dispensing just and sacred ordinances properly to everyone, rather than maltreating, murdering and inflicting evil upon whomsoever he wants, whenever he wants. But if a person such as we are describing were to arise, he would be loved, and would dwell there as the benevolent helmsman of what is, strictly speaking, the only proper constitution. — ibid. 301c

To your point regarding the rule of law, Plato distinguishes between good and bad forms of the regimes accordingly:

Stranger: Under the rule of one we get kingly rule and tryanny; under the rule of the few, as we said, come the auspicious form of it, aristocracy and also oligarchy. As for the subdividing of democracy, though we gave both forms of it previously, we must now treat is as twofold.

Young Socrates: How is this: How can it be divided?

Stranger: By the same division as the others, even though the word 'democracy' to be doing double duty. Rule according to law is as possible under democracy as under the other constitutions. — Statesman, translated by J.K. Skemp

The distinction between regimes raises problems for Socrates' song. The city and laws ask:

... do you think any city can exist and not be overthrown when its just enactments have no force and are rendered ineffective by private citizens, and set at naught?”

(50b)

The key phrase here is "just enactment". Here he ignores the distinction between just and unjust cities and laws. He states that he refuses to play the part of the rhetorician who:

... might have a lot to say about the subversion of the law whereby judgements, once delivered, stand supreme.

(50b)

but does take the part of the rhetorician in his defense of the city and its laws. Like the rhetorician his concern does not seem to be with the truth but with being persuasive. He even asks Crito:

Are the laws speaking the truth, or not?

(51c)

The best argument here is not the one that is true but the one that will persuade him to be obedient to the law. A noble lie may be preferable to the truth.

That leaves open the question of whether this should be the case in all regimes, even the most unjust. Should judgments always stand supreme? Is the fact that the city can be overthrown if the laws are not obeyed sufficient reason to obey?

The role of rhetoric may not lead to a 'truth' that cannot be put into question by facts. Crito does, however, put a lot of emphasis on distinguishing persuasion from coercion. Socrates ties his argument with Crito to his argument with Athens:

Soc: Let’s consider this together, good man, and if you are able to contradict 48E what I am saying in any way, do so, and I shall heed you. Otherwise, at this stage, blessed man, please stop presenting the same argument to me over and over, that I need to get out of here without the permission of the Athenians, for it is very important to me that I do all this with your approval and not against your will. — ibid. 48d

And that picture of coercion is said to destroy what was formerly trying to be saved:

“Tell me, Socrates, what are you intending to do? Do you have anything else in mind, for your part, than to destroy us, the laws, and the entire city too, by 50B your plan of action?" — ibid. 50a

The emphasis upon persuasion is twice compared with coercion in the following:

“Or have you, as wise as you are, overlooked the following facts: that your homeland is more worthy of respect than your mother or father or all of your other ancestors, and is more august, and sacred, 51B and more exalted in status, in the eyes of the gods, and of men of intelligence; that when your homeland is angry she should be revered, obeyed and assuaged, even more than an angry father, and you should either persuade her otherwise, or do as she commands, and suffer in silence if she prescribes any suffering by being beaten or imprisoned; that if she sends you to war to be wounded or slain, this is what you must do, for justice consists in this, and you must not surrender or withdraw or desert your post; that in war, in a courtroom, or anywhere else, you must do what your city and your homeland commands, or else persuade 51Cher as to where justice lies; that it is unholy to use force against your father or mother, but much more so against your homeland?” — ibid. 51a

This does not answer your question of when judgements should (or should not) "stand supreme'. And the account does employ the 'noble lie' of our birthplace being said to be prior to our parents. But maybe persuasion has its own laws. Socrates claiming rights within certain conditions.

In so far as I understand Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein, the rule following aspect of language games is seen as troubling the view that such games involve the description of facts.

I see how that engages the theories of Quine, Davidson, Chomsky, etcetera. But I don't understand how that implicates the treatment of facts in law.

And if this is the case, do you think that justice between you and us is on an equal basis, and that you are justified in retaliating against anything we set about doing to you?

(50e)

This is straight out of Aristophanes' Clouds, where Pheidippides beats his father Strepsiades. (1330) Here persuasion and coercion are comically joined.

Is the distinction always clear? If I can persuade you by making the weaker argument stronger, isn't that a form of coercion? Note how the song of the law, as I think you pointed out, demands submission.

From 48-50 Socrates addresses Crito's argument that it's right to flee because so many aspects of public opinion support it. Socrates points out that we usually only pay attention to worthy opinions, which are those which aim to improve our lives (little bit of consequentialism). He asks a couple of times if adults suddenly change their values when the shit hits the fan and execution awaits.

One of the threads running through 48-50 is the question of whether the ends justify the means. Per Socrates, only children live that way.

In so far as I understand Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein, the rule following aspect of language games is seen as troubling the view that such games involve the description of facts. — Paine

Not to put too fine a point on it, but Kripke's point is that it ends up being an empty claim that communication involves rule following. This idea that we follow rules when we speak is an interesting hypothesis. It's not something supported by any facts (of the kind Kripke specifies).

I cannot argue that the distinction is always clear. The Aristophanes reference is well taken.

I admire Thomas Paine, as my forum handle suggests. His arguments for democracy are in tune with the problem of absolute power as described in Statesman. I wonder if our present condition is one where we cannot distinguish the regimes so clearly. Maybe the tyrannical, the oligarchs, and the dynamic of unfortunate public opinion coexist simultaneously.

It is interesting that you mention Thomas Paine. On the one hand Socrates might have regarded him as someone whose opinions in general should be considered, but his efforts, as an Englishman to become independent, would not have persuaded the law. We are servants of the city and its law, as Socrates speaking for it, demands.

As you point out, not all cities and all laws are the same. But Socrates said he found no fault with the Athenian laws of marriage or the education he received. (50-e) And yet, Socrates own teachings were deemed contrary to those of the city.

I wonder if our present condition is one where we cannot distinguish the regimes so clearly. — Paine

Our democratic republic is by design a mixed regime. In practice there is always the danger of it becoming something else. This raises the question of whether when the city and its laws devolve what allegiance do we still owe to it?

… if she sends you to war to be wounded or slain, this is what you must do, for justice consists in this

(51b)

Earlier Socrates said that:

Presumably because doing harm to people is no different from acting unjustly.

(49c)

How much weight should we put on “presumably”? (West translates this as "surely") Is the presumption wrong?

He goes on to ask:

In leaving this place without having convinced the city, are we doing harm, even to those we should harm least of all?

(49e)

Socrates’ concern is twofold. Doing harm to people and doing harm to the city. By doing harm to the city he would be doing harm to the people of the city. By obeying the city, however, he would be doing harm to the enemy, which, according to what has been said, would be unjust.

In the Euthyphro a similar tension occurs. Euthyphro prosecutes his father on behalf of the gods. Although both dialogues are about justice, here there is no mention of either the laws or the city. In the Crito there is no mention of piety. In the Crito the laws are our master, here the gods are our master. In both there is the question of who is harmed by what is being proposed to be done.

The surrounding of a city seems to be bound up with what it is. The in between places are the premise of many wars. Outside the boundaries, as it is often described, is either a material claim or an existential struggle as Hegel described.

At 50B Socrates presents a Kantian perspective. If everyone ignored the laws of the city, there would essentially be no city.

The laws ask:

Or do you think any city can exist and not be overthrown when its just enactments have no force and are rendered ineffective by private citizens, and set at naught?”

(50b)

Would it be that there would be no city or would it become a different city, one with laws without their just enactment, or a city without law?

Put differently, is it a question of justice or survival? If, as the laws claim, the citizens are its servants or slaves, then what part does justice serve? Isn't justice replaced by obedience? Would it still the same city, still a democratic regime?

Contrary to the way Socrates frames it, the city in question is not just "any city". It is one whose laws are said to be enacted justly. The problem, however, is not simply justice but the force needed to prevent the law from being overthrown. Although Socrates talks as if it is a matter of persuasion, of convincing the city, that too would be a:

subversion of the law whereby judgements, once delivered, stand supreme.

Philosophy poses a threat to the city. Socrates is silenced by force. The law proclaims that he does not stand on an equal footing with the law. To convince them would require doing the very thing they want to prevent him from doing, that is, philosophizing.

Added: West's translation has "judgments" and the following note:

The words "judgments" and "trials" in this speech render the Greekdikai, the plural of dike, "justice".

In effect the claim is that the judgment of the law is just because it is the judgment of the law. But, of course, even the personification of the laws should not obscure the fact that the judgment was that of the many.

The laws ask:

Or do you think any city can exist and not be overthrown when its just enactments have no force and are rendered ineffective by private citizens, and set at naught?”
(50b)

Would it be that there would be no city or would it become a different city, one with laws without their just enactment, or a city without law? — Fooloso4

The laws say:

“Socrates, don’t be surprised at the question, just answer it, since you make such a habit of asking and answering questions. Come on,you are attempting to destroy ourselves and the city. On what grounds?" — 50C

This is stated in the context of the claim that Socrates wouldn't have been born without the law. He was raised and flourished in the stability provided by the city. I'd add that city was an integral part of identities of Athenian citizens. In a number of ways, the citizens and the city are inextricable. You can't really have an Athenian without an Athens and vice versa. Since it was a democracy, rule of law was also inseparable from the city.

So the point was that by breaking the city's law, Socrates would be undermining the foundation of his own existence.

Put differently, is it a question of justice or survival? If, as the laws claim, the citizens are its servants or slaves, then what part does justice serve? Isn't justice replaced by obedience? Would it still the same city, still a democratic regime? — Fooloso4

Well, you have to survive in order to act justly. This represents a challenge to any ideology, for instance if I'm a conservative and I stand against change, it would behoove me to recognize that sometimes societies need to evolve and standing against that is to oppose life itself. If my choice is between my beautiful conservative values and the very life of my society, which do I choose?

But the challenge is even more acute for an ideology that aims to destroy the existing social order without any plan for an alternative, which I think fairly describes the average leftist perspective.

But on a more materialistic note, historians claim that the very idea of living alone beyond the safety of a city was unthinkable for the average Greek. So if Socrates leaves, it certainly wouldn't be to wander. It would be to find another home in a city.

Philosophy poses a threat to the city. Socrates is silenced by force. The law proclaims that he does not stand on an equal footing with the law. To convince them would require doing the very thing they want to prevent him from doing, that is, philosophizing. — Fooloso4

Socrates was blamed for Athens' defeat at the hands of the Spartans. He had previously publicly lauded the Spartan way of life, which probably wasn't the smartest thing to do. He irritated the crap out of the Athenians, so he became a target. More philosophizing probably wouldn't have helped. Our own local Socrates is @Banno. Imagine that he's now being tried for corrupting the minds of the youth. It's that kind of thing.

This is stated in the context of the claim that Socrates wouldn't have been born without the law. — frank

Good point. The law says:

... didn’t we bring you to birth (West: beget), since through us your father married your mother and begot you (West: bring you forth through us).

(50d)

The question of paternity and paternalism becomes even more evident in the West translation when later in the same speech when the laws refer several times to the "fatherland". Horan translates it as homeland.

Well, you have to survive in order to act justly. — frank

Yes, but can a city survive and not be just? Is it sometimes necessary to act unjustly in order to survive?

He had previously publicly lauded the Spartan way of life — frank

It might be worth looking at what he (Plato's Socrates) said and compare it to what the law says here.

Well, you have to survive in order to act justly.
— frank

Yes, but can a city survive and not be just? Is it sometimes necessary to act unjustly in order to survive? — Fooloso4

I don't know :grimace:

The speech of the laws should be compared to what Socrates says in the Apology:

Men of Athens, I embrace you and I love you, but I shall heed the god rather than you, and as long as I am alive, and able to do so, I shall not cease engaging in philosophy

(29c)

For I know full well that wherever I go, the young people will listen to what I say, just as they do here ...

(37d)

Whatever allegiance he might have to the city, when it comes to philosophy he will not be obedient to it. According to the laws, to do so would be to subvert the judgment of the law, and thus would be to act unjustly. But Socrates says he would never knowingly do harm or act unjustly.

Note that at 29c he is addressing the men of Athens. At best only a few

whose opinions are more worthy of consideration

(44c)

It is the opinion of the men of Athens that Socrates is doing harm to the young people. His disobedience suggests that he thinks that whatever harm and injustice to the city and its laws his disobedience may cause, the suppression of philosophy is a greater harm.

t is the opinion of the men of Athens that Socrates is doing harm to the young people. His disobedience suggests that he thinks that whatever harm and injustice to the city and its laws his disobedience may cause, the suppression of philosophy is a greater harm. — Fooloso4

But he wasn't disobedient. He stayed and drank the hemlock.

But the challenge is even more acute for an ideology that aims to destroy the existing social order without any plan for an alternative, which I think fairly describes the average leftist perspective. — frank

Who do you include in this description?

Who do you include in this description? — Paine

The description is of a revolutionary ideology, so people like Bolsheviks, Chinese and American communists, etc., and of course anyone who sympathizes with that crowd.

From 50 on into 52 the Law continues to speak and offers something along the lines of social contract theory.

But he wasn't disobedient. He stayed and drank the hemlock. — frank

This is something we need to try and make sense of. In order to do so, I think we need to go back to the problem of the greatest good and the greatest harm.

As it is, they [the multitude] are not able to do either [the greatest harm or greatest good], for they cannot make someone either wise or foolish ...

(44d)

It would seem that the laws they make cannot either. For if they could Socrates would have been able to find one or more in Athens who are wise. As we know from the Apology, he did not.

Socrates' concern with the greatest good led to the rejection of the laws as the greatest good. He puts the pursuit of wisdom above the law. The laws can vary from place to place, but the truth does not. For Socrates living well, that is, living the examined life, was a greater good than simply living; and the threat to philosophy a greater harm than the threat to his life. The end of his life would not be the end of philosophy.

The law cannot make one wise, but perhaps the pursuit of wisdom can lead to making wiser laws. In the Apology Socrates says:

... anyone who is actually fighting on the side of justice and who intends to be safe, even for a short time, must act privately rather than publicly.

(32a)

If the men who make laws are to be persuaded it would not be through political speech and action, but by the very thing they are trying to prevent Socrates from doing. By silencing Socrates they harm themselves for they lose the opportunity to be made wiser.

The law claims:

... you have agreed, by your actions if not by your words, to live as a citizen in accordance with us

(52d)

As Socrates pointed out in the Apology, it was not until now that his philosophical pursuits are being judged to be illegal. The argument could be turned around. For much of his life, doing what he does and saying what he says was not prevented by the law. By its actions or lack of action the law agreed to allow him to engage in philosophy.

Crito's attempt to persuade him to flee comes too late. We can only speculate as why Socrates did not choose exile. In the Apology (37d) he says it is because the same thing would happen, the young people will listen to him and this will lead to banishment by their fathers and relations. (37e) He does not say the fatherland, that is, the laws, but the men of whatever city he is in. Philosophy is at odds with the ancestral ways, the ways of one's father, the ways of the family.

Given his advanced age perhaps the most important thing he had left to give philosophy is not more words but a final demonstration of something he has often said: philosophy is preparation for death. If in death he arrives in Hades he will meet his final judgment. He is confident that those who rule there will not judge the life of philosophy as harmful or unjust. The laws agree, putting the blame not on themselves but on the men of Athens.

... as matters stand, if you depart this world you depart unjustly treated by your fellow men, and not by us, the laws.

(54b-c)

When Socrates says in the Apology that he will not cease engaging in philosophy he is addressing the men of Athens. (29d) In line with the distinction the laws have made, his disobedience would not be to the law but to the men of Athens. The distinction is problematic, but leads to another consideration.

Perhaps Socrates was wrong in disregarding the opinions of the multitude, for they have decided his fate. Although he may not care about what they will do to him, he should care about the tension between philosophy and the city. The many will never become philosophers, but the philosophers can and should learn how to speak to the people in order to persuade them that philosophy, with its concern for what is just, and noble, and good, benefits the city.

I agree. But what do you think of the case Socrates' Law has made in Crito? Are you convinced or not?