do not get them, and I don’t know how one could. If mind-dependent objects are everything the mind is comprehending, then it is comprehending itself. — NOS4A2

What do you mean "then it is comprehending itself"? That doesn't seem like you are characterizing it correctly.

It’s too circular for my own tastes. It perpetually raises the question: what is it the mind is comprehending? Again, no one could produce such an object. — NOS4A2

It's comprehending all the things that the mind comprehends. I don't get the question. All we know (literally) is what the mind has comprehended. How are you confused about that. Or how are you skeptical about that?

What do you mean "then it is comprehending itself"? That doesn't seem like you are characterizing it correctly.

If it was comprehending anything that wasn’t mind it would be comprehending something that was independent of mind.

It's comprehending all the things that the mind comprehends. I don't get the question. All we know (literally) is what the mind has comprehended. How are you confused about that. Or how are you skeptical about that?

It’s a circular answer. And you could never point to, illustrate, or show me a picture of something the mind comprehends. So why do you believe it?

If it was comprehending anything that wasn’t mind it would be comprehending something that was independent of mind. — NOS4A2

No, that's not what mind-dependent means. Mind-dependent simply means that mind is comprehending/shaping/experiencing the reality in order for it to appear as it does (or in some constructions, for it to exist but then that gets into the schools of ontological and epistemological idealism). It does not mean that what is being comprehended is necessarily "the mind".

It’s a circular answer. And you could never point to, illustrate, or show me a picture of something the mind comprehends. So why do you believe it? — NOS4A2

This I don't get at all. Quite the opposite. Every object and thing I think about is dependent of my mind. Name one thing that is not comprehended by the mind?

Do you think that the entire world is mind-dependent, or just certain of its features?
— charles ferraro

Where would the line be drawn? — Quixodian

That which is existentially dependent upon minds and that which is not.

It's the knowledge regarding that distinction which is difficult to acquire. It's all about method.

P1: A quantitative process cannot produce a quality. [p → !q] — Bob Ross

But sucking on one teaspoon of sugar (a quantitative process) will produce the sensation of sweetness (a quality). So P1 is not right.

The world contains both qualities and quantities.

No, that's not what mind-dependent means. Mind-dependent simply means that mind is comprehending/shaping/experiencing the reality in order for it to appear as it does (or in some constructions, for it to exist but then that gets into the schools of ontological and epistemological idealism). It does not mean that what is being comprehended is necessarily "the mind".

It does necessarily mean that what is being comprehended is the mind because the contents of the mind (like “conscious experience” or “phenomenal consciousness”) are necessarily mental.

This I don't get at all. Quite the opposite. Every object and thing I think about is dependent of my mind. Name one thing that is not comprehended by the mind?

The device you’re using to type those words. What sort of shape did you make of this device? What of it has changed and become of it since you comprehended it? Can you point to these changes?

It does necessarily mean that what is being comprehended is the mind because the contents of the mind (like “conscious experience” or “phenomenal consciousness”) are necessarily mental. — NOS4A2

Phenomenal experience isn't necessarily "all in your mind" though. I explained earlier, if it is epistemological idealism, it is the mind's affect/effect on the object/world. If it is ontological idealism, it could be the case that it is a part of a more foundational mental process observing other parts of or other mental processes. But the way you make it seem is all idealisms believe that "it's all in the mind", kind of like a naive idealism/subjectivism/solipsism. That would be a gross mischaracterization of idealism.

The device you’re using to type those words. What sort of shape did you make of this device? What of it has changed and become of it since you comprehended it? Can you point to these changes? — NOS4A2

But surely, the only way I know about these changes or even "change" itself is through comprehending through my mind.

Hello Pantagruel,

Very interesting, let me try to pick your brain a bit.

Minimally, to be a subject is to be a subject "of" something. I am a subject of perceptions, of ideas, of feelings. So while the "ordering principle" of objectivity is subjective (Kant) knowledge of objectivity arises with experience. Hence, the "synthetic a priori" which yokes the two.

Given your invocation of Kant, would you say that there is a mind-independent world but that many elements of our experience is due to the structure of our minds? Is the mind reducible to the brain to you? Are you a substance dualist?

For me, any attempt to conceptualize a pure subjectivity falls into the black hole of idealistic-solipsism. Everything that I "am" is in "relation to...." and anything that I stand in relation to must be other than what I am.

To your second sentence, I don’t think that everything that I am is in relation to something else but, rather, my knowledge of myself requires an other; so, I would say that I could (potentially) exist without an other but I need the other to know that ‘I’ exist. I would say it is not the case that I only exist (i.e., solipsism) but that the universal mind other minds to know itself.

To your first sentence, I would say that objective idealism is not solipsism, since the latter is the idea that only one’s mind exists.

Ontologically, I am speculating that perhaps the most fundamental characterization of reality is that of subjective and objective. We literally cannot think what a universe minus subjectivity would be because that would be a universe minus thought, which cannot be thought. Even if we tried to imagine it, that would still be an imagined universe. It is a variety of panpsychism for sure.

Interesting, so, for you, there’s two types of fundamental things: object and subject; and so you are not a monist then, correct?

Hello Philosophim,

Reading your work is always a delight! Unique thinkers are what we need and I enjoy mulling over your work.

Same goes to you my friend!

Lets say I have 1 apple. The oneness denotes a quantity, but if I remove the 1 and just say, "apple", is this a quality?

What do you mean by “apple”? To me, that is just ungrammatical and, thusly, does not reference anything (except for being “a word”). Is it “an apple”? If so, then you just have “1 apple” minus “1 apple”, which is nothing. Are you talking about the essence of an apple? The concept?

Just to illuminate my position (perhaps to help here), let’s say there is an actual “apple” on a table in front of me. I would say that “that apple” and “that table” and “this reality” are all inextricably linked: there’s no, ontologically speaking, an exact ending to “that apple” and “that table”; but, I can describe, via quantities, different aspects of reality which I deem useful, such as “an apple” or “that table”. These descriptions are where, for me, quantities emerge: they are nominal. The quantities are not in reality beyond my ability to cognize about reality. Hopefully that helps.

I quantitatively add another apple to a "pile". What is a "pile"?

To me, “a pile” is to cognize, to single out, some piece of reality; and so, for starters, it is one pile, which is quantitative. However, the what constitutes “a pile” (e.g., is it anything greater than 3?) I will leave up to semantics. It could be that “a pile” is just a useful indefinite, and thusly qualitative or perhaps just ambiguous, colloquial term to note a hazy bit of reality; just like how there’s no exact spot where a heap becomes a pile of sand. We could force the terms to start somewhere definite, or just let it be qualitative (indefinite) and let people decide what is the most useful in the context.

I could also call them a "pair" of apples now. Is the word pair quantitative or qualitative now?

So, the word “pair” references nothing (technically speaking) as it is ungrammatical (or at least it must be suspended what one means without further context). “a pair” is one pair, which is one “of two of a type”. The word “pair” is itself, as a mere word, quantitative insofar as it is one “word”. The word “word” singles out a piece of reality, namely words, and in this case “pair” is the word that has been created to single out something.

Perhaps I am confused as to what you are saying, but I think the words that we use to describe reality single out things, which will make it quantitative; but the words themselves do not reference something that is quantitative. For example, yes, one red apple plus one red apple is two red apples; but “redness” and the “actual apple” are qualitative. We use quantities to estimate the qualitative.

I add two red apples together. In my quantitative process did I not also produce the quality of 2 "red"?

So the addition of the apples (if by that you mean combining them physically) is not a quantitative process (or at least that’s what I am arguing); and the physical combination of colors produces more qualities. However, the cognitive process of singling out “one red apple” and “another red apple” and mathematically, in one’s head, adding them together is a quantitative process and will result in “two red apples”.

Hopefully that helps.

Hello T Clark,

I think it's a metaphysical statement - a way of thinking about things or a point of view - not a fact

Interesting, I would say metaphysical claims are facts (or at least purported facts). Metaphysics, I would say, is the study of that which is beyond the possibility of all experience but necessary relates to experience; and a ‘fact’ is an assertion that corresponds to reality (in regards to whatever it references).

I like the way @Janus said it in a different discussion - It's a catalyst for new ideas and feelings.

Could you elaborate on this a bit? I didn’t quite follow.

It demonstrates that our fundamental understanding of reality is human, I guess you would say subjective. That tells us not to be too arrogant about how universal our beliefs are.

Oh, I think I may understand. Are you simply noting that our understanding of the world is dependent on our minds? If so, then perhaps you aren’t making any ontological claims, but more epistemic?

Hello Schopenhauer1,

Is this some sort of Analytic Idealism?

The argument itself doesn’t quite get you to Kastrup’s Analytic Idealism, but it does get to objective idealism (or actually I may need to provide another argument to move from subjective to objective idealism). If by ‘analytic idealism’ you just mean objective idealism, then I would say it basically gets one to that view (just with a bit more arguments to eliminate solipsism).

I would build off of this argument to get to a form of objective idealism very similar to Analytic Idealism; so my terminology is very similar thereto.

Hello Banno,

But sucking on one teaspoon of sugar (a quantitative process) will produce the sensation of sweetness (a quality). So P1 is not right.

I deny that “sucking on one teaspoon of sugar” is a quantitative process. The teaspoon, the sugar, and the act of sucking the sugar from teaspoon is qualitative; and our cognitive description of that process is that it was “a teaspoon of sugar getting sucked on”; and we can describe in much detail the entire process happening, but only in terms of quantitative estimations of the qualitative processes.

I deny that “sucking on one teaspoon of sugar” is a quantitative process. — Bob Ross

Thought you might. So consider this proof that the world is quantitative:

P1: A qualitative process cannot produce a quantity. [p → !q]
P2: Quantities exist (e.g., more than one letter in this sentence). [!!q]
C1: The world (which has such quantities) cannot be qualitative processes. — Bob Ross

Same argument you invoked, used to prove the opposite.

Looks to me that you've juxtaposed qualitative and quantitative and then trapped yourself in a word game.

... reality is fundamentally a mind. That mind, however, objectively exists; that is, it’s existence is mind-independent—i.e., it doesn’t manifest itself nor uphold its own existence. — Bob Ross

An "unmanifest mind" – how do we know it "objective exists"?

By ‘objective’, I mean ‘that which is mind-independent’ and by ‘mind-at-large’ I mean that reality is fundamentally a mind. 

I'd asked about your phrase "objective reality" ... and so you're saying – referring to the above – "mind is mind-independent"? :chin:

It is disembodied in the sense that it doesn’t have an organic body...

By "it" are you referring to "mind"? If so, then the evidence I'd requested is for a specimen of "a disembodied mind".

From one of your previous thread discussions ...
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/813077

An "unmanifest mind" – how do we know it "objective exists"? — 180 Proof

Why we should know anyway? objective exists both separately and independently from us. It doesn't matter if we "know" or "are aware" if it does exist or not.

What?

What, what? :eyes:

What did I say wrong that you didn't understand me?

Interesting, so, for you, there’s two types of fundamental things: object and subject; and so you are not a monist then, correct? — Bob Ross

I don't think that either monism or dualism do justice to what's going on in the universe. Cassirer talks about reality as both meta-physical and meta-psychical (i.e. transcending both matter and mind) and I think this has merit. Freedom and determinism, matter and mind, form and substance, being and non-being. Reality seems fraught with antinomies, but these seem more like poles or extremes of a dialectic which mutually condition and require each other. I just posted a link to a book in my old thread on science and metaphysics that purports to be a systems theoretic metaphysics. If you view the universe from a systems theoretic perspective, traditional problems are not solved so much as they do not appear as problems. For me, it is the logical and scientific presentation of a process ontology.

To your second sentence, I don’t think that everything that I am is in relation to something else but, rather, my knowledge of myself requires an other; — Bob Ross

All intellection takes place in and through language, and language is emphatically a social construct/phenomenon. I just cant fathom the idea of a 'disconnected mind.'

Hello Banno,

Thought you might. So consider this proof that the world is quantitative:
P1: A qualitative process cannot produce a quantity. [p → !q]
P2: Quantities exist (e.g., more than one letter in this sentence). [!!q]
C1: The world (which has such quantities) cannot be qualitative processes. — Bob Ross
Same argument you invoked, used to prove the opposite.

Looks to me that you've juxtaposed qualitative and quantitative and then trapped yourself in a word game.

Excellent! I am surprised that no one has offered this parody yet, as I was fully expecting it. As you can already anticipate, I deny P1 in your parody argument because there is a symmetry breaker between quality → quantity and quantity → quality. A qualitative being can focus on and thusly single out an aspect of qualitative reality of which would be a quantity. In other words, our cognitive faculty is quite literally qualitative (in reality) but is the faculty that allows us to ‘cut up’ reality into definite parts. In contradistinction, a quantity and another quantity always produce more quantities; whereas, a quality could be focused on in a particular manner to single out (or cut out) a particular definite part of that quality.

For example, 1 + 1 will produce a quantity, even if I do not know what it will equal, because ‘1’, ‘1’, and the quantitative process of addition is quantitative through-and-through; whereas, a wall that is painted red, starting with lighter red on the left to a gradual darker red on the right, is qualitative but I can single out a definite portion of the redness and call it ‘section A’ and ‘not section A’. The sections are quantitative, but the reality which they are describing is qualitative.

Hello 180 Proof,

An "unmanifest mind" – how do we know it "objective exists"?
…
By "it" are you referring to "mind"? If so, then the evidence I'd requested is for a specimen of "a disembodied mind".

I gave an argument here in the OP for a mind-dependent, qualitative world: let’s start there. What premise (or premises) did you disagree with?

Whether or not the universal mind is “unmanifested” is a later discussion after we’ve agreed or disagreed on the argument for the world being mind-dependent. It could be that we should hold the world is mind-dependent without knowing if that mind is eternal or a brute fact.

If by ‘evidence’ you mean just something you can tangibly test, then obviously no one can offer you that in metaphysics; the whole point of metaphysics is to use reason to guess what lies beyond that experience which explains that experience. Science is only a negative criteria for metaphysics (viz., it can weed out the really bad theories) but never a positive criteria (viz., that science confirms a metaphysical theory as true). I can give you philosophical arguments and say that it coheres nicely (I think) with empirical knowledge, but the latter isn’t going to positively affirm the former.

There is not any publicly accessible evidence for such an entity.

There’s plenty of evidence that we can explain the world in terms of mind. For example, have you ever had a vivid dream? That body in the dream was not identical to you (as ‘you’ were the mind producing the dream) and yet you had an extrinsic representation of yourself within it, did you not?

That consciousness is best explained via a mind-dependent world.

That quantum physics, such as entanglement, is best explained when thought of as extrinsic representations within a universal mind.

And if "everything is fundamentally mind-dependent" (including this "fundamental", which I find self-refuting),

Please provide the proof that it is self-refuting. Just to clarify, I am not saying that the universal mind is itself mind-dependent; as existence itself is mind-independent.

then "a universal mind" is only an idea, not a fact or "natural process".

The universal mind, under my view, would be a fact; and I would say it is a “natural process” because I do not hold that it is God (e.g., that it has personhood, can deliberate, cognize, consciously experience in the way we do, etc.). It is a primitive, rudimentary, process of mental activity. That’s why I would say I am still a naturalist. There isn’t some mind outside of the universe that willed it into existence.

Hello Pantagruel,

I don't think that either monism or dualism do justice to what's going on in the universe. Cassirer talks about reality as both meta-physical and meta-psychical (i.e. transcending both matter and mind) and I think this has merit.

Then how do you account for the hard problem of interaction?

If you view the universe from a systems theoretic perspective, traditional problems are not solved so much as they do not appear as problems. For me, it is the logical and scientific presentation of a process ontology.

Interesting, could you elaborate on “process ontology” a bit more?

Then how do you account for the hard problem of interaction? — Bob Ross

To really appreciate it, a good grasp of systems theory is essential. However, I can offer part of Laszlo's explanation of why systems philosophy (the philosophical expansion of systems theory) constitutes a new "paradigm":

The disciplinary matrix, defining what may be termed the 'paradigm' of systems philosophy, may be stated as follows.
Holism as a world view. Reductionism exists in many forms: methodological, epistemological, ontological, radical and 'soft'. Holism likewise exists in these many forms. In systems philosophy a 'soft' variety of holism is usually espoused, as consistent with the openness of its scientific base and its
non-dogmatic spirit. It is assumed that many phenomena can be understood only by taking into account the full set of relations constituting them, without reducing them to casual interactions between analytically isolated parts. It is also assumed that it is often counterproductive to reduce concepts and
principles applicable to complex systems to the concepts and principles applicable to their parts.

Essentially, you never effect a split because everything we experience is always a "system" which is a composite of those elements. The best description I have ever encountered is in Laszlo's Introduction to Systems Philosophy (as I've mentioned before) however it's $120 on Amazon and I can't find a PDF so I can't quote it.

As for process philosophy, Whitehead and Bergson are probably the best examples. Considering "events" as metaphysically primary is essentially a precursor to the paradigm-shift to a systems-theoretic metaphysics.

I don't understand the question or subsequent statement in the context of my exchange with Bob Ross..

If by ‘evidence’ you mean just something you can tangibly test, then obviously no one can offer you that in metaphysics; ... — Bob Ross

Yes, and since you're making a fact-claim that there is "the universal mind" by which "consciousness is best explained", you're argument is pseudo-science, not metaphysics.

... the whole point of metaphysics is to use reason to guess what lies beyond that experience which explains that experience.

If this is so, then this so-called "use of reason" does not consist of sound arguments (i.e. lack of factually true premises ergo lack of factually true conclusion). This sort of "guess" consists of an untestable explanation about matters of fact (e.g. "experience") which is mere pseudo-science unlike, for instance, Kant's transcendental arguments which are epistemological critiques of metaphysical speculations of "pure reason".

Science is only a negative criteria for metaphysics (viz., it can weed out the really bad theories) but never a positive criteria (viz., that science confirms a metaphysical theory as true).

Agreed. Also, science rules-out bad (i.e. falsifed or untestable) explanations and thereby abductively affirms only provisionally better (i.e. successfully tested) explanations. As the original Aristotlean corpus suggests, metaphysics – First Philosophy – consists in categorical generalizations abstracted from the 'observed' conditions and limits of nature – physus – which first must be learned by 'empirical inquiries' Aristotle calls "Physics" – science; thus, the relation between 'metaphysics and physics' is a form of reflective equilibrium so that First Philosophy only conceptualizes and interprets scientific – successfully tested (or testable-in-principle) – explanations but cannot itself – as metaphysics – "explain" anything.

There’s plenty of evidence that we can explain the world in terms of mind. For example, have you ever had a vivid dream?

Firstly, anecdotes are not scientific evidence. Secondly, the "experience" of "vivid dreams" cannot itself be conclusive "evidence" for anything "beyond experience" which could be a candidate for – "guess" of – an "explanation of experience".

That consciousness is best explained via a mind-dependent world.

And what "best explains" this "mind-dependent world"?

That quantum physics, such as entanglement, is best explained when thought of as extrinsic representations within a universal mind.

Non sequitur (i.e. quantum woo woo).

I gave an argument here in the OP for a mind-dependent, qualitative world: let’s start there. What premise (or premises) did you disagree with?

I object to "P1"

P1: A quantitative process cannot produce a quality. [p → !q] — Bob Ross

which is obviously not true in many cases.

e.g.
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4479710/

also
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergentism

Just to clarify, I am not saying that the universal mind is itself mind-dependent; as existence itself is mind-independent.

So "universal mind" is not fundamental – dependent on – "mind-independent existence". Yes, minds are dependent on non-mind (i.e. physicalism).

There isn’t some mind outside of the universe that willed it into existence.

I agree. Thus, the physicalist paradigm: the universe is fundamental and minds are (or "the mind is") emergent in, dependent on, derivative from the universe.

Hello Pantagruel,

To really appreciate it, a good grasp of systems theory is essential
…
It is assumed that many phenomena can be understood only by taking into account the full set of relations constituting them, without reducing them to casual interactions between analytically isolated parts.

This is interesting, but, unfortunately, I am not familiar with systems theory and that is why I was asking your system theoretic view. Could you elaborate more on reductionism vs. holism?

Personally, I don’t see how one could argue that something is made up of a set of parts but that the emergent properties are not reducible to those parts and the relationship between those parts as they perform their processes; and, thusly, I am a reductionist.

Hello 180 Proof,

I appreciate your response: let me try to adequately respond.

Yes, and since you're making a fact-claim that there is "the universal mind" by which "consciousness is best explained", you're argument is pseudo-science, not metaphysics.

How does that make it a form of pseudo-science? I am not claiming that it is a scientific fact that there is a universal mind: do you think facts are only scientific?

If this is so, then this so-called "use of reason" does not consist of sound arguments (i.e. lack of factually true premises ergo lack of factually true conclusion). This sort of "guess" consists of an untestable explanation about matters of fact (e.g. "experience") which is mere pseudo-science unlike, for instance, Kant's transcendental arguments which are epistemological critiques of metaphysical speculations of "pure reason".

I suspect by ‘fact’ you mean a ‘scientific fact’: is that correct? By ‘fact’, I mean a proposition which is true (i.e., an assertion that corresponds to reality) and not merely an ‘observation about reality’.

Metaphysics is speculative (i.e., guesswork), even in Kantianism. Kant does not prove definitively that there are such transcendental aspects to our structure of representations he so adamantly advocates for. Yes, metaphysics, including transcendental philosophy, is fundamentally uncertain claims that attempt to best explain the data of experience (of which I believe you may be referring to as ‘facts’: although I wouldn’t quite define facticity in that way): what’s wrong with that?

In order for something to be pseudo-science, by my lights, it has to be claiming to do some form of science: metaphysics is not pseudo-science—not even bad metaphysics. Or are you saying all metaphysics (or perhaps bad metaphysics) is pseudo-science? If so, then why? What do you mean by “pseudo-science”?

Agreed. Also, science rules-out bad (i.e. falsifed or untestable) explanations and thereby abductively affirms only provisionally better (i.e. successfully tested) explanations. As the original Aristotlean corpus suggests, metaphysics – First Philosophy – consists in categorical generalizations abstracted from the 'observed' conditions and limits of nature – physus – which first must be learned by 'empirical inquiries' Aristotle calls "Physics" – science; thus, the relation between 'metaphysics and physics' is a form of reflective equilibrium so that First Philosophy only conceptualizes and interprets scientific – successfully tested (or testable-in-principle) – explanations but cannot itself – as metaphysics – "explain" anything.

I agree; but, then, why would you ban us from positing a universal mind to explain the data of experience best? My argument in the OP is not an argument from pure reason (like a ontological or modal logic argument for God): I am using the existence of qualities to inform us about what the best explanation of the reality that produces such (i.e., that those qualities are contingent upon).

Firstly, anecdotes are not scientific evidence

I never said they were scientific evidence: I said they were evidence. Do you think the only form of evidence is scientific? Scientism is self-undermining: it rests on philosophical principles which are not scientifically verifiable (e.g., PSR).

Secondly, the "experience" of "vivid dreams" cannot itself be conclusive "evidence" for anything "beyond experience" which could be a candidate for – "guess" of – an "explanation of experience".

I agree: I was not intending to argue that our vivid dreams conclusive prove that the world is mind-dependent but, rather, that it can be used as evidence of it (by anological equivalence). Vivid dreaming is direct evidence of the mind being able to (1) generate similar experience to what we have when we are awake and (2) to extrinsically represent archetypes (lower ‘m’ ‘minds’) as physical bodies. It can be cross-referenced as an analogy.

The point is that we start out with mind-operations, including our conscious experience of the real world, and so it is more parsimonious, if it can be done, to explain that data of experience in terms of mind: mentality.

And what "best explains" this "mind-dependent world"?

What do you mean? Metaphysics is about maximizing explanatory power (of the data of experience) while minimizing conceptual complexity. Thusly, there’s always, in any good metaphysical theory, something (or somethings) posited as brute facts.

The universal mind, as a brute fact, is meant to serve as a best explanation of the data of experience and is not a direct datum of experience itself.

That quantum physics, such as entanglement, is best explained when thought of as extrinsic representations within a universal mind.
Non sequitur (i.e. quantum woo woo).

This isn’t a conditional statement, nor a colloquial expression of one. There’s no consequent and thusly no false implication: it was a statement, which you can surely disagree with, that claimed that quantum physics makes physicalism, or at least materialism, less plausible than before.

I object to "P1"
P1: A quantitative process cannot produce a quality. [p → !q] — Bob Ross
which is obviously not true in many cases.

I read your articles: the first one I didn’t see how it really contended with P1, so could you please elaborate?

In terms of emergentism, it sounds like an irreductive account of processes and, in that case, I see why one who subscribes thereto would reject P1. To me, claiming that a property emerges out of a system (i.e., out of parts and the relation/processes of those parts) but is yet not reducible to those parts nor the relation/processes of those parts is magic: this would entail that there is something extra that is completely unaccountable when analyzing the system which is responsible for the propert that emerged, but it somehow was produced by it. By my lights, an emgergentist view concedes that it can’t actually account, by analysis, for the property in its entirety via the system that produced it, as that is what being irreductive means. What are your thoughts on it?

So "universal mind" is not fundamental – dependent on – "mind-independent existence". Yes, minds are dependent on non-mind (i.e. physicalism).

Not quite. To say the world is fundamentally mind-dependent, in the sense I am talking about and objective idealists talk about, is to say that all entities in the world can be reduced down to one entity: a universal mind. Existence itself is mind-independent, but existence itself is not an entity (proper). Physicalism is metaphysical theory (or family of theories) that posits that everything is reducible down to some entity or set of entities that are mind-independent (and, again, being is not an entity nor attribute proper). In other words, I don’t think that being itself somehow sprouts or unfolds out of non-being, nor out of a non-being mind (or something like that). There is fundamentally an eternal mind or eternal mind-independent stuff, and being is what they share simply by being—by being generic existence.

I agree. Thus, the physicalist paradigm: the universe is fundamental and minds are (or "the mind is") emergent in, dependent on, derivative from the universe.

But if an eternal mind is being posited as reality (fundamentally), in the sense that I am arguing for, then that mind would not be emergent nor dependent on the universe but, rather, the universe is that mind. In other words, “universe” and “universal mind” would be interchangeable for me in your statement “the universe is fundamental”.

To me, that is just ungrammatical and, thusly, does not reference anything (except for being “a word”). Is it “an apple”? If so, then you just have “1 apple” minus “1 apple”, which is nothing. Are you talking about the essence of an apple? The concept? — Bob Ross

You are correct on all accounts. I'm fairly certain I understand what you mean by quantitative, but I'm trying to see what's qualitative. I didn't want to say "an" apple because that seems to be a quantity of a quality. There is a difference between one apple, one pear, and one penny. The quantity is the same, but its the qualities that separate them right?

The identity of the concept of "apple" cannot be quantitative, because no two apples are quantitatively alike. If we were to add two apples and compare them, we would see one is slightly lumpier than the other. The redness would not be the same, nor the height and size. All of these seem to be qualities. But qualities can be processed as quantities. After all, remove the qualities from the quantity, and you are left with a qualityless abstract number.

One the flip side, some qualities do not make sense without some quantity. Saying "apple" doesn't roll off the tongue like "an apple does". That is because in this case, the quality and quantity are inextricably linked. And because of this, I'm not sure you can set qualitative and qualitative up as if they cannot include one another in any process.

It could be that “a pile” is just a useful indefinite, and thusly qualitative or perhaps just ambiguous, colloquial term to note a hazy bit of reality; just like how there’s no exact spot where a heap becomes a pile of sand. We could force the terms to start somewhere definite, or just let it be qualitative (indefinite) and let people decide what is the most useful in the context. — Bob Ross

But then what about adding two piles of sand together? Is this not a mix of quantitative and qualitative?

Perhaps I am confused as to what you are saying, but I think the words that we use to describe reality single out things, which will make it quantitative; but the words themselves do not reference something that is quantitative. For example, yes, one red apple plus one red apple is two red apples; but “redness” and the “actual apple” are qualitative. We use quantities to estimate the qualitative. — Bob Ross

Let us remove the quality again however, and what are we left with? Isn't "oneness" itself a quality then?

I will try to answer faster next time, I am busy as of late.

Hello Philosophim,

There is a difference between one apple, one pear, and one penny. The quantity is the same, but its the qualities that separate them right?

There distinguishable properties are what separate them; and depending one’s metaphysical theory they may be completely quantitative, qualitative, or a mixture of both.

For example, for those who believe that the world is fundamentally quantitative, a blue table has properties that are qualities (e.g., blueness, feeling of roughness or smoothness, etc.) and quantities (e.g., its width, height, etc.). Importantly, the table exists fundamentally (ontologically) with definite, quantitative properties (e.g., it has a definite size mind-independently) and the qualitative properties emerge as a result of a mind experiencing it.

For example, for those who believe that the world is fundamentally qualitative, a blue table has no quantitative properties itself (e.g., width, height, etc.) but, rather, they are a mind’s cognitive estimation of them.

For the former example, measuring the table as having a width of X meters is an estimation of whatever the actual, definite width is of the table (let’s say: A meters). For the latter example, the X meters is an estimation of something with no definite width.

The identity of the concept of "apple" cannot be quantitative, because no two apples are quantitatively alike

Perhaps I am misunderstanding, but the concept of an apple is the singled out of a group of entities in the world by virtue of their similar attributes, which, in turn, are the singling-out of certain aspects of those entities. So I would say the concept itself is quantitative (definite) although there may be no mathematical relationships in the concept other then the concept and its attributes being quantitatively, numerically one (i.e., an attribute is one attribute and a concept is one concept).

If we were to add two apples and compare them, we would see one is slightly lumpier than the other.

I agree that the concept of an apple does not every fully capture the particular apples in existence.

The redness would not be the same, nor the height and size. All of these seem to be qualities.

If by height, for example, you are referring to an actual definite size of the apple beyond our mere ability to estimate the apple with math in our heads, then I would say that is a quantity which pertains to the world beyond our mere ability to cognize about it (which would entail a quantitative world to some degree or another).

But qualities can be processed as quantities. After all, remove the qualities from the quantity, and you are left with a qualityless abstract number.

Correct. I think qualities are processed as quantities (via our ability to cognize) and quantities do not exist beyond that. Furthermore, I think positing the world as fundamentally quantities (whereof the qualities emerge from brains) is incoherent because quantities can never produce qualities (viz., the brain cannot be fundamentally quantitative and produce the qualities of our experience).

One the flip side, some qualities do not make sense without some quantity. Saying "apple" doesn't roll off the tongue like "an apple does".

If I am right (and the world is fundamentally qualitative), then the world is an inextricable non-numerical one; for there is absolutely no way to non-nominally parcel up reality. So, I agree, in order to navigate and comprehend reality, we are forced to parcel it nominally (or cognitively); but that doesn’t mean reality is itself those distinctions we make (nor that it is quantitative like the nature of our cognition).

But then what about adding two piles of sand together? Is this not a mix of quantitative and qualitative?

I would say that mathematically adding (in my head) the X granules of sand (in pile 1) and the Y granules of sand (in pile 2) is a quantitative process that will produce (in my mind as a mathematical result of that operation of addition) X + Y. However, all of that is a estimation of the fundamentally qualitative piles of sand in a inextricably linked qualitative world; and I merely call it X and Y granules of sand (and add them together mathematically) for the benefit of getting a better estimated understanding of what is going on.

Ontologically, the sand is qualitative; and our minds cognize that quantitatively.

Let us remove the quality again however, and what are we left with? Isn't "oneness" itself a quality then?

If one removes all the qualities from an object, then I would say they would be left with nothing but the concept or idea abstracted of that object which, again, does not pertain to the object itself (but, rather, is strictly how one is able to try to comprehend that object). Oneness in the sense of a number does not exist, I would say, outside of our minds’ cognition; but oneness as a non-numerical unity would be all of existence itself—which is absolutely infinite under my view (for to admit it is limited would entail that there is an ‘other’ and thusly, a quantity).

I will try to answer faster next time, I am busy as of late.

Absolutely no worries!