It seems this discussion has become rather pointless, even though you are continually trying to insert arbitrary points. This you do simply for the sake of saying that I contradict myself when I say there are no points. That's not interesting for me, so maybe the discussion has run its course.

I was following your example of two different types of experience: — Luke

It was not my example, you proposed two different types of experience. I just showed you why it wouldn't work.

Tell me, what other experience is in between being asleep and being awake? What separates them? Must there be another experience between these? Aren't we asleep and then, at some point, awake again, in succession? — Luke

Come on Luke. Don't you experience awakening, that brief period when you're half asleep and half awake? And don't you experience this 'in between period' when you are falling asleep as well?

Why do we need "something real" to distinguish the end of one and the beginning of another? What real thing distinguishes the end of being asleep and the beginning of being awake? Perhaps there is no distinction between being asleep and being awake and it's just "one continuous experience"? Or did you "arbitrarily assert" that being asleep and being awake were distinct types of experience? — Luke

I am not following you now.

But there must be a point when an event is no longer present and becomes past. Otherwise, past and present are indistinguishable. — Luke

I've been through this already. No point is required if "past" and "future" name different categories which may overlap, instead of them being opposing terms where one denies the possibility of the other by way of contradiction. And this is consistent with our experience, "future" does not name the opposite of "past", it names something categorically different. So, past and present are distinguishable from each other by their relation with the future.

I really don't see why you insist on inserting an arbitrary point all the time.

In this quote, the "point" at which what is in the present becomes past is the starting point of the present. In your terminology, this is when the past (proper) meets "the present" (the combination of past and future). There is also a second point where the future has not yet passed the present, which is the end point of "the present". In your terminology, this is when the future (proper) meets "the present" (the combination of past and future). — Luke

I don't see my use of "point" anywhere in those quotes, so I think you are constructing a contradiction from a misquote.

I know that you are trying to argue that there is some smooth, unnoticeable transition between them, but the distinct concepts won't let you. — Luke

You are treating the concepts as mutually exclusive, not as distinct. That is your failure to properly understand what I've already explained numerous times, not a contradiction by me.

There can be a period of changing, but at some point there must be a moment of change when what is present is no longer future and what is past is no longer present; when the past is no longer combined with the future and when the future has not yet become combined with the past. — Luke

This is what I called the "zero point", and the fact that we tend to think like this, intuitively, instead of the way that I proposed, is evidence that we need to seek, and find the real points in time, to substantiate our way of speaking.

But since you are having so much difficulty understanding this idea of overlap, try this image as an example. In the overlap of past and future, which I described as "the present", consider that the proportion of each, the amount of past, in relation to the amount of future, is constantly changing. So if there was a beginning of time, then at the very beginning, there was only future, and no past. At the very end of time, there will be all past, and no future. We are somewhere in between, and the past and future at our present is proportioned accordingly.

That is just an example of how such a thing could be conceived, so please do not say that it contradicts a completely different example.

Do you believe that, in order to distinguish memories from anticipation, we need to discover "real points in time"? — Luke

No you seem to misunderstand. In order to distinguish memories form anticipations within what we experience as "the present", (for example or sensations), we need such points.

Moreover, if the present is a combination of past and future, as you claim, then how will the discovery of "real points in time" help to disentangle this entanglement of memories and anticipation? — Luke

By providing a point of separation, like you've been desperately trying to do. But your points of separation are arbitrary, I'm looking for points with substance.

Is "the chair of two seconds ago" in the present or in the past (according to your context)? — Luke

Sorry, I do not follow. And I'm tired of trying to explain this point to you, it appears hopeless, just like trying to get you to quit inserting arbitrary points into my description of a continuous present.

The relevant question is "when are you perceiving?" — Luke

We are always perceiving at the present, and the present consists of past and future. We've already discussed this. Where's the problem?

It seems this discussion has become rather pointless, even though you are continually trying to insert arbitrary points. This you do simply for the sake of saying that I contradict myself when I say there are no points. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have given you an argument for why there must be points of distinction between past, present and future. I'm not saying this for the sake of saying that you contradict yourself. However, you did contradict yourself, as I pointed out.

It was not my example, you proposed two different types of experience. I just showed you why it wouldn't work. — Metaphysician Undercover

You introduced the example of sleep. Otherwise, show me where I introduced it.

Come on Luke. Don't you experience awakening, that brief period when you're half asleep and half awake? And don't you experience this 'in between period' when you are falling asleep as well? — Metaphysician Undercover

I'll grant you these "in between periods" of being half asleep and half awake. However, you must admit that there comes a point when you are no longer half asleep but asleep, and there comes a point when you are no longer half awake but awake.

Likewise, there comes a point where an event is no longer in the present (i.e., in combination with the future) but is fully in the past, and there comes a point where an event is no longer fully in the future but is in the present (i.e., in combination with the past).

I've been through this already. No point is required if "past" and "future" name different categories which may overlap, instead of them being opposing terms where one denies the possibility of the other by way of contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

I've never said that past and future are "opposing terms". This does not address my argument.

I don't see my use of "point" anywhere in those quotes, so I think you are constructing a contradiction from a misquote. — Metaphysician Undercover

I did not mean that you had said this. I meant that it was implied by what you said, or that you could not escape the fact that there are points which distinguish the past from the present and the present from the future.

I know that you are trying to argue that there is some smooth, unnoticeable transition between them, but the distinct concepts won't let you.
— Luke

You are treating the concepts as mutually exclusive, not as distinct. That is your failure to properly understand what I've already explained numerous times, not a contradiction by me. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I understand what you have said and I acknowledge your analogy with the Venn diagram. Now picture a Venn diagram with a "past" circle on the left and a "future" circle on the right, with an overlapping section of the two circles in the middle, as Venn diagrams typically have. This overlapping section you call "the present", and it contains a combination of past and future.

The are two "points" (as you call them) in this diagram.

The first point I am referring to in this Venn diagram is where the larger, non-overlapping section of the "past" circle meets the overlapping section of the "past" circle; that is, where the pure, unadulterated past meets the combination of past and future in "the present". Or, in other words, where the past meets the present. Surely you do not deny that events which are present eventually become past; that they are at one time in the present and at a later time in the past.

The second point I am referring to in this Venn diagram is where the larger, non-overlapping section of the "future" circle meets the overlapping section of the "future" circle; that is, where the pure, unadulterated future meets the combination of past and future in "the present". Or, in other words, where the future meets the present. Surely you do not deny that events which are future eventually become present; that they are at one time in the future and at a later time in the present.

This is what I called the "zero point", and the fact that we tend to think like this, intuitively, instead of the way that I proposed, is evidence that we need to seek, and find the real points in time, to substantiate our way of speaking. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why must we "substantiate our way of speaking"? Why should we change "our way of speaking", in the manner you suggest, before we know? What if it turns out that there are no "real points in time" and that time is continuous in reality? Then your way of speaking, and your suggestion that we all change to your preferred way of speaking, is for nought. Therefore, you need to substantiate your way of speaking. Do you have any evidence of these "real points in time" that are being postulated only by you?

In the overlap of past and future, which I described as "the present", consider that the proportion of each, the amount of past, in relation to the amount of future, is constantly changing. So if there was a beginning of time, then at the very beginning, there was only future, and no past. At the very end of time, there will be all past, and no future. We are somewhere in between, and the past and future at our present is proportioned accordingly. — Metaphysician Undercover

This implies that the present (the combination of past and future times) consists of all of time. In that case, I did misunderstand you. This is not your typical Venn diagram, because the "past" and "future" circles here are perfectly overlapping with each other, one directly on top of the other. Thanks for clarifying.

In that case, there is no distinction between past and future. The combination of past and future that you refer to as "the present" has the duration of all of time. Therefore, no event can precede or follow another event using these terms. If one event is in the past of another, then it is also in the future and the present of it. The present is the future is the past.

It would make just as much sense for you to say that at the very beginning of time, there was all past, and no future, and at the very end of time, there will be all future, and no past. This is because these words no longer have their conventional meanings when you define "the present" as the combination of "past" and "future" that spans all of time. There is no way to distinguish any of these concepts.

But this is why it is so extremely difficult to distinguish the anticipatory parts of the human experience of "the present" from the memory parts. That is why I argue that the present will remain unintelligible to us until we find the real points in time
— Metaphysician Undercover

Do you believe that, in order to distinguish memories from anticipation, we need to discover "real points in time"?
— Luke

No you seem to misunderstand. In order to distinguish memories form anticipations within what we experience as "the present", (for example or sensations), we need such points. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why do we need such points in order to distinguish memories from anticipation?

Moreover, if the present is a combination of past and future, as you claim, then how will the discovery of "real points in time" help to disentangle this entanglement of memories and anticipation?
— Luke

By providing a point of separation, like you've been desperately trying to do. But your points of separation are arbitrary, I'm looking for points with substance. — Metaphysician Undercover

You want to find the "real" distinction between past, present and future in nature somewhere? Okay. How? Where will you start looking? I'm not "desperately trying" to find points. I know where the distinctions between "past", "present" and "future" are. As I've told you several times, the present is the time at which we are consciously experiencing, doing or being. The past and future are defined relative to this time. We are not consciously experiencing all of time all at once. We experience one time after another in succession.

Sorry, I do not follow. And I'm tired of trying to explain this point to you, it appears hopeless, just like trying to get you to quit inserting arbitrary points into my description of a continuous present. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you don't want any "arbitrary points" in your description of a continuous present, then there will be nothing to distinguish the present from the past from the future from a turnip. These temporal terms become meaningless.

The relevant question is "when are you perceiving?"
— Luke

We are always perceiving at the present, and the present consists of past and future. We've already discussed this. Where's the problem? — Metaphysician Undercover

The problem is that we are also always perceiving the past and the future (according to you). But, then, the difference between "past", "present" and "future" has dissolved on your view.

Is there any reason that we would choose a "way of speaking" that makes it impossible to distinguish one object or event from another? That is what your "way of speaking" without "points" gives us.

I have given you an argument for why there must be points of distinction between past, present and future. I'm not saying this for the sake of saying that you contradict yourself. However, you did contradict yourself, as I pointed out. — Luke

This is the point we've come to. We seem to be in total agreement. I agree that "there must be" such points of distinction. That is what I've called the "zero point" and I've explained why intuition provides us with the premises which make such zero points a logical necessity. However, what I argue is that experience, therefore empirical evidence, does not support these premises. Empirical evidence shows us time as continuous, and without such points of distinction. And, because we need such points of distinction for our measurement procedures, though experience does not provide them for us, we impose them arbitrarily, according to pragmatic conditions.

I'll grant you these "in between periods" of being half asleep and half awake. However, you must admit that there comes a point when you are no longer half asleep but asleep, and there comes a point when you are no longer half awake but awake.

Likewise, there comes a point where an event is no longer in the present (i.e., in combination with the future) but is fully in the past, and there comes a point where an event is no longer fully in the future but is in the present (i.e., in combination with the past). — Luke

There is no such point though, in experience. When I awaken, I can say with certainty, "now I am awake", and also say with certainty that at some temporally separated (duration of time) past time, "I was asleep", but I cannot find within my experience, the precise point which separates the two.

What you are arguing is a logical necessity for such a point, as the "zero point". You are not showing me the experience of such a point. This logical necessity which you refer to is produced from our common way of speaking about time, and this reflects our intuitions. The logic proceeds from premises derived from intuition. The problem is that the logical systems of mathematics. which are adopted by, and employed by science use premises derived from experience, these are the premises of continuity, and these premises are incompatible with your premises which produce the conclusion of a zero point.

The problem was well explained by Aristotle, as the incompatibility between being and becoming. There is an incompatibility between describing things as distinct states-of-being (what is and is not), and the process, becoming, which is the change which must occur for one state to lead to the other. I have characterized the premises of being and not being as intuitive, and the premises of becoming as empirical.

If we describe things in terms of states-of-being, 'Luke is asleep', and 'Luke is not asleep', this is what is known as predication. The one excludes the other (contradiction) if we follow the fundamental laws of logic, and there is no third possibility (excluded middle). However, if we try to describe the entirety of reality in this way, there is a very serious problem, we cannot account for how one state of being is produced from its opposite. We cannot account for how the subject 'Luke' alters from being asleep to being not asleep.

The intermediary is the process, "becoming", by means of which the subject changes to its opposite state of being, in relation to that predicate. If we try to describe becoming as an intermediary state-of-being we meet the problem of infinite regress. 'Luke is awakening' is a proposition of an intermediary state-of-being. Now we have 'Luke was asleep', 'Luke is awakening', and 'Luke will be not asleep', as three distinct states-of-being. To fully understand, we need to account for how the subject 'Luke' changes from being asleep, to being awakening, and from being awakening to being awake. If we propose further states-of-being we face infinite regress. So Aristotle proposed that becoming is incompatible with being, and the intermediary between distinct and mutually exclusive states-of-being, the process of change, cannot be understood through the terms of states-of-being.

In classical physics (modern physics) the state-of-being is represented by Newton's first law of motion. This is the continuity of experience, empirical evidence, a body at rest remains at rest, or in uniform motion remains in uniform motion continuously, unless acted upon by a force. States-of-being are represented as continuous through time, which is consistent with experience. The intermediary, the process of becoming, by which one state-of-being is changed to another, is represented as acceleration. These are the two incompatible types of description, uniform motion, and acceleration.

However, introducing a distinct and incompatible intermediary (becoming), between two contrary states-of-being does not relieve us of the inclination to assume points. You demonstrate this by insisting that there is a requirement for a point between future and present, and a point between present and past. So if the past is a continuous state 'Luke was asleep' and the future is a continuous state 'Luke will be not asleep', and the intermediary present is 'Luke is awakening' is also a sate-of being, you insist that there must be a point in time when the past state 'asleep' changes to the intermediary state 'awakening', and the intermediary state 'awakening' changes to the future state of 'not asleep'.

Notice the mistake there. The intermediary, the becoming or process of awakening has been represented as an intermediary state. This is what Aristotle showed leads to infinite regress. The intermediary "becoming" cannot be made to be compatible with states-of-being in this way because it only produces an infinite regress and stymies any true understanding which requires that becoming remains incompatible with being.

In modern physics, the intermediary is acceleration. So 'Luke is awakening' is analogous with acceleration, as the intermediary between two distinct states of uniform motion. In physics, we practise the mistake exposed above, and describe the intermediary, acceleration, the becoming, as a third distinct of state. This produces the need for two points which separate the prior state and the posterior state from the intermediary state of acceleration. The points have the characteristic of arbitrariness due to the relativity of simultaneity, and the infinite regress produced from representing the intermediary "becoming" as a state-of being, is absorbed by the concept of a "limit" in calculus.

The conclusion to that long-winded explanation above, is that modern physics represents the reality of physical existence as continuous. To be consistent with the empirical evidence, spatial-temporal reality is represented as a continuum. However, to be able to employ deductive logic, the continuum is divided into distinct states-of-being, and this produces the need for points of separation or division. The application of points is arbitrary as provided for by the axioms of "continuity". The mistake in this practise is that it does not provide for the reality, that in between distinct states-of-being lies the process of becoming which is fundamentally incompatible with states-of-being, and cannot be represented as a state-of-being. By placing points or "limits" as the divisions between states-of being instead of the incompatible process of becoming, the change between one state-of-being and another is misunderstood due to the implied infinite regress.

Why must we "substantiate our way of speaking"? — Luke

So that we are speaking truth, instead of falsity. If it turns out that there are no points in time, then we should stop speaking as if there is, and get on with understanding the true nature of time as continuous. I have substantiated my way of thinking, that's what I've been doing in this thread. I've explained the reason why we talk about points in time, and also the reason why we talk about the continuity of time

This implies that the present (the combination of past and future times) consists of all of time. In that case, I did misunderstand you. This is not your typical Venn diagram, because the "past" and "future" circles here are perfectly overlapping with each other, one directly on top of the other. Thanks for clarifying. — Luke

No they are not perfectly overlapping, you still misunderstand. At the beginning, there is all future and not past, therefore no overlap here. At the end there is all past and no future, therefore no overlap there. For all we know, these non overlapping areas could be bigger than the overlapping area. We have no way to measure this.

Why do we need such points in order to distinguish memories from anticipation? — Luke

You seem to be lost here. Suppose you are sensing (seeing) the chair. You cannot tell which part of the sensation is produced from memory, and which part is produced from anticipation. Points in time would enable a distinction to be made between the past part of the sensation and future part. This would be helpful to understanding sensation, therefore also helpful to empirical science which relies on sense evidence.

If you don't want any "arbitrary points" in your description of a continuous present, then there will be nothing to distinguish the present from the past from the future from a turnip. These temporal terms become meaningless. — Luke

We usually distinguish things from each other by reference to properties, not dimensionless points. So this is completely false.

Is there any reason that we would choose a "way of speaking" that makes it impossible to distinguish one object or event from another? That is what your "way of speaking" without "points" gives us. — Luke

Again, we generally use properties to distinguish things, not points.

I agree that "there must be" such points of distinction. That is what I've called the "zero point" and I've explained why intuition provides us with the premises which make such zero points a logical necessity. — Metaphysician Undercover

When you first mentioned this "zero point", you defined it as the point in time when an object begins a new motion after being acted on by a force. You are now saying it is a logical point instead of a physical point. This is fine, but please stick with one or the other.

Empirical evidence shows us time as continuous, and without such points of distinction. And, because we need such points of distinction for our measurement procedures, though experience does not provide them for us, we impose them arbitrarily, according to pragmatic conditions. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's right.

There is no such point though, in experience. When I awaken, I can say with certainty, "now I am awake", and also say with certainty that at some temporally separated (duration of time) past time, "I was asleep", but I cannot find within my experience, the precise point which separates the two. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's right. It's a logical or grammatical "point" which separates being "awake" from being "asleep", due to the meanings or uses of the two words. If you are one, then you cannot be the other.

he problem is that the logical systems of mathematics. which are adopted by, and employed by science use premises derived from experience, these are the premises of continuity, and these premises are incompatible with your premises which produce the conclusion of a zero point. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is both continuity and non-continuity in mathematics. And it's not my premises that "produce the conclusion of a zero point", but the grammar of our language.

Notice the mistake there. The intermediary, the becoming or process of awakening has been represented as an intermediary state. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think the mistake was the idea that becoming, or a process, is a state.

The points have the characteristic of arbitrariness due to the relativity of simultaneity — Metaphysician Undercover

Why blame the relativity of simultaneity for the arbitrariness?

To be consistent with the empirical evidence, spatial-temporal reality is represented as a continuum. However, to be able to employ deductive logic, the continuum is divided into distinct states-of-being, and this produces the need for points of separation or division. The application of points is arbitrary as provided for by the axioms of "continuity". The mistake in this practise is that it does not provide for the reality, that in between distinct states-of-being lies the process of becoming which is fundamentally incompatible with states-of-being, and cannot be represented as a state-of-being. — Metaphysician Undercover

To summarise:
1. Reality is represented as a continuum
2. To use logic (or grammar or language), the continuum must be divided into arbitrary states
3. Arbitrary states are incompatible with becoming (implying that becoming is continuous)
4. Reality is actually continuous, therefore we should not use logic (or grammar or language) to divide the continuum into arbitrary states

My question is: how do you intend to represent reality without dividing it into arbitrary states (i.e. without using language)?

If it turns out that there are no points in time, then we should stop speaking as if there is, and get on with understanding the true nature of time as continuous. — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you suggesting that we should stop using all temporal concepts until we know whether there are "real" points in time? How would we ever know if there are?

No they are not perfectly overlapping, you still misunderstand. At the beginning, there is all future and not past, therefore no overlap here. At the end there is all past and no future, therefore no overlap there. For all we know, these non overlapping areas could be bigger than the overlapping area. We have no way to measure this. — Metaphysician Undercover

Do the past and the future exceed the present? That is, do you use "the present" to represent (i) a combination of the past and the future (where past and future do not exceed the present), or do you use "the present" to represent (ii) a period of time that separates the past from the future (where past and future do exceed the present)? You earlier rejected (ii), that the present is a period of time which separates the past from the future. However, since you now say "they are not perfectly overlapping", this indicates that you accept (ii), because it implies that the past and future exceed the present. Or, do you accept both (i) and (ii)?

If your answer is (i), then I don't see how there is all future and no past at the beginning or all past and no future at the end. Surely there must be both (past and future) at the beginning and both at the end, or else there must be neither at the beginning and neither at the end.

Presumably when you say "at the beginning" and "at the end" you mean when the present is located at the beginning and at the end of time, respectively. (Or else what do you mean?) If the present is located at the beginning of time, and if (i) is true, where the past and future do not exceed the present, then there can be no future after the beginning, because then the future would exceed (would be outside) the present. The same goes for the past at the end of time.

But I don't consider the beginning or the end to be within time; they are just end-points to time. The entire span of time lies between those end-points and contains both past and future at every point in time on your view. That is, if you use "the present" to represent only (i), where the past and future are contained entirely within, and do not exceed, the present.

If your answer is (ii), then you must accept that there is a point in time where the present is exceeded by a range of past events and another point in time where the present is exceeed by a range of future events (there must be two points if we assume that the present has some duration).

If your answer is both (i) and (ii), then your use of "the present" becomes a senseless mess, meaning both a period which combines the past and the future and a period which separates the past from the future. The present cannot both separate the past from the future and also be a combination of the past and the future.

Why do we need such points in order to distinguish memories from anticipation?
— Luke

You seem to be lost here. Suppose you are sensing (seeing) the chair. You cannot tell which part of the sensation is produced from memory, and which part is produced from anticipation. Points in time would enable a distinction to be made between the past part of the sensation and future part. This would be helpful to understanding sensation, therefore also helpful to empirical science which relies on sense evidence. — Metaphysician Undercover

Perhaps I am lost, because I don't see how this is supposed to work. "Points in time" supposedly exist in reality, whereas memory and anticipation exist in my mind. How do we use real points in time to distinguish memory from anticipation? You say that the points would enable a distinction to be made between the past and future parts of a sensation, but how will that help to separate a memory from an anticipation?

We usually distinguish things from each other by reference to properties, not dimensionless points. So this is completely false. — Metaphysician Undercover

If we distinguish past, present and future from each other by reference to properties rather than by reference to (arbitrary) dimensionless points, then why are you taking issue with arbitrary points?

I’ve been keeping up with part of the interchange between you two. I want to present the following overall thesis regarding the past, present, and future for critique, this since I currently suppose it to be in partial agreement with both of your views. Thanks in advance for any criticisms.

---------

By “entity” I here mean “an individual unit”. By “process” I here mean “continual change”. So understood, an entity is not a process, for in being an individual unit it is not continual change – and vice versa. Of note, an entity thus understood will not need to be in any way physical.

There exists a process/entity duality (which in some ways is akin to the wave/particle duality of QM) in the operations of cognition. For one example, our cognition naturally, innately, perceives physical objects, or entities, set against a background – objects that we can cognize as sometimes engaging in processes (e.g., the rock (entity) is rolling (process) down the hill (entity)).

All these experiences then result in our cognizing that everything physical is in an underlying state of flux, i.e. is process, or becoming. Yet the moment we focus on something it becomes a thing, or entity, within our cognition; and this applies to both perceived givens and concepts. For example, the concept of “running (as process)” itself becomes an entity (an individual unit) - linguistically, a noun – in the form of a specific type of process that we then can cognitively manipulate as concept.

As a generalization, then, when we don’t focus on X we know, hence cognize, X to be process - but when we focus on X it then is cognized as entity.

For cognition to in any way work, it is then absurd – or at the very least direly hypocritical – to deny either process-hood to physical reality or entity-hood to physical reality.

Applying this to past, present, and future:

-----------

In what follows, memory will be addressed as strictly signifying conscious memory – and not any form of unconscious memory which can be inferred to be required for our consciously perceiving, or consciously conceptualizing, givens.

Our experiential present (be it specious or not) consists of a duration replete with befores and afters. To account for this:

What we in any way physiologically perceive via all physiological sense will hold a certain quality as phenomena – a quality of phenomena that is by us readily distinguishable from phenomena we, for example, either recall or else perceptually imagine to occur in the future. In experience, this physiological quality of phenomena lasts for a short but immeasurable duration, a duration that is yet distinct from the phenomena of things we consciously recall and from the imagined phenomena we anticipate. This duration in which physiological phenomena are actual (visual, auditory, etc.) relative to us is then what we intuitively deem our experienced present.

For the sake of argument, presume that this experienced present is for the average human an average duration of approximately half a second to one and a half seconds.

Next, consider a conversation. We actively converse (hence listen and speak) with the other in the present. This extended present we experience can then include our replying after the other’s comment or the other replying after our comment. Generalizing from this and other possible examples: wherever there is any type of direct interaction between human minds, there will be a shared experiential present common to all minds involved – and, hence, a simultaneity of the present relative to these causally interacting minds.

Notwithstanding, relative to all minds involved, everything that is consciously known about the past will be contained within the duration of the experiential present. As will be everything that is consciously anticipated about the future.

Unlike the future, though, our recollections of past present-durations wherein we in any way interacted with other minds will always reference events commonly stored (here overlooking mistakes of memory and such) within the memory of all minds concerned. Hence, the past will be fixed relative to all minds that once partook of it when it was a (commonly shared) present duration. In contrast, the future – not having yet been presently experienced – will not be.

As an aside, I’m one to believe that such musings could (together with other principles) be applied so as to formulate a theory of presentism wherein the past is for all intended purposes perfectly fixed and the future is indeterminate – a theory of presentism that parallels the theory of relativity’s stipulation that simultaneity is always observer-dependent. But I’m here presenting all this simply to provide better general background for the current purposes, this in terms of defining the present in respect to the past and future. (In other words, though I’m aware these given premises could be further enquired into, I’m only here presenting them for the purpose of the current issue.)

We then know from experience that there is no measurable distinction between the future and the experienced present, with the latter always changing to incorporate what in the past was strict future. The same lack of measurable distinction holds between the experienced present and the past. So we know all this to be process, for it's all continuous change. Notwithstanding, we also know that the experienced present is always qualitatively distinct from all past we can recall (be it the past of two seconds ago or that of two years ago, etc.). Likewise with future present-durations which we can in part predict and thereby anticipate.

So, when we don’t focus on the past, present, and future we know that these are all aspects of an inseparable process. Yet when we focus on them, each becomes an individual unit distinct from the others.

Furthermore, when we focus on the past, present, or future, we then cognize each of these to be composed of befores and afters. For example, I am in this current duration of the experienced present writing this word before this one. Upon closer experiential examination, all these befores and afters too are perfectly devoid of measurable distinctions. Yet, when we conceptualize these processes of lived experience – such as by consciously or unconsciously ascribing causality – each before and each after will then be cognized as a distinct unit.

Then, to represent these experientially cognized units we will typically utilize definite quantity, i.e. numbers, and can furthermore represent them geometrically via points – such as a point on a line that measurably distinguishes what was before and what was after the given depicted point on some visual record of our past.

The mathematization of duration, hence of time, can of course be of vast pragmatic benefit (the theory of relativity as example; the use of seconds, minutes, hours, etc. as a more immediate example). Nevertheless, a) any such will be an abstracted representation of our lived experiences as previously addressed and b) any such will conflict with our lived experiences for the reason’s previously provided.

Where would you find disagreement?

Hi Javra, welcome. Thanks for your considered post.

There exists a process/entity duality (which in some ways is akin to the wave/particle duality of QM) in the operations of cognition. For one example, our cognition naturally, innately, perceives physical objects, or entities, set against a background – objects that we can cognize as sometimes engaging in processes (e.g., the rock (entity) is rolling (process) down the hill (entity)).

All these experiences then result in our cognizing that everything physical is in an underlying state of flux, i.e. is process, or becoming. Yet the moment we focus on something it becomes a thing, or entity, within our cognition; and this applies to both perceived givens and concepts. For example, the concept of “running (as process)” itself becomes an entity (an individual unit) - linguistically, a noun – in the form of a specific type of process that we then can cognitively manipulate as concept. — javra

I agree with much of this. My only critique would be that, on my own view, it is not our focus that causes something to become a thing or entity within our cognition; instead, it is the nature of language that requires these "units" or concepts. You hint at this yourself with the concept of "running".

For cognition to in any way work, it is then absurd – or at the very least direly hypocritical – to deny either process-hood to physical reality or entity-hood to physical reality. — javra

Again, I don't see the problem as one of cognition, but as one of language. It is the constant, stable, static meanings/uses of words such as "present" which allow us to talk about it, but which does not capture the ongoing change that we perceive. You cannot step into the same river twice. The meaning of the word "river" stays the same, but the actual river is ever changing.

What we in any way physiologically perceive via all physiological sense will hold a certain quality as phenomena – a quality of phenomena that is by us readily distinguishable from phenomena we, for example, either recall or else perceptually imagine to occur in the future. In experience, this physiological quality of phenomena lasts for a short but immeasurable duration, a duration that is yet distinct from the phenomena of things we consciously recall and from the imagined phenomena we anticipate. This duration in which physiological phenomena are actual (visual, auditory, etc.) relative to us is then what we intuitively deem our experienced present. — javra

Good luck getting MU to agree that we can ever distinguish memories from anticipations, or the past from the present from the future.

My only critique would be that, on my own view, it is not our focus that causes something to become a thing or entity within our cognition; instead, it is the nature of language that requires these "units" or concepts. — Luke

Again, I don't see the problem as one of cognition, but as one of language. It is the constant, stable, static meanings/uses of words such as "present" which allow us to talk about it, but which does not capture the ongoing change that we perceive. You cannot step into the same river twice. The meaning of the word "river" stays the same, but the actual river is ever changing. — Luke

I think I understand what you mean. All, or at least nearly all, concepts we entertain are language dependent. The concept of “animal” is specified by the word, as one example, and this is an inter-agential construct: both as word and as the concept the word specifies. And our conceptual cognition makes use of language to manipulate concepts, sometimes to extremely abstract extents.

With this I fully agree. The impact language has upon our cognition is overwhelming.

Yet, I’m thinking that maybe there’s a difference in the way we understand “cognition” within the contexts I previous addressed. I intended it as the noun form of “to cognize”, with the latter here intending “to hold an awareness of” among with the term’s other meanings. So interpreted, conscious perception is then a form of cognition, for we cognize (gain awareness of) physical objects via our perception of them.

I don’t find it credible that perception will of itself be fully contingent on language; though, of course, the language-specified concepts we hold will significantly influence that which we consciously perceive. If we in no way hold the concept of “a house” we will not be able to perceive a house when looking at something that is otherwise known as a house; we would perceive shapes and colors (etc.) that stand apart from their background but would not recognize these to be houses. I fully grant this. But consider that objects which we commonly perceive with lesser animals are nevertheless perceived as background-independent objects by all organisms concerned. Both a human and a dog, for example, will perceptually recognize a fleshy bone, and will deal with it accordingly to their own benefit. This though lesser animals are languageless creatures.

I infer from this that very rudimentary, likely unthought of, concepts can be held in the complete absence of language: For, just as a wild dog will likely not be able to perceive, and hence recognize, houses (or, even more so, spaceships) due to not having any conceptual understanding of what these background-independent shapes and colors are, so too, I argue, would a dog not be able to perceive and thereby recognize a bone were it have no conceptual understanding of what bones are. In much simpler lesser animals, such as insects, one can then well assume that physical objects are perceived via species-specific rudimentary concepts that are fully inherited genetically. Again, this in the utter absence of language. I’m, for example, guesstimating that a spider doesn’t in any way learn what a fly is via some trial and error in the process of growing to maturity. This as a dog can be said to do in gaining cognizance of what a bone is – and thereby being able to perceive bones.

If one deems the just mentioned to hold, then: To perceive X is to necessarily discern, or cognize, a unit – this, for lack of better words, within one’s focal point of conscious awareness. And language will not be essential to this process of perceiving. So, for one example: some more developed lesser animals (greater apes for instance) could then perceive, and thereby recognize, rivers as individual units (rather than processes) despite having no language by which to refer to the concept of "river".

(BTW, this is to say that lesser animals will necessarily experience units (to which processes, such as running, can then apply). But it takes a human to infer that all of physical reality is in flux.)

Don’t know if you’d find general agreement in this, but, if not, I’d like to better understand why not.

p.s. Thanks for the critique.

Good luck getting MU to agree that we can ever distinguish memories from anticipations, or the past from the present from the future. — Luke

:grin: Fingers crossed, there might not be significant differences between the given description and what MU experiences. But whatever differences there might be, I'm sure he'll inform me of them.

I don’t find it credible that perception will of itself be fully contingent on language; though, of course, the language-specified concepts we hold will significantly influence that which we consciously perceive. — javra

That's a fair criticism to my response, although I wonder if it may be taking us off the track of the preceding discussion.

I think it's very difficult to say what other animals may or may not "think" or what "concepts" they might use. I use scare quotes because the words "think" and "concepts" typically apply to our human thinking and concepts, with which we are familiar, but I don't know if other animals have the same sort of thing or something completely different, especially when you are proposing that they may have non-linguistic thoughts and concepts. Therefore, I am reluctant to apply what we have, and apply those terms that usually mean human cognition and human concepts, to other animals.

But consider that objects which we commonly perceive with lesser animals are nevertheless perceived as background-independent objects by all organisms concerned. — javra

Popular science tells us that many other species have different perceptual capacities than we do. Therefore, I wouldn't uncritically assume that other species perceive the world the same way as us, or perceive the same objects as us, or perceive the same objects that we perceive as objects, or value the same things as us, or have any sort of "mental map" of the world (or of their immediate environment) at all.

Although it does seem likely that those species closest in makeup to humans would have similar sensory apparatus to us, it's hard to know how much of a difference language makes when comparing human cognition to the non-linguistic "cognition" of other animals. Non-verbal drivers of behaviour such as instinct, mimicry and habit are also common to both humans and other species, so it might look like other animals have the same sort of cognition as us, even though they may not, in fact, have the same.

However, this is just a lot of guesswork on my part. I'm not well versed on any scientific research into these matters.

When you first mentioned this "zero point", you defined it as the point in time when an object begins a new motion after being acted on by a force. You are now saying it is a logical point instead of a physical point. This is fine, but please stick with one or the other. — Luke

It's both, I explained. We determine logically that there must be a point in time when a change begins. So it's as I explained, we see logically that there must be such points, and these ought to be supported by physical evidence, but we have not been able to find the physical evidence. So we employ the mathematics of limits, and this hides the fact that we can't find or are simply not looking for, the real points.

There is both continuity and non-continuity in mathematics. And it's not my premises that "produce the conclusion of a zero point", but the grammar of our language. — Luke

Logical conclusions require premises. If you want to characterize your premises as "the grammar of our language", then I will assume that your principle premise is "the way we speak". The problem with this premise of course is that we often speak falsely and deceptively. So it makes for an unsound argument. Such and such is the truth, because we say it's the truth.

Do you recognize the distinction between being "correct", meaning according to convention, and being "true", meaning according to reality? And do you acknowledge that a statement might be correct but false, according to that distinction?

Why blame the relativity of simultaneity for the arbitrariness? — Luke

The arbitrariness to the points in time, at which acceleration begins and ends is due to differences in the frame of reference. This arbitrariness is known as the relativity of simultaneity.

To summarise:
1. Reality is represented as a continuum
2. To use logic (or grammar or language), the continuum must be divided into arbitrary states
3. Arbitrary states are incompatible with becoming (implying that becoming is continuous)
4. Reality is actually continuous, therefore we should not use logic (or grammar or language) to divide the continuum into arbitrary states — Luke

You got #4 wrong. Remember, I argue for real zero points. I also said that I believe sense experience misleads us into thinking that reality is continuous, when it really is not. The reason I spent so long arguing the continuity of time was to get a good understanding of exactly what sense experience gives us as an experience of time as continuous.

My question is: how do you intend to represent reality without dividing it into arbitrary states (i.e. without using language)? — Luke

What I proposed already, is that we need to find the real points of division, then we can avoid the arbitrariness of the current way of dividing.

Are you suggesting that we should stop using all temporal concepts until we know whether there are "real" points in time? — Luke

No, I said if we get conclusive proof that there are not points in time then we ought to stop talking as if there is points.

Do the past and the future exceed the present? — Luke

I don't know the answer of this. Remember, that was an example of how such an overlap could be real, and I cautioned you not to take it as necessarily the way I would conceive of time, just an example.

That is, do you use "the present" to represent (i) a combination of the past and the future (where past and future do not exceed the present), or do you use "the present" to represent (ii) a period of time that separates the past from the future (where past and future do exceed the present)? You earlier rejected (ii), that the present is a period of time which separates the past from the future. However, since you now say "they are not perfectly overlapping", this indicates that you accept (ii), because it implies that the past and future exceed the present. Or, do you accept both (i) and (ii)? — Luke

I think I would choose (i), with a change, that past and future exceed the future. A combination of past and future where past and future exceed the present. So not all of past, or all of future are combined at present, only some of each, in the way I described already. "Union" does not imply that all the parts of the things united are equally united to each other. But I do not think that experience gives me what is required to answer with any certitude, as to exactly how past and future overlap, and exactly how the parts exist outside the overlap.

Perhaps I am lost, because I don't see how this is supposed to work. "Points in time" supposedly exist in reality, whereas memory and anticipation exist in my mind. How do we use real points in time to distinguish memory from anticipation? You say that the points would enable a distinction to be made between the past and future parts of a sensation, but how will that help to separate a memory from an anticipation? — Luke

Your mind is part of reality. Determining the real points within the mind would allow for application outside the mind, because both are part of the same reality.

What I argued is that the experience of sensation, which is an activity we do at the present, must consist of both past and future. The past part consists of memory and the future part consists of future. Real points of "present" would allow a separation between these two, for a better understanding, instead of having them conflated into one activity, sensation.

If we distinguish past, present and future from each other by reference to properties rather than by reference to (arbitrary) dimensionless points, then why are you taking issue with arbitrary points? — Luke

Many people, including you it seems, claim that we distinguish past, present, and future by dimensionless points, when in reality we distinguish these by description. It is "the grammar of our language", which makes people think like that, but it is a misrepresentation of how we really understand the difference between these three. It's done for simplicity to facilitate ease of speaking. Since our descriptions of past, present, and future are so thoroughly underdeveloped and vary from person to person, yet the need to separate past from future in discussion is very commonplace, it's much easier just to talk as if there is a point in time, present, which separates past from future.

There exists a process/entity duality (which in some ways is akin to the wave/particle duality of QM) in the operations of cognition. For one example, our cognition naturally, innately, perceives physical objects, or entities, set against a background – objects that we can cognize as sometimes engaging in processes (e.g., the rock (entity) is rolling (process) down the hill (entity)).

All these experiences then result in our cognizing that everything physical is in an underlying state of flux, i.e. is process, or becoming. Yet the moment we focus on something it becomes a thing, or entity, within our cognition; and this applies to both perceived givens and concepts. For example, the concept of “running (as process)” itself becomes an entity (an individual unit) - linguistically, a noun – in the form of a specific type of process that we then can cognitively manipulate as concept. — javra

I would say, that traditionally the background is of entities. The entity is what is static, and changes occur to it. This is the traditional logic of predication, the subject accepts changing predications. The static aspect is representative of what does not change as time passes, what is continuous, and this is matter in ancient philosophy, and matter is the background. It is only in the modern world view, that energy has taken the place of matter, as the continuous. But energy is fundamentally a predicate, the capacity which a moving thing has, to do work. So now movement, which really ought to be predicated to something, as that which is moving, is allowed to be the background, or substratum itself, hence your background of flux. But this is inherently problematic, because without the ether we have wave motion with no substance which the waves are the waves of.

All these experiences then result in our cognizing that everything physical is in an underlying state of flux, i.e. is process, or becoming. Yet the moment we focus on something it becomes a thing, or entity, within our cognition; and this applies to both perceived givens and concepts. For example, the concept of “running (as process)” itself becomes an entity (an individual unit) - linguistically, a noun – in the form of a specific type of process that we then can cognitively manipulate as concept. — javra

What makes a thing a thing, is temporal continuity. Anything which displays temporal extension is given thinghood. So for example, in Newton's first law, uniform motion is given thinghood. It will continue to persist through time, as it has, unless ended by a force.

Unlike the future, though, our recollections of past present-durations wherein we in any way interacted with other minds will always reference events commonly stored (here overlooking mistakes of memory and such) within the memory of all minds concerned. Hence, the past will be fixed relative to all minds that once partook of it when it was a (commonly shared) present duration. In contrast, the future – not having yet been presently experienced – will not be.

As an aside, I’m one to believe that such musings could (together with other principles) be applied so as to formulate a theory of presentism wherein the past is for all intended purposes perfectly fixed and the future is indeterminate – a theory of presentism that parallels the theory of relativity’s stipulation that simultaneity is always observer-dependent. But I’m here presenting all this simply to provide better general background for the current purposes, this in terms of defining the present in respect to the past and future. (In other words, though I’m aware these given premises could be further enquired into, I’m only here presenting them for the purpose of the current issue.) — javra

If you define the past as absolutely fixed, and the future as absolutely unfixed, then we run into the same problem that I was showing with Luke's arguments when past and future are mutually exclusive contraries. There cannot be any overlap of past and future. Then, the nature of "the present" becomes extremely problematic. Since the present has to be a process (it cannot be a dimensionless point when a predicate changes to is contrary because this requires a duration of becoming), this time, "the present" must be completely distinct from past and future. But then we need to account for the process whereby the past becomes the present, and the present the future, and I think we'd have to posit some other form of time for this. It may become an infinite regress.

So, when we don’t focus on the past, present, and future we know that these are all aspects of an inseparable process. Yet when we focus on them, each becomes an individual unit distinct from the others. — javra

I think that these points of distinction are imposed pragmatically, depending on the purpose. For example, you intentionally qualified "past" with what is consciously remembered as past. That is just for the purpose of having a clear division. If we allow all past, then we have to deal with things like "sensory memory", which I brought up earlier. So sure, you can say that we can make clear and distinct divisions between memories (past), and anticipations (future), so long as you restrict your definitions of memories and anticipations to those which we recognize clearly and distinctly as memories and anticipations. That's a sort of confirmation bias, defining terms to support a bias. These things defined by that bias are further back in the past, and things further ahead in the future. But if you include things in the very immediate future and past, bringing your perspective narrower than the conscious perspective, to consider the relations of the constituent parts of the conscious perspective, then we cannot distinguish between memory aspects and anticipatory aspects in this way.

We then know from experience that there is no measurable distinction between the future and the experienced present, with the latter always changing to incorporate what in the past was strict future. The same lack of measurable distinction holds between the experienced present and the past. So we know all this to be process, for it's all continuous change. Notwithstanding, we also know that the experienced present is always qualitatively distinct from all past we can recall (be it the past of two seconds ago or that of two years ago, etc.). Likewise with future present-durations which we can in part predict and thereby anticipate.

So, when we don’t focus on the past, present, and future we know that these are all aspects of an inseparable process. Yet when we focus on them, each becomes an individual unit distinct from the others.

Furthermore, when we focus on the past, present, or future, we then cognize each of these to be composed of befores and afters. For example, I am in this current duration of the experienced present writing this word before this one. Upon closer experiential examination, all these befores and afters too are perfectly devoid of measurable distinctions. Yet, when we conceptualize these processes of lived experience – such as by consciously or unconsciously ascribing causality – each before and each after will then be cognized as a distinct unit. — javra

Here is where the problems present themselves. When you say "focus on", I consider this to be conscious effort. The process which we know as experiencing the present, if it were purely experiencing, without applying any conscious effort, perhaps in meditation or something like that, would not consist of any differentiation between past and future. Maybe dreaming is like this, no discernible difference between past and future. But dreaming is completely removed from sensation. When sensation is active, then it actually takes conscious effort to remove a sort of natural distinction between past and future which inheres within, or underpins our consciousness.

What I think is the case, is that what you call the "measurable distinction" between past and present, and also future and present, is so deeply inherent within the conscious experience of the present, or prior to it, as foundational to it, that to say that there is no such measurable distinction without conscious effort, is somewhat incorrect. This is why it actually requires conscious effort to remove the influence of this distinction from the conscious experience. For example, practises like meditation which are designed to put oneself into a purely experiential mode of being without the influence of memories and anticipations, actually require great effort.

This would imply that most or all life forms, even those which have not evolved enough to be fully conscious, would have some process for distinguishing between memories and anticipations, as fundamental to their experience of being present. That is implied by the fact that it requires great effort, and is actually impossible, to remove the difference between memory and anticipation from the experience of being present.

The issue here is that consciousness has developed a method of cognizing and recognizing memories and anticipations, through conscious effort, which is most likely completely distinct, and different from the underlying "natural way" of distinguishing memories from anticipations, which underpins, and forms the foundation of the conscious experience. I propose that there are two distinct ways involved, one being the way of continual process and the other being the way of distinct states-of-being, what you call entities.

I believe that the crux of the matter is the use of symbols or signs. If we take Luke's proposed "grammar of our language" for example, we see that language is fundamentally conformed to the entities, or states-of-being type of temporal reality. But there is always a part of the conscious experience of being present, which language cannot get at, or is ill-formed for describing. This is the underlying, background of process which you refer to. So the underlying experience of being conscious at the present appears to consist of a continuous process, and the conscious effort to distinguish past memories and future goals as objects or entities, is somewhat inconsistent with this natural background.

What I propose is that even the underlying experience of continuity is constructed from an even more primitive way of recognizing distinct past and future entities or states-of-being. And what has happened is that the living system for pragmatic reasons has produced a synthesis which creates the appearance of continuity. This type of synthesis is the very same type that we find in modern physics. The underlying grammar of language provides an understanding of temporal reality in terms of entities, objects which are states-of-being. This representation is supposedly supported by strong philosophical principles, metaphysics and ontology, so theology and religion have enforced this usage for centuries, as best representative of the truth. However, all the entities we find in the physical temporal reality are in flux, so we move to represent the entities as active, Newton's first law for example. This law represents continuity as a uniform motion. And this representation is supported by the underlying experience, which is itself an experience of continuous process. Since the fundamental inner experience is apprehended as continuous process, we move to represent the entire outer universe as continuous process. This is done for pragmatic reasons, but it is claimed as truth, because it is supported by the underlying inner experience, which is apprehended as a continuous process.

So I have exposed four levels of representation in the preceding paragraph. At the upper levels of consciousness we have the entire universe represented as continuous process. This is a synthesis of of the distinct entities which are the substance of the layer below that, in the more base levels of consciousness, the common language. The synthesis is carried out for pragmatic purposes of understanding the motions and activities of the entities represented in the more base level of consciousness. Below this base level of representing performed by consciousness is the conscious experience itself. The conscious experience is apprehended as a continuous process and the base level representation of it, with entities, which is derived from ancient metaphysics is seen as a faulty representation. However, what I've proposed is that this presumed foundational level, the continuity of the conscious experience at the present, is really itself a synthesis, produced by the evolution of the living being for pragmatic reasons, and that underlying this apparent continuity is further, more base, entities, or states-of-being, which have been synthesized into the continuity evident as the conscious experience of the present.

In summary, what I say is that the representation of entities is more real, more truthful in its correspondence with temporal reality, than is the representation of the continuum. But temporal reality is extremely complex and very far from understood by any living beings on earth. So as our understanding of temporal existence progresses, it proceeds through an evolution of representing entities, synthesizing them into a continuity of existence, which is guided by pragmatic reasons, until the synthesis reaches the limits of its usefulness. At this time, a whole new level of representation of entities is required, so that the cycle starts over again.

Therefore I can propose a fifth level to the four described above. The representation of modern physics, as a synthesized space-time continuum has pretty much reached the limits of its usefulness. Quantum physics has presented us with the reality of fundamental quanta, entities which underly the spatial-temporal reality. The space-time continuum as currently synthesized cannot provide comprehension of these fundamental entities because it has reached the limits of its usefulness. So we need to identify a whole new level of entities, as foundational to spatial-temporal reality, and renew the cycle on a new level.

Logical conclusions require premises. If you want to characterize your premises as "the grammar of our language", then I will assume that your principle premise is "the way we speak". The problem with this premise of course is that we often speak falsely and deceptively. So it makes for an unsound argument. Such and such is the truth, because we say it's the truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

The grammar of our language is not synonymous with "the way we speak". It involves the logic of our language and the meaning of words, e.g. why you cannot be both asleep and awake, but you can be both asleep and dreaming. It is also why the past and future cannot both exceed the present and not exceed the present. It does not concern any propositions or theories about the world, so neither does it concern truth or falsity in the manner you suggest.

The arbitrariness to the points in time, at which acceleration begins and ends is due to differences in the frame of reference. — Metaphysician Undercover

How can differences in the frame of reference cause the arbitrariness to the points in time? This makes no sense to me.

4. Reality is actually continuous, therefore we should not use logic (or grammar or language) to divide the continuum into arbitrary states
— Luke

You got #4 wrong. Remember, I argue for real zero points. — Metaphysician Undercover

You said:

The mistake in this practise [of dividing the continuum into arbitrary states] is that it does not provide for the reality, that in between distinct states-of-being lies the process of becoming which is fundamentally incompatible with states-of-being, and cannot be represented as a state-of-being. — Metaphysician Undercover

So "the reality [is] that in between distinct states-of-being lies the process of becoming" which is not compatible with states (or arbitrary points). I don't believe I got #4 wrong.

My question is: how do you intend to represent reality without dividing it into arbitrary states (i.e. without using language)?
— Luke

What I proposed already, is that we need to find the real points of division, then we can avoid the arbitrariness of the current way of dividing. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm asking: what are we meant to do in the meantime, until we find them?

Are you suggesting that we should stop using all temporal concepts until we know whether there are "real" points in time?
— Luke

No, I said if we get conclusive proof that there are not points in time then we ought to stop talking as if there is points. — Metaphysician Undercover

In that case, until we get "conclusive proof" that there are not points in time, then we ought to continue talking as if there are points.

I don't know the answer of this. Remember, that was an example of how such an overlap could be real, and I cautioned you not to take it as necessarily the way I would conceive of time, just an example. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm asking how you are using the words "past", "present" and "future". I'm not asking whether past and future exceed the present or not in reality. I thought you were making an argument one way or the other. But your argument appears to be along the lines of "let's blur the distinctions between the concepts and make it as unclear as possible".

I think I would choose (i), with a change, that past and future exceed the future. A combination of past and future where past and future exceed the present. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then that's both (i) and (ii). (i) is where past and future do not exceed the present. (ii) is where past and future do exceed the present. You are arguing for both, which is a contradiction.

I would say, that traditionally the background is of entities. The entity is what is static, and changes occur to it. This is the traditional logic of predication, the subject accepts changing predications. The static aspect is representative of what does not change as time passes, what is continuous, and this is matter in ancient philosophy, and matter is the background. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm in general agreement. There was, however, the ancient philosophy of Heraclitus.

What makes a thing a thing, is temporal continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover

True. I didn't want to define it by temporality, though, since it's temporality that we're trying to understand.

If you define the past as absolutely fixed, and the future as absolutely unfixed, then we run into the same problem that I was showing with Luke's arguments when past and future are mutually exclusive contraries. There cannot be any overlap of past and future. Then, the nature of "the present" becomes extremely problematic. Since the present has to be a process (it cannot be a dimensionless point when a predicate changes to is contrary because this requires a duration of becoming), this time, "the present" must be completely distinct from past and future. But then we need to account for the process whereby the past becomes the present, and the present the future, and I think we'd have to posit some other form of time for this. It may become an infinite regress. — Metaphysician Undercover

To be clear about what I meant, I qualiified the perfect fixedness of the past with "for all intended purposes". Meaning that the past is not, as I interpret it, absolutely fixed.

That said, I do hold that the future, not having yet been experienced as a present duration by any mind, is distinct from and in a sense contrary to the past, which was once experienced as a present duration by all minds concerned - such that, generally speaking, interacting minds will not agree on what the future will be but will agree on what the past was. Making the details of the past equally real to all, but not the details of the future.

But I'm having trouble understanding how the past could ever become the present, or how the present could become the future. To my mind, the newer portions of the present duration perpetually incorporate the most proximal aspects of the future; likewise, the older portions of the present duration perpetually transmute into the past. Yet the present duration always remains the present duration: that duration of befores and afters which we experience with physiological phenomena. (I should here add, during waking states of being.)

I think that these points of distinction are imposed pragmatically, depending on the purpose. For example, you intentionally qualified "past" with what is consciously remembered as past. That is just for the purpose of having a clear division. If we allow all past, then we have to deal with things like "sensory memory", which I brought up earlier. — Metaphysician Undercover

I prioritize the conscious experience of the present duration (or "moment" in the sense of a short duration) because I take the conscious experience to be the sole source of all epistemological givens of which we can be aware: including, for example, all knowledge regarding the unconscious operations of our minds, hence including our knowledge of sensory memory. And this ontological source for all givens we can be aware of, which is our consciousness, I take to hold regardless of purpose.

So I so far don't find this epistemological prioritization to be a matter of confirmation bias.

Here is where the problems present themselves. When you say "focus on", I consider this to be conscious effort. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not typically. Our vision, as one example, always holds a focal point (more technically, a "focal zone"), i.e. some given area of vision upon which we visually focus, which is itself surrounded by peripheral vision we don't focus on, itself surrounded by non-vision. Maybe obviously, without any sharp distinction between these three zones of visual awareness, so to speak. And all this occurs, typically, in manners fully devoid of conscious effort. When we're very attentive visually, this focal point becomes smaller bringing more details into visual focus; when we "zone out" this focal point can become so disperse so as to virtually blend everything into our peripheral vision; nevertheless, most of the time, our visual focal point, or that which we visually focus on, will occur without any conscious effort. The same, I believe, can be generally held for all other senses (with tactile perception potentially holding two or more focal points as the same time) as well as for our overall awareness in general. But getting into all this would be quite a chore. So I'll just let it be for now.

Nevertheless, you bring up good points. My tentative, overall understanding of what you've written is that it addresses the issue of time by prioritizing physical matter over conscious experience. (I say "physical matter" so as differentiate it from the Aristotelian notions of, for example, individual ideas being the constituent matter - or material substrate - of a paradigm (with neither ideas nor paradigms being physical matter)).

If so, our metaphysical outlooks will then get in the way of our agreeing upon the nature of time.

But if I'm not misinterpreting you with the just mentioned, I'd be interested to know how you would address time in regard to prime matter? This given that prime matter, from which all matter as individual units develops, is understood to be completely undifferentiated in all ways.

And thank you for the criticisms.

The grammar of our language is not synonymous with "the way we speak". It involves the logic of our language and the meaning of words, e.g. why you cannot be both asleep and awake, but you can be both asleep and dreaming. It is also why the past and future cannot both exceed the present and not exceed the present. It does not concern any propositions or theories about the world, so neither does it concern truth or falsity in the manner you suggest. — Luke

To me, what you describe here is simply the way we speak. That it makes no sense to say that a person is asleep and awake, both at the same time, is simply a feature of the way we speak. That there is logic which supports the way we speak requires that there are premises as well. In this case the premise would be the law of noncontradiction. Therefore "the grammar of our language" does involve propositions and theories about our world, such as the fundamental laws of logic. But, we also speak about awakening, and this is understood as a process which is neither being asleep nor awake. So despite the fact that the way we speak, or "the grammar of our language" discourages us from claiming that we are both asleep and awake at the same time, it does allow us to say that we are neither asleep nor awake.

That we understand awakening as neither being awake nor asleep is the result of the rule established by Aristotle, that becoming violates the law of excluded middle. Aristotle's logical structure resulted in the convention, that becoming, which is now expressed as processes like awakening are neither one nor the other of the two opposing predications. In modern times, there are some who following Hegel, like the dialectical materialists, think that becoming ought to be expressed as a combination of both the opposing predications, in violation of the law of noncontradiction.

How can differences in the frame of reference cause the arbitrariness to the points in time? This makes no sense to me. — Luke

According to the relativity of simultaneity, two events which are simultaneous from one frame of reference (the specific time on a specific clock, and another event), are not simultaneous from another frame of reference. Therefore the point in time at which the specified event occurred is arbitrary, depending of the choice of frames of reference.

So "the reality [is] that in between distinct states-of-being lies the process of becoming" which is not compatible with states (or arbitrary points). I don't believe I got #4 wrong. — Luke

You are still not understanding. The "becoming" which lies between particular states-of-being is real, but so are the states-of-being real. Both are real, and this is contrary to your #4 which states that reality is continuous. Reality is not continuous, by what I am arguing, it consists of states-of-being and a process of becoming which lies between the states of being. Hence the need for real points, and the conclusion that continuity is not real.

I'm asking: what are we meant to do in the meantime, until we find them? — Luke

Look for them, obviously.

In that case, until we get "conclusive proof" that there are not points in time, then we ought to continue talking as if there are points. — Luke

Sure, why not? As long as it serves the purpose. But when we get to the limits of any specific representation we need to switch to another, rather than trying to force the reality to fit the representation, when it does not. That is known figuratively as trying to force a square peg into a round hole.

Then that's both (i) and (ii). (i) is where past and future do not exceed the present. (ii) is where past and future do exceed the present. You are arguing for both, which is a contradiction. — Luke

No, it's not contradiction, your options were just not well formulated. My perspective takes parts from each. You did not give the proper option, past and future being unified at the present, and also each of them exceeding the present. As I said, unification does not imply that all properties of the things unified overlap with each other, or are unified, only that some are unified or overlap.

That's a fair criticism to my response, although I wonder if it may be taking us off the track of the preceding discussion.

I think it's very difficult to say what other animals may or may not "think" or what "concepts" they might use. I use scare quotes because the words "think" and "concepts" typically apply to our human thinking and concepts, with which we are familiar, but I don't know if other animals have the same sort of thing or something completely different, especially when you are proposing that they may have non-linguistic thoughts and concepts. Therefore, I am reluctant to apply what we have, and apply those terms that usually mean human cognition and human concepts, to other animals. — Luke

I can very much respect this. Just so its said, the way I look at this subject is that, just as we can infer that lesser animals have minds, with some lesser animals giving all indications of themselves having a theory of mind, so too can we infer that lesser animals can in some ways hold non-linguistic concepts. But your are quite right in saying that further discussing this would take the thread off its current course.

No, it's not contradiction, your options were just not well formulated. My perspective takes parts from each. — Metaphysician Undercover

Allow me to put it another way.

What do you call that part of the future which lies outside the present? You call that “the future”, right?

But what do you call that part of the future that lies inside the present? Do you call that “the future” or do you call that “the present”?

Now, does the future exceed the present? If so, then it is distinct from the present.

You are trying to use “the future” in two different ways.

And same for “the past”.

To be clear about what I meant, I qualiified the perfect fixedness of the past with "for all intended purposes". Meaning that the past is not, as I interpret it, absolutely fixed. — javra

I agree that the past is fixed, and the future is not, but this creates enormous, seemingly unsurmountable problems for understanding the nature of the present. The first question is, what happens at the present, which could cause such a change? The unfixed future must consist of possibilities, and the past must consist of the results of some sort of selection process. The selection process is often referred to as the Will of God, and in this way we meet the subject of the op head on.

The deeper question is how does the unfixed future relate to the fixed past, how is the selection process allowed to be carried out? This is why I like to assume a present which consists of an overlap of past and future. The human being has a fixed presence, by its physical body, sharing in the principles of continuity of Newton's first law, which states that the fixedness will continue into the future in a fixed way, unless caused to change. But in the mental world of intelligible objects, the mind partakes of the future, full of possibilities. So the human being as a whole, at the present, must be partly in the fixed world of the past, and partly in the unfixed world of the future. The overlap allows that the mind, in the future, can have influence over, and the capacity to change the continuity of the fixed body, in the form of free will choices.

So I so far don't find this epistemological prioritization to be a matter of confirmation bias. — javra

Let me say then, that it is a limitation you impose. The problem with this limitation, limiting your understanding of time to conscious experience, is that if you adhere to it strictly, you get a solipsist position. But you do not accept the solipsist position, you allow conscious experiences other than your own to have an influence on your understanding of time.

By taking this step, you must allow for the reality of a whole lot of other things, beginning with the separation which makes another's conscious experience distinct from your own. And by your own description, you allow a lengthening of the duration which you call "present", to allow for human beings to communicate. Strictly speaking, this lengthening of the present is not consistent with conscious experience, it is an adaptation you must make to allow for the reality of other individuals, and the separation between individuals. So now, you have allowed right here, that logic, along with premises derived from observation of the external world, infringes on your stated limitation, strict adherence to conscious experience.

In reality, once you leave the world of solipsism, to allow that the experience of others has any influence over your principles, you no longer adhere to the strict epistemic principle of conscious experience. Then allowing a specific type of alteration to your principles, as the result of your interaction with others, while disallowing others because you claim to adhere only to conscious experience, is a sort of bias.

Not typically. Our vision, as one example, always holds a focal point (more technically, a "focal zone"), i.e. some given area of vision upon which we visually focus, which is itself surrounded by peripheral vision we don't focus on, itself surrounded by non-vision. — javra

I don't think this is a good example. I think that vision is always dependent on conscious effort, it requires attention. So i do not see any argument from you, which would persuade me that the focus of vision can be carried out without conscious effort.

And all this occurs, typically, in manners fully devoid of conscious effort. When we're very attentive visually, this focal point becomes smaller bringing more details into visual focus; when we "zone out" this focal point can become so disperse so as to virtually blend everything into our peripheral vision; nevertheless, most of the time, our visual focal point, or that which we visually focus on, will occur without any conscious effort. — javra

I think we must have differing ideas as to what constitutes "conscious effort". Do you for example, find that you point your head toward that which you are looking at? Isn't this a matter of conscious effort? And suppose you are not even pointing your head, isn't moving your eyes a matter of conscious effort? In general, when you direct your attention toward something, anything, don't you consider this a matter of conscious effort? How do you believe that you could focus on anything, in any way, without conscious effort? Isn't that exactly what "focusing" is, to direct your attention at something? And directing your attention is making conscious effort.

Nevertheless, you bring up good points. My tentative, overall understanding of what you've written is that it addresses the issue of time by prioritizing physical matter over conscious experience. (I say "physical matter" so as differentiate it from the Aristotelian notions of, for example, individual ideas being the constituent matter - or material substrate - of a paradigm (with neither ideas nor paradigms being physical matter)).

If so, our metaphysical outlooks will then get in the way of our agreeing upon the nature of time.

But if I'm not misinterpreting you with the just mentioned, I'd be interested to know how you would address time in regard to prime matter? This given that prime matter, from which all matter as individual units develops, is understood to be completely undifferentiated in all ways. — javra

The answer to this question is complex and layered. I'll be brie but probably hard to understand. The Aristotelian conception of matter characterizes matter as potential, just like the modern conception of energy is as potential. "Matter" also provides for temporal continuity, that which persists through a change of form. And for Aristotle matter is proposed as the possibility for a substrate to reality. But it fails in its capacity to meet the requirements of this position due to its nature as potential. The cosmological argument demonstrates that ultimately there must be an actuality as the substrate.

So "prime matter" is shown by the cosmological argument to be a concept whose physical reality is impossible due to the reality of the physical world we inhabit. Aristotle shows how the form of any particular thing must precede in time, the material existence of that thing, in order that when it comes to be the thing which it is, it is that thing and not something else, which it must be, as dictated by the law of identity. By this fact of reality, prime matter cannot be a true concept. Individual units come to be by the form which determines what they will be and this is an actuality, not the potential of matter.

But what do you call that part of the future that lies inside the present? Do you call that “the future” or do you call that “the present”? — Luke

You can call it either one, or both, depending on the context and what you are trying to say. What do you call those animals who are also human beings? Do you call them human beings, or do you call them animals? Obviously, either one, or both, depending on the context and what you are trying to say.

Allow me to put it another way.

What do you call that part of the future which lies outside the present? You call that “the future”, right?

But what do you call that part of the future that lies inside the present? Do you call that “the future” or do you call that “the present”?

Now, does the future exceed the present? If so, then it is distinct from the present.

You are trying to use “the future” in two different ways.

And same for “the past”. — Luke

Sorry Luke, I just can't see your point. Look, "animal" exceeds "human being", and "animal" is distinct from "human being". However, there is overlap because some animals are human beings. In a similar way, "the future" exceeds "the present", and is distinct from the present, yet there is overlap because some of the future is at the present. That is not a case of using "animal" in two different ways, nor is it a case of using "future" in two different ways. Why is this so hard for you to understand?

I agree that the past is fixed, and the future is not, but this creates enormous, seemingly unsurmountable problems for understanding the nature of the present. The first question is, what happens at the present, which could cause such a change? The unfixed future must consist of possibilities, and the past must consist of the results of some sort of selection process. — Metaphysician Undercover

I would address this by incorporating the both conscious and unconscious, intention-driven free will of all co-occurring minds in the cosmos. Not that easy to explain though in forum format.

Let me say then, that it is a limitation you impose. The problem with this limitation, limiting your understanding of time to conscious experience, is that if you adhere to it strictly, you get a solipsist position. — Metaphysician Undercover

First off, what I expressed was about “prioritizing” and not “limiting” one’s understanding of time. Makes a world of difference.

Second off, I think it should have been lucidly clear from my previous posts that I was addressing conscious experience in general: the conscious experience of all co-occurring minds in the cosmos that are so endowed. Such as via my addressing the present duration during conversations between two or more minds necessarily resulting in a simultaneity of the present relative to all minds concerned. Each of these (need I say, “separate”?) consciousnesses will then hold their own conscious experience to be epistemically primary as I previously described. Not because I so declare or impose but because that’s the way consciousness works: Even though it’s not infallible, can you think of a more robust certainty then that of “I am”? Yet this in no way then logically translates into the ontological primacy of one’s own consciousness over everything else. Self requires world in order to be in the first place. More specifically, it requires a world in which one is not the sole self.

But I’m not here to debate this.

It has always been so. I have always been in the present. The present is where I am now and where I’ve been my entire life. The present never ends. I am always in the present, even if my mind is elsewhere. — Art48

Does what’s present change?

But what do you call that part of the future that lies inside the present? Do you call that “the future” or do you call that “the present”?
— Luke

You can call it either one, or both, depending on the context and what you are trying to say. What do you call those animals who are also human beings? Do you call them human beings, or do you call them animals? Obviously, either one, or both, depending on the context and what you are trying to say. — Metaphysician Undercover

Obviously what I meant was: in the context of your argument, do you call it "the future" or "the present"?

I'll try another way. Do you agree with the following definitions?

(1) "The present" is the temporal region in which the past and the future are combined.
(2) "The past" is the temporal region which is not combined with the future.
(3) "The future" is the temporal region which is not combined with the past.

Can you see that there are two different definitions of "the past" and "the future" here?

If the past is not combined with the future as per (2), then how can the present be a region in which the past and the future are combined, as per (1)? Seems like you have two definitions of "the past".

If the future is not combined with the past as per (3), then how can the present be a region in which the past and the future are combined, as per (1)? Seems like you have two definitions of "the future".

Presumably, you will say that I have it all wrong, and that it instead should be:
(4) "The past" is the temporal region which is both combined with the future and not combined with the future; and
(5) "The future" is the temporal region which is both combined with the past and not combined with the past.

Then what becomes of (1)? It follows that "the present" is the temporal region in which (4) and (5) are combined. Therefore, "the present" spans all of time, as do the past and the future.

Perhaps we could define it a bit better and say:
(6) "The past" is the temporal region which is both combined with the future (in the present) and not combined with the future (in the future?); and
(7) "The future" is the temporal region which is both combined with the past (in the present) and not combined with the past (in the past?).

Hopefully, you can see that these definitions are circular.

Put more simply, you are attempting to say that:
(8) "The past" is the temporal region which combines the past and the present. And:
(9) "The future" is the temporal region which combines the future and the present.

Sorry Luke, I just can't see your point. Look, "animal" exceeds "human being", and "animal" is distinct from "human being". However, there is overlap because some animals are human beings. — Metaphysician Undercover

That analogy would hold only if you were arguing that a human being is a combination of an animal and something else.

Why is this so hard for you to understand?

First off, what I expressed was about “prioritizing” and not “limiting” one’s understanding of time. Makes a world of difference. — javra

The issue I explained, is that I can conclude from a logical process, that my conscious experience of the present must consist partly of past. I went through this at the beginning of my posting in this thread. I only supported it with the evidence of sensory experience later in the thread because Luke would not accept the logic.

By the time I say "now" it's in the past. But I sense activities, motions, at the present. This means that the present must consist of duration. Also any duration can be divided into before and after. And before and after in relation to my experience of the present are past and future. Therefore I can conclude that this duration of time which I experience as the present consists of future and past, which are inherent within my experience of the present, as memories and anticipations. My experience of the present consists of memories and anticipations.

Your way of "prioritizing" limits "memory" to conscious memory,. Therefore it excludes these memories which are inherent within my conscious experience of the present. That's why I called this type of prioritizing a bias.

Obviously what I meant was: in the context of your argument, do you call it "the future" or "the present"? — Luke

In that context it is very clearly both. You do not see it as that, because you enforce a mutual exclusion between these terms which is unwarranted.

I'll try another way. Do you agree with the following definitions?

(1) "The present" is the temporal region in which the past and the future are combined.
(2) "The past" is the temporal region which is not combined with the future.
(3) "The future" is the temporal region which is not combined with the past.

Can you see that there are two different definitions of "the past" and "the future" here? — Luke

Of course, 2 contradicts 1, and is not part of my conception.

If the past is not combined with the future as per (2), then how can the present be a region in which the past and the future are combined, as per (1)? Seems like you have two definitions of "the past". — Luke

I already explained all this, it is explained by parts, like the Venn diagram example.

If the future is not combined with the past as per (3), then how can the present be a region in which the past and the future are combined, as per (1)? Seems like you have two definitions of "the future". — Luke

It is not two definitions of "future". Look at my example of "animal". It does not require two definitions of " "animal" to have some animals which are human beings and some which are not. Nor does it require two definitions of "future" to have some of the future combined with the past, and some not.

That analogy would hold only if you were arguing that a human being is a combination of an animal and something else. — Luke

Yes, "human being" traditionally is a combination of "animal" and "rational". that part of the realm of animality which overlaps with rationality is known as "human being". That is the way that conceptualization works.

(1) "The present" is the temporal region in which the past and the future are combined.
(2) "The past" is the temporal region which is not combined with the future.
(3) "The future" is the temporal region which is not combined with the past.

Can you see that there are two different definitions of "the past" and "the future" here?
— Luke

Of course, 2 contradicts 1, and is not part of my conception. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then what is your conception? How do you define "the past" and "the future"?

There is "the past" which is not part of "the present" (call this P1), and "the past" which is part of the present (call this P2). There is also "the future" which is not part of "the present" (call this F1), and "the future" which is part of the present (call this F2).

Can we not distinguish P1 from P2 and F1 from F2? Most people call only P1 "the past" and only F1 "the future", with "the present" as its own distinct third period of time that contains neither P2 or F2 (inside it) and to which P1 and F1 (outside it) are relative. I think you sometimes revert to this common usage, too.

I think this common usage is apparent in your claim that at the beginning of time there is all future and no past, and that at the end of time there is all past and no future. For what are "the past" and "the future" relative to in this scenario?

In your argument, the past and future are not defined relative to the present, as it is per common usage; instead you define the present relative to the past and future, as an overlapping region containing parts of each.

So why would there be all future and no past at the beginning of time on your view? This appears to be defining past and future relative to the present, with the present presupposed at the beginning, and all of time as F1 outside it.

Then what is your conception? How do you define "the past" and "the future"? — Luke

"Present" is defined by conscious experience, the presence of being. Past and future are defined by before and after in relation to a duration of time which is the present. Before and after are defined by the order observed in temporal duration.

There is "the past" which is not part of "the present" (call this P1), and "the past" which is part of the present (call this P2). There is also "the future" which is not part of "the present" (call this F1), and "the future" which is part of the present (call this F2). — Luke

Yes, you seem to be finally getting it.

Can we not distinguish P1 from P2 and F1 from F2? — Luke

Right, we cannot make these distinctions, now you're catching on. Due to the problems already discussed, we cannot establish such points of division. These points are arbitrarily assigned, not distinctions based on anything real.

Most people call only P1 "the past" and only F1 "the future", with "the present" as its own distinct third period of time that contains neither P2 or F2 (inside it) and to which P1 and F1 (outside it) are relative. I think you sometimes revert to this common usage, too. — Luke

Right again, the way we speak displays a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the present, and of time in general. I discussed the reasons for this. The fact that I sometimes speak in the conventional way does not lessen my claim that I think this is incorrect. It's like a bad habit.

I think this common usage is apparent in your claim that at the beginning of time there is all future and no past, and that at the end of time there is all past and no future. For what are "the past" and "the future" relative to in this scenario? — Luke

That was not a claim, it was an example to help you understand the nature of the overlap, and that it is not necessary that all past overlaps with all future in such an overlap. You didn't seem to understand so I gave you an example. Notice I said "if" there was a beginning in time, then this would have been the case at that time. If the example confused things more, then forget it. You seem to be understanding now without it.

I am not making any claims of necessity about the relation of P1 to P2, and F1 to F2. Since we cannot determine the points of division, it may be the case that all past overlaps all future, in the way of proportions, like I suggested. Conscious experience gives the appearance that there are such divisions, but conscious experience may be misleading us.

In your argument, the past and future are not defined relative to the present, as it is per common usage; instead you define the present relative to the past and future, as an overlapping region containing parts of each. — Luke

I don't think that this is quite right. Convention defines "present" relative to past and future. We have conscious memories, and conscious anticipations, as you and javra assert, and these represent past and future. By recognizing that there is past and future, we posit a "present" which is now, the centre of the conscious experience of the living being, as the separation, or division between the past and future which we are consciously aware of. So conventionally, we have started with past and future, which we are consciously aware of, and have defined "present" accordingly.

My proposition is to start with the conscious experience of the present, and define "present" according to the conscious experience of being present, directly. Then we move from this definition of "present" to define "past" and "future". This is opposite to the conventional way which derives "present" from a recognition pf past and future.

And what we notice in our experience of being present, is that we observe activities, motions. From this we can conclude that there is a duration of time at the present because motion requires the passing of time. And, we can say that any length of time is divisible into a before part and an after part. In relation to the present we can call the before part "past" and the after part "future".

Would you find it more acceptable to say that the future part is before the past part?

So why would there be all future and no past at the beginning of time on your view? This appears to be defining past and future relative to the present, with the present presupposed at the beginning, and all of time as F1 outside it. — Luke

Right, I define past and future relative to the present, and the present relative to conscious experience, as I've said numerous times. This is different from the conventional way, which defines present relative to the past and future, and past and future relative to conscious experience. Does that make things clearer for you?

I may respond more fully later, but I wanted to note the following for now:

I think what is really the case is that "the present" is defined relative to past and future — Metaphysician Undercover

I define past and future relative to the present — Metaphysician Undercover

Right, I think that what is really the case, is that "the present is defined relative to the past and the future". That is the conventional definition, as I explained in my last post, It is "what is really the case". What I am proposing is something other than the conventional definition. My proposition is that we ought to define past and future relative to the present. This is not "what is really the case" it is what I believe ought to be. Notice in the following paragraph that I characterized the separation between past and future, which results from the conventional way of defining present as a misrepresentation, a misunderstanding.

What I am arguing is that this separation between past and future is a misrepresentation, a misunderstanding, as the present is really a unity of the past and future. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are quite correct to say that I revert to common usage at times, and that is because I make much effort to explain common usage, to reveal its faults. That is what I am arguing, that our way of speaking, our grammar of language, from which you derive your temporal conceptions, is misleading, because it is based in some fundamental misunderstandings concerning the present and the nature of time in general.

What you need to do in order to understand what I am saying, is to pay close attention to the difference between what I am criticizing and what I am promoting. This is very important in philosophy. It is a common mistake here at 'The Forum' for people to take quotes from philosophers, Plato especially, but also other greats like Aristotle, completely out of context. They present these out-of-context quotes as representing something which is being promoted, without recognizing the reality of the context, that the author is being critical of that perspective.

Right, I think that what is really the case, is that "the present is defined relative to the past and the future". That is the conventional definition, as I explained in my last post, It is "what is really the case". What I am proposing is something other than the conventional definition. My proposition is that we ought to define past and future relative to the present. This is not "what is really the case" it is what I believe ought to be. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is evidently false. You have it backwards. The past and future are conventionally defined in terms of the present.

You, on the other hand, are proposing that the present is defined in terms of the past and future, because you define the present as an overlap between the past and future.

Here is more of your earlier quote, by the way. From page 3 of the discussion:

Do you agree that the past and future are defined relative to the present time? If not, then how do you reconcile this with your view that the present time is defined relative to one's conscious awareness?
— Luke

I think I may have said that earlier, that past and future are defined relative to present. But now I see I may have misspoke on this as well. I think what is really the case is that "the present" is defined relative to past and future, which are defined relative to conscious experience. This means that conscious experience gives to us, past and future, as the memories and anticipations which I mentioned, and from this we derive a present. "The present" is derived from conscious experience, but from an understanding of the elements of it (past and future).

So what we call "conscious awareness", or the conscious experience of the present, is really an awareness of the difference between past and future. Since these two are radically different, yet appear to be in some way a continuum, we conclude that there must be a "present" which separates them. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is evidently false. You have it backwards. The past and future are conventionally defined in terms of the present. — Luke

I gave a complete explanation. The past is defined as what has gone by in time, and this is substantiated by memory. The future is defined as what will come in time, and this is substantiated by anticipations. The present is defined by now, which is supposed to be neither past nor future.

You, on the other hand, are proposing that the present is defined in terms of the past and future, because you define the present as an overlap between the past and future. — Luke

I do not define the present as an overlap between the past and future. That there is such an overlap is a logical conclusion which is produced from defining present by conscious experience, instead of defining it in relation to past and future as is the conventional way. You really don't pay attention to what I write sometimes Luke.

Here is more of your earlier quote, by the way. From page 3 of the discussion: — Luke

Yes, that post of mine is consistent with what I am saying. You can see, that is the conceptualization I am critical of. Your post is a little incomprehensible to me though, so I might not have addressed your question.

Conventionally, the present is defined relative to the past and future, and this what I am arguing is a mistake. The present ought to be defined relative to conscious experience, and from this we'd derive the conclusion of an overlapping past and future. It took me a while at the beginning of the thread to realize that the problem with the conventional conception is that "present" is defined relative to past and future rather than conscious experience. That is why my understanding of "present" which is based directly in conscious experience is so different from the conventional. Making the present the separation between the mutually exclusive past and present, instead of defining it in a way which is based directly on experience, creates the problem I've been talking about.

Are you will to start with your conscious experience of being at the present, experiencing the passing of time, without reference to measurement? — Metaphysician Undercover

Is this the core of your thesis?

How do you counter-argue the claim "experiencing the passing of time," is measuring time?

I'm trying to get clear on your position. Back on page 1, you said:

I say that the only coherent way is to define past and future by the present. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then, on page 3, you said:

I think I may have said that earlier, that past and future are defined relative to present. But now I see I may have misspoke on this as well. I think what is really the case is that "the present" is defined relative to past and future — Metaphysician Undercover

I note that you were not referring to convention here, but to your own opinion. You made a correction to what you had said earlier. You said that you "misspoke on this". You were responding to my question about reconciling your views.

Then recently, on page 5, you said:

I define past and future relative to the present — Metaphysician Undercover

So I'm left wondering:
Did you misspeak when you said "the only coherent way is to define past and future by the present" on page 1? Or:
Did you misspeak when you said ""the present" is defined relative to past and future" on page 3? Or:
Did you misspeak when you said "I define past and future relative to the present" on page 5?

The past is defined as what has gone by in time — Metaphysician Undercover

The past is defined as what has gone by what (or gone by when) in time?

The future is defined as what will come in time — Metaphysician Undercover

The future is defined as what will come to what (or come to when) in time?

The answer to both of these questions is: the present. Past and future are defined relative to the present. The past could be defined as what has "gone by" the present and the future could be defined as what will "come to" the present (or 'come to pass' the present).

I do not define the present as an overlap between the past and future. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, this contradicts what you said earlier:

The overlap is the true nature of what the present is, and what time is. — Metaphysician Undercover

Time consists of the two aspects, past and future, and where these two are observed as overlapping is known as the present. Refer back to my Venn diagram explanation. There are two overlapping categories, past and future, and where these two overlap is called the present. — Metaphysician Undercover

This could not be misconstrued as anything but you defining the present as an overlap between past and future.

That there is such an overlap is a logical conclusion which is produced from defining present by conscious experience, instead of defining it in relation to past and future as is the conventional way. — Metaphysician Undercover

To define the present relative to the past and future is not "the conventional way". As I stated in my previous post, it is conventionally the past and future that are defined relative to the present.

I don't disagree with your claim that the past and future are defined relative to the present, because that is how they are conventionally defined. That's not controversial. What's controversial is your belief that you are going against convention in this respect.

You are, however, going against convention with your argument that the present is defined as a combination of the past and future. This definition is unconventional. Furthermore, this does not define the past and future relative to the present, as per convention, but the opposite; you are defining the present relative to the past and future.

You really don't pay attention to what I write sometimes Luke. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's hard to keep up when you keep changing your argument.

The present ought to be defined relative to conscious experience, and from this we'd derive the conclusion of an overlapping past and future. It took me a while at the beginning of the thread to realize that the problem with the conventional conception is that "present" is defined relative to past and future rather than conscious experience. That is why my understanding of "present" which is based directly in conscious experience is so different from the conventional. Making the present the separation between the mutually exclusive past and present, instead of defining it in a way which is based directly on experience, creates the problem I've been talking about. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that the present is defined relative to experience or being, but I disagree that it is not conventionally defined this way. The present is conventionally defined in relation to (or as the time of) being, existing or happening, and the past and future are conventionally defined relative to this, with the past as what has been, has existed or has happened, and the future with what will be, will exist or will happen.

Your confusion stems from your belief that "past", "present" and "future" refer to psychological events instead of time periods. Memories are not the past, and anticipations are not the future. Memories are of (or about) the past, and anticipations are of (or about) the future.

What is relevant is when you are actively thinking, remembering or anticipating. Or, when you are actively doing anything, or just being. The time at which you are doing any of these things, that any of these things are happening, is the present. The past and future are defined relative to this.

Don't you experience awakening, that brief period when you're half asleep and half awake? And don't you experience this 'in between period' when you are falling asleep as well? — Metaphysician Undercover

"the grammar of our language" discourages us from claiming that we are both asleep and awake at the same time, it does allow us to say that we are neither asleep nor awake. — Metaphysician Undercover

Can you accept, as another representational example of your above claims, the lap dissolve, a scene transition mechanism essential to the continuity of motion pictures?

As you probably know, the lap dissolve occurs when one scene, nearing its conclusion, becomes imposed upon by a new scene of translucent density. The ghostly density of the new scene allows the viewer to continue viewing the conclusion of the concluding scene. As the lap dissolve progresses, the concluding scene dematerializes into translucency (and, finally, transparency) as the new scene materializes into an opaquing density that ultimately makes the concluding scene disappear.

Given that the two scenes can be in different places at different times, the temporary simultaneity of the composite image of the lap dissolve in progress presents us with an ambiguity that is existentially intriguing.

If we imagine a lap dissolve from Scene A, the present to Scene B, the future, and if we allow the temporary, transitional composite of the two scenes to be an ambiguous interval neither present nor future but rather, unspecifiable, then we seem to have a temporal-phenomenal puzzle.

The trick consequently resides in working out how this ambiguity expresses itself in three dimensions.

My goal herein is elaboration of some ramifications of your thesis concerning passing time.

How do you counter-argue the claim "experiencing the passing of time," is measuring time? — ucarr

Measurement is of quantify. And we do not experience any distinct points, or quanta of time, which would provide for such a quantification. That is central to this discussion.

So our experience of time, in itself, does not provide what is necessary for measuring time. Therefore we end up measuring time by comparing physical activities, usually cyclical activities.

I note that you were not referring to convention here, but to your own opinion. — Luke

Yes I was referring to the convention, and I really think that's obvious. I also think it's very childish of you to be arguing in this way.

It is my opinion, of the convention, read through it. It continually refers to "us", and how we have produced these conceptions. It is a correction of what I said earlier, because earlier I said that I could see no coherent way to define the present by reference to past and future. But then I realized that this is actually the convention for defining time, and it is coherent. It is coherent, but as I argue from that point onward, mistaken. It is mistaken because it is not properly grounded with true premises (it divides future and past instead of uniting them) but it is still logically coherent.

So, I was definitely referring to convention at that point, not to my opinion of how "Present" ought to be defined. Also, I said that I was mistaken earlier, in reference to having said that I could think of no coherent way to define present by reference to past and future. That was my mistake, because I later realized that this is the conventional way, and it actually is logically coherent, just flawed in premises

Did you misspeak when you said "the only coherent way is to define past and future by the present." on page 1? — Luke

Yes, as above, I misspoke because at that time, I did not recognize that it could be coherent to define present relative to past and future. I then recognized that it was coherent, but a misunderstanding, and misleading.

The answer to both of these questions is: the present. — Luke

No, the present does not go by, nor is it yet to come. Both of these refer to time, as what goes by. But the present is the perspective from which it is observed to go by. That's why I said earlier, that this conception, the conventional one, gives us "the present" as a perspective, a view point, and it does not provide for a "present" which is a part of time. And I criticized you when you separated yourself from reality.

Past and future are defined relative to the present. — Luke

We'd be better off to yo say what "present is defined "in reference to", rather than "relative to", because "relltive to" is ambiguous. Every definition is "relative to" a human perspective, or view point. But the view point, or perspective from which a definition is made, does not necessarily enter into the definition. We do not commonly include that, though it is implied as necessary, because there is a person making the definition. So when past and future are defined as what has gone by, and what is yet to go by, this refers directly to time itself, as that which is passing us. This definition refers to time gone by, and time not gone by. However, it is implied that there is a human perspective, from which this judgement is made. The definition is "relative to" the human perspective, which we might call "the present", but the perspective does not enter the definition by way of reference. That is not necessary, a human perspective is always implied in all definitions. The definition does not include the "us", as not a required part of it, though it truly is "relative" to us. By not including the "us" which the definition is relative to, we produce the illusion of an objective definition.

Most supposed "objective" definitions are like this, and it creates fodder for philosophical discussion. We can define "red" for example, as a specific range of wavelength, creating the illusion that there is no observer necessary for there to be the colour red. But there is a problem here, because most incidents of naturally occurring light, judged to be "red" are combinations of different wavelengths. The convention in definition, is to remove the need for a point of observation, from the definition, to create an objective definition, but such definitions are always somewhat lacking, therefore open to philosophical criticism. Hence the proverbial philosophical question, "If a tree falls in the forest with no one there, does it make a sound?"

So, yes, past and future are defined "relative to" the present, because the present is taken as the subjective view point, and every definition is made relative to a subjective view point. But from here onward, I'll say that in the conventional definition "present" is defined in reference to past and future, but what I propose is that past and future be defined in reference to the present. That both of these definitions are created from, and therefore relative to, the subjective view point which we know as "the present", is irrelevant.

Again, this contradicts what you said earlier: — Luke

I see no contradiction. A definition is not the same as a description, you ought to know this Luke.

This could not be misconstrued as anything but you defining the present as an overlap between past and future. — Luke

Again, you are confusing the description, which is posterior to the definition, with the definition, which is prior to the description.

I agree that the present is defined relative to experience or being, but I disagree that it is not conventionally defined this way. The present is conventionally defined in relation to (or as the time of) being, existing or happening, and the past and future are conventionally defined relative to this, with the past as what has been, has existed or has happened, and the future with what will be, will exist or will happen. — Luke

I've never seen "the present" defined like this. But I've discussed time enough to know that there are many differing and even contradicting conventions. So it does not surprise me to see that this is the convention that you are familiar with, and that it is different from the convention I am familiar with.

Since we are in agreement about the way that "the present" ought to be defined, we can get back to the points of my argument. Now, we have only a definition of "present", and we have no definition of past or future, because they are to be defined in reference to the present. That we agree on. Do you see that "being", "existing", and "happening" are all verbs, referring to activity. And you seem to agree, earlier, that such activity must occur in a duration of time. So we have a temporal duration, within which activity occurs, and we call this "the present". Are we agreed so far? How do you propose that we proceed to define "past" and "future" in reference to this duration of time as being or existing at the present?

Can you accept, as another representational example of your above claims, the lap dissolve, a scene transition mechanism essential to the continuity of motion pictures? — ucarr

I suppose, the "lap dissolve" seems analogous.