Then how could the accuracy or precision of the measurement be improved? — Luke

More work is required before this can be determined. If we can find natural points of division, and abide by them, measurement would be improved greatly. The problem though is that such points are not experienced by us. — Metaphysician Undercover

More work is required on what? Is it possible, in principle, that we are able to experience "such points"?

Take a look at two distinct objects, like a chair and a table. Do you not see a natural divisibility between these two? — Metaphysician Undercover

I might see that they are two different (types of) objects. I don't know what "natural divisibility" is supposed to mean.

This is the foundation for counting, such natural points of divisibility allow us to count objects as distinct things. A supposed continuum has no such natural points of divisibility, therefore it can provide no principles for counting. — Metaphysician Undercover

This sounds like little more than a complaint about infinity, or uncountable sets, but it's unclear what the complaint is exactly. I assume what you mean by "natural points of divisibility" is that we should use only a finite set of numbers? But I don't see how a reduced, finite set of numbers would give us more accurate or more precise (or non-arbitrary) measurements. We would miss out on all those "in-between" numbers/measurements, and that would make our measurements less accurate, not more. Otherwise, I don't know what you mean.

No, I said that we are not consciously aware of the present. We are consciously aware of the past, through sensation and memory, and consciously aware of the future, through anticipation. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm very rarely consciously aware of any of those time periods. Instead, I determine the present time in terms of when I am consciously aware and actively doing/being, and the past and future are determined relative to this.

I am not at all understanding what you are saying. First, as you are well aware, "present moment" doesn't make any sense to me. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't understand your complaint here. I don't care if we call it "the present" or "the present time" or "the present moment"; I see no difference between these. If it will help to prevent your complaints, I will stop using the phrase "present moment". However, if I accidentally use the phrase again in future, then please just substitute it with "the present" instead. That seems to keep you calm.

The point is that the thing, whatever it is, which we become aware of, through sensation, is always in the past by the time we become aware of it. And, the mind which becomes aware of it is therefore always in the future relative to the thing which it becomes aware of. Furthermore, the mind is concerned with anticipating what will happen next, and it is even actively determining (as cause through freedom of choice) what will happen next. — Metaphysician Undercover

Where is the present situated in all of this? Earlier you said that sensations themselves were also in the past. If sensations themselves are in the past then what event is simultaneous with, or defines, the present? Our brain signals that produce the sensation? Light hitting the retina? Light hitting and reflecting off objects (including very distant objects)? Human evolution? The Big Bang?

If past and future define the present, as you claim, then the present could potentially have an enormous duration. Can you narrow it down at all?

So where do you think this so-called "present moment" is, where the mind apprehends the sensations? — Metaphysician Undercover

When, not where. But yes, why not? (I mean, apart from just repeating your own argument, is there any good reason not to accept this?)

That "present moment" is just a misconception. — Metaphysician Undercover

Is "the present" (sans "moment") also just a misconception? If so, then why do you say that the present has a duration?

Or did you "misspeak" again, like when you said that the past and future were defined in terms of the present, or when you said that the present could not be measured, or when you said that any arbitrary measurement is not a measurement at all? Are you now arguing that the present does not have a duration and that there is no present? It's getting difficult to keep track.

We experience the past and we anticipate the future. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that we anticipate the future, but how can we (now) experience the past?

There is not anything within human experience which indicates a present moment. — Metaphysician Undercover

There needn't be anything "which indicates a present moment" except for having experiences. The present (moment) is defined in terms of when we are experiencing.

You appear to make no distinction between having a sensation and remembering having had a sensation. You appear to be saying that the only possible experience one can have is remembering things. Accordingly, you would make no distinction between (now) reading these words and only remembering reading these words. In 5 minutes time, when you think back to reading these words, would that remembering be the same as the "remembering" you are now doing while reading these words? Or are there two different types of remembering? Otherwise, we could say that we experience things in the present and remember things that we experienced in the past, and not try to change the grammar in the way you are proposing.

In the conventional sense, the present divides time, it is not itself a period of time. — Metaphysician Undercover

I disagree. The Google search results from earlier had scientists attempting to find the duration of the present, and some people - as you have noted - think of the present as having an infinitesimal duration. I don't agree that the present is not conventionally considered as "not itself a period of time". However, I do agree that the present is conventionally thought of as separating the past from the future. And you appear to recognise that you are going against convention here.

The problem is that you always think in terms of separate portions of time past, present, and future, as if the present is a distinct portion of time. I know that this is your preferred way of understanding "the present", but this idea is inconsistent with what I am proposing... — Metaphysician Undercover

You were proposing from the start of this discussion that the present has a duration. Have you changed your position on this?

...so if you cannot dismiss it for the sake of discussion, and quit falling back on it as a crutch, you'll never be able to understand what I am proposing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not if you keep changing your position, no, I agree.

What I've been arguing is that the pinpointing of the present is a mistake. That is what is at issue, I am saying it is a mistaken notion of "the present". You were willing to respect that first step, and accept the present as a duration instead of a pinpoint, but then you wanted two pinpoints, one at the beginning and one at the end of the present. — Metaphysician Undercover

Agreeing (for the sake of argument) that the present has a duration does not require two pinpoints; it requires one larger pinpoint. Do you know that a duration has a start time and a finish time? The duration of the present is the pinpoint (or what we were earlier attempting to pinpoint). The start and finish times of that duration are not two separate pinpoints.

'Where you live' is in your brain's model of reality, which is generated in part based on the light that hit your retina (on the order of 100 milliseconds) earlier. — wonderer1

Where you live is, in part, your perception of that light right now.

Where you live is, in part, your perception of that light right now. — Ø implies everything

Right. My point was that there are complicating factors, in translating between an external world scientific reference frame and one's subjective seeming reference frame. Do you agree?

Yes, I agree they are complicating factors but your original comment did not make their relevance to Art's post clear. Perhaps we just have a different opinion on what's relevant enough to warrant mentioning in this thread.

and I have both been frequent posters on another forum for a long time. So I replied to him:

1) with the assumption that he had relevant background knowledge about my perspective that I didn't need to elaborate on.

2) with knowledge of his specific background that led me to think a succinct response might be sufficient.

I see. But for us others, could you expand on how the fact that our phenomenal reality is supposedly caused by/represents a physical reality in the past is relevant to Art's musings about only experiencing the phenomenal present, where phenomenal present is he only sensible reading of present, since no-one is experiencing anything non-phenomenal by definition.

Yes, I read it and found the additional text samples interesting as well. Regardless of the hoax, it is still interesting to consider what text samples like that can reveal to us about our thinking. — wonderer1

I think that what it reveals is that the process is noy like we think it is. And I guess that's why we have different opinions about it, no one really knows how they read.

More work is required on what? Is it possible, in principle, that we are able to experience "such points"? — Luke

More work is required on understanding what we call the passage of time, in order to establish more accurate measurement. I think that the work done in quantum mechanics indicates that it is highly likely that there actually is points in time, that's why events occur as quanta rather than continuous. If this is the case, then we probably do experience such points in time, in some way, but we do not recognize them, just like we experience molecules, atoms and electrons, but we do not recognize them as such, through sensation.

I might see that they are two different (types of) objects. I don't know what "natural divisibility" is supposed to mean. — Luke

Let me try again then. When you see two different chairs in a room, do you not see them as two distinct objects? The natural, spatial separation between them, which we apprehend through the sense of sight, represents a natural divisibility in spatial existence. We see distinct objects, and this apprehension of distinct objects is a division performed by the perceptual process, which is carried out according to a natural spatial divisibility which we perceive in our environment. It is the way that we perceive our environment, as consisting of a natural divisibility, which the perceptual process takes advantage of, to produce distinct objects of perception. This is the foundation for the concept of quantity. We need principles to distinguish one thing from another, in order that we can evaluate a multitude of distinct things, count, quantify or measure them. If there was no natural divisibility in our environment any division into discrete objects would be completely arbitrary, therefore any measurement of quantity would also be completely arbitrary.

In the case of time, we assume a continuum, therefore no natural divisibility. So to count or quantify distinct periods of time we look to repeating cycles, earth, moon, sun, quartz crystal vibrations, and now the quantum characteristics of the cesium atom. The problem is that all of these cycles are physical events, which in order to serve as measurement need to be compared to other physical events, the ones to be measured. This requires a means of determining the beginning and ending of a cycle, in relation to the event to be measured. The event to be measured is always spatially separated form the clock. The various possible features of this spatial separation are what Einstein dealt with in his special theory of relativity, where he stipulated that simultaneity is relative. This stipulation means an accurate comparison is

\ impossible, and therefore precise measurement of time impossible, because the simultaneity of the beginning and ending of the cycle of measurement, in comparison with the event to be measured, is dependent on the frame of reference. In other word the temporal measurement of the same event will differ depending on the frame of reference.

This sounds like little more than a complaint about infinity, or uncountable sets, but it's unclear what the complaint is exactly. I assume what you mean by "natural points of divisibility" is that we should use only a finite set of numbers? But I don't see how a reduced, finite set of numbers would give us more accurate or more precise (or non-arbitrary) measurements. We would miss out on all those "in-between" numbers/measurements, and that would make our measurements less accurate, not more. Otherwise, I don't know what you mean. — Luke

No, the point is that the object to be counted in any act of quantification (a count) must be a true and real object, or else any proposed count is arbitrary. To be a true and real object, it must be distinct, discrete, separate from its surroundings, or else it's just a part of another object. And if we are allowed to count parts as objects, and everything is infinitely divisible, then every count will be infinite.

That's what happens when we try to quantify something which is already assumed to be a continuum (the real number line, or time, as examples). Since there are no natural points of division we can't even start to count anything because there are no distinct objects to count. So we allow divisions and we produce a count according to the divisions. But these divisions are arbitrary, so there is no rule about how to apply them, except that they can be applied anywhere. Then any count will be a count of infinity (any random section of the number line contains an infinity of numbers, and any random section of time contains an infinite number of time durations).

So it's not a matter of choosing finite numbers over infinite numbers, it's a matter of basing "the count", which is the act of quantifying, or measuring, in something real, real divisibility as the example of distinct physical objects (mentioned above) demonstrates. Then the measurement is of something real.

The problem therefore, is the assumption of continuity, the continuum. The number line, with the real numbers is a very good example. The assumption is continuity, represented as the infinitely divisible line. That assumption is problematic when applying numbers to the divisions, because the divisions are arbitrary. Of course in most practise of measuring, things are separated by natural divisions (as explained above), and so numbers are applied in measurement according to the natural divisions. But then there is time, and we do not find natural divisions, so we assume continuity, but this creates problems.

I don't understand your complaint here. I don't care if we call it "the present" or "the present time" or "the present moment"; I see no difference between these. If it will help to prevent your complaints, I will stop using the phrase "present moment". However, if I accidentally use the phrase again in future, then please just substitute it with "the present" instead. That seems to keep you calm. — Luke

If "moment" has no meaning to you, then so be it. It has meaning to me. And, "the present" is not a moment because the present goes on and on continuously. This seems to be where we are having difficulty. You do not conceive of the present as something which goes on and on continuously, like I do. You want to mark "the present" as a very short period of time, but this cannot capture, or represent the present as we know it through experience. This is why I used that example, by the time you say "now", that point which you have tried to mark as the present, is in the past. What you do not seem to apprehend is that the present continues on after that particular "moment" has gone into the past. And no matter how many times you mark "now", the present continues through all of them, and onward.

This is why we must apprehend "the present" as having two important features. One is the feature you point to, the moment, "now", from which we base measurements, starting the stop watch, etc.. The other feature is the conjunction between past and future, which I point to, and this continues on and on, seemingly continuously, so it is indefinite. This continuity of the present is what is measured when we measure passing time. We use arbitrary points, and mark a section of the continuity of the present, as a period of time.

So it does no good for me to substitute your "present moment" with my "present", because these have completely different meanings, referring each to a different aspect of time. One is the artificial, imaginary, or fictional "point" which you wan to deem as "the present", the other is the continuous, extended passage of time, duration, which is "the present" as we experience it.

If so, then why do you say that the present has a duration? — Luke

The present continues on and on, as time passes. From this perspective, its duration may be as long as time itself.

The present (moment) is defined in terms of when we are experiencing. — Luke

There is no such thing as the moment when you are experiencing. Experience continues on and on, in a seemingly continuous and indefinite duration, just like the present, except you die. Do you not apprehend your experience in this way, as a continuous, long duration, rather than as a moment, or any sort of pin pointed duration?

Or are there two different types of remembering? Otherwise, we could say that we experience things in the present and remember things that we experienced in the past, and not try to change the grammar in the way you are proposing. — Luke

There are many different types of remembering, and many different ways of reading. So this does not look like a productive direction for the discussion, too much ambiguity and confusion. For example, do you not think that remembering is part of your experience? So this distinction you make here, between remembering things and experiencing things is not sound because remembering is a form of experiencing.

You were proposing from the start of this discussion that the present has a duration. Have you changed your position on this? — Luke

Obviously not.

Agreeing (for the sake of argument) that the present has a duration does not require two pinpoints; it requires one larger pinpoint. — Luke

Can you agree, that according to experience, the present continues on and on indefinitely, and so trying to pinpoint it is trying to represent it in a way completely opposed to how we experience it? The present is our experience of time, and the present continues indefinitely, just like time. Trying to represent it as a dimensionless point in time, as an infinitesimal point in time, or as a slightly larger point in time, is a completely futile adventure, because these points cannot represent "the present" as we know it from experience, as extended indefinitely

Do you know that a duration has a start time and a finish time? The duration of the present is the pinpoint (or what we were earlier attempting to pinpoint). The start and finish times of that duration are not two separate pinpoints. — Luke

There is a difference between "duration" in the general sense, and "a duration", as a particular. The former is how I have been describing the present, as an indefinite duration. You have been wrongly interpreting me as speaking of "a duration". If I was unclear, and that mislead you, then I apologize. However, now I have made the clarification. When I speak of the duration of the present, it is in the general sense of duration, indefinite duration.

I think that what it reveals is that the process is noy like we think it is. And I guess that's why we have different opinions about it, no one really knows how they read. — Metaphysician Undercover

Hmm. I see it is as revealing that the process is a lot like I think it is.

Trained neural nets can have a lot of 'fault tolerance', which is easy to say, but not so easy to explain. Anyway, as skilled readers we have neural nets that have been effectively trained at word recognition and automation of that recognition so that we don't need to consciously recognize each letter. I only need my trained neural nets to reveal the word in my lexicon that has the closest pattern match that also fits semantically with what I had already read.

I expect this to sound like a strange request but... Please see here for an explanation as to why, not knowing you at all, I would find it difficult to explain. There is an important sense in which I need to know my audience in order to communicate with any meaningful degree of success.

Trained neural nets can have a lot of 'fault tolerance', which is easy to say, but not so easy to explain. — wonderer1

It's not appropriate to say that a neural net is "trained". Nor is it appropriate to say that a neural net performs word recognition. So I'll just say that your post is an attempt to simplify something very complex and the result is a gross misrepresentation, and leave it at that.

It's not appropriate to say that a neural net is "trained". Nor is it appropriate to say that a neural net performs word recognition. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know what you mean by "not appropriate". I take it you are expressing disapproval. However there is a large community of people in AI and neuroscience who see things differently than you do, and provided human civilization doesn't collapse, thinking in such terms is going to become more and more a matter of common knowledge.

To me it sounds like you are saying something like, "It is inappropriate to talk about riding in a car, because riding is something which is done on a horse, or in a carriage drawn by a horse.

So I'll just say that your post is an attempt to simplify something very complex and the result is a gross misrepresentation, and leave it at that. — Metaphysician Undercover

Absolutely, it is an attempt to simplify something enormously complex. Certainly it is simplistic and open to misinterpretation by people who don't educate themselves on the subject.

Here is one way people who want to know what is going on in the 21st century can educate themselves.

To me it sounds like you are saying something like, "It is inappropriate to talk about riding in a car, because riding is something which is done on a horse, or in a carriage drawn by a horse. — wonderer1

Yes, similar to that, but not quite the same. An individual is trained, a person or some other being. We do not train a part of a person. I find that to be an absurd usage of the term to say that a person trains a part of one's body, like saying that a man trains his penis when to have an erection and when not to.

Anyway, it's off topic and I see that discussion with you on this subject would probably be pointless, as you seem to be indoctrinated.

Yes, similar to that, but not quite the same. An individual is trained, a person or some other being. We do not train a part of a person. I find that to be an absurd usage of the term to say that a person trains a part of one's body, like saying that a man trains his penis when to have an erection and when not to.

Anyway, it's off topic and I see that discussion with you on this subject would probably be pointless, as you seem to be indoctrinated. — Metaphysician Undercover

Dude, it's just a matter of the vocabulary used in discussion of neural networks. It has a fairly specific meaning in that context. You may be closed minded towards looking into the subject and developing an understanding of how training is used in the context of that subject, but don't mistake whatever your hangup is, for me being indoctrinated.

I think you equivocate. Neural networks of AI are said to be "trained". But we weren't talking AI, we were talking about biological neurons, involved in a person reading.

I think you equivocate. Neural networks of AI are said to be "trained". But we weren't talking AI, we were talking about biological neurons, involved in a person reading. — Metaphysician Undercover

Would you elaborate on how it is that you think I am equivocating?

Perhaps the article, Neuroscience: How to train a neuron will help.

The article is evidence of your indoctrination. There is clearly equivocation. The opening paragraph starts talking about "cellular learning", then claims a relation with how the "animal learns". And then it makes a conclusion about "learning" in general, as if these two senses of "learn" are the same. That's very deceptive use of equivocation.

That's very deceptive use of equivocation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Unless you are able to present some evidence, that animal learning does not supervene on cellular learning it's a bit ludicrous to call it very deceptive use of equivocation.

It looks to me like you simply have a bias against science.

Unless you are able to present some evidence, that animal learning does not supervene on cellular learning it's a bit ludicrous to call it very deceptive use of equivocation. — wonderer1

More evidence of your indoctrination. The onus is on the researcher, to show the evidence, that's how science works. By giving the process the same name, "learning", the authors of this article are hinting that a direct and necessary relation has already been established. That's how the psychology of this type of deception works. Use the same word and a psychological association is made, which "implies" that a relationship has been established.

Suppose instead, we rename this process which they have named "cellular learning", calling it "laboratory manipulation of cells". Then the deception might be much more evident to you. You'd be more inclined to ask, how is this laboratory manipulation related to the actual learning process of an animal, instead of taking for granted that there is a direct and necessary relation, because of the use of the same word, "learning".

Then you might notice a few weaknesses in your assumption of a direct and necessary relation. Consider the following passage:

"Surprisingly, however, the biphasic changes occurred over a time scale five-fold longer than that anticipated from typical STDP studies in vitro (Markram et al., 2012). Using a computer model, Pawlak and co-workers showed that this temporal rescaling could result from noise in the spike timing of inputs. Such noise is to be expected in the intact brain, where there is always ongoing activity, but not in dissected brain tissue, which is relatively inactive.

It appears like the cellular responses (so-called learning) took five times longer to occur in living tissue than it took in prior studies inanimate mass, "in vitro". That is very clear evidence that the relationship between stimulus and effect, is not direct. The cause of this five-fold delay (clear evidence that there is not a direct cause/effect relation) is simply dismissed as "noise" in the living brain.

Furthermore, it is noted that the the subjects upon which the manipulation is carried out are unconscious, and so it is implied that "attention" could add so much extra "noise" that the entire process modeled by the laboratory manipulation might be completely irrelevant to actual learning carried out by an attentive, conscious subject. Read the following:

"It is important to note that these findings were obtained in anaesthetized animals, and remain to be confirmed in the awake state. Indeed, factors such as attention are likely to influence cellular learning processes (Markram et al., 2012).

Now, take note of the concluding sentence of the article:

"Despite these limitations, the elegant work of Pawlak, Kerr and colleagues provides some of the strongest evidence to date that STDP may underlie cellular learning in the intact brain."

Sure, STDP may underlie this process which they have called "cellular learning", but it's very clear that they have established no relationship between this process (more appropriately called "laboratory manipulation of cells") to actual animal learning. In fact, the exposed problem with "noise" indicates that the idea of such a relationship is rather far-fetched.

It looks to me like you simply have a bias against science. — wonderer1

It looks to me, like you are easily swayed by pseudo-science.

It appears like the cellular responses (so-called learning) took five times longer to occur in living tissue than it took in prior studies inanimate mass, "in vitro". That is very clear evidence that the relationship between stimulus and effect, is not direct. The cause of this five-fold delay (clear evidence that there is not a direct cause/effect relation) is simply dismissed as "noise" in the living brain.

Furthermore, it is noted that the the subjects upon which the manipulation is carried out are unconscious, and so it is implied that "attention" could add so much extra "noise" that the entire process modeled by the laboratory manipulation might be completely irrelevant to actual learning carried out by an attentive, conscious subject. Read the following:

"It is important to note that these findings were obtained in anaesthetized animals, and remain to be confirmed in the awake state. Indeed, factors such as attention are likely to influence cellular learning processes (Markram et al., 2012). — Metaphysician Undercover

How is is it that you learned about these confounding factors?

From the "devious" scientists.

More work is required on understanding what we call the passage of time, in order to establish more accurate measurement. I think that the work done in quantum mechanics indicates that it is highly likely that there actually is points in time, that's why events occur as quanta rather than continuous. If this is the case, then we probably do experience such points in time, in some way, but we do not recognize them, just like we experience molecules, atoms and electrons, but we do not recognize them as such, through sensation. — Metaphysician Undercover

How does quanta possibly indicate that there are "points in time"? I'm guessing that you consider these "points" to be natural divisions in time. I don't see what difference they would make over and above the quanta. Couldn't we have quanta without any natural divisions in time (like we already do)? What do these "natural divisions" add?

In the case of time, we assume a continuum, therefore no natural divisibility. So to count or quantify distinct periods of time we look to repeating cycles, earth, moon, sun, quartz crystal vibrations, and now the quantum characteristics of the cesium atom. The problem is that all of these cycles are physical events, which in order to serve as measurement need to be compared to other physical events, the ones to be measured. This requires a means of determining the beginning and ending of a cycle, in relation to the event to be measured. The event to be measured is always spatially separated form the clock. The various possible features of this spatial separation are what Einstein dealt with in his special theory of relativity, where he stipulated that simultaneity is relative. This stipulation means an accurate comparison is

\ impossible, and therefore precise measurement of time impossible, because the simultaneity of the beginning and ending of the cycle of measurement, in comparison with the event to be measured, is dependent on the frame of reference. In other word the temporal measurement of the same event will differ depending on the frame of reference. — Metaphysician Undercover

How do you plan to take a "precise measurement of time" without any sort of clock, or without making a comparison to any physical, cyclical event?

No, the point is that the object to be counted in any act of quantification (a count) must be a true and real object, or else any proposed count is arbitrary. To be a true and real object, it must be distinct, discrete, separate from its surroundings, or else it's just a part of another object. And if we are allowed to count parts as objects, and everything is infinitely divisible, then every count will be infinite. — Metaphysician Undercover

How can you tell if something is a "true and real" object or only part of a "true and real" object? Presuming it's via "natural divisibility", how does that work?

That's what happens when we try to quantify something which is already assumed to be a continuum (the real number line, or time, as examples). Since there are no natural points of division we can't even start to count anything because there are no distinct objects to count. So we allow divisions and we produce a count according to the divisions. But these divisions are arbitrary, so there is no rule about how to apply them, except that they can be applied anywhere. Then any count will be a count of infinity (any random section of the number line contains an infinity of numbers, and any random section of time contains an infinite number of time durations). — Metaphysician Undercover

How are we going to work out these rules? We will need to use only a finite set, no doubt, with its "natural points of division". Explain to me again why a continuum does not have natural points of division? Can we not count objects using an infinite set? But wouldn't the infinite set of real numbers include a finite set of integers that we could use for counting?

So it's not a matter of choosing finite numbers over infinite numbers, it's a matter of basing "the count", which is the act of quantifying, or measuring, in something real, real divisibility as the example of distinct physical objects (mentioned above) demonstrates. Then the measurement is of something real. — Metaphysician Undercover

Okay, but the measurement is made in numbers and what is measured is something that isn't numbers, but is objects/events. I don't see how the numbers (or the set or the continuum) has any effect on which objects/events are real or not. I can count objects using either a finite or an infinite set of numbers.

You do not conceive of the present as something which goes on and on continuously, like I do. — Metaphysician Undercover

I do, actually.

And no matter how many times you mark "now", the present continues through all of them, and onward. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right. So?

And, "the present" is not a moment because the present goes on and on continuously. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is why we must apprehend "the present" as having two important features. One is the feature you point to, the moment, "now", from which we base measurements, starting the stop watch, etc.. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's funny how you say that "the present" is not a moment, yet you consider "the moment" to be one of the "two important features" of "the present".

This is why we must apprehend "the present" as having two important features. One is the feature you point to, the moment, "now", from which we base measurements, starting the stop watch, etc.. The other feature is the conjunction between past and future, which I point to, and this continues on and on, seemingly continuously, so it is indefinite. This continuity of the present is what is measured when we measure passing time. We use arbitrary points, and mark a section of the continuity of the present, as a period of time. — Metaphysician Undercover

The feature that you say I "point to" also continues on and on continuously. There's not much that I disagree with here, except that the present is not a "conjunction" between past and future because past and future are not concurrent with the present.

There is no such thing as the moment when you are experiencing. Experience continues on and on, in a seemingly continuous and indefinite duration, just like the present — Metaphysician Undercover

That's right, the present continues on and on just like your experiencing. And it's not a coincidence, because whenever you are experiencing is when the present is for you. In relation to this, those things that you've already experienced are in your past, and those things you will experience but are yet to experience are in your future. It's simple really.

Do you not apprehend your experience in this way, as a continuous, long duration, rather than as a moment, or any sort of pin pointed duration? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, except we don't speak of the present as a continuous, long duration, but as a moment or point along that duration which is present for us at that moment. We typically don't consider the whole duration as "the present" or as present for us "all at once". Although, as I said earlier, we might use the adjective "present" to describe longer periods, such as the present day, year, lifetime, etc.

Or are there two different types of remembering? Otherwise, we could say that we experience things in the present and remember things that we experienced in the past, and not try to change the grammar in the way you are proposing.
— Luke

There are many different types of remembering, and many different ways of reading. So this does not look like a productive direction for the discussion, too much ambiguity and confusion. For example, do you not think that remembering is part of your experience? So this distinction you make here, between remembering things and experiencing things is not sound because remembering is a form of experiencing. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think there is a distinct difference between having or undergoing an experience and remembering it later. Think back to any memorable event in your life. That is just a memory compared to the actual event that you lived through and experienced. I understand your reluctance to acknowledge this obvious distinction, however, given that it is simply too detrimental to your argument (that every experience is a memory).

How does quanta possibly indicate that there are "points in time"? I'm guessing that you consider these "points" to be natural divisions in time. I don't see what difference they would make over and above the quanta. Couldn't we have quanta without any natural divisions in time (like we already do)? What do these "natural divisions" add? — Luke

That's a complex issue beyond the scope of this thread, which would only serve as a distraction, but the photoelectric effect indicates that energy is transmitted as discrete units rather than as a continuous wave.

How do you plan to take a "precise measurement of time" without any sort of clock, or without making a comparison to any physical, cyclical event? — Luke

As I said, this would require determining natural points in time. Then the points can be counted as real objects, units of time.

How can you tell if something is a "true and real" object or only part of a "true and real" object? Presuming it's via "natural divisibility", how does that work? — Luke

As I explained, empirical evidence.

Explain to me again why a continuum does not have natural points of division? — Luke

There's nothing to explain. A continuum is assumed to be infinitely divisible. It can be divided in any way, and no particular way is more suited to the matter itself being divided than any other way, because there are no natural points of divisibility, proper to it. If you do not understand this, then you do not understand what "continuum" means.

Okay, but the measurement is made in numbers and what is measured is something that isn't numbers, but is objects/events. I don't see how the numbers (or the set or the continuum) has any effect on which objects/events are real or not. I can count objects using either a finite or an infinite set of numbers. — Luke

The point is not the effect of the numbers on the real, but the effect of the real on the numbers. If the entirety of reality is indivisible, then there is nothing real to count. Any count is arbitrary. If the entirety of reality is continuous, yet infinitely divisible in anyway possible way, then division is arbitrary and the count is arbitrary. Each of these produces an unmeasurable reality. But if reality has natural divisibility, then we can distinguish real objects to count and measure according to those divisions. Such a reality is measurable.

It's funny how you say that "the present" is not a moment, yet you consider "the moment" to be one of the "two important features" of "the present". — Luke

Laugh all you want. I use the quotes to signify the concept of "the present". So what was meant is that the concept of "the present" has two important features. And as I've been explaining, I believe the "present moment" is a misconception. Nevertheless, regardless of its truth or falsity, it maintains status as a very significant feature of the concept "the present".

The feature that you say I "point to" also continues on and on continuously. There's not much that I disagree with here, except that the present is not a "conjunction" between past and future because past and future are not concurrent with the present. — Luke

Explain to me how you conceive of this "present moment", that infinitesimal period of time, or shortest duration of conscious awareness, as something which continues on and on indefinitely.

You did say that you could exchange "present moment" for "present" didn't you? Now you are saying that the present continues on and on indefinitely. How do you formulate consistency between the present being an extremely short duration, yet also something which continues on and on indefinitely?

That's right, the present continues on and on just like your experiencing. And it's not a coincidence, because whenever you are experiencing is when the present is for you. In relation to this, those things that you've already experienced are in your past, and those things you will experience but are yet to experience are in your future. It's simple really. — Luke

If this is what you believe, then do you see that it is incoherent to speak about a "present moment" as if the present is a very short period of time, or a point in time? How could it be that the present continues on and on indefinitely, as if it is an infinitely long duration of time, yet it is also an infinitesimally short period of time, as "the moment". One of these must be dismissed as the cause of contradiction, and the latter, "the moment", is inconsistent with empirical evidence. That is why I say "the present moment" is incoherent to me. .

Yes, except we don't speak of the present as a continuous, long duration, but as a moment or point along that duration which is present for us at that moment. — Luke

Now, look closely at this statement. Do you see that "at that moment" has no real meaning, no real referent. It refers to nothing real. It's a convention which human beings concocted for pragmatic reasons, for the sake of measuring. "Start the clock now, at this moment". "Motion is transferred from one object to another at the moment of collision". Etc.. "At the moment" is a convenient fiction.

So, remove "at that moment" from the proposition above, as an untruthful part of the proposition. Now we have "the present as a continuous, long duration", exactly as we experience it, and all this speaking about a moment, or point along this duration, is nothing but bs.

I think there is a distinct difference between having or undergoing an experience and remembering it later. Think back to any memorable event in your life. That is just a memory compared to the actual event that you lived through and experienced. I understand your reluctance to acknowledge this obvious distinction, however, given that it is simply too detrimental to your argument (that every experience is a memory). — Luke

The problem is that all experience is completely wrapped up in memory, whether you like to admit it or not. Consider looking at an object in front of you, a chair or something. What you see is not a hundredth of a second of chair, or a half a second of chair. You are seeing the chair over a continuous duration. But the chair of two seconds ago must be only in your memory. However, that chair of two seconds ago is an integral part of your perception of it now,. That's how you know whether it's moving or not.

So, it's easy for you to take an event years ago, and say that's in the past, its only memory, and you can surely tell the difference between that memory and what's happening now. But when we are talking about the perception of events happening right now ("right now" being incoherent) then we are faced with having to separate what we anticipate from what we remember, as having influence over the perception. And this is much more difficult because we cannot fall back on the false premise of the "present moment". We cannot assert that our sense perceptions are at the present moment, because "the present moment" is incoherent. It's a convenient fiction created for pragmatic purposes, not consistent with reality. Look into the concept of "sensory memory" for example, it's very important to the way that we hear music.

That's a complex issue beyond the scope of this thread, which would only serve as a distraction, but the photoelectric effect indicates that energy is transmitted as discrete units rather than as a continuous wave. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, I'm aware of Einstein's Nobel Prize-winning work, but that doesn't begin to explain why you think that quanta signify any sort of "natural points" in time, or why time might possibly be naturally divisible into quanta.

As I said, this would require determining natural points in time. Then the points can be counted as real objects, units of time. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't see how this could possibly be determined. What is the nature of these "points"? Why suppose them at all?

How can you tell if something is a "true and real" object or only part of a "true and real" object? Presuming it's via "natural divisibility", how does that work?
— Luke

As I explained, empirical evidence. — Metaphysician Undercover

You asserted "empirical evidence" and suggested we could tell if something is an object or only a part of an object just by looking. That's not much of an explanation. For example, is a coconut an object or a part? How about a hydrogen atom? There are many things that are parts. Which ones are the "true and real" objects and how can you tell?

Explain to me again why a continuum does not have natural points of division?
— Luke

There's nothing to explain. A continuum is assumed to be infinitely divisible. It can be divided in any way, and no particular way is more suited to the matter itself being divided than any other way, because there are no natural points of divisibility, proper to it. If you do not understand this, then you do not understand what "continuum" means. — Metaphysician Undercover

So, unlike a continuum, only a finite set of (positive?) integers has natural points of division. Is that right? Does the set need to contain an even number of integers?

The point is not the effect of the numbers on the real, but the effect of the real on the numbers. If the entirety of reality is indivisible, then there is nothing real to count. — Metaphysician Undercover

Wait. Chairs aren't real?

If the entirety of reality is continuous, yet infinitely divisible in anyway possible way, then division is arbitrary and the count is arbitrary. Each of these produces an unmeasurable reality. But if reality has natural divisibility, then we can distinguish real objects to count and measure according to those divisions. Such a reality is measurable. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're saying that, unless time has natural points of division, then everything we count in reality is arbitrary and not real?

You did say that you could exchange "present moment" for "present" didn't you? Now you are saying that the present continues on and on indefinitely. How do you formulate consistency between the present being an extremely short duration, yet also something which continues on and on indefinitely? — Metaphysician Undercover

We have a continuous succession of experiences from birth to death; we do not experience everything in our lives "all at once". As John Wheeler said, "Time is what prevents everything from happening at once." The present (moment) is when we are at any point along that continuous succession of experiences. As an indexical expression, the meaning of "the present" changes with context. So I can consistently say that "the present" is now, but (also, later) that it's now. It's comparable to saying "here" in relation to spatial location.

How could it be that the present continues on and on indefinitely, as if it is an infinitely long duration of time, yet it is also an infinitesimally short period of time, as "the moment". One of these must be dismissed as the cause of contradiction, and the latter, "the moment", is inconsistent with empirical evidence. That is why I say "the present moment" is incoherent to me. . — Metaphysician Undercover

This question also applies to you. If you reject the present as a short period, or moment, of time, then it must be "an infinitely long duration of time" that "continues on and on indefinitely" (since they are the only two options you have given). What, then, of the past and future? When is something past and when is it future? That is, what are the past and future relative to?

Yes, except we don't speak of the present as a continuous, long duration, but as a moment or point along that duration which is present for us at that moment.
— Luke

Now, look closely at this statement. Do you see that "at that moment" has no real meaning, no real referent. It refers to nothing real. It's a convention which human beings concocted for pragmatic reasons, for the sake of measuring. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't deny this, except it's not only for the sake of measurement, because it is also relative to when one is experiencing, doing or being, and specifically, indexical to when one is speaking. I have never claimed that "the present" is something we find in nature (just as I wouldn't say that "here" is something we find in nature), but I would say that the passage of time is something we find in nature, because things age. Looking for some natural source of "the present" or for natural divisions in time is not my concern.

Now we have "the present as a continuous, long duration", exactly as we experience it, and all this speaking about a moment, or point along this duration, is nothing but bs. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's not how I experience it; or, that is, I don't use the phrase "the present" to refer to all of time. I don't think anyone does.

The problem is that all experience is completely wrapped up in memory, whether you like to admit it or not. Consider looking at an object in front of you, a chair or something. What you see is not a hundredth of a second of chair, or a half a second of chair. You are seeing the chair over a continuous duration. But the chair of two seconds ago must be only in your memory. However, that chair of two seconds ago is an integral part of your perception of it now,. That's how you know whether it's moving or not. — Metaphysician Undercover

Aren't you claiming that my "perception of it now" is also a memory?

I don't deny that my experience of the chair may include my memory of how it was two seconds ago, or that my experience is not influenced by my memories. I only deny that two seconds ago is not the present, because the present is defined in terms of when I am experiencing or perceiving which, according to your example, (was two seconds ago but) is...now.

So, it's easy for you to take an event years ago, and say that's in the past, its only memory, and you can surely tell the difference between that memory and what's happening now. But when we are talking about the perception of events happening right now ("right now" being incoherent) then we are faced with having to separate what we anticipate from what we remember, as having influence over the perception. And this is much more difficult because we cannot fall back on the false premise of the "present moment". — Metaphysician Undercover

The issue is not what is contained in experience, and having to disentangle whether our experience consists of memories or anticipations or both or more. The issue is simply when we are experiencing.

I see what you mean, but I think you would be passing on higher-quality (but perhaps less) knowledge if you switched to my strategy, which involves explaining things logically (with supplements of intuitive explanations). Whenever someone doesn't understand me, I simply expand on the explanation, removing ambiguities.

And that's really what I mean about explaining things logically; remove ambiguities. (Re)define words, use simple words, make up words if you have to, so long as they are either well-defined by you, or well-defined by the relevant people. I say relevant people, because in certain contexts, the words are not well-defined for some audiences, but for others, they are (like terms from quantum mechanics for example).

If you find yourself lacking precise definitions for the words you are using, then you likely do not possess a good verbal understanding of the thing you are talking about, which means you likely do not possess a good understanding of it at all. Some things lend themselves better to non-verbal understanding, of course, but still, if you are not good at explaining something, you probably do not understand it very well.

I'm fine with waiting until I've read more of what you have to say, before deciding that I have something that I want to try to communicate to you.

Yeah, I'm aware of Einstein's Nobel Prize-winning work, but that doesn't begin to explain why you think that quanta signify any sort of "natural points" in time, or why time might possibly be naturally divisible into quanta. — Luke

Well, it's intuition, with many complicated factors involved. But I am not arguing that, am I? I am arguing continuity. So despite the fact that there are many reasons to make me intuitively believe that there are natural points in time, this is not consistent with our experience of time as continuous, and that is what I am arguing, the experience of time as continuous.

Briefly though, there is an issue with what could be called "point zero". Whenever an object at rest, or one in regular motion as per Newton's first law, begins a new motion from being acted upon by a force, there must be a point in time, or "moment" when the motion begins. In human experience, this would be self-movement. If I'm sitting on the couch, and decide to stand up, and actually move in that way, there must be a point in time when this motion begins.

Classical physics represents an object being acted on by a force, with the concept of acceleration. But there is a problem with this representation because there must be a point in time, the zero point, when the object goes from not having, to having, the new motion. At this time, the rate of acceleration must be infinite because the value goes from zero to some quantity. Conventional mathematics handles this with calculus, which treats the zero point as a limit rather than a point in time which is actually traversed. In short, the concept of acceleration cannot account for the zero point, because of the need for infinity, and a different form of this same problem manifests in quantum mechanics as the uncertainty principle.

What is intuitive though, is that there must be a real point in time, when a new motion of an object begins. This is assuming that objects have real distinct existence. If objects are not distinct, then a change in motion is just a continuation of the whole (universe) through cause and effect, and there is no need for a real point of beginning. It is intuitive because objects appear to have real distinct existence, independent from each other, and can be moved freely.

For example, is a coconut an object or a part? How about a hydrogen atom? — Luke

Your examples are concepts, "a coconut", "a hydrogen atom", universals. You are not pointing to particular aspects of the world here, so I cannot address the examples directly. Each of these named types could have particulars which exist as a separate object, or as a part of a larger object. As I said, we need to refer to empirical evidence, and this would give us the context of existence of each particular occurrence.

Naming the type usually doesn't provide for us the context of existence. However, whether the thing is a part or a whole is essential to some universals. This depends on how the named things exists within its environment. So the hydrogen atom for example cannot exist naturally as an object, it must be a part. Human beings can in some sense separate hydrogen atoms, and present it as an object. But in reality, it is not an independent object even after this separation, because the device which separates it is required for its purported separation, therefore this device is necessary to its environment, so it really just becomes a part of that device. This is why I referred to "natural" divisibility. Artificial divisibility is very deceptive, creating divisions where divisions are not naturally possible, such that the separation of the supposedly separated part is dependent on the coexistence of some device, and this renders the objective existence (existence as an object) of the part as not properly independent according to empirical evidence. Empirical evidence indicates that such a part has just changed from being a part of a natural object to being a part of an artificial object, the device which separates it from its natural place.

So, unlike a continuum, only a finite set of (positive?) integers has natural points of division. Is that right? Does the set need to contain an even number of integers? — Luke

No, numbers are conceptual, therefore divisions are fundamentally arbitrary. When I spoke of natural divisibility I was referring to material things, the empirical world which we sense. That's why theories of real divisibility are based on empirical information.

Since numbers may be divided in any way we can manipulate the divisibility of them to match the natural divisibility of the world, through the use of axioms. This in part, is what makes numbers useful. Pure mathematicians may create whatever axioms they desire, at will, but the way that the axioms conform to the empirical world is what determines how useful they are.

The problem with "the continuum" is that this is itself a stipulation, or proposition concerning the empirical world, 'space and time form a continuum'. It is very useful because it conforms to the empirical reality to a large degree. However, since we observe that natural divisibility within the empirical world is restricted, according to the spatial existence of independent objects, "continuum" is not completely appropriate. So the problems begin.

The concept of "continuum" allows for divisibility in any way, but this is not truly consistent with the empirical reality of spatial-temporal existence. However, it is consistent with a large percentage of practical applications, and it has proven itself to be extremely useful in facilitating all sorts of measurements. Because it is so extremely useful, it is the accepted convention, so it gets used even where it is not adequately suited. In these instances, we impose the principles of continuity onto aspects of the empirical world which do not properly correspond. This misleads us, leading to misunderstanding and misconception.

Take the hydrogen atom example. The assumption of continuity leads us to believe that the empirical world can be divided in any way that we want. So, the hydrogen atom must be separable from its natural environment. We produce a device to separate it, and we conclude that we have created an independent hydrogen atom. This in turn, is supposed to support, as empirical evidence that reality is continuous, and can be divided anywhere. However, the truth of the situation is that the hydrogen atom has not really been given independent existence as an object on its own, its supposed independent existence relies on the device which removed it from its natural environment, so it is now just a part of that device. Therefore the appropriate interpretation of the empirical evidence ought to be that the empirical reality is not continuous, and cannot be divided anywhere we want. This issue becomes extremely evident when the existence of massive fundamental particles like hadrons and quarks which are associated with the strong force, are considered. It becomes very clear, that the assumption of continuity, the spatial-temporal "continuum" is completely inappropriate here.

You're saying that, unless time has natural points of division, then everything we count in reality is arbitrary and not real? — Luke

I said "the entirety of reality", not strictly "time". When the entirety of reality is considered, we do find natural points of division, distinct spatial objects, as explained above. These divisions are what allow one object to move in one direction, and another in another direction. This is what allows you to take one individual away from a group, and activities like that. These natural points of division are what make a count more than arbitrary. The count is based on real, natural divisibility, as substantiated by empirical evidence.

In the case of time alone, we have identified no such natural points of divisibility. So counts of time are dependent on the repetitive motions of distinct, naturally divided objects. However, since measurement requires comparison, and with time we are comparing motions, the problem of the relativity of simultaneity arises.

We have a continuous succession of experiences from birth to death; we do not experience everything in our lives "all at once". — Luke

This is a misrepresentation. We have continuous experience, not a "succession of experiences". Any division of that continuous experience into separate experiences is arbitrary. Even during sleep we are experiencing, in dreaming etc., it's just a change in type of experience. This misrepresentation is fundamental to your insistence that "duration" must be "a duration" with beginning and end. There really is not any such natural points of divisibility in human experience which would substantiate this representation of a "succession of experiences". Therefore, "the present moment" as a point along that succession of experiences is not substantiated either.

This question also applies to you. If you reject the present as a short period, or moment, of time, then it must be "an infinitely long duration of time" that "continues on and on indefinitely" (since they are the only two options you have given). What, then, of the past and future? When is something past and when is it future? That is, what are the past and future relative to? — Luke

There is no problem here. As time continues onward, the future is always becoming the past. That's what happens at the present, as the present continues, next minute becomes last minute, next hour becomes last hour, etc.. "Future" refers to time which has not yet passed the present and past refers to time which has past the present, such that if there was a fixed amount of future at the beginning of time, the future is always getting smaller while the past is getting bigger. This is a continuous process which we experience as the continuity of the present.

I don't deny this, except it's not only for the sake of measurement, because it is also relative to when one is experiencing, doing or being, and specifically, indexical to when one is speaking. I have never claimed that "the present" is something we find in nature (just as I wouldn't say that "here" is something we find in nature), but I would say that the passage of time is something we find in nature, because things age. Looking for some natural source of "the present" or for natural divisions in time is not my concern. — Luke

OK. let's say that this type of point in time, this moment, is like the "point zero" I described above. The point in time when you are saying "now", or the point in time when you start to do X, etc.. Notice that it is better not to refer to this type of point as "the present", because it is just a designation of the relation between one physical action in the world, to another, or others. We might assign the point zero a date and a time, which relates it to the position of the earth and sun, etc.. If it's a real event, with real occurrence, then that point is in the past. If it's a designated possible future event, the point is in the future. But there is no reason to think that such a point would be exclusive to the present, so it should in no way be a defining feature of the present.

But what would it be like to conceive of such a point at the present? Suppose we can talk about a zero point in the past, and a zero point in the future. And also suppose that the present is when future points are becoming past points. Since this is a process, "the present", the process whereby future points become past points, and processes are events which take time to occur, then we must conclude that it takes time for a future point to become a past point, even while it is at the present. In this time, we might say that the point is neither past nor future, but that seems to imply that this point, when it's at the present, is right outside of time. But it's already been determined that there is time at the present because it is a process. So the point itself doesn't really go anywhere outside of time when it's said to be at the present. Therefore I think it would be better to say that the point is both future and past in this transition which is the present, rather than neither. And as I explained earlier there is no reason to think that this implies contradiction.

Aren't you claiming that my "perception of it now" is also a memory? — Luke

Right, that's why I mentioned the concept of "sensory memory". If I understand correctly, the information from the senses is put into a type of extremely short term, subconscious memory, and this memory is what the conscious mind interprets as the sense experience, and then allocates the memories to other types of memory, which the conscious mind has influence over.

Well, it's intuition, with many complicated factors involved. But I am not arguing that, am I? I am arguing continuity. — Metaphysician Undercove

It was something you said. I take it you no longer wish to defend it, especially as it is not consistent with your assertion of continuity, as you note:

I am arguing continuity. So despite the fact that there are many reasons to make me intuitively believe that there are natural points in time, this is not consistent with our experience of time as continuous... — Metaphysician Undercover

If objects are not distinct, then a change in motion is just a continuation of the whole (universe) through cause and effect, and there is no need for a real point of beginning. — Metaphysician Undercover

I consider this to be more likely.

However, whether the thing is a part or a whole is essential to some universals. This depends on how the named things exists within its environment. So the hydrogen atom for example cannot exist naturally as an object, it must be a part. Human beings can in some sense separate hydrogen atoms, and present it as an object. But in reality, it is not an independent object even after this separation, because the device which separates it is required for its purported separation, therefore this device is necessary to its environment, so it really just becomes a part of that device. This is why I referred to "natural" divisibility. Artificial divisibility is very deceptive, creating divisions where divisions are not naturally possible... — Metaphysician Undercover

This still doesn't explain what makes something a "true and real" whole object, rather than just a part. All coconuts (that we know of) are part of the Earth, and the Earth is part of the Solar System, and so on. All of these divisions - indeed all divisions - are "artificial", because those concepts belong to our language and we divide the world up into those "objects" or concepts that we value, not according to any "natural" divisions.

When I spoke of natural divisibility I was referring to material things, the empirical world which we sense. That's why theories of real divisibility are based on empirical information. — Metaphysician Undercover

What is your theory?

The problem with "the continuum" is that this is itself a stipulation, or proposition concerning the empirical world, 'space and time form a continuum'. It is very useful because it conforms to the empirical reality to a large degree. However, since we observe that natural divisibility within the empirical world is restricted, according to the spatial existence of independent objects, "continuum" is not completely appropriate. So the problems begin. — Metaphysician Undercover

But I thought you said:

I am arguing continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are complaining about the infinite divisibility of the continuum of numbers while also arguing that the empirical reality of time, or the present, is continuous. Are you arguing against yourself?

This is a misrepresentation. We have continuous experience, not a "succession of experiences". Any division of that continuous experience into separate experiences is arbitrary. Even during sleep we are experiencing, in dreaming etc., it's just a change in type of experience. — Metaphysician Undercover

If there are different types of experience, then we can sensibly speak of having one type then another, different type. Hence, we can sensibly speak of a succession of different types of experience.

Unlike a succession, a continuity (of experience) gives no indication of direction or even motion.

As time continues onward, the future is always becoming the past. That's what happens at the present... — Metaphysician Undercover

How can the future become the past at the present, when you also claim that the present contains both the future and the past; when the past and future are inside the present?

"Future" refers to time which has not yet passed the present and past refers to time which has past the present... — Metaphysician Undercover

How can this be, when you claim that the past and future are both inside the present?

I think it would be better to say that the point is both future and past in this transition which is the present, rather than neither. And as I explained earlier there is no reason to think that this implies contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

It contradicts what you said just above. This is what I've been telling you all along.

Aren't you claiming that my "perception of it now" is also a memory?
— Luke

Right, that's why I mentioned the concept of "sensory memory". If I understand correctly, the information from the senses is put into a type of extremely short term, subconscious memory, and this memory is what the conscious mind interprets as the sense experience, and then allocates the memories to other types of memory, which the conscious mind has influence over. — Metaphysician Undercover

When is "now" (i.e. the present) in this scenario? Which event is simultaneous with the present here?

This still doesn't explain what makes something a "true and real" whole object, rather than just a part. All coconuts (that we know of) are part of the Earth, and the Earth is part of the Solar System, and so on. All of these divisions - indeed all divisions - are "artificial", because those concepts belong to our language and we divide the world up into those "objects" or concepts that we value, not according to any "natural" divisions. — Luke

I agree, that is one way of looking at things. We can class all divisions as artificial. Then we must look at the nature of divisibility itself. The assumption of the reality of continuity implies that any division imagined in theory can be carried out in practice. So the real issue now is whether some theoretical divisions are impossible in practise. If some theoretical divisions are impossible then the assumption of continuity is incorrect. I think that physicists general believe Planck units to be a boundary to divisibility. Divisions beyond this are possible in theory but not in practise. And if there are fundamental units like this, limits to divisibility, then spatial-temporal reality is not as a continuum.

You are complaining about the infinite divisibility of the continuum of numbers while also arguing that the empirical reality of time, or the present, is continuous. Are you arguing against yourself? — Luke

No, I am saying that it is highly likely that the human conscious experience misleads us in respect to the true nature of time. This way of looking at human experience is common in philosophy, dating back to Plato who said that the senses deceive, and the mind is to be trusted over the body.

So I've argued that the conscious experience provides for us a representation of a continuous spatial-temporal reality. So the assumption of continuity provided the foundation for classical physics, and along with this came the relevant mathematical axioms required to model physical activity within this continuum. However, I see that the assumption of continuity has reached the limits of its effectiveness. Quantum uncertainty has revealed that there are real problems with this assumption of continuity.

The evidence therefore ought to lead us to question, doubt, what we assume about conscious experience. This is the philosophical way, to accept the possibility that the senses mislead us, what we accept as "empirical fact", is really a deep misunderstanding. So the common example is that a serious of still frames can produce what appears to be the continuous activity of a movie. Likewise for the human experience, it may feel just like a continuity of consciousness, a continuum of space and time, but at the foundation is really a series of discrete units.

The important point is that with the assumption of continuity, points of divisibility are allowed to be anywhere within the supposed continuum, arbitrarily. But if the real underlying substratum of spatial temporal existence has within itself, natural points of divisibility, then the arbitrarily assigned points will not correspond, therefore no truth will ensue.

If there are different types of experience, then we can sensibly speak of having one type then another, different type. Hence, we can sensibly speak of a succession of different types of experience. — Luke

Unless we posit points to separate the different experiences, this would lead to an infinite regress. To be a succession, one would have to follow the other, and something would have to separate them, or else there'd be an overlap, and not a succession. The thing which separates two distinct types of experience would have to be another type of experience, and this would lead to an infinite regress of always positing another type of experience to separate one from the other. Otherwise we'd have to posit points which separate one type of experience from the other, and then we're back to the problem I described, of the "zero point", and points in general.

How can the future become the past at the present, when you also claim that the present contains both the future and the past; when the past and future are inside the present? — Luke

I don't see the problem. This is what happens "inside the present", the future becomes the past. Therefore both future and past must exist within the present, as one becomes the other inside the present. Consider the freezing point of water for example. "Inside the freezing point", water becomes ice, so both water and ice exist inside the freezing point. This process though, is also reversible, as ice becomes water inside the melting point, which is the same as the freezing point.

How can this be, when you claim that the past and future are both inside the present? — Luke

I see no problem. The present is not a point, as I've been arguing, it has breadth, or width. "Point" has been adopted by pragmaticism As the Venn diagram example shows, past and future extend outside the present, but they also overlap inside the present. When the future is inside the present it is past a part of the present, so it has already become past in relation to that part of the present, and is still future in relation to the rest of the present. This is the nature of change, it does not happen all at once, but over a duration of time.

It contradicts what you said just above. This is what I've been telling you all along. — Luke

Sorry, you've lost me. I've addressed all your concerns, so there is no reason to accuse me of contradiction, just your refusal to accept my terms.

When is "now" (i.e. the present) in this scenario? Which event is simultaneous with the present here? — Luke

There is no now, unless we change the meaning of "now", as I've been explaining. By the time you say "now" it is in the past. So the use of "now" to designate some point at the present is just a pragmatic practise to facilitate measuring and such things. There is no "now" in that scenario because there is no now in general, it's a useful fiction.

"Simultaneous with the present" makes no sense. There are events which move from future to past, at the present, and every single real event does this, but there is no sense to ask which event is "simultaneous with the present", because every event occurs at the present, yet they have different times when they are at the present.

To be a succession, one would have to follow the other, and something would have to separate them, or else there'd be an overlap, and not a succession. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is a false dichotomy. You're saying there must either be a gap between the two experiences or else there must be an overlap between them. The third option is that one experience follows the other immediately without any gap or overlap.

The thing which separates two distinct types of experience would have to be another type of experience — Metaphysician Undercover

Why?

Otherwise we'd have to posit points which separate one type of experience from the other, and then we're back to the problem I described, of the "zero point", and points in general. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why do we need points? Are you referring to points in experience or points in time? I don't get it.

As time continues onward, the future is always becoming the past. That's what happens at the present...
— Metaphysician Undercover

How can the future become the past at the present, when you also claim that the present contains both the future and the past; when the past and future are inside the present?
— Luke

I don't see the problem. This is what happens "inside the present", the future becomes the past. Therefore both future and past must exist within the present, as one becomes the other inside the present. — Metaphysician Undercover

Okay, at some point inside the present, the future becomes the past. But is it always at the same point inside the duration of the present that the future becomes the past? For example, supposing that the present has a duration of one second - for the sake of argument - is it always at the halfway mark that the future becomes the past, or does it vary? That is, does the future become the past sometimes a little earlier and sometimes a little later than at other times? Is there any good reason for this variation? Or is this just obfuscation?

Consider the freezing point of water for example. "Inside the freezing point", water becomes ice, so both water and ice exist inside the freezing point. — Metaphysician Undercover

The freezing point is a temperature, not a duration of time. Regardless, I'm sure a definition could be established to measurably distinguish water from ice without the black box mystery that you propose for the present. And, while I'm no authority, it seems likely to me that the freezing point defines the distinction between water and ice.

"Future" refers to time which has not yet passed the present and past refers to time which has past the present...
— Metaphysician Undercover

How can this be, when you claim that the past and future are both inside the present?
— Luke

I see no problem. The present is not a point, as I've been arguing, it has breadth, or width. "Point" has been adopted by pragmaticism As the Venn diagram example shows, past and future extend outside the present, but they also overlap inside the present. When the future is inside the present it is past a part of the present, so it has already become past in relation to that part of the present, and is still future in relation to the rest of the present. This is the nature of change, it does not happen all at once, but over a duration of time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ah, but here you say that the past refers to time that has passed (or "past") the present. This means that the past is not within the present and is no longer within the present because it has passed (outside of) it. If it has passed the present, then it is not inside the present. It cannot be both inside the present and outside the present. There is your contradiction.

The problem is that all experience is completely wrapped up in memory, whether you like to admit it or not. Consider looking at an object in front of you, a chair or something. What you see is not a hundredth of a second of chair, or a half a second of chair. You are seeing the chair over a continuous duration. But the chair of two seconds ago must be only in your memory. However, that chair of two seconds ago is an integral part of your perception of it now,. That's how you know whether it's moving or not.
— Metaphysician Undercover

Aren't you claiming that my "perception of it now" is also a memory?
— Luke

Right, that's why I mentioned the concept of "sensory memory". If I understand correctly, the information from the senses is put into a type of extremely short term, subconscious memory, and this memory is what the conscious mind interprets as the sense experience, and then allocates the memories to other types of memory, which the conscious mind has influence over.
— Metaphysician Undercover

When is "now" (i.e. the present) in this scenario? Which event is simultaneous with the present here?
— Luke

There is no now, unless we change the meaning of "now", as I've been explaining. — Metaphysician Undercover

If "there is no now" as you say, then what did you mean by "your perception of it now"?

There are events which move from future to past, at the present, and every single real event does this, but there is no sense to ask which event is "simultaneous with the present", because every event occurs at the present, yet they have different times when they are at the present. — Metaphysician Undercover

I was referring to your scenario of looking at a chair in front of you. Which event is simultaneous with the present in that scenario? You used the phrase "your perception of it now". If you used "now" to mean something different than "the present", then what did you mean?

And, again, when is the present situated in that scenario?

This is a false dichotomy. You're saying there must either be a gap between the two experiences or else there must be an overlap between them. The third option is that one experience follows the other immediately without any gap or overlap. — Luke

It is incoherent to describe this as two distinct experiences, in succession, unless there is something which separates them. Otherwise you have just arbitrarily inserted a point and claim that on one side of the point is one type of experience and on the other side is another distinct type. You need something real, which distinguishes the end of one and the beginning of another, or else you are just arbitrarily asserting distinct experiences in a succession, rather than one continuous experience.

Your other questions on this matter will be answered for you, when you come to comprehend what I've said above.

Okay, at some point inside the present, the future becomes the past. — Luke

No! We have no premise for a "point". You incessantly want to insert a "point" when the unreality of such a point is my primary premise. You insert the unjustified "point" which is completely inconsistent with the justified position I am arguing, then you ask me to make sense of such a point. It cannot be made sense of because it is incompatible with what makes sense.

Ah, but here you say that the past refers to time that has passed (or "past") the present. This means that the past is not within the present and is no longer within the present because it has passed (outside of) it. If it has passed the present, then it is not inside the present. It cannot be both inside the present and outside the present. There is your contradiction. — Luke

I explained this, the present consists of duration. read the following:

When the future is inside the present it is past a part of the present, so it has already become past in relation to that part of the present, and is still future in relation to the rest of the present. This is the nature of change, it does not happen all at once, but over a duration of time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course, there is the issue of dividing the continuous into parts, the parts are arbitrary. But this is why it is so extremely difficult to distinguish the anticipatory parts of the human experience of "the present" from the memory parts. That is why I argue that the present will remain unintelligible to us until we find the real points in time. That there necessarily is real points, is demonstrated by the issue with the "zero point" of change, which I described. The problem is that we do not experience these points, so experience has misled us into modeling motions as continuous, and accepting mathematical axioms which produce a continuum. And since these premises prove to be very useful (up to a limit), we are reluctant to see them as misrepresentations. What is required to get beyond the limitations which those premises impose, is to determine the real points.

If "there is no now" as you say, then what did you mean by "your perception of it now"? — Luke

Human experience, along with the conventions employed for measurement have misled you to believe that you perceive a "now" at the present. There is no such now, as described by you, your perception of it is an illusion.

I was referring to your scenario of looking at a chair in front of you. Which event is simultaneous with the present in that scenario? You used the phrase "your perception of it now". If you used "now" to mean something different than "the present", then what did you mean?

And, again, when is the present situated in that scenario? — Luke

OK, I found the paragraph in question:

The problem is that all experience is completely wrapped up in memory, whether you like to admit it or not. Consider looking at an object in front of you, a chair or something. What you see is not a hundredth of a second of chair, or a half a second of chair. You are seeing the chair over a continuous duration. But the chair of two seconds ago must be only in your memory. However, that chair of two seconds ago is an integral part of your perception of it now,. That's how you know whether it's moving or not. — Metaphysician Undercover

In this context, "now" means present, which is continuous. It is not the "now" of a point in time, which you propose, the one I argue is an illusion. The context ought to reveal this to you, " the chair of two seconds ago is an integral part of your perception of it now".

Your perception of anything at the present, what is called "now" above, includes memories of past (exemplified by sensory memory). The perception also includes anticipations for the future. Due to the problem described above, it is impossible to separate which aspects of your conscious perception are produced bu memory and which parts are produced by anticipation.

So for example, if you are consciously watching the chair, and something unexpected suddenly happens, you will recognize the sudden occurrence as unanticipated, but this will occur with a reaction time. That there is a reaction to sudden change indicates that anticipation is part of the conscious experience, that there is a time it takes for the reaction to occur, indicates that memory is part of the conscious experience. Therefore we can understand the conscious experience described as "the perception of it now" as a combination of past and future.

So, to answer your questions, "your perception of it now" refers to "at the present", and this is an extended duration of time, as indicated, by "the chair of two seconds ago is an integral part" of that perception now. And, as explained above, your anticipations concerning the future of that chair, 'the chair in the future' are also an integral part of that perception of the chair at the present. Your true perception of the chair now, or at the present, is as of the chair as existing through a continuous duration of time, not the illusionary point, or infinitesimal point, or anything like that, as you keep proposing for me to make sense of. What you ask me to make sense of cannot be made sense of because it is inconsistent with what makes sense.

It is incoherent to describe this as two distinct experiences, in succession, unless there is something which separates them. Otherwise you have just arbitrarily inserted a point and claim that on one side of the point is one type of experience and on the other side is another distinct type. — Metaphysician Undercover

I was following your example of two different types of experience:

Any division of that continuous experience into separate experiences is arbitrary. Even during sleep we are experiencing, in dreaming etc., it's just a change in type of experience. — Metaphysician Undercover

Tell me, what other experience is in between being asleep and being awake? What separates them? Must there be another experience between these? Aren't we asleep and then, at some point, awake again, in succession?

You need something real, which distinguishes the end of one and the beginning of another, or else you are just arbitrarily asserting distinct experiences in a succession, rather than one continuous experience. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why do we need "something real" to distinguish the end of one and the beginning of another? What real thing distinguishes the end of being asleep and the beginning of being awake? Perhaps there is no distinction between being asleep and being awake and it's just "one continuous experience"? Or did you "arbitrarily assert" that being asleep and being awake were distinct types of experience?

Okay, at some point inside the present, the future becomes the past.
— Luke

No! We have no premise for a "point". You incessantly want to insert a "point" when the unreality of such a point is my primary premise. You insert the unjustified "point" which is completely inconsistent with the justified position I am arguing, then you ask me to make sense of such a point. It cannot be made sense of because it is incompatible with what makes sense. — Metaphysician Undercover

But there must be a point when an event is no longer present and becomes past. Otherwise, past and present are indistinguishable.

Ah, but here you say that the past refers to time that has passed (or "past") the present. This means that the past is not within the present and is no longer within the present because it has passed (outside of) it. If it has passed the present, then it is not inside the present. It cannot be both inside the present and outside the present. There is your contradiction.
— Luke

I explained this, the present consists of duration. read the following:

When the future is inside the present it is past a part of the present, so it has already become past in relation to that part of the present, and is still future in relation to the rest of the present. This is the nature of change, it does not happen all at once, but over a duration of time. — Metaphysician Undercover — Metaphysician Undercover

Instead of referring to other quotes, I'd prefer you to account for the quote in which you contradicted yourself . You said:

"Future" refers to time which has not yet passed the present and past refers to time which has past the present... — Metaphysician Undercover

In this quote, the "point" at which what is in the present becomes past is the starting point of the present. In your terminology, this is when the past (proper) meets "the present" (the combination of past and future). There is also a second point where the future has not yet passed the present, which is the end point of "the present". In your terminology, this is when the future (proper) meets "the present" (the combination of past and future).

I know that you are trying to argue that there is some smooth, unnoticeable transition between them, but the distinct concepts won't let you. There can be a period of changing, but at some point there must be a moment of change when what is present is no longer future and what is past is no longer present; when the past is no longer combined with the future and when the future has not yet become combined with the past. Otherwise, if they are forever combined, then past, present and future are indistinguishable concepts.

But this is why it is so extremely difficult to distinguish the anticipatory parts of the human experience of "the present" from the memory parts. That is why I argue that the present will remain unintelligible to us until we find the real points in time — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you believe that, in order to distinguish memories from anticipation, we need to discover "real points in time"? Do you truly think that the distinction between memories and anticipation is that problematic? Moreover, if the present is a combination of past and future, as you claim, then how will the discovery of "real points in time" help to disentangle this entanglement of memories and anticipation?

If "there is no now" as you say, then what did you mean by "your perception of it now"?
— Luke

Human experience, along with the conventions employed for measurement have misled you to believe that you perceive a "now" at the present. There is no such now, as described by you, your perception of it is an illusion. — Metaphysician Undercover

I asked about your use of the word in your earlier quote.

OK, I found the paragraph in question: — Metaphysician Undercover

Did you have trouble finding it? I quoted it for you in my last post.

In this context, "now" means present, which is continuous.
It is not the "now" of a point in time, which you propose, the one I argue is an illusion. The context ought to reveal this to you, " the chair of two seconds ago is an integral part of your perception of it now". — Metaphysician Undercover

Is "the chair of two seconds ago" in the present or in the past (according to your context)?

Due to the problem described above, it is impossible to separate which aspects of your conscious perception are produced bu memory and which parts are produced by anticipation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Impossible? Really? If I ask you what you had for breakfast today, you wouldn't know if your recall of what you had was a memory or an anticipation? If you told me you were looking forward to your vacation, you wouldn't know if this was a memory or anticipation? Come on.

So for example, if you are consciously watching the chair, and something unexpected suddenly happens, you will recognize the sudden occurrence as unanticipated, but this will occur with a reaction time. That there is a reaction to sudden change indicates that anticipation is part of the conscious experience, that there is a time it takes for the reaction to occur, indicates that memory is part of the conscious experience. Therefore we can understand the conscious experience described as "the perception of it now" as a combination of past and future. — Metaphysician Undercover

Only if "memory" means "past" and "anticipation" means "future". But they don't. What actually follows is “Therefore we can understand the conscious experience described…as a combination of memory and anticipation.”

So, to answer your questions, "your perception of it now" refers to "at the present", and this is an extended duration of time, as indicated, by "the chair of two seconds ago is an integral part" of that perception now. — Metaphysician Undercover

So "now" and "two seconds ago" both mean "at the present"?

The relevant question is "when are you perceiving?" I didn't ask what that perception consisted of, or what informs that perception, or whether that perception is true, or whether you have trouble distinguishing memories from anticipations.